International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

The repressive course of the Belaunde Terry regime in Peru

International Viewpoint No. 26, 21 March 1983 · pp 9-11 · 3,240 words

This text was corrected by hand against the scan: transcribed from the scan, pp.9-11 (19 Nov 2026): the contents list missed this item, an unsigned introduction and interview with Hugo Blanco (PRT, Peruvian section of the FI), and the split had run it into the end of Jean-Pierre Beauvais's Argentina report; now its own record, with footnotes 1-5 at the end and OCR slips corrected (seetors, imparialist, contronang, 'machismo?', PRI). Unsigned; the two photos (placards 'BLANCO'/'PRT'; a banner 'UNIDOS VENCEREMOS') carry no captions and are not reproduced. Two line-ends cut off at the scan's edge on p.10 supplied as certain (politica[l], organisa[-]tions). Printed slips kept: 'to salvaged by', 'imprisoning torturing', 'has lead to', 'these type of actions', 'peasants self-defence patrols', 'Sendero Luminoso have been able'; editorial '(Izquierda Unida — IV)' kept as printed

Latin America Peasants and land reform Repression and political prisoners Fourth International

The repressive course of the Belaunde Terry regime in Peru

Since December 1982 the front pages of the Peruvian daily newspapers have been preoccupied with the activities of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas, in the remote Ayacucho province.

The fight to combat the guerrillas has become the number one priority of the Belaunde Terry government. One of the events which has caused the biggest stir was the killing of eight Peruvian journalists in the area on January 26, 1983. The media claimed that the local peasant population had killed them, believing them to be Senderista guerrillas. But according to further reports the peasants state that they were carrying out the orders of the government to kill any strangers in their area.

To combat the guerrillas the government has declared a state of emergency in the province, and sent the army to allegedly 'reassure the population and protect the forces of law and order' (Liberation, Paris, January 25, 1983).

Sendero Luminoso has support among the local peasant population, and to an extent reflects the justified discontent, particularly of the young peasants, under the present government.

When he ran for president in May 1980, Belaunde Terry played heavily on the fact that he was ousted from the presidency by the so-called military coup for reform of October 3, 1968. But throughout the past three years his Accion Popular government has followed a more and more repressive course. The latest stage is his sending the army to stamp out the 'guerrilla war' in Ayacucho.

This repressive course has gone hand in hand with an economic policy openly favouring imperialist investors, which has led to the reprivatization of many sectors of the economy. Belaunde Terry's regime has shown no evidence of a desire to solve any of the fundamental problems, such as unemployment, malnutrition, infant mortality, and illiteracy.

More and more, the direction of the Belaunde Terry regime is symbolized by the Peruvian army commandos who have been scouring the streets of Ayacucho, knives in hand, chanting 'Terrorists, tonight we're coming into your house, and we're going to eat your guts and blow off your head.'

The fight against the guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso in the Cuzco area is going to be used as a pretext for stepping up the militarization of social and political life of the country. After all, did not the minister of war, Luis Cisnero Vizquerra, recently call for the support 'of all good Peruvians, in or out of uniform' against Sendero Luminoso (La Republica, Lima, December 29, 1982)?

In the May 1980 general elections Hugo Blanco was elected to parliament representing the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Peruvian section of the Fourth International). In this interview he explains the context in which Sendero Luminoso have been able to gain support through making a balance sheet of the first three years of the Belaunde Terry government, and explains the action perspectives and orientation of his party.

Question. How does the PRT assess the Belaunde Terry government?(1)

Answer. Fundamentally, this government represents the interests of the imperialists. In this period, when the system is in crisis, if it is to defend these interests, it can only do so by plunging the great majority of the population into hunger and poverty. Let's look at some central aspects of its economic policy.

What has marked this administration is strengthening the private sector. Facilities are being given to private enterprises, most of which are imperialist owned. The co-operatives and co-operative centres are being weakened or dissolved. Once they have been fragmented, they will fall easy prey to big capital. Finally, they have decreed a gradual privatisation of the public companies.

