"The third alternative"
What will happen if the authorities come to consider that economic underdevelopment and disturbances are less costly than a compromise? If local incidents do not grow into a nationwide revolt? If the occupation lasts a long time, even though in less spectacular forms?
has known examples of a slow decomposition of power combined with an enduring resistance of society, even, and perhaps above all, when society is faced with famine and
Do we have to prepare for such a possibility, an evolution and not a revo-
It so, what evolution? That depends on society.
Thus, we do not stop at the alternative put forward by Jacek Kuron, the choice between compromise and revolution. We will examine a third possibility: a slow decomposition of the system, accompanied by gradual changes, which could lead to society regaining influence over its own destiny.
If the evolution is to move in this direction, then it is necessary to organise a clandestine Society rather than a clandestine State. That means not to establish a centre which exercises a strict discipline, but a many-centered movement, decentralised, informal, composed groups, circles, committees, etc., which are independent from each other, largely autonomous, and with freedom of decision. Their role should be to guarantee long-term and effective aid to all those who are persecuted by the regime, to develop the circulation of independent information and uncensored thought, to create a network of social information, and to guarantee self-education. In this way, it will give moral and psychological support to everyone.
Tnis system will lead to a situation where the regime will control empty shops but not the market; employment, but not the means of subsistence of workers; the state-owned mass media, but not the circulation of information; the printbut not publishing; the post communication; schools, self-organisation of society could leadwith time-to a situation where the retime will only have control over the police and a handful of incorrigible col-
Then there will no longer be a third possibility. That would imply that the re20
Striking Polish workers (DR) gime would be overthrown, that the barriers separating it from society would be opened little by little, and that society would gradually rid itself of its chains.
No spectacular compromise, but a gradual return to the rights of citizens, self-management, and at last participation in society and continuous broadening of the scope of decision taking, above all on the economic, cultural, and social life of the country. The prospect of the restoration of liberty should weigh more heavily in the balance than the risks run in participating in the clandestine society.
Only when it is possible to reestablish social control over society will the attraction of the clandestine society diminish, in equal measure to the progress of the re-establishment. The price the regime would have to pay to re-establish its influence would be democratisation and progressive liberalisation.
Long-term mass clandestine activity in a nationwide organisation is impossible in a modern police state, which is surrounded by similar regimes, and like them all, watched over by a great neighbouring power. Therefore, to create such a centre would be loaded with danger of a predestruction, which ould be a defeat that we cannot
This is why only a smaller group can take the risk of constituting the embryo of a 'National Centre', and, better, regional centres. This embryo of a clandestine state can thus only be a potential supplementary threat for the re-
Its influence could grow in the clandestine society, at the point where it turns out to be necessary.
Thus, it is only in the final phase of the struggle that the clandestine state will find its life and its support in the clandestine society. Until then, the clandestine society should be autonomous and avoid too frequent contact with the central structure. This will allow it at the same time to strengthen the protection of that structure and protect society from defeat. For then, even the destruction of the clandestine state would only be a setback. The clandestine society would continue to live and could rebuild that which is destroyed.
This third possibility particularly merits more attention because another danger is taking shape. Empires, shaken by internal conflicts, hit by crises, threatened from without, have often resorted to raising the stakes by moving to the offensive and to aggression. Such a policy allows a rapid growth of military potenwithout counting the cost, and closing the ranks of masses around the regime and turning their attention away from the tragic situation of society. To say in our situation, like Jacek Kuron, that 'armed intervention would be the last act of the USSR' is small consolation.