The Punjab elections and the course of the Rajiv government DESPITE THE RECENT installation of an elected provincial government, the Punjab remains the single most important trouble spot for the Indian government. To understand the nature of the deal between Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal, [moderate leader of the Sikh Akali
INDIA year breathing space would be useful.
The centre's problem was in getting a strong group with which it could negotiate, and in not giving the impression that the group had 'sold out' to the centre. To achieve this goal, the centre followed a two-track policy. On the one hand, repression was stepped up. The new anti-terrorist act is draconian by any standards. But it was promulgated not so much because the government had hopes of frightening the terrorists as of weakening them by whittling away at their extremist base. On the other hand, a series of steps were taken to show that this time, a genuine attempt would be made for some kind of agreement. In conceding the demand for a judicial conceding the demand for a iudicial probe into the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi (though till now no significant developments have materialised in this respect) it was shown that the post riot or post Bluestar set of demands, like abolition of the special courts, or even abrogation of the anti-terrorist act, could become negotiable.
But beyond this the centre could do little, while the battle was fought out for control of the Akali Dal. Since November 1984, Hindus and Sikhs alike, in their vast majority, have come to view the Sikhs as a separate community. This reinforced the tendency of the Sikhs to fall in line behind the Akali Dal, which is the principal political leadership and expression of the Sikhs as a community.
All the contenders for Akali leadership were communalists. But the Longowal/moderate faction wanted a settlement. - The Longowal group was solidly based on the Jat-Singh peasantry, which needed a settlement for the resumption of normal economic activities. The Talwandi faction had a stronger extremist-fundamentalist base, and it used Bhindranwale's father, Baba Joginder Singh, as its public face.
Since Bluestar, however, extremism had taken several hard knocks. Joginder Singh was no substitute for Bhindranwale. The severe crack-down had also weakened the terrorists and substantially reduced their extremist base. Nonetheless, any settlement needed as a basic precondition further strengthening of the AD-Longowal. Hence Longowal had to make
1. Chandigarh is an administrative centre which houses two provinces - Punjab and Haryana, hence the demand for its full integration into Punjab. This demand was all but conceded at the August 1985 accords. The green revolution in India requires high amounts of irrigation. The Punjab's share of the waters of the rivers Ravi and Beas is quite low. See "International Viewpoint" No 57, July 16, 1984 for more information on this. All notes by "IV"
2. Operation Bluestar is the operation carried out by Indian crack troops when they occupied the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar, which was being used as a shelter by the 'extremist' Sikh leader, J S Bhindranwale and his supporters. Bhindranwale died in the attack.
19
Dal Party] and the subsequent history. INDER SINGH
By early 1985, it was clear to everyone that the central issue was no longer the demands concerning water rights for irrigation or the integration of the city of Chandigarh to Punjab, thus altering the state boundaries. (1) What was at stake was the future of a beleaguered and imperilled community - the Sikhs. The events of the last half a decade, and especially of 1984-85 have both made them far more community conscious than before, and reduced them to a kind of second class citizenship status. The responsibility for this lies with the Akali Dal, the Congress (I), and the proBhindranwale fundamentalists.
Rajiv Gandhi's leadership on the issue has essentially made no difference. The last parliamentary elections were fought under an openly Hindu communal banner. Activists of the Hindu communalist organisation, RSS, campaigned openly for many Congress (I) candidates, ditching their usual vehicle, the BJP [ Bharatiya Janata Party ].
In the post-election period, that is from January 1985 onwards, discrimination against Sikhs, far from being abated, has been in the process of being institutionalised, in the army,
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Shitted to Pun ab and Mani Majra may go to Haryand Kapurtha
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Disputed area Arees claimed HARYANA by Punjeb Areas ciaimed Shiwari ( Rohla DELHI by Haryane events, we must look back at the in the government services, ete. AntiSikh sentiments are often whipped up in various ways. TV viewers in Delhi were treated, a few months back, to an interview with one of the generals in charge of "Operation Bluestar" to the accompaniment of the constant sound of machine gun firing. (2) In the same city, according to many people, the least disturbance is often followed by official anti-Sikhism in various forms, such as the open display of hostility to bearded and/or longhaired persons.
