Solidarity debates:which way forward for the Polish workers movement
Jacqueline ALLIO
After the first moment of shock created by the bureaucracy's crackdown on December 13, 1981, the spirits of the Polish workers very quickly
The power of the movement that can be seen today testifies to their determination to fight against those that they call the "oceupiers."
The defeat generated quite an intense debate in the mass movement on the strategy and tactics for winning the three immediate demands that everyone agrees on-lifting the state of siege, release of all the prisoners, and restoration of trade-union and democratic rights
Most of the activists writing in the bulletins published clandestinely by Solidarity indicate that these demands are the minimum for pursuing the struggle begun by the working class to take their affairs into their own hands. them directly questions the need of such a fight, at least in the long run
The differences of opinion are on the timing and the means of establishing a more favorable relationship of forces with respect to the junta.
In the positions they have taken, the best-known trade-union leaders (1) express a concern shared by the bishops and the lay advisors of the Polish primate,
They are anxious to social explosion that could lead to a bloody confrontation with the regime.
Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski think that the way to do this is by building a decentralized social movement with the objective of undermining the junta's authority by organizing a "clandestine society."
For his part, Zbigniew Romaszewski rejects any approach based on the view that the system is unreformable, because that would mean that "the situation in Poland is not just a difficult one but hopeless."
Opposing any sort of extremist policy, he argues that what has to be done is "widen the room for maneuver for critics." The only possible approach, according to him, is a "political perspective based on the system evolving toward democratization without bloodshed."
In an attempt to avoid the danger of resignation and passivity as well as "an emotional reaction to injustice, an attitude of all or nothing, Bogdan Bogdan Borusewicz argue that the only way forward is to stick to a program confined to the three demands mentioned above. Such a program would have, also, to take account of "the realities, in particular the geopolitical ones, over which we
La limited influence." "certain national objectives must be deferred to a later time." immediate objective is to regain legality for Solidarity and get the prisoners released through an "accord with the regime" that "will require good will on the part of all those concerned."
The representatives of the church, both lay and clergy, also stress this point: "The regime must recognize that it is impossible to get out of this crisis without dialogue and without the civil society accepting certain things. But, on the other hand, it is also an essential precondition for internal stabilization that the civil society understand the needs of the system and the objective situation of the state." The civil society would have also to demonstrate this realism in taking account of the consequences that flow from the geopolitical position of our country (2)."
The shadow of the Soviet Union falls ominously over this debate, as can be
"Political stabilization, even if it involves limited Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Poland, may seem a relatively attractive alternative in comparison with an endless conflict in central Europe. That is why, among the leaders of People's Poland also, we find representatives of a more flexible policy that could lead to the achievement of a lasting compromise." (Zbigniew Romaszewski.)
What is striking in these documents is the persistant illusions about the possibilities for a lasting understanding with the regime and skepticism-or outright hostility by some, such as Bujak-toward any perspective of centralized action, such as a general strike. This
"would restore the government's cohesiveness and enable it to crush the movement once and for all."
On the other hand, whether they consider Soviet military intervention likely or not, all the writers argue their positions in the name of Poland's geopolitical situation and the impossibility of exceeding certain limits in the confrontation with the regime without risking an explosion that would be a catastrophe.
The breadth and determination of the protest movement that shook Poland in the first half of May shows clearly that the perspectives outlined by the leaders were at least incomplete. On the other hand, Jacek Kuron saw that such mobilithe Bialoleka camp, he stated his conviction "when it is attacked, when it is forced to suffer poverty, a healthy society responds by fighting back." wise, he said: "the occupiers have put an end to any chance for peaceful action."
Therefore, Kuron advocated preparing for an organized mass uprising that could "take the form of a simultaneous offensive against all the centers of power and information in the country." took up this idea again and developed it in an open letter to the leaders of the resistance published on May 12 (3).
He wrote that he was convinced that resistance actions were not an end in themselves and that the workers would not mobilize foreover without some clear goal. This was all the most true inasmuch as the catastrophic economic situation is creating a pressure whose moral and social effects on a population that wants "a normal life" cannot be predicted.
