What's behind the Angola - South Africa talks
Nathan PALMER
December 8, 1982, on the island of Sal in the Cape Verde archipelago, bilateral discussions took place between representatives of the Angolan and South African governments. There is scarcely any doubt that the subject of these talks was the situation in the south-western part of southern Africa. That is, they must have dealt with the Namibian conflict and the South African raids against the SWAPO camps located on Angolan territory, as well as with the guerrilla war being waged by UNITA, with South African support, against the MPLA gov-
Little information has leaked about these five hours of talks. South African delegation was headed up by the minister of foreign affairs,
Botha; and minister of detense, General Magnus Malan. rank of the negotiators points up the importance of this meeting.
The Angolan foreign minister, Paulo Jorge, said in London during an official visit February 5 that the meeting was held on the initiative of the South Africans. The outlines of the positions on both sides are well known. For the South Africans, things are simple — no deal until the Cuban troops are withdrawn from
At a press conference, Botha said: "South Africa will not reduce its forces in the territory (that is Namithe Cuban troops have left Angola." (1)
The Angolans have a different point
For them, the Cuban involvement was essential to drive back the
African invasion during the 1975 civil war and to keep the present government in power thereafter. indicated that this sides to it, and that a withdrawal of Cuban troops could be considered only if "the South African threat were considered reduced."
It has been confirmed by the Angolan minister and by the South African government that a second meeting will be held shortly. Needless to say, there has been a flurry of speculation that an agreement is on the way. At the end of January, the Portuguese press service announced a two-month ceasefire between the Angolans and South Africans. This report proved to be at least premature. But that does not mean that there are not reasons to believe that an agreement is likely for a provisional ceasefire.
THE UN TAKES A BACK SEAT
The two-handed card game that has now begun, with the U.S. dealing the cards, contrasts with the stalled diplomatic operation being conducted by the UN. In fact, this operation has been essentially in the hands of the Group of the Five Western countries that are members of the Security Council - that is, Great Britain; France; West Germany; Canada; and, most of all, the U.S.
United Nations has, to be sure, discussed Namibia at length and adopted a considerable number of resolutions on been recognized by the General Assembly as the sole representative of the Namibian
Resolution No. 385, adopted unanimously by the Assembly on Janu-
1976, condemns South Africa and provides for "free elections under
In 1978, a series of resolutions were adopted. They including Resolution No. 432, which recognizes the need for reintegrating into Namibia the port of Walvis Bay, the country's only deep-
South Africa has detached it from Namibia with the aim of hanging onto the port if it is obliged to relinquish its mandate over the country as a whole. Another was Resolution 435, which set up an aid group for organizing elections, Resolution No. 439 condemned South Africa's decision to proceed unilaterally to hold elections in December of that
It declared in advance that the results of these elections would be in-
From January 7 to January 14, 1981, a conference was held in Geneva under the auspices of the UN that laid out the first five major points for the first stage
These were 1) that South Africa permit the holding of elections, 2) that a ceasefire be declared and a demilitarized zone set up in the northern part of the country, which would be re nforced by 7,500 UN troops, 3) phasec withdrawal of South African troops, 4) the election of a constituent assembly, 5) withdrawal by South Africa within one week after the announcement of
Subsequently, the Group of the Five was to make
South African demands. That is, it called for the election of an assembly in March 1983, based on "one man, two votes," with both direct and proportional representation, thereby favoring
(75,000 out of a population of more than a million, according to the 1981 census). This stands in contradiction to a Black majority and the demand by SWAPO for a system of "one man, one vote."
On the military questions, dropped the proposal for a demilitarized zone and reduced the projected UN force to 6,000. Finally, they proposed to carry out the process not under the control
Assembly but of the antagonistic to South Africa.
In June 1982, the Group of the Five had to face the fact that the negotiations had become stalled, since SWAPO refused to give in on the question of the electoral system. So, they decided to go over immediately to the second phase as regards the United Nations role during the transitional THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION -
POLITICAL CRISIS AND LOW INTENSITY WARFARE
In Namibia itself, an internal crisis led South Africa to resume official control of administration. ary 18, it dissolved the "National Assembly" that it set up after the 1978 electoral farce, and concentrated power in the of the General Administration.
The South Africans had set up a Council of Ministers presided over by Dirk Mudge, cochairman of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, which was then the major pro-South African formation. It played the game, taking steps to wipe out the more visible aspects of apart-
Internal rivalries would the DTA, with the departure of Peter 1. Pretoria News, November 21, English and quotations from publications in Afrikaans have been retranslated from French
Kalangula. In May 1982, he formed Christian Democratic Action. The new formation had a mainly Ovambo base, but was financed by the German Christian Democrats, among others.
