New setbacks for imperialism in Salvador Francisco Herrera, representative of the Salvadoran revolution front - the FMLN-FDR — for Austria and Switzerland, passed through Paris in early October.
At that time, he gave the following interview to Gerry Foley and Vincent Kermel - the editors respectively of International Viewpoint and Inprecor, the English- and French-language journals published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.
The interview was conducted in French and has been translated and edited. Companero Herrera has not had the opportunity to review the English edited text. Because of the length of the interview, we have divided it into two parts. The second part, to be published in the next issue, will take up the political perspectives of the revolutionists in some detail, along with the questions of negotiations with the went over the head of the UPD. Peasants meeting in an assembly are one thing. Peasants in the street are another.
In a country where there is a very sharp confrontation between the classes, where there is a terrible civil war, the streets are by nature "subversive."
In fact, in this demonstration, we saw the people raise such excellent slogans as "No People Without Land, No Land Without People," and "Only the People Will Save the People."
These are in effect revolutionary slogans. To demand the land in a country where this is the central point of conflict has enormous significance, especially when this is done at the point when the constituent assembly is discussing land reform. This is why we say that these demonstrations went over the heads of the Christian Democrats, that it would be simplistic to see them in the context of the Christian Democracy.
Q. In fact, what was most impressive about this peasant demonstration was that it was the first time in quite a while that people had been able to take to the streets. Previously this was impossible because of the repression and rightist terror.
Do you see possibilities for similar action by the urban working people? How has the union movement reorganized since the onset of the repression? What possibilities does the crisis of the Christian Democratic organizations that you referred to open up for the left, for resuming mass work in the urban areas?
A. I said that it was mass discontent that produced this demonstration; that it went beyond the Christian Democracy.
In this situation, we have one primary responsibility. It is to bring the people involved to more advanced positions. We are, so to speak, condemned to do this. If we did not, these masses would be deregime and its imperialist backers.
Question. In recent weeks, massive peasant demonstrations took place in the capital of El Salvador, San Salvador. In your opinion, what is the significance of these actions in the context of the conflict that is going on in the country?
Answer. These demonstrations were held when the question of the agrarian reform came up in the constituent assembly. This is, in fact, a decisive question for the constitution that the regime is preparing.
It is notable that on every one of the three articles dealing with the agrarian reform, very sharp clashes have occurred among the bourgeois forces. On the one side is the oligarchy, which is not prepared to make any concessions on the question of agrarian reform. On the other is the Christian Democracy, which is committed to some reform. This conflict among bourgeois forces was the immediate background to the demonstrations. But they have to be seen in the context of larger and more fundamental factors.
The peasants involved in these demonstrations are very poor. They are suffering especially from the very severe economic crisis that is hitting all sections of the population. They live every day in the grip of desperation. These people are disillusioned. They are frustrated. They have come to realize that this regime is not going to do anything for them. That is, it is not going to give the land to those who work it. To the contrary, thousands of famil ies have already lost the little plots that they got just a short while ago during the first phase of the agrarian reform. [That is, they lost it for debt, because of the economic crisis in particular, since according to the land reform the land had to be purchased.] A year and a half ago, most of these peasants were prepared to support a project pushed by the U.S., that is the March 1982 elections.
Q. So, the demonstrations represent 14 a further narrowing of the regimes's social base?
A. Yes. It should be noted also that while the international press talks about these demonstrations being called by the Christian Democratic Party, the reality is much more complex.
The economic crisis bearing down on the Salvadoran people today does not make any distinctions according to party affiliation, it does not distinguish between a peasant who supports the Christian Democratic Party and one who supports one of the component organizations of the FMLN-FDR.
The peasants see today that the regime is obliged to import maize. But this is traditionally the basic crop of the coun try, along with beans. It is the basis of the national diet, the one thing above all that we should not have to import. And now we are importing a very poor quality maize from the U.S.
It is impossible to find milk, which poses a serious problem for families with infants. Even water is very expensive. Some consumer goods, such as tooth paste, have gone up by 500 percent.
