LEBANON Cooling-off period for Syria in Lebanon THE BOMBING raids carried out by the United States against Colonel Qadhafi had repercussions in the region that went far beyond the borders of Libya.
Salah Jaber, a leader of the Lebanese section of the Fourth International, talked to Gerry Foley on September 10 about new developments regarding Syria's intervention into Lebanon, in the context of changes in the regional and international context following the US attacks.
Question. What is your balance sheet of Syria's attempt to pacify Lebanon?
Answer. It's useful to look at the situation of Syrian politics in the light of events since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982. (1)
From then until early 1984 saw a first phase of developments, during which Syria was excluded from direct influence on the Lebanese government, represented by President Amin Gemayel, and was replaced with the direct sponsorship of the United States. They were represented on the spot by US troops, who were part of the multinational forces in Lebanon. Still under the impact of the Israeli invasion, the Syrian regime waited to see how the situation would develop and what the response of the Gemayel government would be to the new situation.
After the turning point of the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty in May, 1983 - which was considered to be a direct challenge against the Syrian government - the Syrians gave a green light to the bourgeois Muslim opposition forces in Lebanon to launch their attack against the government and against the presence of the multinational forces. From early 1984 onwards, following the victory of this offensive launched and backed by the Syrians, the multinational forces had to withdraw and Gemayel had no, choice but to tum to Damascus. This opened up a new phase, with the Syrian regime having a renewed direct influence, if not hegemony, over the Lebanese central government.
From here until the end of 1985 there were intensive attempts by the Syrian government to reach a form of compromise between the contending bourgeois factions in Lebanon in order to stabilize a pro-Syrian goverment, a pro-Syrian state. This seemed to reach a peak in 1985, after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the major part of Lebanese occupied territory. At this time, Syrian control seemed to be stronger than ever. The first reaction against this Syrian hegemony in the Christian camp was defeated - this was the first rebellion led by Geagea. Hobeika took control, officially, of the so-called Lebanese forces - the fascist Christian militias — with a new politics of cooperating with the Syrians.
These events created the conditions at the end of 1985 for the Syrian regime to take an important, qualitative step forward in its drive to reach a compromise allowing it to stabilize a pro-Syrian government in Lebanon. That was expressed in December, 1985, by the conclusion of a treaty between the three main contending military factions - the Shiite Amal, and Druze led by Walid Jumblatt and the Christians led by Hobeika.
Shortly afterwards the whole thing collapsed with a new turn-about in the Christian camp, which put Geagea in control of the Lebanese forces again, and with the ousting of Hobeika and his people on January 15, 1986. At the same time this gave a mortal blow to the agreement signed in December 1985, and to the Syrian hegemony over the Christian camp.
The situation then reverted to a resemblance of the period before 1984. That is, the Christian camp
1. See "The political terrain after the Israeli withdrawal" interview with Salah Jaber, International Viewpoint' No. 73, April 8, 1985.
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
again looked to be under US influence very clearly, contesting Syrian hegemony and in opposition to the proSyrian forces. Even Israel itself was again directly interfering in Lebanese polities through Geagea, who is well-known to have links with the Israelis.
There are some differences between Gemayel's forces - including the Kataeb Party - who are pro-American, and Geagea's militias which are slight, but which can be important. Even recently, some clashes have occured and can blow up again at any time, because these are rival forces within the Christian camp who sometimes have differing political lines. Gemayel is very opportunistic, but basically submissive to classical bourgeois interests, whereas Geagea can be accurately described as a fascist in the Lebanese context.
Going back to the situation from early this year onwards, the first violent reactions of Syria were translated into car-bombings in the Christian areas. After this it appeared as though the Syrian government decided to cool down. This was in the context of the regional situation, including the US bombing raids on Libya, and increasing warnings given by Israel to the Syrian regime with very strong rumours of war on the Israeli side. (2) This led to the recent talks between Christians and Muslims in the Lebanese government which aimed to conclude some truce. But even this very modest aim is apparently very difficult to attain.