We can give some examples of this privatisation policy. Big advantages are given to the imperialist oil companies. At the same time the state oil company, Petroperu, is being run down. Measures are being taken in favour of the imperialist mining companies, and the state mining sector is contracting, particularly in the area of marketing. The nationalised steel industry is on the point of sinking, leaving the debris to salvaged by North American, Japanese and other imperialist companies. Fishing is another sector where the state company is being rundown in favour of capitalists. The national electricity company is not exempt from this policy either.

The objective of the government is to get agribusiness transferred into private hands. To this end, the co-operative organisations at all levels are being destroyed, and their property being offered to the big landowners (latifundistas) whose expansion the government supports.

As for imports, the way is open for foreign goods to flood the market and to destroy industry in the country.

Exports are becoming more and more concentrated into the hands of private firms. The state companies for internal trade are equally under attack, and that has serious consequences for the poorest layers of the population. The national income serves mainly to pay a gigantic external debt, which grows each year, and to finance military extravagance. The budgets for health, education, housing, and other things that are really necessary for the population, are being continually reduced.

The constant and more and more drastic devaluation of the national currency, the sol (2), is rapidly worsening the poverty of wage earners. As for the peasants, their loans are given in dollars! Given the galloping inflation, after a period, they have to pay back in soles twice what they received, plus the interest.

Certain diseases, which we thought belonged to history, have reappeared in Peru; malaria, rabies, etc. Infant mortality is increasing. Two children have to share the same cot in hospital, two women in labour have to share the same bed, children are being born in hospital corridors.

And in a country where the health service is so precarious, and getting worse, the private clinics and laboratories are getting richer. A United Nations study showed that there was overcharging of 400 per cent on medical imports.

Q. What is the present state of mass activity, and what role does the PRT play?

A. The pro-imperialist policy of the regime that is taking the bread out of people's mouths has hit hard against all sections of the population. The people have responded by vigorous mobilisations.

The workers in the companies in danger of privatisation have acted to defend the nationalised sector. In several enterprises, they have fought to defend their standard of living. In others, they are fighting against the illegal closure of the enterprises in question and against lay-offs. The peasants have had the first national general strike in their history, against governmental policy towards them. The co-operators are defending their co-operatives. The university students are defending the universities which are being stripped of resources. The neglected regions of the country are struggling to draw attention to their specific problems.

The most frequent forms of struggle are region-wide strikes; paralysis of activity at a regional level for one, two, or three days. There have been marches that have involved sacrifices, like the mineworkers of Canarias who, with their families, including the children, covered more than 700 kilometres. During this march 5 children died, as well as a woman who had just given birth, and a worker. The peasants block the roads, taking the land to build huts in which to live. This happened at El Palomar, where the police killed five inhabitants. Hunger strikes, and workplace occupations have also taken place.

Unhappily, these struggles have not been co-ordinated, which has considerably lessened their effectiveness. The leaderships of the workers confederations did not fulfil their duty to co-ordinate and centralise these struggles. The General Workers Confederation of Peru (CGTP), led by the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), would have been able to do so, but did not want to. Neither did the United Left (Izquierda Unida — IV), a coalition of most of the left, want to initiate a centralised struggle.

The PRT is in favour of co-ordinating and centralising the struggles of the workers and the exploited as much as possible. We consider that to be our fundamental task today. Unfortunately, our organisational weakness does not allow us to do this on a large scale.

Q. What is the meaning, and the real impact, of the Ayacucho guerrilla struggle? What does 'Sendero Luminoso' (Shining Path) represent?

A. Sendero Luminoso is a Maoist group with some very sectarian aspects. It considers that all those who do not support it are reactionaries who have to be eliminated.

It rejects participation in elections and devotes itself to guerrilla warfare. Cleverly, its activists began by preparing their troops for war through minor sabotage actions, and then soon took up guerrilla warfare. Their stronghold is the mountainous region of Ayacucho, one of the poorest and most remote regions, where there is strong religious feeling. This makes it easier to push such articles of faith as, 'The thought of comrade Gonzalo (the leader) guides the world revolution'.

