No justification for French troops in Chad A process of internal decomposition was already developing in Chad over the last few years, as well as an incredible social and economic chaos. (1) The civil war, a result of imperialist balkanisation of black Africa, involves a multitude of regionalist military cliques. This turmoil has been aggravated by the intervention of French imperialism, as well as by other states in the region.
In some ways the conflict in Chad represents a concentration of all the most explositive problems facing the neo-colonial states in Africa - political and economic dependence, strong regionalism, weakness of the state, the rapacity of the dominant cliques, clientelism, etc.
Throughout the twenty years Chad has been independent France has intervened a centralised state. This has included direct administration of the north until 1964; almost continuously, although in varying forms, to try and maintain the fiction of substitution of the Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA) for the local administration in 1969; sending expeditionary forces in 1969, 1978 and 1983; aiding the intervention by the Inter-African Force in 1981, the permanent presence of hundreds, or sometimes even thousands, of military ploitation of local wealth; regular aid to prop up the central government's budget; and so on.
The two principal elements in this intervention are obvious from the share out of the money allocated to Chad. One is military aid to try to form a Chadian army, in a situation where France had failed to ensure the real existence of a state. The other is paying for the functioning of the local administration.
In 1976, 40 per cent of the military co-operation budget for the African countries was allocated to Chad. In 1979, of the 399 million francs of French aid (about £40 million sterling at the time) 204 million went to 'military assistance'. France reduced the Chad state to being completely dependent on Paris. But all this did nothing to improve the standard of living for the Chadian masses, whose annual per capita income is estimated at 700 francs. It can be said that since independence French imperialism has substituted itself for the neo-colonial state in Chad. The presence of the French commander, Governec, serving in a Chadian uniform, at
Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), at the time in opposition, criticised French support to the Goukouni government by accusing Paris of 'having kept up a large-scale war — militarily and politically - through delivering, daily and in enormous quantity, sophisticated arms to N'Djamena airport' . (2)
The southern leader Kamougue, presently allied to Goukouni and the Libyans, since he was France's tactical choice for a whole period himself, always turns out to be very understanding about the policy of French imperialism. Last November he made the following statement about French policy, "This is the attitude of France, we don't hold it against them. We know that if we were at N'Djamena, France would come along, as it did before. Leave France aside. At least, the aid it supplies benefits Chadians. (3)
To break with this sort of neo-colonial policy would have meant to refuse to support any of the military cliques, and to put into question all the neo-colonial agreements that keep the country within the French fold. To have done this would have been to orient towards an overall questioning of the system of domination that allows Paris to control the economies of a whole series of countries in black Africa. But, it was for precisely the opposite reason - to prove its capacity to defend the stability of the neocolonial edifice of French imperialism -that the Mitterrand-Mauroy government sent 3,000 soldiers to Chad in August.
From the time he came into office, Francois Mitterrand has demonstrated, with no beating about the bush, his respect for France's commitments towards its African neo-colonies, including in the military field. From the point of view of managing French capitalism, keeping these states as a special preserve for French economic expansion is vital. Taken together, the co-operation agreements France has with these states assure the survival of this sphere of influence.
Nevertheless, there were many reasons that prompted caution in the Chad affair. There were the experiences of the previous bourgeois governments in getting bogged down in the situation. There was the complexity of the local political situation, the instability of the state, and also the need to retain good commercial relations with Libya. The last was all the more important since Tripoli had welcomed Mitterrand's election, and even invited French companies to participate in the different undertakings projected in the third Libyan development plan of 1981-85.
MITTERRAND'S POLICY IN CHAD
The first intervention by the new French government in Chad in fact dates from 1981. At that time, Mitterrand proposed the formation of an inter-African 1. Cf International Viewpoint, No 36, 19 September 1983. 2. Le Monde, Paris, 10 February 1982. 3. Liberation, Paris, 3 November 1982.
17 the head of the intelligence services of 1976, is a striking proof of this. Francois CAZALS
In recent years, having been unable to overcome the centrifugal forces at work, and weld together an indigenous bourgeois layer around the state apparatus, Paris has simply supplied the various cliques with arms as they rose to power. Relations with the different local factions the Chadian army from independence until
203 ANDELTA French troops in CHad (DR) have nevertheless remained tactical and limited, since French imperialism has, despite everything, continued to pursue its own policy.
