The "social truce" ends in Bolivia
Faced with the growth of massive strikes and protests in the summer and early fall of 1982, the Bolivian military regime was obliged to agree to hand over power to a civilian government in order to avert an uncontrollable explosion. Following the installation of the new goverment in early October, the top military fell into disarray. Major figures are now in exile charged with smuggling, involvement in drug traffic, and other criminal offenses.
The military handed the government over to the major electoral force in the country, the Union Democratica Popular (UDP), a front whose major components are the MNR-I of Siles Suazo, the left-wing of the old bourgeois national movement put in power by the revolution of 1952, and the PCB, the Bolivian Communist Party.
The form that the transfer took was an ambiguous one. The National Assembly suspended by the military was called back into session. This body, based on the elections held before the 1980 coup, has a right-wing majority, now very much out of step with the mood in the country. At the same time, the executive branch was handed over to a UDP government.
On November 5, the UDP cabinet decreed an austerity program and appealed to the masses for a hundred-day "truce" to allow it to restore order in the economy. The hundred days ended on February 16.
On January 9, the UDP government suffered a major split, with the departure of the MIR, the most right-wing component of the coalition, even though it is led by former guerrillas. It is widely believed in the Bolivian left that the MIR is aiming for a government of national unity including the right-wing parties, the PCN and the ADN of the former military dictator Banzer, as well as the so-called "Historic" faction of the MNR, the MNR-H. In fact, the MR split over the issue of cooperating with the Banzer dictatorship. The "Historicos" are the faction that collaborated.
The following is an assessment of the first hundred days of the UDP government and the tasks it poses for revolutionists by the Political Bureau of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario - Combate (Revolutionary Workers Party - Combat), the Bolivian section of the Fourth International. The statement has been edited somewhat for an international audience.
On November 5, less than a month after the UD government took office, it adopted economic measures that it claimed were necessary and in the interests of the people. They were, the UDP said, part of a "New Economic Poliey." This term reflects an attempt by the UDP to compare the present capitalist crisis of the Bolivian bourgeois state with the economic crisis of the Soviet workers state in the 1920s.
Before November 5, the increase in the cost of living had exceeded a rate of 800%. Wages remained stationary, and this rapid rate of inflation and speculation reduced their buying power to a fiction. Unemployment had grown enormously. The annual income of the state had stabilized around 900 million dollars, of which 600 million had to go for interest and retirement of the foreign debt.
The remainder, 300 million dollars, was all that was left to meet the needs of the national economy. In fact, the state's coffers were empty, and the Central Bank had no foreign currency reserves.
The military had decided to let the peso float against the dollar, which led to windtall profits for the exporting sectors and bankrupcy for small local industry. This in turn led to increased unemployment and underemployment, impoverishment of the masses, and the weakening of the national currency. The price of imported products, including medicines, increased by more than 1,000%. It is important to point out that 80% of the key enterprises of the national economy are in the hands of the state, and, with the exception of the Huanuni mine, they were all bankrupt. 12
THE EFFECTS OF THE UDP'S ECONOMIC MEASURES
Of all the measures adopted by the UDP government on November 5, only those involving currency control by the Central Bank and the establishment of a fixed rate of exchange for the peso could be considered to have any positive aspects. But even these decrees were far from adequate. In fact, while the dollar was set at 200 pesos, the internal demand was so high that in a few days the rate of exchange reached 400 to one.
With the exception of the currencycontrol measure, all the steps taken by the government very much resembled those that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) tried to impose while the military dictatorship was still in power. But the dictatorship was not able to apply them out of fear of the reaction of the masses. Priority was given to foreign trade, to the middle-sized mining corporations (the private mines), to the agribusiness sector in the eastern part of the country, the private banks, and all those sectors that bring in foreign currency so as to enable the state to meet the interest and principal payments on its foreign debt.
These priorities were set to the detriment of the statized sectors, which will increase unemployment and stifle the small-scale industry working for the local market. All this, in fact, amounts to a typical monetarist policy to guarantee the interests of imperialist capital.
Thus, the UDP government, in which the masses have placed their hopes, has done what the military government did not dare to. This policy has had the following results: 1) increased inflation, combined with a fall in the value of the peso, which, together, has led to an inflation rate of 1,500%; a 13% increase in unemployment; a monthly minimum wage of 8,490 pesos, which corresponds to the expenses of a family of five for only a week and a half; and, finally, the threat a new devaluation of the peso in the near future. It is clear that the bulk of the state sector is still sinking into bankruptcy, along with private nonexporting industry. It is clear also that the subordination of the national economy to U.S. and West European imperialist capital is reaching a crucial point, especially since the country no longer has any reserve capital.
