International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

The Fight of the Bolivian Fourth Internationalists

International Viewpoint No. 26, 21 March 1983 · pp 16-17 · 1,716 words

Latin America Repression and political prisoners

The fight of the Bolivian

Fourth Internationalists

The following interview with a leader of the POR-C, the Bolivian section of the Fourth International, was made in La Paz in mid-February.

Question. How much time does the present government have?

Answer. It's impossible to predict exactly how fast things will move. We know that in Bolivia bourgeois democratic governments don't last long.

The U.S. is anxious to cap the social volcano that is threatening to blow up in its Latin American back yard. They have tried the method of dictatorship, and the people have defeated them. They have tried democratic governments, but these have not held up very long.

Moreover, in Bolivia the various factions of the native bourgeoisie, the oligarchy, and the army are linked to different international interests. Besides, a factor that has decisive weight is the maturity and experience of our working 16 class, its impressive class consciousness and militancy.

The right is plotting to establish a regime of the hard right. The workers are fighting for their rights and their demands, for a revolutionary solution. Whether the UDP government falls and how quickly depends on the interaction of all these factors. But it is certain that it cannot hold up for long and that we are heading toward a political and military confrontation with the right.

Q. What is our strategy for the event of a coup d'etat?

A. The political results and the social cost for the masses will differ, according to whether it is a cold coup or a bloody one. If it is a cold coup, the repression will be limited, but there will be repression to destroy the mass organizations and consolidate the power of the right. A violent coup will be aimed at destroying the political and social organizations of the masses and wiping out their gains in a single blow. In the immediate future, it seems more likely that bourgeoisie and the imperialists will go for a cold coup than for a hot one.

The masses have just gone through the experience of a criminal, despotic, bloo hot and brahared and in tact are bloody, and barbaric dictatorship. They developing self-organization. A violent coup would run straight up against a mass response and would threaten to unleash a mass counteroffensive that could seriously endanger the bourgeois state. The COB leadership could be bypassed by the combativity of the insurgent masses and the actions of the small revolutionary parties, whose au- authority might rapidly grow.

The right prefers a cold coup. But the kind of coup the reactionaries have in mind does not resemble the traditional scenario of rebellions initiated on military bases — a dawn attack on the presidential palace, ouster and exile of the president. This time, they are talking about three things — an economic and political boycott, forcing the president to resign, and getting the parliament representing 'a broad national agreement' to appoint Paz Estenssoro (of the MNR-H) as president and Paz Zamora (of the MIR) as vice president.

We are calling on the masses and their parties to defend the people's rights and to organize people's self-defense.

Q. How did the POR-C come through the change from clandestine to legal work?

A. Although we are a small party, with a limited material apparatus, we were able to come through two years repression without being destroyed. Our losses were only about 30%. Of course, that is a third of our organization that was hit by repression, and we had to concentrate our forces in certain social sectors and certain areas. It would have been wrong to scatter our forces; that would have made us an easy target for the would Have made us an easy larget for the dictatorship.

We declared that we would accept "neither exile or surrender." We put our confidence in the masses and their capacity for a rapid recovery. We had confidence in ourselves and in international solidarity. We never underestimate the enemy, and we do not overestimate the strength of the masses.

However, the assessment we made of the government's situation, that it had no popular or international support but rested solely on repression, without even the support of the social forces it sought to represent, made it possible for us to foresee that the dictatorship would not last long. We saw that its talk about remaining in power for twenty years was only a bluff.

We had to begin to face the repression with little preparation. We had no houses, no money, no press, and not even an elementary techical apparatus. We had to build that on the run, in the

course of the struggle. It was not that we were surprised by the coup. It was simply that despite our previous efforts we did not have the material means to build an apparatus. But we were able to take the first steps toward this as a party.

Our organization was small, close knit, and a large proportion of our members were trained cadres. That was our first weapon against the repression. Our party never stopped doing mass work. It was able to shield itself from the repression, but without cutting itself off from the masses.

After the initial atmosphere of fear was overcome, we started to concentrate our forces and set up our political leadership.

We had made progress in reorganizing the party and in raising the morale of the membership as well as in the mass sectors in which we were working. We put out our press and maintained a regular fortnightly publishing schedule. We started with a very small run, distributed in the beginning among trade unionists and members of the other parties. Then we overcome our technical limitations and increased our circulation to 2,500 copies nationally. In a period of repression, a newspaper or even a simple leaflet is an invaluable thing in the hands of workers, and so our paper passed from hand to hand.

To be sure, if we had not had the benefit of international solidarity, we would have had difficulty in coming through the repression. We might have been forced to go into exile or at least we would have been more exposed to repression owing to the material precariousness of our lives. We got a modest but essential revolutionary support from the comrades of the Fourth International and some independent comrades outside the country. But our party itself was able to face adversity and overcome it. We proved that it is possible to build a revolutionary organization in the midst of a period of repression, if you have a correct line and if the morale of the fighters is commensurate with the demands of the situation.

It was in this period of clandestinity that we begun to set up mass fronts - the Revolutionary Workers Front (FTR), the Revolutionary Student Front (FER) in the universities and high schools, and the Revolutionary Peasant Front (FCR). We scored major successes in these areas, inasmuch as independent trade unionists and even members of other parties joined. Our party led these united-front organizations and offered them a political line.

In this period, we consolidated our political role in the resistance. We were an important component of the CONADE, an underground body involving the COB, the MNR-I, the MIR, the PCB, the PS-Uno, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari (an Indian organization), the PRIN (the most left of the groups originating in the MNR, led by Juan Lechin, the chairman of the COB), and an independent group. It was the basis of our proposal that the April-May programmatic document of this front was drawn up. We launched a propaganda offensive to mobilize the masses and to stimulate strikes in 1980, which the government claimed was terrorist activity.

In November 1981, our miner comrades, led by Felipe Vasquez, encouraged the Huanuni miners to organize their union, issue a signed appeal, unleash a general strike, and confront the dictatorship. All our comrades, including Comrade Vasquez were arrested and brutally tortured. But in an immediate response to this, our women comrades in the mining region organized a hunger strike and inflicted a new defeat on the dictatorship. The movement spread and marked the beginning of the end for the dictatorship.

Twice, the dictatorship managed to break up the leadership of our party. Twice we were able to rebuild it with new cadres and continue the struggle.

In May 1982, we were the only party that functioned as such in the mobilization and workers march. We were there with our own flags, posters, and press. We were, to be sure, protected by the security groups organized by the parties. But we came through a whole process without being destroyed by the repression, while revolutionary organizations larger than ourselves before the coup disappeared without leaving a trace.

The party also grew numerically in this period, especially in the working class and the middle strata.

It is not simple to make the transition from working underground to working in conditions of democracy and legality. What is more, it would be wrong to turn the entire party to legal work in a country where democracy never lasts long. We are following a mass orientation in our organizational and agitational work, but we maintain the basic elements of underground organization, prepared to reorganize the party in the underground if necessary.

Today, we have our mass fronts, which are operating publicly. We have party members and leaders working publicly. At the same time, we maintain that there is a need for clandestine organization and security work, both in a period in which there are still paramilitary gangs, and for the periods to come. Thus, the party is preparing itself for all situations. We reject the cult of clandestinity. But we also combat organizational laxness.

The basic contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was not resolved by the assumption of power by the UDP government. It will be resolved only by civil war.

Q. Are we prepared for a new coup?

A. We are not organizationally and militarily prepared to defeat a bloody coup by ourselves. We rely on the masses and their fighting capacity. If the masses are defeated, we will be also, and we would then have to undertake a new phase of the struggle, with new methods and new forms.

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