A large part of the peasant population, sectors that are not with the regime but have not yet taken a position either in support of the opposition we represent, were waiting to see what the agrarian reform would bring.
Up until now the Christian Democratic Party has been able to take advantage of these sectors but it is beginning to lose control. That is the basic meaning of these recent demonstration.
Q. How are these peasants organized?
A. Most of them are organized by the Salvadoran Peasant Union, the UCS. The UCS has very close relations with the UPD, the Democratic People's Union, which includes both political parties and unions. Its component parts are generally oriented toward the Christian Democracy.
It was these peasants who forced the holding of this demonstration. President Magana was obliged to let it be held.
But I would stress that these actions
ceived again by formulas put forward by the imperialists and the Christian Democrats.
We have to show them that there is no solution but to join organizations that are clearly in opposition to this regime, that is, the FMLN-FDR.
It is true that an opening has appeared. But it has to be kept in mind that this represents a victory of the mass organizations, whether they belong to the UPD or the FDR.
That is, it is not the regime that is offering this opening. The regime did not decide out of the goodness of its heart to let the peasants demonstrate. Quite the contrary, this was a victory, a victory in the fight that has been waged for the last three years. And in this respect, we should highlight the struggles of the workers in San Salvador.
It is well known that the regime undertook a calculated campaign of repression, with the aid of the U.S., and that this succeeded in demobilizing more than a few of the trade-union organizations.
This relative demobilization posed a grave problem for us. According to the conception we defend for taking power, the mass movement is a strategic necessity. The seizure of power cannot be accomplished by arms alone. A whole spectrum of political work is necessary to combine the people's insurrection and armed struggle.
This is because we are a small country, and the imperialists are determined to smash the process of liberation that has been developing. So, it is only with the broad support of the working people and the other poor masses that we can hope to hold out, that we will be able to achieve the seizure of power and meet the challenge that will come after. So, we had to try to regain the ground lost in the area of the mass movement. This was ex-
Iran army officer, US-trained (DR)
tremely difficult. It was necessary to find new methods of work. But we are rather satisfied now with the progress that has been made.
For example, last May 1, it was possible to hold a day long workers rally in the capital. The area was surrounded by the repressive forces. But it was possible to get the meeting held.
On July 26, the Revolutionary Trade-Union Federation, the FSR, which is a member of the CUSS, that is the United Trade-Union Committee of El Salvador, held a congress. That was a great achievement.
AMES, the Salvadoran Women's Organization, also managed to hold a congress.
The peasants are making preparations to hold a congress. Every year the teachers have their day of discussion, on June 21, and they hold it in public, which is extremely difficult but nonetheless they do it.
The university was militarized three years ago. But the university educational system continues to function even though the campus is occupied by the military. Courses are being held in private apartments and in facilities made available by various organizations.
Recently, there have been a lot of strikes. They have taken place in the building industry, in the textile industry, among municipal workers. And the level of solidarity has been quite high. So, these actions interlock.
We, the revolutionary opposition forces, have to be able to exploit the enormous economic difficulties in which the regime is floundering. We have to increase the contradictions within the ruling class and between the oligarchy and Washington in order to widen the space for mass activity that you talked about. This will make it possible, in time, to rebuild the mass movement, and that is fundamental for us. of ine that are the mraintion oreg What are the organizational forms go through the unions?
A. Yes, in many cases. But there are also a lot of sectors that are unorganized. These are generally politically unaligned. They have not come out for the people's struggle. But they are not with the government either. They are sectors that have good reasons to be afraid.
They live in the zone controlled by the enemy, who is carrying out a ferocious repression and a massive propaganda campaign to promote a distorted view of the revolutionary movement.
These are unorganized sectors. But they have a certain consciousness. They have sufficient consciousness that when the FMLN launches a decisive offensive, they can join with the people's organizations. Because they are people who suffer, our duty is to help them, but in a practical way.