Far from mitigating the economic crisis, the UDP government has aggravated it, and shifted its weight still more onto the shoulders of the workers, the urban masses, and the poor peasants. Now, plunged into a political crisis, the UDP government is trying to rectify its earlier economic measures by carrying out new devaluations and setting the minimum wage at a miserable level, just high enough to slow down workers strug gles. Another such measure is establishing workers comanagement of the statized enterprises. But in every respect the UDP government is continuing to follow the road of subordination to imperialist capital and the lines laid down by the IMF.
With its attempts to make mitigating adjustments in its austerity policy, the UDP will succeed only in increasing hunger and unemployment for the masses, worsening the subordination of the country to imperialist capital, increasing foreign debt, and enriching the four octopuses that feed on the national
economy. (i.e., the native bourgeoisie, the landlords, the military, and the imperialists). It will succeed only in increasing sacrifices and austerity measures imposed on the workers, and, as a result, in accelarating the process of social decay. This will necessarily involve a polarization of the social forces, the isolation of the government from the masses, and a strengthening of the reactionary right. In fact, the right is seeking not only to improve its opportunities for lining its pockets, but to assure its possibilities for enrichment by regaining political power. This is why the reactionary right is plotting against the government and is bound to move toward a coup d'etat.
THE DILEMMA OF THE UDP GOVERNMENT
Mismanagement by the reactionary right's military alterego left the UDP a totally bankrupt economy. But the UDP was also left with the job of containing the movement of the workers and the poor masses, which was threatening to overflow and break down the retaining walls of capitalism. It was not the UDP that won this democratic opening, but the poor masses in their heroic struggle, which began with the strike of the Huanuni miners in November 1981, and continued to spread throughout the country until it inflicted a decisive political defeat on the military dictatorship.
However, it is important to see, as the masses do, the difference between a dictatorial regime with a fascistic orientation and a bourgeois democratic one. The masses feel this difference acutely. We do also. But while we place no real hope in the UDP government, we do have confidence in the capacity of the masses for struggle. So, it should be clear that we will support all "democratic and anti-imperialist measures, all measures in the interest of the people" taken by the UDP government. We call on the people to maintain their independence in their political and trade-union activity so that they can continue the struggle for their own demands and historical objectives. demands and historical obiectives.
From October 10 to November 5, it can be said that, to a certain extent, the masses lowered their guard, waiting to see what the UDP government's measures would be. However, it took no step in the interests of the people or against the imperialists. And, in fact, the pro-imperialist measures it finally adopted were a brutal disillusionment for the working people. It is important for the masses to go through this experi ence so that they can see through the "anti-imperialist and populist masque" of this government.
A ONE-LEGGED GOVERNMENT
This government has arisen as the result of pressure and a political deal. We warned that a government set up by the parliament would be a one-legged one. But the MIR and the reactionary right wanted a parliamentary solution. We, the PCB, and even the MNR-I insisted the need for elections, despite the time that was lost. Elections would have made it possible to push back the right, to defeat it on the electoral level as well as in the streets. It is true that the masses cannot eat ballots, and, as the MIR demagogically said, that the hungry cannot wait. But what we wanted to do was to push the democratization process to the maximum, since the political and social relationship of forces was extremely favorable to the left and to the UDP.
In this situation, the UDP would have been able to gain an absolute majority in parliament and at all levels of government. This would have encouraged and emboldened the masses and obliged the new UDP government to take measures against the oligarchy, to take on the paramilitary gangs, to push back the reactionary sectors in the army, and to defeat the right in parliament.
All domestic and international reactionary forces combined immediately to stop elections and impose a solution based on the existing parliament. Today, there is a right-wing majority in parliament, and the UP government remains confined to the executive branch, without any real decision making power. But the masses have already gone beyond that phase of the struggle. That is, now that the UDP has revealed its antipopular character and its line, the fact that it lacks an absolute majority in parliament is hardly important anymore.
FISSURES IN THE GOVERNMENT
What is more, the UDP bore the seeds of its own decay within it, since it is a class-collaboration front. In a country such as ours, where there is a native bourgeoisie that is organized and differentiated as a class, where the national economy is totally subordinate to imperialism, where there are oligarchic strata linked to international finance capital,
IPODE UNR where the army serves as the policeman for imperialist interests, a bourgeois democratic regime based on class collaboration cannot last for long. Political and social confrontation is on the agenda. Thus, at the end of 1982, the first fissure appeared in the government and in the UDP itself, with the departure of the MIR from the government.
