Solidarnosc activists speak...
has sent a letter on this subject to comrade Jaruzelski, and, in response, conditions have been made precise. Although
Glem had been very insistent that he wanted to meet comrade Jaruzelski during the last few weeks, he held back when
We publish here two lengthy extracts from interviews with underground leaders of he saw that the trade union law was going
Solidarnosc, made in Poland by Claude Sevrac. The Solidarnose leaders come from two to be voted on by the Diet. On our side very different regions of the country: Swidnik and Silesia, in the south-east.
we warned the Church that in the case of made in mid-October, workers resistan in Poland today. Thus, they also shed light on the situation that repeated actions and the use of masses against the state we would:
exists now, after the failure of the general strike called by the Temporary Co-ordinat-
1) Conduet public polemics, we would ing Committee of Solidarnose for November 10, and the release of Lech Walesa.
lift the embargo on news concerning the
We have already practice of the Church.
had an example in yesterday's newspaper, where it clearly stated priest was the organiser of such events.
2) Begin a Publie Prosecutor's investigation against those priests who get involved in clear anti-state activitiy in their
That would not be a simple thing. The affair is complicated and also has, let us say, negative aspects, but the state must do something so that we do not think the
Church can do what it likes. The government does not want to enter into a struggle with the Church, we do not need any new fronts of struggle. Then, if one day we want, let us say, to limit the room for the Church, that could only take place when the times have changed. I say this because often during party meetings there have been shouts of the type, 'Let us have it out once and for all with this Church!'
It is easy to shout such slogans but the reality is that the Church is there, and we must come to agreement with it.
FORMALLY THE STATE OF WAR
WILL BE LIFTED
To finish, let me take up the question of the state of war. As far as lifting the state of war is concerned, our decisions have not changed. Today the leadership of the party and the state wishes to proceed to lifting the state of war towards the end of the year. Despite these last two events, those of Tuesday, August 31, and the most recent (October 10), we have not changed our decision. There are at least two anniversary dates ahead of us
- Wednesday, November 10, and Monday,
December 13. We will see.
that in raising or suspending the state of war we will give special powers to the government. I'm thinking for example of the militarisation of the enterprises as a way of strengthening the discipline of the workers, proclaiming a 'state of emergency' in certain regions, and perhaps throughout the country, that is powers that will allow us to act rapidly to calm the situation. But - formally - the state of war will be lifted. I emphasise once more that, for the moment, our intentions remain unchanged from those that comrade Jaruzelski reported to the Diet.
IN SWIDNIK: THE SITUATION AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF
The situation today is even more explosive than after Sunday December 13, in my opinion. First of all because the fear, which was a mass phenomenon during the first months of the state of war, has, if not disappeared, at least decreased. The people are used to it, they have seen internees come back, they have seen sacked workers - at any rate when they are skilled workers - get work again. Here, in Swidnik, there were more than 3,000 workers sacked in all in the aircraft work again because there can be no production without them. It's common to see the military commissar sack workers one day, and the factory manager take them on again the next.
Another aspect is the crazy character of the repression. Taking a leaflet in the street means risking seven years in prison, the risk for leading an underground organisation is the same, there's no gradation. So, the people have ended up getting used to repression, and, as solidarity between the victims of repression is strong, and they know they can count on the support of the trade union, the people continue
The outlawing of all the trade unions on Friday October 8 united the people. Even those from the sectoral or autonomous unions(1) reacted violently - those few who were not careerists. One worker even said*o me, 'I wouldn't be surprised if they celebrated a Mass at the Central Committee tomorrow. They don't have any principles.' No leadership team has been hated as much as Jaruzelski's. This is the basis of the present combativity this hate, and deep conviction that it can-
Another element in the situation is the demoralisation of the repressive forces. We know that the army is considered unreliable. If Solidarnose did serious work within it, that could bring results, quickly. But what is new is the demoralisation of ZOMO. They have been kept away from home too long. We have learnt that there are often rows among them, and I that they fire over each other sometimes understand the when they are drunk. They are corrupt, and get into lots of black market dealing, in fuel in particular. This is important because it means the ZOMO is no longer an obedient machine. It could well be that one day the confusion in its ranks will manifest itself in the street.