According to Kuron, all sorts of concessions are justifiable to the extent that they reflect a social compromise between the state power and an independently organized civil society. necessary to make every effort today to get the Soviet leadership to understand that with a minimum of good will on its part, a national understanding among Poles-even without the participation of the present rulers of the country—will not endanger the USSR's military interests and can only be beneficial as regards its economic interests. and Wiktor Kulerski published in the Warsaw of Solidarity bulletin Tygodnik MazoBujak ("The War of Position") and Third Possibility") "Theses" published March 31, 1982; " a mimeographed document by an underground leader of Solidarity in Warsaw, Zbig1982; the article by activists in the Gdansk region (including Bogdan Lis and Bogdan Borubulletin of the Gdansk region, No. 34-65, April
2. Theses of the Social Council of the of Poland (mimeo), March 31, 1982; and Jacek Kuron, "You Have
Historic Chance," Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 13, May 12, 1982.
However, Kuron said that he was cannot avoid defeat by refusing to fight." An uprising-or rather the threat of an uprising-was the only way to force "the occupiers" to retreat. Pursuant to this, he points up the need for centralizing the resistance movement, because he considers that only such centralization can prevent scattered and uncontrolled social explosions.
Kuron also stresses, which is something new for him, the need for work directed at the army and police in order to win over a section of the troops to the objectives of the resistance movement.
Over and above several positive aspects that appear in Jacek Kuron's documents, in particular his proposals for work directed at the army, a number of critical observations have to be made:
NIE
PROWIKUJE!
"Solidarnos No to provocation" (DR)
-The first is that Jacek Kuron, like many other leaders of Solidarity, maintains the idea that a lasting compromise with the bureaucracy is possible. In
February document, about a compromise with the Soviet bu-
-The second thing is that he does not indicate what would be the basis of
"The leadership of the resistance must prepare the society both for major concessions to achieve a compromise with the regime and for the liquidation of the occupation by an organized mass uprising," Kuron wrote in his February document. To talk now about a 'situation in which the regime will not come to an understanding with the society and not even with itself," as he does in the second, does not clarify things.
-The third is that the working class seems strangely absent from his document as the central moving force in the resistance movement, which explains the little he has to offer by way of proposals for concrete ways to mobilize the working class in its entirety around immediate
Although he talks about an uprising, Jacek Kuron does not envisage the overthrow of the bureaucratic regime and its replacement by workers rule, rather a compromise between the two.
But the military crackdown showed that a lasting compromise with the bureaucracy is impossible. It is one thing to say that accords reflecting the relationship of forces at a given momemt in the struggle have been reached by the workers and the regime. Such tactical comlike the Gdansk accords in August 1980, or the agreement granting workers free Saturdays in January 1981, inevitable but necessary. But it must not be forgotten, however, that in signing these accords the regime "yielded only to the power and determination of the working class (4)."
It is important to point out that compromises are only transitory, that they do not represent the final victory but only successes that prepare the way for other struggles. A number of Solidarity activists did believe that the gains in the August 1980 Gdansk accords were irreversible, that only the Soviet threat "forced society to put a damper on an important part of its aspirations" (Jacek Kuron). December 13 dispelled this illusion.
As Adam Michnik wrote (5), "Solidarity was a deadly threat to the ruling apparatus. It did away with the Communist [we would say Stalinist] principle that the Communist Party represents the working class."
the rise of Solidarity deprived the bureaucratic apparatus of all
And an illegitimate regime can maintain itself in power only on the basis of repression. Because of this, there cannot be any strategic compromise between the society and the bureaucracywith an independent power of the bureaucracy.
To base the strategy of the resistance on the search for a compromise-as is proposed by Jacek Kuron, Bogdan Lis or Bogdan Borusewicz-can only lead to
By making such propograve setbacks. sals, these representatives of Solidarity are helping to revive illusions that have been shown in recent months to be false by the facts themselves.