These are not the only reasons the Sikhs feel threatened. As the green revolution spreads to other parts of the country, the importance of Punjab as a surplus grain-producing province will decline. This will mean a reduction in prosperity. Since the majority of Punjabi rich peasants are Sikhs, it is easy to lend a communal or religious colour to this as well. In short, some genuine and justifiable problems and grievances of the Sikhs as a community will remain and even increase. It is the extremists - Khalistanis - who will feed on these grievances.
Punjab politics in 1985 has gone through a number of phases. But all the time, the central question was, what would a reconstituted Akali Dal (AD) look like, what would its relationship with the centre be and what kind of leadership would it be able to provide?
Despite its communal nature, the Congress government at the centre had to adopt a conciliatory approach in the post parliamentary election period. It needed a bourgeois "solution" to the Punjab crisis in order to usher in a period of "stability" There are serious problems in the way of finding long-term stability. But a medium range stability, or even a one-
International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
Sikhs on guard in the Golden Temple(DR)
contradictory statements, now threatening renewed agitations, now appearing as the soul of the peace party, etc. He could neither walk into a settlement too fast, nor launch a stiff antiCongress agitation for fear of being elbowed out by the Bhindranwale followers as had happened two years back.
The settlement, when it came, was only a partial and temporary solution to the problems at hand. It did not resolve the basic issues. But it did buy time to tackle some of the deeper problems. By conceding some of the legitimate demands of the Sikhs and of Punjab, tension was somewhat defused. Most of the specific demands of the earlier phases of the movement were conceded. The judicial probe was extended to Kanpur and Bokaro. It should be said here that this is totally inadequate. It was necessary to set up judicial probes for all major riot-hit areas. What is more, the probe into the Delhi riots is, at the time of writing, yet to take off. Instead of assisting it in the interests of speedy justice, something which Rajiv Gandhi's sycophants claim as his 'own thing', the government is persecuting all civil rights organisations which have tried to highlight the plight of riot victims, the people of Punjab, etc. A pamphlet issued by the Citizens for Democracy has been banned. Another pamphlet, "Who are the Guilty?" brought out by the People's Union for Demoeratic Rights and the People's Union for Civil Liberties, has been under constant 20 attack. Several thousand copies of its Punjabi edition, brought out by the AFDR, Punjab, were seized.
Some features of the agreement are downright reactionary. The most important of these is the expression of willingness by the centre to consider the All-India Gurdwara Act. The Akali Dal's communal character is heavily reinforced by the links it has with the reactionary SPC [Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee]. (3) An all-India Gurdwara Act will greatly strengthen the financial clout of the SGPC and enhance its influence over the AD. This in turn will strengthen the Longowal group. By getting the government to agree to this demand, they could steal much of their rivals' thunder.
The settlement made an election inevitable. But once again, it posed problems. Unless the AD-Longowal won at the polls, there could be no stability. But with a very large Hindu minority, it was feared that any sizeable fragmentation of the Sikh vote might result in a Congress victory. Even a Congress-AD-Longowal alliance, whether pre or post election, would have been almost as bad, since it would have seriously weakened the latter's political credibility and status among the alienated Sikhs.
Consequently, the feeling of relief was very short lived in Punjab. The Talwandi - Joginder/Bhindranwale "extremists" were not routed. Their tacties ranged from rejecting the agree. ments, calling for poll boycotts, to putting up a few candidates or demanding a party symbol from the Election Commission. And because the Akali Dal as a whole is communalist, it was fairly easy for 'moderates' like Prakash Singh Badal, the former chief minister, then switch to the 'extremists' . And then came the assassination of Longowal.