The boycott of the new unions is massive. Even though the regime's project is to make them above all a social aid agency, able to distribute a little pile of privileges to entice people, this project is utopian. Given the economic situation there are no carrots to distribute.
THE SITUATION OF SOLIDARNOSC
What is working well in our region, and beyond that in the whole Lublin region, is aid to the victims of repression and trade union education programs. The second aspect is important. It gives the university youth in particular something to do, and thus keeps a gap from developing between these youth and the rest of the union, as has happened in certain other regions. But that is not to say that everything is going better. There are huge difficulties of communication between the enterprises. People distrust each other. If they don't know each other they avoid making contact, for fear of being picked out. What's more, sometimes the political police (SB) themselves try to organise the co-ordination, and that can only strengthen people's distrust after-
But the principal problem is the political disorientation of the majority of the leaderships. The illusion of Jacek Kuron, that we can reach a historic compromise with the bureaucracy, is still present among many of the trade union activists. This has led to many actions that are more directed at showing the regime that we exist than shifting the relationship of forces in our favour. What the workers want is actions that bring results, even limited ones. Fewer and fewer people, particularly among the most politicised, are ready to take risks for what seems a
These are the sectoral unions that continued in existence after the official confederathemselves self-managed they the same membership and leadership.
symbolic struggle. And for how long can one put forward the same demands without concrete perspectives for achieving them?
Without this the union leaderships are going to seem more and more cut off from their base, isolated. Particularly if tactical errors are made because of this lack of strategy. For example, the slogan of a boycott of the official press was launched right in the middle of the football World Cup, in July 1982. This is an attitude of intellectuals, of experts. The worker will hesitate, pace up and down in front of the kiosk, and end up buying the newspaper which, for once, contains something interesting. And the leadership which took such a decision discredits itself and discredits the union.
THE OUTLOOK
I am very sceptical about the idea of a general strike, as it has been put forward today. The workers say it clearly: a general strike which consists of shutting oneself up in the factory and occupying them will change nothing. Because in that situation it will be the police who determine the duration of the strike. The strike will stop when the factory is taken by assault. The effects of the previous strikes - and in the spring there were strike calls practically every week — also weigh on the consciousness of the workers. strikes achieved nothing. In return thousands of workers were sacked and hundreds imprisoned. Therefore I am worried that the people will not follow the order to strike on Wednesday November 10. Not because they are unprepared to fight or because they are depoliticised but, on the contrary, because they think in a political way, and they see that this strike is not part of an overall perspective, that once again it is a symbolic action.
The people are ready to take on a hard struggle, on condition that the Solidarnosc leadership has an overall strategy for the workers. They are even ready for a general strike, in as much as this strike leads on to the question of power. Without that they think it is a game, and the workers are not pawns.
If there was an overall programme, which clearly posed the question power, then the people would be prepared to make big sacrifices. They would even be ready - as has begun to happen in this region - to go into the army to do work there. But nobody will make sacrifices without perspectives. This is therefore the main weakness of Solidarnosc today. The lack of strategy, and a leadership which knows where it wants to go, and goes there without hesitating at every moment.
IN SILESIA: ON DEMONSTRATIONS
I am opposed to street demonstrations. For one thing, because the terrain is the most favorable to the regime, which can use them for propaganda purposes, provoking disturbances, then using them to discredit our movement. And, for 10 another thing, because the price we pay for these demonstrations is too high, out of all proportion to the results that we can expect. Even if the authorities 'tolerate' such assemblies, as they did on Friday September 3, at Jastrzebie, where police didn't attack the assembled workers, everyone was filmed, and then summoned three days later and given heavy fines, 18-20,000 zlotys (more than double the official average wage). The amount to pay in these fines took a good deal of the union's finances which, you can be sure, made our work a lot more difficult.
the demonstrations last August 31 were only partially negative, Release of Polish internees (DR). the fact that they showed tens of thousands of people ready for anything was completely positive.
