International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Latest Iranian Offensive

International Viewpoint No. 19, 13 December 1982 · p 10 · 1,247 words

Middle East

Lat The third major Iranian offensive aimed at Iraqi territory ended in mid-November, with an Iraqi counterattack. It was the last offensive the Iranians were able to launch before the onset of the winter, which in the area of the fighting means severe weather in the mountains and, in the lowlands, rains that turn this desert region into a sea of mud.

From now until the spring at least, any fighting on the front will take on a different character. In recent months, the Iraqis have had total control of the air, as well as a superiority in tanks and artillery. These advantages are reduced by bad weather conditions.

That sort of bloody advance through the mud and cold, however, could only be launched if the Iranian homefront is prepared to accept the same sort of casualties in the new offensive phase of the war. The winter will be the test of that. But indications are that the Iranian people are not prepared for that kind of war, even if some sections of youth still have the old enthusiasm.

Since the failure of the first Iranian offensive against Iraqi territory in the summer, the nature of the Iranian operations changed fundamentally. The first offensive was a drive to win a decisive victory. It involved committing large numbers of troops and volunteers to a frontal assault. The subsequent offensives have been on a tactical scale involving limited regular-army forces. The reason for this is obvious.

In the first offensive, the Iranian forces suffered very heavy casualties, which apparently now represented too high a political cost for the regime.

It seems symptomatic that throughout the two-year campaign of large-scale warfar on Iranian territory, the Khomeini government did not resort to general conscription, since it got large numbers of volunteers.

However, in the early phase of the November offensive, a decree was issued are working in very difficult conditions, we have to point out that some of their decisions indicate how isolated they are, their lack of direct contact with the enterprises. For example, their calls for demonstrations at a time when society as a whole did not want street demonstrations. Or the calls for strikes which were not always followed, which undermine the credibility of the union as a whole.

It was to overcome this that the Interregional Committee for the Defence of Solidarnosc (MKO) was formed of workers from the big enterprises. This is not a parallel strueture. On the contrary the workers want to help the TKK, by providing a relay into the factories. At present the MKO covers 13 regions, most of its members are workers, and they all had, at different levels, responsibilities in the movement before the crackdown.

There is, lastly, another national structure, that was formed on the Baltic coast, the Second National Commission, (I KK). est Iranian offen calling for conscription of all youth between 1 and 23. It is probably significant also that this decree was issued at the same time as the first victories won by the Iranian army since last summer.

The reports in the international press, and suggestions in the Iranian press as well, indicate that the Iranian forces did not consolidate any gains inside Iraq. But they did penetrate a few miles across the border, unlike the previous offensive in October that was stopped cold at the frontier. This incursion threatened to cut off Iraqi troops still stationed across the Iranian border, forcing their evacuation.

Thus, the Iran government could claim both a successful invasion of Iraq and the liberation of Iranian territory. Since the summer, every time Iranian troops cross the Iraqi border, the government-controlled press starts counting the miles still to go to Bagdad. Actually, the Iranian gains this time were pretty thin gruel to feed a propaganda campaign.

Since the Iraqi government has offered to withdraw its troops behind the old frontiers if the Iranian force stop their attempt to mount an invasion of Iraq, the continuation of the fighting can hardly be justified by the taking of the few areas inside Iran still in Iraqi hands. The only justification of the war that will stick with the Iranian people now is if it deals major blows to the Saddam regime and appears likely to bring it down.

The Khomeini regime's total control of the press and mass media and its control of a number of transmission-belt mass organizations made it possible for it to make a lot of noise about the gains in the first part of the offensive. But this becomes quickly counter-productive if the claims are not confirmed, at least in part, by the experience of the masses.

Corrupt and worldly journalists do not win wars, nor do mindless cheerleaders. Moreover, Saddam has the same sort of cheerleading setup, if its links with a mass

It involves about fifty enterprises.

### PERSPECTIVES

I have said, we must prepare a general strike. But we have to point out at once that this is not an immediate perspective. Today, a general strike is unrealistic. First, we have to create a strong national structure, strengthen links between the many underground groups in the enterprises, so that information and discussions can circulate more widely.

Next, we have to overcome the present divisions - presenting a programme and precise aims which can mobilise all the workers, whatever their religious beliefs or the ideologies they have adopted. Nothing can be done unless the workers constitute an organised mass movement.

On the level of aims, we have to show the link between the present struggle for often limited objectives, and our general aim - workers power. sive revolutiomary process are much weaker and more remote. At the end of the present offensive, the Baghdad regime made corresponding hoopla about "annihilating" another Iranian assault, as they have done before with considerable justification in fact. On the other hand, it is harder to arouse enthusiasm about defensive victories, especially when the Iranian offensives keep coming.

The situation could change if the Khomeini regime is able to mount a mass attack during the winter, or if it can resume its tactical offensives in the spring and begin to wear down and break up the Iraqi defense and thereby demoralize the Iraqi homefront.

But for the moment, the political results of the war since the Iranian forces reached the Iraqi frontier remain clear. The population of Iraq has lined up behind the regime. The Iranian forces have shifted to a style of warfare that indicates they are not looking forward to any mass uprising against Saddam. Signs continue to appear that the Khomeini regime is running out of steam politically. For example, the Kurdish resistance leaders say that the offensive the government launched against the Kurds after its victory in Khorramshahr has lost its push.

In these conditions, the political evolution in Iran in the next months will likely prove decisive for the outcome of the war, as well as for the more fundamental questions of the fate of the Iranian revolutionary process and the stability of the capitalist system in the region. Therefore, it is particularly important now to look at the way the Khomeini leadership gained an maintained its control. This issue of IV has an analysis of what happened to the working-class movement in Iran before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. In a coming issue, we will have articles that will go in detail into what has happened to the workers movement during the war itself. • 11

← Solidarnosc Activists Speak ... — Document · War Danger Mounts in Central America →

Something wrong on this page?