International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

War Danger Mounts in Central America

· International Viewpoint No. 19, 13 December 1982 · pp 11-12 · 1,379 words

Latin America United States

War danger mounts in

Central America

Jean-Pierre BEAUVAIS In his November 29-December 4 tour of Latin America, Ronald Reagan has two stops in Central America. One, in Costa Rica, was planned long ago. The other, in Honduras, was added to his itinerary at the last moment.

In Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital, the American president has several meetings scheduled. One, to be sure, is with the constitutional president, Suazo Cordova. But Reagan is also meeting Suazo Cordova's military chief of staff, General Alvarez, an avowed supporter of "military action" against neighboring Nicaragua.

Reagan will also meet the Guatemalan dictator, Rios Montt, who bears direct responsibility for the massacre of thousands of Indian peasants, although this has not kept him from being classitied as a "defender of human rights" by the White House bigwigs.

According to the official announcement, at the top of the agenda will be the bilateral relations between the U.S. and each of its two allies. What this involves is a new step-up in aid programs to the Guatemalan military, which is engaged in "counterinsurgency" operations of a growing scope, and an accelerated militarization of Honduras, so as to prepare it as soon as possible to assume fully its role of the bastion of counter-revolution and American military base in the region.

The importance of Reagan's visit to Tegucigalpa, however, goes far beyond this. Both in the case of Nicaragua and El Salvador, the American administration is facing some crucial choices. And Reagan's discussions in Honduras may have a decisive effect on them. 1 2

For three years now, Washington has been waging an "undercover war" against Nicaragua, as the U.S. magazine Newsweek recently put it. The U.S. did not hesitate to back ambushes, sabotage, or the massacre of isolated communities in order to create a climate of insecurity in Nicaragua and force the Sandinista government to devote a growing part of its human and material resources to defense.

Washington sought to get Nicaragua bogged down in a military confrontation at the same time as it took measures designed to strangle the country economically.

A lot of people in Washington and in the Central American capitals are convinced that it is time to move into a new stage of this "destabilization plan." They think that the time has come to make full use of the "three to five thousand" counterrevolutionaries "massed at a dozen bases along the Honduran frontier." (See the December 8 issue.) In other words, it is necessary to "create the conditions" for an invasion of Nicaragua.

This gives the full import to Colonel Buchanan's testimony: "The information I got in Central America is that a war between Honduras and Nicaragua is going to begin in December." That is what he told the U.S. legislators who questioned him.

Is Reagan going to follow the logic of his Central American policy to the end? Will he give the greenlight for a massive invasion of Nicaragua? That is unquestionably the most important subject for discussion in his stop in Honduras.

Obviously, many political factors, both domestic and international, will affect his final choice. Some of these factors weigh on the side of postponing such a decision, such as the change of regime in the Kremlin. But in Tegucigalpa there will be strong pressures for unleashing the military machine that has been built up steadily since the victory of the Sandinista revolutionaries.

Another no less crucial choice that the American imperialists will have to make concerns El Salvador. Here the decision will be linked to the one concerning Nicaragua, from which it is in many respects inseparable.

In El Salvador, the revolutionists of the FMLN launched a series of large-scale actions over October, the most extensive for at least a year. By occupying important towns in the provinces of Chalatenango and Morazan, blocking the main thoroughfares, cutting off the capital several times, and successfully resisting a number of military counteroffensives, the guerrillas demonstrated that they had neither been "isolated" nor "decimated," as the government's spokesmen had claimed. At the same time, they showed that the government is by no means on the way to "controlling virtually all of the country," as Washington has been suggesting for some time.

Of course, the revolutionists are not yet in a position to win a decisive victory over the junta's forces. They are the first to recognize this. But the junta has shown itself still incapable of dealing any decisive blows to the FMLN fighters.

The political advantages the junta counted on getting out of the March 28 "elections," have proved finally to be very limited. Even the financial and technical aid of the imperialists, their massive arms shipments, and their intensive training of new "elite units" for counterinsurgency warfare have not enabled the junta to turn the relationship of forces on the ground in its favor.

It was in this context that the leaders of the FMLN-FDR dramatically renewed their offer of negotiations.

On October 26 in Mexico City, Guillermo Ungo for the Executive Committee of the FDR, and Ana Guadalupe Martinez for the FMLN, proposed a "rapid opening of direct dialogue without any preconditions." Such discussions would involve "neither humiliation nor surrender by either of the two parties." They would "put the unity of the Salvadoran family above any special individual or group interests."

The very terms of this proposal have aroused debate among the Salvadoran revolutionists. But they were finally endorsed by all the sectors that make up the FMLN-FDR. What is more, while continuing to give total support to the fighters of the martyred Salvadoran people, the Cuban leaders are favorable to a search

for a negotiated settlement. Several of their more recent statements clearly go in this direction.

Formally, the FMLN-FDR initiative was rejected by the spokespersons of the regime. But, over and above this, it aroused numerous and divergent reactions in the military and political circles that support the regime.

Major d'Aubuisson, head of the Republican Nationalist Alliance, the main far-right group, and chairman of the so-called Constituent Assembly that was elected on March 28, categorically rejected negotiations in principle. As he saw it, "even thinking about negotiations is treason."

But the Constituent Assembly disassociated itself from the extremism of its chairman, rejecting the motion that he presented, which excluded "any attempt at dialogue or discussion with the terrorist minorities."

The so-called president, Alvaro Magana — in fact the puppet of the sections of the general staff grouped around General Garcia, the minister of defense -has publicly envisaged the naming of a "peace commission."

This commission could propose the entry of representatives of the Salvadoran left into the city councils, which will be up for reelection in early 1984, on condition that it first lay down its arms. The Catholic hierarchy and particularly Monsignor Rivera y Damas, the influential archbishop of San Salvador, are pushing for such a settlement.

Facing a military impasse and growing dissention among its allies, which have been thrown on the defensive politically, the U.S. imperialists are going to have to try to make a decisive move soon to avert a rapid deterioration in the position of those trying to defend their fundamental interests in El Salvador.

What will the U.S. do? Beef up its military aid again? Swell the already large number of "military advisers"? Take a more direct part in the fighting? All these options mean increasing the U.S.'s stake on the more and more dubious prospect of crushing the insurgent forces.

Or will the U.S. imperialists go for opening up negotiations, and risking clashes among their allies. This is obviously a difficult choice. And a desire to assess the implications more thoroughly was undoubtedly a factor in the decision to include Honduras in the presidential junket.

At no time since the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979 has the Nicaraguan revolution been as directly threatened as it is today. Never has its fate been so closely tied up with that of the Salvadoran fighters.

Everything possible must be done to assure that the repeated cries of alarm raised by the Sandinista leaders do not go unheeded. This is necessary to avoid the worst - an invasion of Nicaragua and the isolation of the Salvadoran fighters, which in the long term would prove fatal. The decisive moments seem to be approaching.

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