Thus, while there have been numerous collisions between Paris and its local proteges, none of these local tendencies represent a genuine anti-imperialist orientation. For example, in 1982 Hissene
military force. It was to replace the Libyan contingent that Goukouni, then president of the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) in N'Djamena, had invited to help him repel the attacks by Hissene Habre.
Paris succeeded, in November 1981, after much pressure, in getting the Libyan troops withdrawn from Chad. In exchange, it offered a small amount of aid to Goukouni, payment of the Chadian government employees, and the sending of military contingents from Zaire, Senegal and Nigeria, which were to be jointly supplied and financed by France and the United States. Paris characterised this as an 'African' solution to the conflict in Chad. The Libyan action, paradoxically, was characterised as external'. However, it goes without saying that it was French policy that was applied by the African soliders.
The promises of international aid made to Goukouni did not save him from being overthrown by Hissene Habre in June 1982. Paris, saying not a word about this 'aggression' against a government characterised as 'legitimate' a few months before, gave its support to Habre. But Goukouni's troops, reorganised by Libya just as Habre's had been by Sudan and Egypt, took Faya Largeau on June 24, 1983.
The first reactions to Goukouni's offensive were marked by a certain prudence. The French minister for external relations, Claude Cheysson, called the confrontations a 'fight between chiefs' and recognised that 'there is no foreign intervention in Chad'. (4) The former Gaullist colonial administrator, Pierre Messmer, also stated that, 'the civil war arises from the fact there is not a Chadian state nor a Chadian nation'. (5) In the same vein, the delegate for external affairs of the Rally for the Republic (RPR), the party of Jacques Chirac, former French ambassador to Kinshasa, stated that, "the conflicts taking place in this country are the result of a war between the chiefs of opposing clans' . He even added categorically France has no interest in getting involved in these internal struggles.' (6)
Libya seemed to be on the same wavelength, and Colonel Qadhafi declared at the same period, "The conflict in Chad is a struggle for power which has lasted twenty years. N'Djamena is like a football of which both sides want to have possession. Goukouni was in N'Djamena, Habre chased him out. Now it is Goukouni who is attacking, and he will undoubtedly arrive in N'Djamena. But nothing guarantees that he will stay there, and whoever arrives after him, Habre or someone else, will not have any guarantee of power either.' (7)
No one made a distinction between the two camps that were confronting each other, or attributed to either some anti-imperialist or destabilising dynamic. For several days the situation was treated as one of the numerous, sudden flareups of the civil war in Chad. However, the French government was soon to engage 18 itself in a neo-colonial military adventure.
Hissene Habre, who received financial aid from Washington, called on France for support. The neo-colonial states in black Africa also put on pressure for this, while the bourgeois press widely circulated the notion that what was happening was aggression by Libya against the "legitimate' government of Hissene Habre.
First of all, several tons of weaponry and several dozen military advisors were dispatched to N'Djamena. But on July 14, Francois Mitterrand was still saying, •We have helped the legitimate government in Chad by all the means at our disposal, according to the terms of the 1976 agreement. But we have no need to go further than that, because beyond that nothing has been agreed by our countries.'
To reassure its African preserve, and to cover the ground militarily and diplomatically before Reagan, pursuing his anti-Libyan crusade, could take his own initiative, the French government got still more deeply involved. In July, 1,500 Laire military, trained by French instructors were sent, and operation Manta' was launched. The latter was claimed to be a 'training mission' for the instruction of Habre's troops. It led to the dispatch of 3,000 French soldiers in August.
PARES PRANGASE, D' AFRIOUE HORS
NATIONAL UNANIMITY AND THE
ANTI-LIBYAN CRUSADE
An anti-Libyan hysteria worthy of Reagan swept the ranks of the Socialist Party and the government. On August 18, the Socialist deputy Alain Vivien did not hesitate to accuse Tripoli of, 'preparing to launch an offensive to seize the capital'. The French government had intervened supposedly to 'stop the invader and force him to negotiate' , because, 'we cannot accept an African "Munich"'.