Q. What does Gemayel and his government really represent at this point?
A. The Gemayel government represents two things. As an official government, its strength stems from the support it has had until now from the Christian section of the legal army, which cannot be neglected as a military force. It is relatively well-armed, given that the Lebanese government and the US have put special emphasis on strengthening this army since 1983. In Lebanon it's also an important fact that Gemayel is still the official president of the country, which can make his authority useful either to the US or to the Syrians as an official cover for any political moves. In addition to these two factors, Gemayel has his own militia, mainly in one part of the Christian area, which is traditionally his base. These are the three sources of his power.
As regards popular support, Gemayel has none at all because he's very much discredited and his reputation as a corrupt man is very strong in Lebanon.
Q. But to what extent is he still a card for the Syrians to play, do you think?
A. He rebelled against the Syrians when they were preparing the agree. ment of December, 1985, not so much because of the content of the agreement as that it was done without him. At that time Gemayel was left on one side as the Syrians dealt directly with Hobeika. He collaborated with Geagea's overthrow of Hobeika and since then links seemed to be severed between Gemayel and the Syrians.
When it became clear that Hobeika was out, the Syrians hopes and calculations which had been built on the Hobeika leadership of the Lebanese forces collapsed. With the latter appearing to become an irreversibly anti-Syrian and even pro-Israeli force, Gemayel became again - in the eyes of the Syrians - the only possible interlocutor of the Syrians in the Christian camp. This led him to make new proposals to the Syrians which in
The El Amal office in Beirut (DR)
tur led to renewed friction between himself and Geagea's forces, which I referred to earlier. The Syrian regime had the choice then of either pushing their own supporters in a drive to oust Gemayel, to launch a new stage in the war, or their present politics of cooperating even if they have not yet decided to have direct talks with Gemayel.
The fact that the government met with the Muslim pro-Syrian and the Christian pro-Gemayel ministers, and that this could not have been done without a Syrian decision, is significant. This is in the framework of what I called a cooling down period, chosen by the Syrians at that stage because it seemed to them too dangerous to let the situation blow up right now in the present international context.
Q. Have there been significant changes in the relationship of forces among the Muslim groups in this period?
A. Concerning the Sunni Moslems, they are the weakest confessional group of all in Lebanon because traditionally they used to consider Yasser Arafat's Fatah as their armed wing, but then they were kicked out of the country by the Israelis and the Syrians. What used to be considered as a Lebanese Sunni armed organization, mainly the Murabitoun, have been crushed by the pro-Syrian forces - not only because of Syrian decisions, but also as a result of rivalry between the Druze militias, the Shiites and the Sunnis, the Murabitoun. Excepting Sidon in the south of the country, where there are local so-called Nasserite armed organizations which have good links with the Syrians and the rest of the pro-Syrian forces, there are no other Sunni organizations.
In Tripoli in the north, the fundamentalist Sunni forces which dominated the town were crushed by the Syrian military in 1985 in alliance with leftist parties which had been previously kicked out of the town by the same Sunni fundamentalists. The main figures today in the Sunni milieu are the traditional bourgeois figures, like Rashid Karami, who are desperately weak. They have no autonomy, and no basis for autonomy of any kind.
On the Shite side, the new factor after Amal established its overwhelming hegemony over the Shites in 1983-4, has been the development of the fundamentalist wing, the Khomeiniite wing, which is directly linked to Iran. This tendency, the
2. See "A new war on the horizon" interview with Michel Warschawsky (leader of the Israeli section of the Fourth International), 'IV" No. 103, July 14, 1986.
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Hezbollah, witnessed some real developments last year and in recent months. Various factors may explain this phenomenon. On the one hand, the Syrian politicking, in which Amal took part, collapsed, and so any hopes in this direction on the part of the masses became just impossible.