More and more often, we find this attitude being denounced by Solidarity activists. In a letter from a reader to one of the underground journals, one can read: "There is nothing left for us but resistance, from passive resistance to armed struggle if necessary. All those who think the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) will agree to negotiate are naive, to say the least. WRON, negotiating would be tantamount
"This regime will defend against the society in a truculent way, resorting to every means, including waging a bloody war against the population. can have no illusions about that only realistic program for us is to organize for a confrontation that is inevi-
The position taken by the leaders mentioned above is all the more danger. ous because most of them, like Jacek Kuron, do not clarify what a compromise
"You seem to have forgotten that in order to negotiate a compromise, there has to be a certain margin for maneuver, and that by retreating as much as you do, you deprive yourself of any possibility for maneuvers for concesan activist wrote in a "Letter to Zbigniew Bujak"(7).
Of course, the minimum conditions for a compromise have to be made clear, but it is wrong as Bogdan Lis and Bog dan Borusewicz do-to relegate to some indefinite future the fight for all the decenter of the struggle waged by Solidarity and which raised the question of power. the fight for the elimination of all sorts of injustices and consequently for the elimination of all the parasites fattening at the expense of the workers; the strug. gle for a genuine socialization of the basic means of production; the fight for a self managed, genuinely democratic society.
In the name of the "here and now" and "realities," you cannot ignore what has been shown repeatedly throughout the history of the workers movementthat is, there is no way to draw a precise dividing line between immediate long-term objectives, which come intertwined in the course of strug
Therefore, while we do not reject compromises on the tactical level, we cannot help but agree with the following
Social Resistance in Warsaw La
Adam Michnik, No. 16-17 80e te Tygodnik Wojenny, Warsaw region bulletin.
position that was expressed in an underground bulletin:
"There is no one here that we can come to an understanding with" have no other choice but intransigent civil resistance based on the solidarity of the society (8)."
It is impossible to separate democratic demands-such as the call for restoration of trade-union rights-from those that directly challenge the power of the bureaucracy. To the contrary, it is necessary to look for a bridge between the two types of demands.
From this standpoint, it is wrong to say, as Bogdan Lis does, that on the basis of the formula negotiated by the trade-union movement, we will see whether the unions will be able, for example, to play a role in running the country or whether they will be able to concern themselves only with trade-union pro-
The whole recent history shows that far from being merely a union in the traditional sense of the term, Solidarity represented a social movement that went far beyond the limited tasks of defending the workers' immediate interests to tackle the problems directly involved with running the economy and political life.
That was what happened before in the context of the legal activities of Solidarity; it continues to today under the
This has to do with the nature of this society where capitalism no longer emerged-every economic demand mediately raises a political question.
"The hope that trade-union activity be limited to strictly trade-union questions without any need for getting involved in politics represents a misunderstanding,"Zbigniew Romaszewski said. We agree entirely with him. tions of work, wages, and jobs are certainly purely trade-union matters, but that does not mean that they are not bound up very extensively with labor legislation and therefore with the running of the economy."
The author of the Letter to abig niew Bujak follows Romaszewski's lin survival, and a precondition for this-an essential one in my opinion-is a real economic reform, which is impossible without a political reform, and therefore without the demise of the Military Council of National Salvation."
"PREMATURE ASSAULTS" ON THE REGIME On the other hand, we do not want to sow the opposite sort of illusions, leading people to believe that the fight for democratic rights or economic demands leads automatically to a political struggle or to a revolutionary situation in which the working class could triumph.
It is necessary to take account of the concrete situation you are in at each
There is a fundamental difference between the conditions in which Solidarity waged its struggle on the eve of December 13 and those in which it is working today. It is obliged to wage an underground struggle, deprived of one of the elements that gave it its power, that is legal structures existing in every region, city, and plant along with the ability to present the point of view of the workers publicly at every moment.
Despite the massive character of the resistance and the impressive combativity that has been demonstrated since the crackdown, the grave setback represented by the loss of democratic rights in general and trade-union rights in particular cannot be underestimated. Ten million workers openly organized is not quite the same thing as ten million workers trying to organize clandestinely.
