The role of trade unions in the Sandinista revolution THE FOLLOWING round-table discussion among trade unions, from which we are publishing excerpts, was organized in June 1986 by the Nicaraguan daily Barricada. This newspaper of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FLN) published the most important passages. The paper invited all the union confederations in Nicaragua, eight in number, along with Carlos Gallo, the Managua region FLN leader in charge of labor questions. For various reasons, three confederations - the ATC, the CTN and CTN-I - did not take part. The participating organizations were the CGT.I. the CAUS. the CST
NICARAGUA with shortages of spare parts, obsolete machinery, maintenance problems, and so on. And this is to say nothing of the lack of foreign currency, which affects raw materials purchases, and energy problems. Sometimes machinery has to be left idle for days.
Generally, a worker's wage includes a fixed rate and productivity bonuses, the latter designed to encourage higher productivity. But because of the material state of their factories, workers are often unable to do their job and therefore to top the production norms and raise their salaries. This situation cannot fail to create tensions, which can lead to conflicts and strikes. The difficulties are made worse because workers get the impression that a lot is being asked of them in the name of their revolutionary consciousness, while others are enjoying a distinctly more privileged situation. They do not fail to feel a certain resentment at seeing the material advantage enjoyed by some technicians for example, whose convictions are a good deal more lukewarm.
Facing a brain-drain abroad or into the informal or private sectors, very frequently the state and the nationalized agencies the Area of People's Property) try to keep skilled personnel in their jobs - with mixed success - by arguments that have nothing to do with ideology. The inticements include a car, housing and wages often raised above the level fixed by the SNOWW by means of various procedures. Higher wages not the main demand
However, higher wages are not even the workers' main demand. Of course, in view of the rapid drop in buying power, readjustment is only just and is seen to be so. Facing galloping inflation, the workers greet wage increases of 100 or 50 per cent (as in January and March 1986) with relief, but also with a lot of scepticism. The question on their minds is how much will prices go up tomorrow?
1. The total number of industrial workers in Nicaragua is estimated at 100,000 people, including the workers in the sugar complexes. Nicaragua has about 3 million inhabitants.
2. The ATC was also formed before the revolution, in 1975 from the movement of the agricultural workers for land and better working conditions It has gone much further than the CST in thinking about the role of unions in a transitional society.
3. Comandante Jaime Wheelock Roman, minister of agricultural development and agrarian reform (MIDINRA). 'Barricada', June 2, 1986.
13 ine participating organizations we the CUS and FO. [See box on page MARIA MERRI
The discussion among the trade unionists, which was rather sharp, pointed up one of the thorniest aspects of transitional society -the role of unions in the post-revolutionary period. In a more general way, it posed the question of the role of the working class in such a period, especially in a country where it constitutes a small minority. (1)
Of all the unions represented, only the CGT-I and the CAUS existed before the revolution. (2) These traditional organizations of the workers movement were thrown into crisis by the victory of the FSLN. The result was that a part of their cadres went over to the CST. All the other confederations, in particular the CST, the largest of them, were established after July 19, 1979. -Owing to the Somoza dictatorship's previous repression, mass trade unions took form at the same time as the new regime. Concretely this meant that almost overnight the CST found itself to be the main trade-union organization in the country. Lacking tradition, experience, and sufficient cadres, the CST had to take up the problems of the transition.
The accelerating decline in the economic situation has hit the workers of the productive sector hardest, in particular in Managua. They have been caught in the gap between wages and prices that opened up in 1984-1985. A layer of wage workers have left their jobs to swell the ranks of those involved in the "informal economy" This included many technicians and skilled workers, who suffered proportionally more from the general re the cut, the cAus, the st, 15.] drop in the standard of living.
Moreover, until now the System of Norms and Organization of Work and Wages (SNOWW), which defines skills and the payment for them, has been particularly unfavorable to such workers. It was not unusual to find engineers opening some little business simply because they could make more money that way.
Until the revolution Nicaragua suffered chronic unemployment, and workers - especially skilled workers - are in short supply. In industries such as construction, where demand is very strong, there is a major process of de-proletarianization. A lot of workers go into business for themselves because they know that they can get much better payment for their labor in the contracts they make with the state, in particular in the area of defence, than accorded them by the SNOWW.