The MIR's aim is to get a government of "national unity," including the UDP, private enterprise, the army, and thereactionary right organized in the ADN, the MR-H, and the PDC. It wants a policy of rapprochement with U.S. imperialism and the European bourgeois governments in order to contain the revolutionary upsurge of the masses and reconsolidate the bourgeois state. For these objectives, they are using the fight against the paramilitary gangs and the drug traffic as a cover; they have no intention whatever of promoting any mass mobilization.
The UDP has no clearly defined political or economic positions on either the national or international level. The 13-day crisis touched off by the MIR's departure from the government is now combining with the row started up by the government's condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which provoked a strong reaction from the Communist Party.
However, the PCB does not want to leave the government. It is hanging on to its place in the cabinet by tooth and nail. Because this position offers opportunities in two areas that are decisive for its reformist policy - working in a class-collaborationist government and controlling the labor movement.
Both the MIR and the Americans are interested in getting the PCB out of the government. This is not because they fear that PCB will push a radical policy; this party has no such intention. What they want to do is to quiet the fears of a backward, oligarchical bourgeoisie. But the MIR, as well as the Americans and the West European Social Democrats,
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know that it is better to keep an old toothless hound dog in the kitchen and fed it on scraps, than have it running around outside raising a howl. This is what the myopically anti-Communist local bourgeoisie and oligarchy stubbornly refuse to see.
The departure of the MIR from the government had two effects:
1. It swelled the ranks of the right.
2 It put the UDP government on a short leash, with narrowing mass support.
THE THREAT OF A COUP
It is no accident that the MIR has been saying that "this government is not the one the masses elected, a new government of national unity is needed. " It is no accident that the reactionary right in parliament has begun a barrage of challenges to various UDP ministers. It is not an accident that the reaction is denouncing this government a total disaster and calling on the people to replace it. Nor is it by chance that at the end of December, representatives of the ADN, of the MNR-H, of private enterprise, of the MIR, the truckers, and the military met at Tarija. They are plotting against the government, preparing to isolate it and overthrow it.
The government is on the defensive. It can only be saved temporarily if the masses shore it up. But it cannot appeal to them because it itself represents the native bourgeoisie and not the workers.
We think that this government cannot survive long. What the right proposes to do is already public. It is going to mount an economic boycott, boycott the government, and create a general economic and political crisis in order to get parliament to intervene and name a right-wing government headed by Victor Paz Estenssoro and Jaime Paz Zamora (MNR-H and MIR), supported by their colleagues in the ADN, the PDC, private enterprise, and so forth. This will be a cold coup, of course, but still a coup. It will lead to a cutting back of democratic freedoms, a shifting of the process to the right, and a blocking of the mass upsurge.
The relative demobilization of the masses that resulted from hopes being placed in the UDP government and from an acceptance of the 100-day period of grace that the government asked for is now beginning to overcome. Up till now, all labor organizations in the country have called for a minimum wage of 40,000 pesos a month backed up with a sliding-scale of automatic cost-of-living allowances.
There is a very wide-ranging discussion in the workers movement over the comanagement proposal. Some sectors accept it; others reject it categorically. We have called for a majority for the workers in comanagement boards in statized enterprises, along with collective workers control with the right of veto in private enterprises. We are proposing the discussion in the unions of a program of demands to deal with the economic crisis in order to open up the way for mobilizing the workers, peasants, and the poor masses in general to defend and deepen the democratic process, to strengthen the mass organizations, and enable the Bolivian Confederation of Trade Unions (COB) to play an independent role leading the mass movement.
### MASS SELF-DEFENCE
Today there is a noticeable upturn in the mobilization of the workers and the poor masses. Factory occupations are being carried out to counter the economic boycott of the bosses. Assemblies and congresses are being held where alternatives in the interests of the people are being disuessed, as well as methods of struggle and organization. All this is focused on combating the economic crisis and confronting the counteroffensive of the right in parliament and in the army. This is the reason why mass organization and people's self-defence are so important.
In the new period opened up by the end of the "100 days" on February 16, there is no doubt that there will be a revival of the • cial struggle. If the gap grows betw. 'he UDP government
MICRO and the aspirations of the masses, it is clear that we are heading for a political confrontation in short order, which could even take the form of armed clashes. The masses are going to defend the democratic process. They are going to fight for decent living conditions, decent working conditions, and a living wage, for a genuinely democratic and revolutionary solution, for a government of their own.