Q. But if they are not organized, how can they fight?
A. Work is being done in the neighborhoods by new methods. There is a network of activists and there is broad sympathy. When these activists go into action, when they issue the call for specific actions, these masses are able to come out into the streets.
Q. Has the FMLN carried out political-military actions recently in the cities, such as were carried out during the election period - military actions with popular participation, such as barricades? Has it organized any self-defense actions?
A. Yes. This sort of action has never stopped. According to our conception of struggle, there is no question of ever abandoning a single front. It is necessary to harass the enemy everywhere, above all where he is strong. There was an ebb. There have been ups and downs in this. But for some months now these actions have been continual.
These are mainly guerrilla actions rather than self-defense actions. They are incursions. The guerrillas move in, stay a short time underground, prepare attacks on important centers for the regime, and then get out. There have been confrontations right in the center of the capital with the repressive forces. There have been sabotage actions.
You know that a U.S. military advisor was executed. This was a considerable achievement. This type of person does not move around easily and is well guarded. There was also an attack on the U.S. embassy in San Salvador, and you know what that represents.
These actions demonstrate the striking capacity of the guerrillas and their mobility. Likewise, they give an idea of how extensive a web of support runs through the society. The guerrillas made their strikes and then were able to get away safe and sound.
These actions point to a new rise of activity directed at the nerve centers of the enemy.
Q. In view of the growth of the liberation struggle, what strategy have the imperialists adopted to try to deal with it?
A. At the start, the Reagan administration thought the Salvadoran problem could be quickly liquidated. After the major offensive launched by the FMLN in January 1981, they realized that something serious was happening in the country. Then they set a time limit for destroying us. They thought it would take a few months. Then, after the FMLN was defeated, they would push what they called "democratization" of the country, which was part of their overall politicalmilitary plan. The means for this would be elections, the famous March 1982 elections.
But they had a lot of problems. The FMLN continued to gain strength throughout 1981, and so we were able to make a real demonstration of force during the 1982 elections. That was not the same, of course, as being able to carry out a boycott of them; that was quite a different matter.
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All this led the U.S. experts to estimate that they would need two years to wipe out the FMLN. It seems now that they think they would need seven years.
That means that there has been a considerable evolution over the last three years. The Salvadoran army has proved incapable of stopping the revolutionary movement. To the contrary, the people's forces have consolidated themselves and grown.
The Americans began to raise serious questions about the way their counterinsurgency strategy was being applied in El Salvador. They had a plan. They have learned a lot in Vietnam and elsewhere.
But they were dealing with an army on the spot that has a lot to learn. A few months ago an American advisor talked about the army in a contemptuous way, saying that it had a nine-to-five-Mondayto-Friday notion of how to fight a war. This worries the Americans. One of the results is that the advisors now direct the war themselves. They even take part directly in the genocide.
They have transformed Honduras into a staging ground for aggression against Nicaragua and El Salvador. There they are training Salvadoran soliders and soldiers of other countries for confrontation with the Salvadoran people's forces.
They have made a major effort to apply more refined techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. They have tried to create very mobile small units. They have pushed in a massive way the creation of elite units, the famous special brigades. And this has gone hand in hand with the application of a whole package of advanced technology, particularly in the field of electronics.
Q. How do they apply this electronics technology?
A. They have ships on the Pacific to monitor our communications. They have an electonic surveillance center in the country. But technology in itself doesn't always produce results.
For example, there was a report by the CIA a few months ago saying that they had given information to the Salvadoran military that there was going to be an offensive and the military paid no attention to it. The offensive did take place all right, but the U.S. warning had no effect.
They have also started a campaign of infiltrating agents into the revolutionary military organizations and started applying a system of more systematic torture.
Q. There have been reports that the new methods - night operations, constant patrols, population re-settlement, and the setting up of permanent bases in guerrilla-controlled territory - have had an effect in disorganizing the controlled zones. What effect have these techniques had?