The conflict between Mudge and the South African administrator sharpened, leading Pretoria eventually to drop its protege. The December 9 issue of the Johannesburg magazine Report, for example, wrote the following about the need for unity among those opposing SWAPO: "From this standpoint, it is a great pity that a public confrontation is looming between Mr. Dirk Mudge and the general administrator, Mr. Danie Hough....Those interested in Southwest Africa/Namibia know that the DTA no longer has the support that it did in 1978..Such a situation has given rise to discontent and distrust."
Further on, with respect to the meetings set up by the South African premier with a view toward forming a new interim government, Report said: "It is hard to believe that Mr. Mudge and the other DTA leaders know nothing about this. One can only advise them to participate in this process, because the role of the DTA is by no means ended."
Apparently, the Mudge card was losing its value.(2) And the military operations in the northern part of the country were still going on. In 1982, this "low-intensity war " according to the official terminology used by Pretoria, resulted in 77 dead in the South African ranks, as opposed to 61 in the preceding year. According to amounted to 1,268 (as opposed to 1,494 in 1981). More than half of these losses were suffered in South African raids on Angolan territory 200 in March during Operation "Super" and 350 in July-August). It should be added that in the first week of January 1983, the South Afri cans lost eight white soldiers in a mine explosion. (SWAPO seems to be making increasing use of land mines.)
Thus, South Africa has not only been occupying Namibia territory but also a slice of southern Angola, in which it claims the right to move at will, in accordance with the doctrine of "hot pursuit." Assured that they can act with impunity and with the blessing of the U.S., the South Africans barely waited for General Walters, ambassador, to leave Luanda at the end of July, following talks on a Namibian settlement and the Cuban presence in Angola, before they launched a large-scale invasion of southern Angola.
U.S. POLICY AND THE GROUP OF
THE FIVE
It is no secret to anyone that the Reagan administration has developed a special relationship with Pretoria. The Cape Verde talks were a diplomatic success for the American government, especially since it has claimed loudly that settling the Namibia question is one of the priorities of its African policy.
On August 29, 1981, Chester Crocker, undersecretary of state for African affairs, said: "It is clear that the Namibia question is the flash point in this part of the world and is seriously worrying the diplomats. It is equally clear that the war could continue and spread, unless a solution to the principal problems can be found that will satisfy all the parties, including South Africa... We realized immediately that the Namibia negotiations were central in the closer and closer relations we are developing with Black Africa and southern Africa, and that they stood high on the agenda in our talks with our allies. (3)
The imperialists' policy in the region is obviously aimed at preserving their interests and their domination. But South Africa has clearly understood the Reagan administration's special interest in Namibia. "The Reagan administration has just completed the first half of its term. Over the last two years, in view of the other priorities on the international scene, it has invested a surprising amount of energy and political capital in SWA/Namibia.
"The reason for the U.S. interest in this relatively remote region is simple -the presence of 30,000 Cubans in Angola. Were it not for the latter, who complicate Washington's overall East-West strategy, you could be sure that the Namibian problem would not go above the intermediate rungs of the State Department. It is the Cubans who have drawn the White House's attention.
"Since the present administration is already looking toward the next elections, it is not surprising that strong operations are taking form on the major foreign-policy questions. This why Pretoria should play all of its strong cards in the most recent series of talks. If we runy Pouser is! quality accodin NE are Equat to in her but not tgul lau white Commanily If Otherwise u all will Bue do not seize the opportunity to get out of a situation that is devouring our energies, we could find ourselves dealing with recalcitrant Democrats in 1984."(4)
Seeking to carry their policy to a successful conclusion, the U.S. has dragged the Group of the Five into a diplomatic offensive. The favorable attitude of these countries to South Africa has been pointed up by the South African white press since 1981: "The five negotiating countries have not only declared publicly that they have never considered SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people. They have followed up their words with deeds by negotiating directly with all parties in the territory. These concerned parties see this move as an important concession, and South Africa is reserving the most favorable reception for the turn things could take."(5)
More recently, the chairman of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, expressed astonishment at the position adopted by the U.S.'s partners in the Group of Five in claiming that the Cuban presence represented one of the main obstacles to a settlement. In an interview published in the January 25, 1983, issue of the Paris daily Le Monde, he described even the Mitterrand adminstration's policy as "a double game."
The European imperialist countries do not want to be left on the sidelines; they have a direct interest in Namibia. Even if there is not an identity of views among 2. In a statement the members of the Council of Ministers who resigned said that they had decided unanimously not to accept reappointment to this government body. Cf. The Citizen, January 1, 1983. 3. A speech given in Honolulu at a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 4. The Johannesburg Sunday Times, November 21, 1982. 5. Die Burger, Cape Town, October 30, 1981.