Our party supports such a perspective. Undoubtedly, the UDP government is part of the democratic process that we are determined to deepen. But in fighting for this, we are not defending the bourgeois government but rather the gains of the masses. The main enemy at the moment is not the UDP govern- al ne moment is not the Ur government but the reaction entrenched in parliament and the army. In fact, it is these reactionaries who represent American imperialism and the European Social Democracy.
THE LEFT ALTERNATIVE AND
REVOLUTIONARY MASS LEADERSHIP
The only national political pole of attraction to the left of the UDP is the Partido Socialista-Uno. The POR-C cannot be that at present because it is stil only a relatively small party level. still only a relatively small party, not We are, however, the only revolutionary Marxist current with a perspective for growth in the coming period since other small revolutionary groups have begun to fade away. We are, of course, trying to extend a hand to these groups and
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draw them together in a single revolutionary current.
However, this is not sufficient to meet the tasks of the moment and those that lie ahead. We need a broader policy of alliances, one that can draw in revolutionary and progressive sectors, authentically democratic sectors, sections of the population interested in consolidating and deepening democratic process. This is why we are calling on all these forces to confront the main enemy, and, for that purpose, to build a democratic political-military leadership. Such a mass leadership can only be built on the basis of a revolutionary and democratic program bringing together the genuinely democratic and revolutionary left parties, the unions, and the progressive institutions. The only form it can take is a Revolutionary People's Bloc. Bloc.
The PS-Uno lacks both organization and a clearly defined policy. Therefore, it cannot develop as an alternative political leadership for the mass movement. If it overcame these deficiencies, the PS-Uno might manage to focus the radicalized consciousness and determination to fight of the working masses, and become a mass leadership.
However, as of now that is not the case. In middle-class areas, where there have been elections, the PS-Uno has scored smashing victories, gaining from the backlash against the UDP. But it has not gone any further. Throughout a period filled with social struggles, it has not called for any mobilizations, demonstrations, or rallies. It has sat on its hands, doing nothing more than make statements about rarified political and technical questions without linking these to the fundamental problems of the country, or appealing directly to the masses, or clarifying its position toward the government, the state, the economic crisis, for the preparations for a coup. THE SECTARIANISM OF THE PS-Uno
We maintain a completely collaborative attitude toward the PS-Uno. We support it, or mobilize side by side with it, to confront the right or gain ground from the UDP. But the PS-Uno accepts unity only on a temporary basis, to win elections. It does not have a united-front strategy.
At the militant Huanuni mine, the PS-Uno took a wrong, sectarian step, running a purely party slate. Out of the 1,800 votes cast (the total workforce is 2,200), it got only 57 votes. However, in alliance with dissident Maoists, we won an absolute majority, defeating the UDP and the official Maoists.
The UDP and the parties that make it are not maintaining monolithic up unity in all areas of mass work. Thus, there are openings for achieving limited agreements with radicalized sections of these parties. For example, in the easter part of the country, the MNR-I has a militant base among the peasants and the poor masses. So, this offers a possibility for making alliances with it on certain occasions against the right bloc. In the universities, we form united fronts with the MIR and the PCB, or with other independent and revolutionary groups. All of this is done in the framework of a tactic of building united mobilizations against the common enemy.
THE PROCESS OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
In the mass movement, the process of self-organization is beginning to ripen.
The factory occupations have given rise to factory committees or strike committees. The economic crisis is giving impetus to the development of Committees to Defend the People's Economy (CODEP), which the MIR is trying to control from the office of the vice presidency, which it holds. But there are still no independent mass organs of selforganization. In some areas, neighborhood committees play a role in assuring supplies and services. But such committees have not become a general phenomenon in the cities where they exist, nor have they developed on a national scale. So far it has been the unions, the departmental (district) union structures and the COB, that have been playing the main role. But we have not yet reached a stage of political development higher than the peak reached last October. That is why there are still no structures of mass selforganization other than the unions.
This is still a period of ferment, of discussion, of learning, but the processes that are beginning now will be extremely important in the big confrontations that are looming on the horizon and which may be extremely dramatic.
ARTICLES ALREADY PUBLISHED
IN INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT
- General Strike Rocks Bolivia, by Fernando Zamora, No 5, 26 April 1982. Bolivia, By You No 6, 1 Cove To 1s iz. - Prerevolutionary Crisis Looms
- Interview with Bolivian Indian Leaders, by IV, No 17, 15 November 1982.
- The Radicalization of Bolivian Peasantry, by S. Romande, No 17, 15 November 1982.
- The Bolivian Cauldron, by S. Romande, No 23, 24 January 1983 d L VIANA
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Bolivian miners elect union leaders (DR)