A. Most recently, the imperialist advisors and the Salvadoran military have started applying the so-called Conara Plan, which they say is a plan for "pac16 ification" and development of the coun try, for "reactivating" the economy. Their chosen target is the central region around the San Vicente volcano. They have put all their strength into hitting this region.
The campaign in the San Vicente region has been going on now for nearly four months. Their idea was to hit hard and fast, but now they are getting bogged down.
In fact, this region is very favorable for the guerrillas and very unfavorable for the counterinsurgency forces. They cannot ly whee the get their heavy equipment to the top of the volcano, which is precisely where the guerrillas are based. The terrain does not favor them. They are obliged to expose themselves, and when they do, the guerrillas put their plans into action.
The "economic" part of the plan consists of trying to seduce the population. They give candy to the children. They dump bags of food out of planes. They drop a lot of propaganda from small planes.
They are trying to set up strategic hamlets like in Vietnam or Guatemala. That is, they are trying to separate the population from the guerrillas, because they start from the supposition that it is the population that supports them. And they aren't far off.
But they face natural obstacles. On the one hand, there is the terrain. But also the population has a very high level of consciousness, in particular because of the existence in this region of the PPL (Poderes Populares Locales, Local People's Power Bodies). This is a power in the hands of the people, of the people, and thus for the people.
These structures make it possible for the population to protect itself, to follow the guerrillas or to flee according to a plan and then to return when the bombing is over.
Q. What effect has the attempt to station troops permanently in the guerrilla zones had?
A. They did try to station the Rangers permanently in the San Vicente area. But the problem for them is that it means keeping troops in a hostile environment.
Since the people are hostile to the soldiers, they watch them and report on their movements to the guerrillas. Since the guerrillas have military control of the region, they can move about at will and carry out ambushes and so forth.
This means, if you will permit me to speak plainly, that if any soldiers wander off into the bushes to relieve themselves, they can easily fall into an ambush. This causes very painful nervous problems. Over time, the troops become demoralized.
So, the presence of the military is not very effective in determining people's power. The only effect of the military offensive in San Vicente in that respect is more destruction, more slaughter.
Because of the bombing the people have to leave their fields. Everything is burned. And they have to start all over again. But this is only a physical setback. Because the people come back full of anger against the invader, as they say. That upsets the Americans because they want to destroy the basis of support for the guerrillas.
Q. There was a period of some months, however, when the guerrillas appeared less active. What was the reason for this?
A. War has its own laws. You can't launch offensives just to maintain credibility or impress people. There are real logistic difficulties. You have to take stock. You need more adequate plans to respond to the new plans of the enemy, who is neither weak nor stupid. It would be foolish to think that they are stupid. It's true that they have problems. They have lost a lot of capacity for initiative. There is a deterioration in the morale of the troops. But overall, thanks to American aid, the army is still a serious force.
Nonetheless, it's a bit too simple to say that there was an ebb in the period you mention, because the guerrillas had the capacity to fight back in San Vicente. And recently, they have shown their capacity for resuming the offensive.
Q. You're referring to the seizure of San Miguel six weeks ago?
A. Yes, this operation had excellent results. The enemy lost 300 men, and we captured a lot of weapons. In this battle the FMLN demonstrated its capacity to mobilize large units.
Q. You said that this was the first time the FMLN used heavy arms.
A. That's right. The guerrillas bombarded the military base in San Miguel for hours. And you have to consider that the comrades have no vehicles for transporting cannons; they have to be carried on the backs of the soldiers.
Moreover, corridors of approach have to be maintained, and this requires a lot of support all along the way. And this operation was carried off virtually without losses. This success makes it possible to envisage a whole campaign of major actions such as the one that took place about a week ago in the center of the country in a place called Tenancingo.
The results there also were quite encouraging. About 100 weapons were captured, and sixty prisoners. Most importantly three officers were killed. That is very important.
One of the Salvadoran army's biggest problems for the last two years at least has been the loss of officers. An army without officers is in serious trouble. That also explains the growing involvement of the American advisors. They are being forced more and more to actually lead the fighting.