So, although we do not share the pessimism of Zbigniew Bujak, who out of fear of an uncontrolled social explosion insists on caution above all else. But we are not as optimistic as Zbigniew Romaszewski when he says that December 13 was "only a lost battle, in which we lost a little material and in which the organizational were wiped
These losses, he says, "are not esperspective for continuing Solidarity's struggle today has to take account not only of the morale of the masses but also of the objective limitations obstructing their organization and
Revolution is not a linear process, contrary to what Wiktor Kulerski seems to think when he evokes a seizure of all the levels of control and decision making indicates clearly that this is supposed to lead to a situation of dual power, but apparently without a direct confrontation with the regime at any point. Such a perspective is illusory because the Polish bureaucracy will defend itself, and it showed on December 13 that it was ready to use every means to maintain itself in
In analysing the experience of the revolution in Poland and Russia, Rosa Luxemburg wrote:
"In the course of the political cri sis accompanying its seizure of power, in the course of the long and stubborn strug gles, the proletariat will acquire the degree of political maturity permitting it to obtain in time a definitive victory of the
Thus these 'premature' attacks of the proletariat against the state power are in themselves important historic factors helping to provoke and devictory (10)."
This victory depends in part on ur reseeable factors linked to the radical zation of the masses, whose anger explodes suddenly focusing around mands that sometimes seem harmless at
"The spontaneous element plays a big role in all mass strikes (11)."
Victory also depends on patient propaganda and educational work by a vanguard, which, as history shows, for long periods consists only of nuclei of
This is true of Poland, like everywhere else. The work done in
1967-80 by the small groups linked to the
Committee to Defend the Workers (KOR, later the Committee
Defense), and to the free-union organicommittees, ground for the
Finally and especially, victory depends on the capacity of a revolutionary leadership to offer an action program it possible to rally the broad masses around specific objectives at the decisive moment in the confrontation.
cannot be improvised in a matter of a few days.
COORDINATING THE RESISTANCE December 13 showed how unprepared Solidarity, and especially its leadership, were for a confrontation with the regime. To draw the conclusion from this that you must not confront the bureaucracy, that you must not challenge the "leading role of the party," would be absurd and fundamentally wrong.
To draw such a conclusion would mean that there is no hope and that the demands pushed by millions of workers over many months have to be dropped. But you cannot just call for a mass up. rising against the "occupiers," as Jacek Kuron calls them, without more serious
The Polish masses have demonstrated their determination to retake the initiative. This has become particularly evident since the beginning of May. this mean that they are ready to take power in the coming weeks.
The contributions to the discussion by plant activists who disagree with the perspectives proposed by various Solidarity leaders indicate a demand for coordinating the activities of the movement in order to regain a more favorable relationship of forces. This is the dominant note, rather than a straining to strike the deci-
"A lot of energy and enthusiasm are being wasted....because working in a dispersed way as we do we cannot act effectively. The only effective means of rebuilding a real social network, and what people are impatiently waiting for, is the subordination of our actions to the union regional authorities (12)."
Another contribution maintains, in response to Zbigniew Bujak's arguments that the leadership cannot make decisions
"The view that the work of the union should be decided on by the membership as a whole is a worthy one. But in a period when it is impossible to convoke a general congress of the dele1982, Warsaw region bulletin.
10. Reform or Revolution? 11. The Mass Strike, in Rosa Luxemburg 12. Opornik, No. 3.
gates, during the state of siege, the membership has no way of expressing its opinion and the slogan 'Let the workers decide!' raised by the [Warsaw] regional leaders sounds as naive as statements of the state authorities do cynical. The state of war will last a long time, and a policy of waiting, whether it is waiting for the voice of the people or for that of the union leaders, is no policy.