Even if Longowal had lived, factionalism would have created enough trouble for the Akalis, and the 'moderates' would still have been separated from the extremists' by degree, not quality. But they would have been able to present a somewhat more united and pro-agreement face. With his death, they were left leaderless. The selection of former Union Minister, Surjeet Singh Barnala as leader came about mainly because the jathedars rallied behind him. But important leaders like Badal refused to accept his supremacy.
In the medium term, this vacuum in the leadership can be utilised by the Khalistanis. The position for an independent Khalistan is still not accepted by the majority of Sikhs. However, a small but determined minority has adopted this idea. Law and order methods, meaning the continuation of state terrorism in response to nro-Khalistani terrorism. response to pro-Khalistani terrorism, cannot tackle the latter. On the contrary, each incident of state terrorism since it hits the innocent as much if not more than, the terrorists, makes heros of the latter, and strengthens their appeal. Assassinations and elections
Nevertheless, even after the declaration of the elections, state terrorism continued. The assassinations of Congress leaders Lalit Maken and Arjun Dass brought out just such a response from the centre. These two were amongst those who instigated the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in November 1984, as several reports attested. These killings did not constitute the murder of "innocents". But they were totally counterproductive. Such killings help to widen the gulf between Hindus and Sikhs. They also provide an excuse for massive state organised repression. Using these killings and the atmosphere of public fear created by them, the central government is carrying out totally unjustifiable "preventative" arrests. Many of the arrested "suspects" are regularly tortured, and in quite a few cases, they have died as a result of torture. These deaths are
3. The SPC is a committee elected by the Sikhs to run the historic shrines or "Gurdwaras" • It is made up of jathedars. Under the new legislation all "Gurdwaras" across the country will effectively be under Akali control. International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
announced blandly as cases of "suicide" while under detention. The courts have also joined in. The Supreme Court went out of its way to denounce civil rights activists.
It was in this situation of renewed tension that the Punjab polls were conducted. Massive police arrangements and large scale arrests marked the restoration of democracy. At the end of the exercise, the voter turn-out was high, and the Akali Dal won with over 60% of the votes and 73 seats. This massive victory can be read as a popular endorsement of the Rajiv Gandhi - Sant Longowal accord. It does not mean, however, that a decisive breakthrough has been made. The continuing factionalism in the AD is reflected by the refusal of the Badal faction to reconcile itself to Barnala's ascendancy and join the ministry. The communalism of both the Akali Dal and the Congress constantly threatens to undo the bonds of amity between Hindus and Sikhs. Nor are the terrorists and their extremist base defeated. In fact, Barnala's first pronouncements on them after he took over as chief minister indicate that he will try to placate them if he can. At the same time he also asserted that terrorism would not be accepted. This reflects the pressure from the centre to deliver the goods. By signing the accord and taking part in the elections, Barnala's party has, in so many words, agreed to play according to the rules of the game of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, and to take over the task of policing the province and keeping peace on behalf of the central regime. On the other hand, while the base of terrorism is narrower than before, continuation of the centre's policy of repression is likely to prove fruitless, and detrimental to the standing of the new provincial government.
The elections were noteworthy in varous other ways. Above all, they various other ways. Above all, they were used to further curtail democratic rights. During the election campaign, an ordinance was promulgated saying that the death of independent candidates would no longer mean the cancellation of elections in the constituencies which they were contesting. Since the Indian election laws stipulate that a party must secure a minimum percentage of the votes cast in at least five states to get the status of a national party and the same percentage of votes in one state to be recognised as a state party in that state, "independent" candidates include those who belong to smaller parties as well. In itself, this law is discriminatory andundemocratic. But the implications are even more serious, in view of the repeated attacks on these independent candidates. SIn the 1985 Rajasthan assembly polls, an independent candidate was murdered by the police. In Bihar province, an
International Viewpoint 13 January 1986 activist of the radical tribal party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha who was contesting the assembly polls was murdered. The new law thus increases actual physical risks for members of unrecognised political parties. And themajority of them, in many provinces, represent various socially oppressed groups.