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to reinforce its authority over the party. people."
Demo against South Africa's rigged elections (DR) the EEC Ten on SWAPO(6), there does seem to be unanimity about preparing the way for the integration of an independent Namibia into the framework of the Lome Convention. This agreement links the EEC to 63 countries in Africa, the Carribean, and the Pacific. third version is due to go into effect after January 1, 1985. Such integration is all the more important for the EEC since it would fit into the pattern established by the requests made in October 1982 by Angola and Mozambique to be admitted to the Convention as observers.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA AND THE CRACKDOWN
IN ANGOLA
The background to the Angolan and Mozambican overtures to the West is the crisis of their economies. Angola is suffering severely from the Namibian conflict, combined with the guerrilla war being conducted by UNITA in the south and east of the country. In reporting President Dos Santos' proposals on November 11, 1982, the Angolan news agency, Angop, estimated that country had invested 10 billion U.S. dollars in national defense since independence in 1975. Such expenditures are a heavy burden, when the country is on the brink of bankrupcy, with a downturn in all sectors except petroleum.
Official Angolan sources regularly report guerrilla operations by UNITA in the south and east, where it has traditionally been active, and in the central part of the country, for example, near Huambo, where the head quarters of the People's Defense Organization has been attacked. 20 seems to have succeeded in creating running sores in various areas
It is all of these problems together and the desire to accept bilateral discussions with South Africa that are at the root the crackdown and purges in the MPLA-Workers Party. They are not the result of a settling of accounts between pro- and anti-Soviet factions. If such a rivalry exists, it does not form the line of demarcation between those who are ready to negotiate with South Africa and those who reject this.
At the beginning of 1982, a campaign was launched against corruption, which involved appeals to the ranks. the prestigious military leader, Iko Carrera, emerged from his disgrace. On his return from Moscow, he was put at the head of a commission to reorganize the army. It is this same Iko Carrera who was the initiator of the plan adopted by the Central Committee special powers to Eduardo Dos Santos and provided for the ouster of Ambrosio Lukoki, a member of the Political Bureau and chief of information.
The purge affected certain ministers, in particular hitting the entourage of Lucio Lara, a member of the Political Bureau and considered to be the No.2 man in the regime. His wife was removed from her responsibilities training cadres. His adopted son
This crackdown was essential in order for the government to be able carry through its contacts with Pretoria, since the Luanda regime is not in a strong position. It had, therefore,
While Mozambique is not directly affected by the Namibian conflict, it is suffering from a similar policy being carried out against it by Pretoria through a different set of rebels. In this case, it is the Mozambique National Resistance, which has claimed responsibility for the sabotage of the petroleum storage tanks in December 1982 in the port of Beira, the country's second largest city. In Lesotho, moreover, Pretoria is supporting the Lesotho Liberation Army, which Is linked to the Basuto People's Congress in exile. Growing activity by the Mozambique National Resistance has forced the Mozambican army to carry out operations to keep the capital of Maputo from being cut off from the agricultural regions in the south.
A CAMP DAVID FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
It is becoming more and more clear that U.S. diplomacy is seeking not just a settlement of the question of Namibian independence but a settlement for the entire region based on a special alliance with South Africa, an ally that has undeniable military strength but which has the disadvantage of a poor political image created by its policy of apartheid
South Africa has, moreover, made a notable effort to demonstrate its military power in operations that it backs or carries out on its own. It made its latest demonstration of strength on the very heels of the Cape Verde discussions. In a murderous raid between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, South African forces killed thirty African National Congress activists and seven local people, five women and two children. This Israeli-style raid is not the only resemblance between these two countries, fire-breathing with diplomatic
The Maseru raid did not, in fact, prove an obstacle to South Africa continuing its contacts with Luanda. even permit itself the luxury of suggesting that SWAPO might well pay the price for a ceasefire with Angola. Answering questions from the foreign press on January 27, Pik Botha said: "Luanda offers them (the SWAPO fighters) shelter and support, knowing that they are going to do their dirty work in the neighboring territory. (Therefore) it is not essential to take SWAPO's viewpoint into account in an agreement between Angola and us."
The subsequent course of the negotiations and the evolution of the situation on the ground will indicate how likely it is that the imperialists will be able to carry out their plans.
The Political Commission of the European Assembly adopted a resolution on September 23, 1982, calling for the "dissolution under international control of the SWAPO military groups based in Angola." It also demanded "proper consideration for the ethnic realities
Namibia and rejection of SWAPO's claims to be the sole representative of the Namibian