For the left, the crucial task both before and during the election campaign should have been the creation of an anti-communal front. A step, however slight, was taken in that direction by the communist parties, the CPI and the CPI(M) (4). These two parties this time abandoned their traditional lines of aligning with one bourgeois party or the other. Instead, they formed a purely left front, and fought on a secular programme. This resulted in a fall in their votes and a dramatic reduction in the number of seats won (the two parties had a total of 13 MLAs in the last Punjab Assembly, against the solitary CPI MLA this time). But it is fairly clear to anyone that the votes they received this time were committed secular votes. This electoral venture thus has the potential for becoming the springFor a South A weapons free THE FOLLOWING is a statement Asia.
There can be no doubt that Pakistan is very close to developing a nuclear weapons making capacity. In view of the negative repercussions it might have the country is unlikely to announce it through any kind of Pokhran-type explosion. (1) Indeed the government in Islamabad is likely to pursue a policy of keeping the last wires [of the bomb unconnected so that technically she cannot be accused of being a nuclear weapons power.
India had, of course, demonstrated her nuclear weapons making capacity at Pokhran in 1974. Since all nuclear regimes (whether in authoritarian societies like the USSR, China or in bourgeois democratic societies like US, Great Britain, France) are fundamentally undemocratic, the
DOCUMENT board for an anti-communal front which will fight against all communalisms, all communalist groupings and all bourgeois parties in all possible terrains. At the same time, the past role of these two parties, regarding minority communalism (which they have often condoned or turned a blind eye to) indicate that unless the far left and all other secular forces make serious efforts, this step will not necessarily lead to the formation of such a front.
Any settlement of the Punjab crisis requires several socio-economic and political measures. These include setting up agro-industrial units and the provision of jobs for Punjab's alienated Sikh youth. From the bourgeois point of view, however, restoration of stability requires striking a balance between the aspirations of the regionally based, primarily agrarian bourgeoisie. Any anti-communal front will thus have to combine class tasks with anti-communal work. •
4. The Communist Party of India which has a base among a broad base of the population in Punjab. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has practically the same social base as the Akali Dal. See "IV" No 57, July 16, 1984, for more information on the positions taken by these two parties. sian nuclear zone published by the Inquilabi ComIndian public, has no way of knowing whether, or how many, 'bombs in the basement' India has. The country certainly has enough weapons gradefuel to construct a number of bombs, possibly with the last-wires-unconnected' also.
For some years now, a systematic hysteria has been generated [in India] about the 'Pak bomb'. . Its purpose is to gather publie support for the Indian government's policy on the bomb. This policy is not one of nuclear disarmament or to see to it that Pakistan also disarms, but to
1. India's first nuclear power plant was built with US help in 1970 near Bombay. Canada helped India build two reactors. In May 1974 at Pokhran, a nuclear device was exploded underground. - IV.
21 munist Sangathan (ICS), the Indian section of the Fourth International, calling for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South munist Sangathan (ICS), the Indian section of the Fourth International, calling for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South
keep the option open for India to produce the bomb openly and establish a proper nuclear weapons programme (which is much more than just having the capacity, or even keeping a few 'bombs in the basement whenever it decides to do so.)
This is why Rajiv Gandhi has, on the one hand, rejected proposals from Pakistan for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities or for establishing a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia and on the other, keeps warning of the danger that a 'Pak bomb' will cause to the subcontinent and the need for "re-evaluating" India's nuclear policy if this happens. At the same time, he and others in the government repeat that India has no intentions of going in for nuclear weapons, and only wants to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. What this whole approach amounts to is a policy of nuclear ambiguity, of deliberately creating uncertainty as a way of maintaining some leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan, as well as the other nuclear weapons powers.
In fact, Pakistan is also pursuing a policy of nuclear ambiguity to maintain its own leverage vis-a-vis other powers. However it is more serious and willing than India to close the nuclear option for both countries by having a NWFZ in South Asia.
This is not because General Zia of Pakistan is more peace-loving than Rajiv Gandhi. It is that he and other experts realize full well that if there is a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the burden of matching the enemy' will be much greater on Pakistan than on India in every respect (economic, political, social) because of the great imbalance in power, resources, size, population ete. That is why Zia would be prepared to have 'non-nuclear parity' between Pakistan and India through establishment of a NWFZ. That is why, although India says the Pakistani proposal for NWFZ is just propaganda, they will never dare to call Pakistan's bluff in this matter.
The Indian government, in fact, argues that just because Pakistan and the US as well as other nuclear powers, want such a zone for their own reasons, "we' should not be 'manipulated' into accepting this. This is a typical example of the kind of thinking which is responsible for promoting proliferation (both horizontal and vertical) of nuclear weapons. This kind of thinking fails to recognise the unique nature of nuclear weapons which are capable of mass destruction and tries to treat them like conventional weapons — as legitimate instruments of foreign policy to secure so-called national interests' as defined by the bour22 geois ruling class. But the nuclear weapons can never be used to defend territory. The threat of nuclear weapons far from leading to stability through deterrence, only leads to even more insecurity and a spiralling arms race. If there is to be genuine disarmament of nuclear weapons then, they must not be used as instruments of foreign policy.