The French military intervention took place in the context of a huge brainwashing of French public opinion. The extent of Libyan aid to Goukouni was knowingly exaggerated. A journalist, who was at Faya Largeau at the beginning of July, wrote, From all the evidence received at Faya Largeau it appears that there are neither troops nor fighter planes from Libya, nor even the phantom 'foreign legion' of Colonel Qadhafi. On the other hand there are some dozen Libyan military personnel charged with maintaining radio contact with Libya, as well as handling certain logistical matters, particularly supply'. (10)
What was presented by the Habre government as fifty Libyan aircraft bombing a town in northern Chad was, in reality, a foray by only two aircraft. And, after that, this propaganda campaign went so far as to present what everyone agreed was a war of the clans, as an attempt to destablise the legitimate government. Thus, it is factually false to state that French troops intervened against Libyan aggression. The truth is that the Mitterrand government, following the policy of its predecessors, wanted to act as guardian of the phantom Chadian state, and, in order to do so, found itself caught up in a neo-colonial type operation. Chad has seen many such operations in the past. Hypocrisy reached its height when the French leaders claimed that their military action should guarantee the territorial integrity of Chad, the right to self-determination, and independence of the peoples. These affirmations had no other function than to obtain the support, or at least the tacit agreement, of the French masses for the neo-colonial policies of Mitterrand.
Thus, around this intervention, and on the basis of the anti-Libyan propaganda, a broad national consensus of the political parties was forged - of the majority and of the opposition. Jacques Chirac of the RPR, the former prime minister Raymond Barre, and Giscard d'Estaing all declared their agreement with the Mitterrand government.
Even the French Communist Party (PCF), although a little ill at ease, swallowed the pill. Moreover, it combined in its own way all the duplicity of the government's course supporting the dispatch of troops while insisting on the need for negotiations. Thus Pierre Juquin, member of the political bureau of the PCF, recognised the validity of the neo-colonial agreement with Chad, signed by Jacques Chirac, Giscard's prime minister, in 1976. However, the traditional position of the PCF is to demand the renegotiation of these agreements. While accepting the need to come to the aid of Hissene Habre, the same person whom l'Humanite, the PF's daily newspaper, called a French counter-espionage agent a few years ago, Juquin covered his tracks, saying that, 'the number one question in Chad today is how to prepare the way for, and start negotiations'. (11) On the French military intervention, the PCF leader remarked on nothing more than, *the risks involved in sending armed forces into such a complex environment'.
THE LIBYAN ROLE
There is no doubt about the Libyan intervention on the side of Goukouni. Moreover, Libyan action in Chad is of 4. Le Monde, 29 June 1983. 5. Le Matin de Paris, 7 July 1983. 6. Le Quotidien de Paris, 8 July 1983. 7. Le Matin, Paris, 1 July 1983. 8. Le Monde, 16 July 1983. 9. Le Matin, 18 August 1983. 10. Liberation, 4 July 1983. 11. Le Monde, 31 August 1983.
long standing. Culturally, the populations in the north of Chad are very close to Libya. In fact, we might even trace the connection back to the former Libyan king Idriss, who was spiritual head of the Muslim warrior sect of the Senussi, a major force among the Toubous of Chad. But in any case, Libya has always supported the Muslim peoples in Chad. When Moammar Qadhafi came to power in 1969, after the overthrow of the monarchy and the corrupt former ruling layers, he increased Libyan aid to the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT).
In the name of a pan-Islamic poliey Libya supported the 'Northern' elements the most favourable to a rapprochement with the Arab world. The most faithful pro-Libyan faction is, moreover, a split from FROLINAT composed mainly of Arabs, who are an ethnic minority in Chad.
Libya has clearly taken an expansionist attitude toward Chad. This is evidenced particularly by the occupation, since 1973, of the Aouzou strip, which is believed to be rich in uranium and oil. Libya has several times put on pressure to have Chad divided into zones of influence with France. Thus, paradoxically, it has sometimes found itself in alliance with the secessionist 'Southern' elements like Kamougue.
The Libyan regime has supported the different fractions in the struggle at every turn, and has participated in many negotiations with France and the neo-colonial states in the region. In 1979, Tripoli gave its support to the installation of the GUNT led by Goukouni. When this government, threatened by the action of Hissene Habre, called for their aid, the Libyans intervened massively in Chad at the end of 1980. However, Libya hardly invested at all in the restart of the economic machine in Chad. When Goukouni demanded the withdrawal of the Libyan troops at the end of 1981 they left in less than a week. But their precipitous departure left the way open for an anti-government offensive by Habre. He, thus, came to power in June 1982.
Libya's interest in Chad is undoubtedly motivated by its strategic concern to have a state on its southern flank that is not too hostile. It is certainly also looking forward to being able to put its hands on certain mineral wealth in the country. Libya has the financial means to devote to this undertaking, given its large oil revenues. But, while it is being exposed to manifold pressures from the Reagan administration, Libya remains no less a dependent country. This dependence is expressed in the form of the dominance of oil production in the economy of the country.