### REPRESSION
Everyone knows about the massive arrests, the internments, the trials...I would like to draw attention to another, less known, aspect of the repression. First of all the fact that the foremen have all the rights in the enterprises. From this point of view the situation is worst in the mines in Silesia. The foremen there earn 50-60,000 zlotys per month, (official average salary 8-9,000 zlotys) and are ready to do anything to keep this privileged position. And the miners' wages depend on them. A miner earns from 6,000depending on the post allocated. And, with 6,000 zlotys, you can't feed a family in Silesia, where the prices are higher than in other regions. The second aspect is the sackings. In July for example, six miners were sacked from one of the mines for trifling reasons. Some workers asked the military commissar for permission to collect money for their comrades then unemployed. The commissar gave permission, and three days later sacked them in turn.
We have to say clearly; the working class today is divided. On the one hand, because the regime does everything possible to divide them.— following the old adage 'Divide and rule'. For example, it is obvious that decree 199 - against which Solidarnose fought before December 13, which fixed much higher wages miners, introduced an objective division - the other workers considered the miners as privileged, as people who were not quite reliable.
On the other hand, there's a division from the point of view of perspectives One could say that there are three currents. The first, a radical one, is in favour of street demonstrations, of taking power straight away. But this is unrealistic, and this type of adventurism is dangerous. The second current thinks that it is neces sary to prepare for a general strike. But that first requires the unity of all workers, and the strengthening of organisation and co-ordination. Such a strike, with self-defence of the enterprises, which could become an active strike if we were able to do so, would put the regime in a cleft stick — either to give up or to accept a compromise. And this compromise would favour the workers to the extent that they were strong and well organised. It's our strength which would determine the nature of the compromise. The third current is those who have lost every hope and are apathetic. The first two are very definitely in the resistance, the third obviously less so.
Finally we should note a few negative points within the resistance. First of all, the different groups have a tendency to withdraw into themselves for fear of police infiltration, which makes co-ordination difficult, and is a handicap in circulating the underground press. The atmosphere of fear also means that while lots of people are ready to take part in initiatives one by one, those who are active day to day in the underground structures are a lot fewer. And, finally, we should recognise that the intiatives called by the underground leadership do not always correspond to what the workers are ready to do. For example, the 15 minute strike in May was a failure. In
Silesia there were not many who were prepared to take a big risk for a symbolic
So, we have to say clearly that our orientation has to be for a lengthy struggle because, to organise a general strike, we have to overcome the present divisions, and also have a clear and concrete programme, which we don't have today.
THE DIFFICULTIES IN CENTRALISING THE TRADE UNION
The co-ordination of trade-union activities is essential. But we have to say that today we are only just starting. The conditions of. clandestinity are an obvious and objective barrier, but I think that with time we will get to a situation where, one way or another, each action will be collectively decided.
Without throwing stones at the Temporary Co-ordinating Commission (TKK) of Solidarnosc, because these are working in very difficult conditions, we have to point out that some of their decisions indicate how isolated they are, their lack of direct contact with the enterprises. For example, their calls for demonstrations at a time when society as a whole did not want street demonstrations. Or the calls for strikes which were not always followed, which undermine the credibility of the union as a whole.
It was to overcome this that the Interregional Committee for the Defence Solidarnosc (MKO) was formed of workers from the big enterprises. This is not a parallel structure. On the contrary the workers want to help the TKK, by providing a relay into the factories. At present the MKO covers 13 regions, most of its members are workers, and they all had, at different levels, responsibilities in movement before the crackdown.
There is, lastly, another national structure, that was formed on the Baltic coast, the Second National Commission, (II KK).
It involves about fifty enterprises.
### PERSPECTIVES
I have said, we must prepare a general strike. But we have to point out at once that this is not an immediate perspective. Today, a general strike is unrealistic. First, we have to create a strong national structure, strengthen links between the many underground groups in the enterprises, so that information and discussions can circulate more widely.
Next, we have to overcome the present divisions - presenting a programme and precise aims which can mobilise all the workers, whatever their religious beliefs or the ideologies they have adopted. Nothing can be done unless the workers constitute an organised mass movement.
On the level of aims, we have to show the link between the present struggle for often limited objectives, and our general aim - workers power.