The question of nuclear security must as far as possible, be separated from other issues of national security. Nuclear security can be defined as the legitimate right of people of, say, South Asia to be progressively free of the use, the threat of the use, and even the possibility of the use embodied in the very existence of nuclear weapons. The only alternative to such an approach will be a proliferation in the name of national security which only leads to greater insecurity at ever higher levels of danger. This is precisely the experience of the superpower arms race which has reached "insane" levels of overkill capacity on both sides and still shows no signs of even stopping temporarily.
Regardless of the motives of the US, USSR or Pakistan in wanting a NWFZ, the objective value of having a NWFZ in South Asia is profound. Keeping the nuclear option open for both countries through a policy of nuclear ambiguity means that the option can well be exercised or realised if pressures to do so build up beyond a point.
Having a NWFZ in South Asia does not mean the India-Pakistan conflict will disappear or that there will not be clashes. But it does mean that both sides agree that neither side will ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other's population, even if war breaks out between the countries. This will be an immense gain and advance for sanity. It is up to India to respond positively to the Pakistan proposal for mutual inspection and a NWFZ, whatever the latter's motives, and to try and establish such a zone.
The arguments by the Indian pro-bomb lobby and by Rajiv Gandhi against such a zone are dishonest, hypocritical and weak. In fact if Pakistan's bomb is the real problem then this zone is the best way to eliminate the danger. That is why most Indian objections to such a zone have nothing to do at all with Pakistan! To take some of these objections: - Rajiv Gandhi has publicly declared that having a NWFZ in South Asia is meaningless because it will not prevent clandestine betrayal, that it cannot guarantee against non-violation. In which case why bother to have any treaty of any kind. No political pact can guarantee non-violation. Why bother to call for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean which the Indian government does? Nothing can prevent US or Soviet submarines from violating such a zone of peace if they want to. But does anyone doubt that if the zone of peace proposal was accepted by all concerned including the US and USSR that it would be a great political advance? Nuclear weapons no deterrence
The NWFZ is above all a political proposal of great merit. Like all such proposals it will work best when those governments who are party to it want to make it work and share an interest in maintaining it. The weight of mass opinion in the subcontinent must be brought to bear on the governments of India and Pakistan (the other South Asian governments except Bhutan [sic] are all in favour of such a zone) to accept the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ.
The other major argument used by India's pro-bomb lobby is that if India gives up its nuclear option it has no defence or deterrence against nuclear blackmail by US, China or other nuclear powers. This is an insidious argument because (a) it deceptively implies that keeping the option open could enable India to have such a deterrence; (b) it ignores the historical character of conflicts and tensions and argues on an essentially, abstract, absolutist and hypothetical level. For example, China has never threatened India (nor Vietnam) nor any other country with nuclear weapons. Neither the USSR nor the US has ever threatened with success any other non-nuclear nation. We continue to live in a world where the correlation of class forces on a world scale do not make it possible for any national bourgeoisie or state to get away with fulfilling such threats against the masses of another country.
Nor does keeping the option open help India to deter, even in a theoretical sense another nuclear weapons power. It is not enough to have the option or even a few weapons. To have any hope of deterring other nuclear weapons it is necessary to have what is known as a "credible deterrent equation," that is a sufficiently developed i nuclear weapons programme of warheads, missiles and other delivery systems which can promise massive retaliation even after an enemy first-strike. India is so backward (as UK and France are with respect to the USSR) in this respect that it can never have an effective nuclear deterrent against the superpowers who are going further and further ahead. International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
With respect to establishing a credible nuclear deterrent against China, it is 15-20 years behind. If it embarks on a programme to "match" China (1) it can do nothing to prevent nuclear blackmail by China during the long years of Indian preparation; (2) it will spark of a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent, since Pakistan will go ahead with its own nuclear weapons programme; (3) it will make China and the US more hostile about Indian intentions. Even the Soviets will be more suspicious, not to mention greatly disturbing India's smaller neighbours which will have every reason to worry about India's "hege. monistic" ambitions; (4) it will in all probability still fail to "match" China because the latter will simply maintain if not extend its lead by making further advances in its own nuclear weapons programme.
All this only goes to show the fallacy of thinking that going in for nuclear weapons will enhance Indian security. It will not. But it does fit in with the ambitions of the Indian bourgeoisie and its state to increase its prestige, authority and control over the South Asian region. Even here it will create more problems and instability than the "stability" (read domination) that the "stability read domination) wat the Indian state wants.
What is more, going in for a nuclear weapons programme will have dangerous domestic repercussions.
- Although having a few bombs is not expensive, having a proper nuclear weapons programme is, and updating it constantly or embarking on the escalator of a regional nuclear arms race will mean an enormous diversion of resources from other sectors and needs such as proper housing, health-care, food, education for the Indian masses.
- Establishing a "nuclear regime" in India means further militarising of civil society, greater erosion of democratic rights in order to "protect" military secrets or "security", proscription in various forms of protest against such nuclear weapons production and deployment ete. Such a nuclear regime will also mean greater concentration of power in the executive and even less control by the masses over what is literally for them, a life and death issue.
- Finally, such a nuclear weapons programme could quite possibly aggravate a delicate situation by weakening communal harmony between Muslims and other communities in India.
The Inquilabi Communist Sangathan [ICS] unequivocally calls for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia.
88 International Viewpoint 13 January 1986