There is also a very strong deepening of the economic crisis to unprecedented levels in Lebanon. In the country, because of the war situation of more than 11 years, most of the productive sector has been destroyed. Most consumer goods are now imported. Just to give an example of the depth of this crisis, the US dollar against the Lebanese pound went from £4.5 in 1983 to £45 today. You can imagine what this must have meant for the standard of living of a population which has no sliding scale of wages or anything similar, such as exist in France or in Israel, and which can soften the impact of inflation. The gap between the inflationary rise in prices and wages is huge and widening day by day. This is disastrous and we can say this without exaggerating. This disastrous social and economic situation provides a breeding ground for fundamentalist forces to appear as radical and to exploit the despair of the petit-bourgeois population in the absence of any alternative leftist force which can appear credible.
The Lebanese left has witnessed a very sharp decrease of its influence since 1982. The Lebanese Communist Party had an opportunity of reversing this demise in 1984 because of the role they played in the resistance to the Israeli occupation. But they lost this opportunity mainly for two reasons. First, while they played a prominent role in the resistance to French troops in Lebanon (DR) 12 the Israelis, they played no role at all in internal politics but continued to tailend Muslim bourgeois forces and the Syrians. So they were part of the general bankruptey or failure of these politics.
Second, they did not and they do not play a role as a communist party in reacting to the social and economic situation. They organize no action. They are not pointing to the real solutions which can only be a total radical change of the Lebanese economy. You cannot continue in a war situation with such a totally liberal economy - Lebanon's is the most liberal in the world. Bank secrecy and freedom of business, of enterprise in Lebanon is incomparable to anywhere else in the world. All the more so since the war because now there is no state so it's a total mess. The Communist Party, which is faced by rivalry from the fundamentalists, has been suffering attacks - including killings - from the Hezbollah. Instead of having resolute answers to such assaults, the Party continuously calls for the necessity of strengthening the unity of the national and Muslim front and so on. This position of retreat, and even cowardice in facing the fundamentalists, is also a strong factor in the weakening of the Party and its influence. This even has a marked effect on the rank and file of the Party, which is very much frustrated by the present line and politics of the leadership.
Q. What is the present state of the resistance to the Israeli security zone in the south and the attitude to UN troops? A. As regards present clashes between UN forces and pro-Iranian Shite groups in southern Lebanon
- who are mainly French troops -this is more linked to Iranian politics than really to local issues. The decision to make attacks against UN forces came from Iran, along with a statement by the Iranians of a rejection of the resolution that the United Nations decided on the formation of this force. The official explanation of this is that this force is there to prevent Shiite attacks on Israel and should be removed. But this has no chance of convincing the masses in Southern Lebanon, who consider the UN forces as beneficial to them, as a protection against Israeli incursion and as allowing them to live in relatively normal conditions.
The correct demand which could be understood by the masses should, on the contrary, have been the implementation of the United Nations resolution (Number 425), which provided for a deployment of the troops on the southern frontiers of Lebanon, instead of their present deployment north of the Israeli-controlled "security zone".
Q. What's happening around the war in the camps at the moment?
A. The last round of the war in the camps was concluded by direct intervention of Syrian troops, albeit symbolic, for the first time since 1982. Their main role was to put an end to the war in the camps and to guarantee a general stability in western Beirut after months of clashes and bombings. For a few weeks this Syrian intervention was effective in stabilizing the situation, but this won't last very long. It takes more than a few hundred soldiers to get a grip on a situation like the one in western Beirut, especially taking into consideration that even the leaderships of the various militias cannot control them entirely. Even Jumblatt cannot control his own people. After a few weeks of official removal of armed appearances in Beirut, everything is back again.
The presence of the Syrians in the camps until now has been effective in stopping the fighting. Here there is a difference between the Syrians and Amal, although it is minor. The aim of the Syrians is to have the camps dominated by pro-Syrian Palestinians, while the aim of at least the rightist part of Amal is to wipe out any Palestinian armed existence or presence. They don't mind Palestinian civilians, but no armed forces.
The limit put on the camp war by the Syrians is to mainly weaken Arafat. The camps again became a stronghold of Arafat, so the aim was to crush Arafat's armed presence in the camps and to establish more effective Syrian or pro-Syrian control in them. International Viewpoint 29 September 1986