The economic policy of the regime, which cuts so brutally against the interests of the population, and the failure of the mass leaderships to offer an alternative by mounting an effective struggle is leading to an increase in the actions and influence of Sendero Luminoso.

Fundamentally, the government has responded by repression. It enacted an 'antiterrorist' law — imprisoning torturing, raping, and assassinating the Senderistas, peasant leaders, and other people. But this has not enabled it to crush Sendero Luminoso, which has recently executed several well-known people in the area, amongst them the most powerful local figures. The guerrilla forces have also made numerous attacks and ambushes against the forces of repression, coupling these with new acts of sabotage.

Finally, the government has sent the army into the Ayacucho region, where it has inflicted even greater repression. It has carried out house to house searches, and given orders to shoot suspects on sight. This has not been very effective against Sendero Luminoso, which was able to call a strike against repression in the town of Ayacucho that mobilised 90 per cent of the population.

Other sabotage operations are being carried out in other areas of the country, including Lima. Unfortunately, the victims include peasant leaders of other sections of the left, members of peasant co-operatives, and leaders of organisations in non-Senderista areas.

However, it is notable that, despite all these negative factors, Sendero Luminoso, rather than being crushed by repression, is growing. This shows that the economic situation of the population is desperate, and that there are always more disappointed people, disappointed not only by the bourgeois political machines, but also by the mass organisations and the left parties.

The PRT is presently discussing these recent events.

Q. In recent months the conflicts in the countryside have worsened, which has lead to serious confrontations between the peasants and the government's repressive forces. Whilst Sendero Luminoso concretely poses the question of armed struggle, the rest of the left only seems to be concerned with the next elections. What is the political position of the PRT on armed self-defence, on peasants self-defence patrols (rondas campesinas) (3), etc?

A. During its last conference, the Confederacion de los Campesinos de Peru (CCP) (4) approved the proposal, which has been put forward several times by the PRT, of setting up a Self-defence Secretariat, to encourage and organise the peasants armed struggle against the armed repression of the government.

We know that this vote in itself is not enough, and that it will be necessary, on the basis of this agreement, to push forward the organisation of self-defence in the country areas. We understood, too, that this has to be done in line with the specific local conditions, without falling into adventurism.

In the past, we have taken part in these type of actions. Nowadays we can see the embryo of armed self-defence in what are called the rondas campesinas (peasants patrols) in the Cajamarca province, where the peasants have organised themselves to protect their cattle against thieves. This armed vigilance has already led to minor confrontations, including with the police, who aid and abet the thieves. We consider that this is an example of armed action organised by the masses, even if it is still only embryonic.

If the peasants continue these strike actions, including blocking the roads, governmental repression directed at the mass organisations in the countryside will force them to defend themselves with arms.

During the national civic strikes, the urban population began to gain experience in confronting armed repression. We think that the masses organised in the towns will also begin to develop armed self defence.

Q. The 1983 municipal elections are approaching; there's already a pre-election atmosphere. What is the position of the PRT on these elections? Do you have a policy of making electoral alliances? and, on that question, what is the balance sheet you make of the alliances you made in the past, FOCEP, ARI etc? What does the PRT think about the possibility of an electoral alliance between the APRA and the United Left?

A. Let's start on the balance sheet. The big discussions on this question, and the rapid development of the dynamic of the class struggle, have prevented the PRT from making a common balance sheet of the experiences of these fronts up till now.

My opinion is that the weight of sectarianism among the majority of Peruvian Trotskyists prevented, on both these occasions, our movement finding itself at the head of broad mass revolutionary fronts. Our weakness allowed the reformists, through the creation of the United Left (IU), to take advantage of the desire for unity among the masses. The reformist leadership of the latter front prevents it becoming an instrument for mass struggle. It serves to put a brake on it, and channel the masses towards electoralist illusions.

The PRT has still not decided on its policy for the municipal elections in November. Personally, I think that these elections will have less importance for the masses than the previous ones. A large part of them have lost any illusion that they can do very much to improve their situation through municipal elections. Moreover, apart from a few exceptions, the left mayors and municipal councillors have been absorbed into the system, and do not try to use their posts as an organising centre to support the struggles of the people against the government.