In fact, oil brings in the largest part of the state's income, with 40 percent being sold to American companies. This keeps Libya under the pressure of the international capitalist market. The very development plans that are making Libya a semi-industrialised country also reinforce the dependence of the state on Western technology and the purchase of goods and equipment from these countries.
Thus, 75 percent of Libya's imports of goods and equipment come from the nine biggest imperialist countries. As for
France, it is the sixth most important trading partner of Libya, but the second most important supplier of arms after the
USSR. Some 50 French companies are active in the country. The total contracts with French companies for projects or services presently in force amount to 2.1 thousand millions of francs per year on average. Specifically, Paris sold Tripoli 150 Mirage jets in 1970 and 1978, along with several dozen Alouette-III, a dozen light patrol boats, 200 AMX tanks, Crotale and Milan missiles. And in every case training contracts were included in the purchase. The value of Libyan purchases of French civilian material rose from 206 million francs in 1969 to 666 million in 1972, and to 1,731 million in 1974. In this period the Libyan head of state declared that, 'Arabs can only count on two real friends in Europe, Yugoslavia in the East and France in the West' (12) •
To be sure, relations then worsened under Giscard d'Estaing. But, after each crisis between the two states, Qadhafi did not fail to make overtures towards French industry and government. In particular, a convention of co-operation was signed by Jacques Chirac in 1976, at the same time as the agreements between France and Chad.
THE PROCESS OF THE COLONIAL WAR
All this gives good objective reasons, for both sides, to try to come to a political settlement in Chad. Any such arrangement would, as everyone knows, only be provisional, even if it overrode the wishes of the forces on the ground. Such an accord was in fact made before, When Libya and France sought to impose a ceasefire agreement on the Felix Malloum regime and FROLINAT in 1978. This idea was also included in the recent proposals by Qadhafi, who stated in June, *France must understand the key position of Libya in Africa. I hope she understands that her interests lie on the side of Libya, aner that, we are the best available partner'. (13)
Moreover, the objective of the present tour by French diplomats in Africa is to try, on the basis of the relationship of forces created by the French intervention in Chad, to get Libya to come to an agreement and force its protege Goukouni to negotiate. However, the unknown factor in this operation is what sort of governmental and state formula will be put forward, since everything, or almost everything, has been already tried in Chad.
For the sake of his demagogic propaganda campaign to fool the French workers, Francois Mitterrand has tried to present his action in Chad as a different policy from that of his predecessor. However, the sending of a French expeditionary corps, like the financing of the Chadian government employees, demonstrates the continuity of imperialist policy.
Obviously, there is a certain momentum created by sending in a military force. This makes it possible to defend every further step as necessary to defend the French expeditionary force. What is more, the French intervention is being justified by insisting that its function is as a deterrent. This argument clearly does not rule out the possibility of French forces going into action, since they can only be a deterrent if they are prepared to act. Mitterrand made this clear and precise on August 28 by stating that the forces that France has installed give it the means to respond rapidly and militarily to a new offensive if necessary. The role of the French troops was then defined by the head of state, 'Beyond that we play a deterrent role, for those who might wish to advance towards the zone where we are. It is also known that, if threatened, our troops will respond and that, the better to defend themselves, they will not limit their response to simply defensive action.' (14) From that point on, the process of a colonial war would go into motion. French aircraft have already overflown a column of Goukoun's troops, although it seems on this occasion it was without firing. It is easy to imagine the next stage of French involvement.
The action of the Mitterrand government in Chad therefore remains contrary to the interests of the popular masses in Chad and the French workers. In this period of austerity for French workers, and of the "immigrant-hunt' against foreign workers in France, the Mitterrand government is engaged in spending hundreds of millions of francs to defend, arms in hand, a phantom of a neo-colonial state that is in utter decomposition. However, so far the national consensus that this policy enjoys within the organised workers movement and the bourgeois opposition parties has been challenged only by the campaign led by the far left organisations, principally the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire (French section of the Fourth International), which alone have come out for the withdrawal of French troops from Chad.
The French military intervention cannot bring a solution to the chronic crisis of the Chadian state. From now on the Mitterrand government has to look towards negotiations, which will undoubtedly mean an agreement with Tripoli. But even in this eventuality the French government will have helped to aggravate the civil war that is inflicting suffering on the Chadian masses. Therefore, nothing can justify keeping French troops in Chad. 12. Africque-Asie, Paris, 24 March 1980. 13. Le Matin, 1 July 1983. 14. Le Monde, 28 August 1983.
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