Labour productivity has dropped catastrophically. There are political reasons for this: under the Somozista dictatorship, as under any capitalist system, "The workers went to work because they were compelled to do so. For example the vagrancy laws threatened those who refused to work for starvation wages. But most of all, poverty and unemployment were the fundamental mechanisms for forcing people to work." (3) This means of regulating capitalist profitability was undermined by the victory of the revolution.
While the imperialist economic boycott has made its effects felt in all sectors of the Nicaraguan economy, it has wreaked havoc in industry,
International Viewpoint 29 September 1986
What the workers want more than anything is to be able to have a voice in the running of the plants. That is the main question - a real voice for the workers and workers' management. And this is also the only way to confront and solve some of the problems in industry.
The workers argue that they are best placed to know what happens in detail in the production process. They point to the gains made by the innovators' movement and its exemplary value. Such workers, with practically nothing to work with, have been able to cushion the effects of the blockade by improvising spare parts, repairing machines that would be junked anywhere else, adjusting production to the needs of defence, and so on.
Structures exist in the plants through which workers are supposed to be able to participate in decision-making. But the workers only say that they run up against foot-dragging, bad will, and even outright hostility from state-appointed administrators. They often take a dim view of workers interfering in management, pointing to the cultural backwardness of the working class in Nicaragua.
Of course, you can point to the problem of backwardness. But then how do you explain the fact that it is the union confederation, the ATC, and the agricultural workers (who have traditionally had few educational opportunities) who have gone the furthest in participating in management?
What is at stake in this discussion is considerable, because it is far from being a functional or economic matter; above all it is a political question. How are the new productive relations to be organized? What should workers' power mean concretely within the plant? In the words of FSLN president Daniel Ortega, replacing the "capitalist mentality of plant management" with full and complete involvement of the workers in management is no luxury for a revolution but a necessity:
"If under socialism workers' participation in management is a necessity, since it helps to raise the quality of production, enhance the efficiency of management, and promote the elimination of bureaucracy, while it may be a risk for states in transition, it is just as necessary." (4)
Despite the real difficulties of the situation, the workers are not turning away from the Sandinistas toward other organizations, despite the ultraleftist demagogy they generally resort to in an attempt to capitalize on the working-class discontent that does exist.
It should not be forgotten that all the trade-union organizations are 14 linked to a party, and the union's words are measured against the party's acts. The most glaring case is that of the CGT-I and the CAUS. The credibility of their ultra-leftist language on the trade-union level is largely compromised by the rightist behaviour of the PSN and the PCN. It is hard to reprove the FSLN for its concessions to private ownership and at the same time sign statements with the bourgeois parties in the National Assembly, or refuse to participate in the united May Day celebration demonstrations on the same day with right-wing unions in the provincial cities. (5)
Nonetheless, if this demagogy has finally made some small inroads, it is largely owing to the attitude of the FSLN, which has taken up the Trade union r
Carlos Salgado (CGT-I): According to the figures of the Institute of Research and Statistics (INEC), 54 per cent of property in Nicaragua is private. This defines the character of the state. There is no political party of the working class in our country, and it is a bit venturesome to say that the workers and peasants have the power today. The FSLN has not yet managed to go beyond the stage of a national liberation movement, and its leaders themselves say that today they are taking the first steps to transform the Front into a party.
If we look at political parties internationally, we see that their organizational structures are identical. For example, the leaders are elected from top to bottom. The lower bodies submit to the higher ones. The minority bows to the majority.
But in the FSLN there are no structures. All that we know about is a National Directorate of nine members and a Sandinista National Assembly that does not have a decision-making character but simply a consultative one, where the majority is content to apply the decisions emanating from the National Directorate. There is really no expression, no reflection of a political party representing the workers and peasants.
Ronaldo Membreno (CST): First of all, let me briefly review the role of the unions before the triumph of the revolution. Owing to economic, problems forthrightly, calling on its militants to involve themselves more actively than they had before in the problems of the plants.
In another debate, Carlos Gallo stressed: "The workers must assume supervision and economic management if we are to be able to deal with the crisis. As the FSLN, we think that the masses have to take up the challenge. Workers' management is a principle of the revolution, a right won by the workers." And he added: "Learning to be the masters is hard."