There are several possibilities for the PRT's participation — launching candidates of mass organisations; candidates of the PRT itself, either alone or as a member of one or several fronts; critical support for the IU candidates.

Given the character of the municipal elections, and the differences in political reality in various regions, it is most probable that these three different types of participation will be combined.

As for the possibility of an electoral alliance between APRA and IU — the PRT thinks it is a shameful betrayal for the IU to ally itself with a party of the right, which is involved in the repressive system. This helps to deceive the starving masses, when what they need is to turn toward self-organisation of their own struggles, independent from all the exploiters.

But, unfortunately for IU, it seems that APRA is declining its company this time.

Q. With reference to the other groups that claim to be Trotskyist, what relations does the PRT have with them at the moment? Are there possibilities for joint work? Is there any possibility of unification?

A. The PRT was created through the fusion of Trotskyist groups. We had the illusion that it would be possible to form a single party with the PST and POMR. But our efforts were in vain, and were exploited in a dishonest way by the comrades from the other groups.

At the present time we have undertaken to co-ordinate with the POMR-PST (that is the PST and a part of the POMR) for certain common activities, such as the formation of the Socialist Parliamentary Bloc. (5) We will try to go forward in this direction, as far as possible. We will make the same effort with the POMR.

However, we are conscious of the difficulties which arise because of the sectarianism that has traditionally marked these organisations, sectarianism towards the rest of the left, which is then reciprocated.

As for the possibility of unification, we think it is difficult at the moment for the reason I have just mentioned, and because of the lack of internal democracy in these parties, and because of their attitude towards us. They do not set their course in accordance with the needs of the class struggle in this country, but follow the orders they get from Nahuel Moreno or Pierre Lambert.

Naturally, the PRT wants to combine its efforts with all revolutionaries, through common work and fronts. If programmatic and political homogeneity makes unification possible, so much the better. We hope that the revolutionary process will lead to a convergence of many organisations.

1. The president, Fernando Belaunde Terry was the candidate of Accion Popular (AP) in the presidential elections in May 1980. This formation won 43% of the vote, on the basis of quite demagogic propaganda — which has been continually contradicted by the subsequent repressive policy of the regime.

Against all expectations these elections represented a serious defeat for the bourgeois populist organisation APRA which won only 25% of the vote, and for the left as a whole, which got 15 to 20%.

2. On the day that Belaunde Terry formally took office, July 28, 1980, the US dollar cost 290 soles. In July 1982 the exchange rate was 710 soles to one dollar — a drop in value of Peruvian currency of almost 150% in two years.

3. The 'peasant patrols' are a form of peasant self-organisation against the exactions of the cattle thieves. But most of the time, the police being associated with this activity, the 'peasant patrols' constitute peasant self-defence from the repression or passivity of representatives of the bourgeois state. These forms of organisation are an elementary stage of the mass self-defence process in the peasant community.

4. The Sixth National Congress of the CCP took place in Lima on 16-21 July, 1982. In the issue of Combate Socialista (paper of the PRT) for the first fortnight of October 1982, Hugo Blanco — who was re-elected a member of the National Executive Committee and secretary for human rights of the CCP — made a first assessment of the congress.

Among its positive aspects, he emphasised the attendance of 1,201 delegates and guests, the degree of rank-and-file involvement in the discussion, the comradely spirit of the debates, the points of agreement that came out, and the 'vigorous intervention of peasant women, demanding their rights and combatting machismo'.

The PRT, for the first time, had a political intervention in this congress as a member organisation of the Confederation. It presented documents, and peasant members of the PRT took part in the debates and commissions.

5. In a September 15, 1982, meeting, the parliamentary representatives of the PRT and the POMR-PST (unified party) decided to form a Parliamentary Socialist Bloc. This Bloc made its first intervention in parliament when the government of Premier Manuel Ulloa was called to give an account of its policies in September. The APRA voted with the opposition against the government, provoking a Cabinet reshuffle. In a declaration adopted on December 16, 1982, the Bloc pledged to 'make the voices of the exploited heard in parliament', and 'from this position to give impetus to the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses'.

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