"If we remain passive, time will not work for us, quite the contrary. We do not propose creating new structures, nor changing the name or the objectives of
We propose action. We have the union. democratically elected regional leaders, and the membership has the right to expect that they will lead the work of the regional organization and work in the region in general." And this means that they have to take "initiatives that will stimulate the present
"What we need," the author of the "Letter to Zbigniew Bujak" wrote, national leadership able, here and now, to create the conditions in which it will be possible for Solidarity to regain legality.... We do not need orders but coordination... to build a massive resistance movement and infuse it with hope." ranks expressed in the underground press have been getting sharper and sharper: "Why do the Warsaw leaders, such as Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski, asscoiate the passive resistance they advocate with weak organization? Because, unfortunately, in their conception, passive resistance is action of a symbolic character."
In the same bulletin, it says, referring to Zbigniew Bujak's strategy: "It is based on the idea of symbolic actions, but people consider it sterile," because they are convinced that "the time for making gestures is past and what is needed now is to strike real blows. They are looking for proposals for action that can really hurt the enemy (14)."
"The leaders and the experts are calling on the ranks to practice selforganization, to undertake symbolic actions that do not bring on repression and
Solidarnosc Congress (DR) conditions of a very great social crisis, limited economic struggle, which demands enormous efforts and enormous sacrifices, cannot produce serious results. The workers are ready to participate in mass demonstrations and even in a general strike, but not in exhausting little strikes without perspectives."
And he adds: thought, however, that the mass radicalization will continue on its own, automatically. The working class is expecting initiative from its organizations. has reached the conclusion that its expectation is in vain...the process of radicalization will break up into expressions of demoralization, protests, isolated explosions of dispair (16)."
The Solidarity leaders have shown that they are sensitive to the demands of the masses and capable of changing their position. They expressed their doubts about the proposals to accelerate the setting up of national coordination and calling national actions. But after that for which we have to organize ourselves in the new conditions will continually widen (17)."
The editors of the bulletin Karta have expressed their opposition to the tactic advocated by Zbigniew Bujak, which they call passive. They propose "a system of escalating collective actions with the presentation at each step of cer tain demands and the threat of new ac tions if these demands are not met (18)."
Of course, these proposals do not exhaust the debate on the methods of struggle by which the movement can progress in the present situation.
Strikes, in Poland as elsewhere, remain the most natural way for the workers to create a more favorable relationship of forces vis-a-vis the bureaucratic regime But at the same time, their reluctance to engage in strikes in the first months after the military crackdown shows that the Polish workers do not want to use this weapon in any and all circumstances.
They refuse to do this because they they decided to form a Provisional Coor do not see the effectiveness of resorting to observe self-imposed limits. But the rank-and-file activists are demanding that the leadership offer them a program and directives for action and organization."
At the same time, "the forms of resistance implemented since December are no longer satisfactory. The trade-union press, paying unions dues, helping those persecuted and their families, forming nuclei of resistance all this is insufficient. Networks for coordination including numbers of plants have started being set up from below. The workers in the plants have begun to demand more determined actions on the part of the clandestine regional leaderships (15)."
The point of view expressed by these activists illustrates what Leon Trotsky said in 1935 polemicizing against the leaders of the French Communist Party:
"The masses of workers understand what the 'chiefs' do not, that is, in the 16 dinating Committee, and they themselves, by means of leaflets and Radio Solidarity, called the May 3 and 13 demonstrations.
ACTIVE STRIKES AND THE QUESTION OF POWER The activists who wrote in the underground bulletins voicing their disagreement with certain leaders did not display any extremist tendency. They did not propose calling a general strike right away, but wanted to know how to advance toward coordinating initiatives.
After listing the kinds of actions immediately possible-demonstrations of the existence of Solidarity, fighting the "collaborators,"mutual aid, information and a clandestine press system, political debates, etc.-the author of one of these contributions says: "The goals and tasks to strikes all the time but also because strikes of the traditional type, even with occupations, pose a specific problem in the bureaucratized workers capitalist society, strikes are not only a proletariat can use to create the political conditions for advancing its daily struggle but also an instrument directly threatening the economic
But it quickly became evident to the Polish workers that in their case strikes could be a two-edged sword.
13. Quoted in the Bulletin d'Informa tion, No. 17, published in Paris by the Comite coordination du syndicat Solidarnose en France.
14. CDN bulletin of the network of 40 plants in Warsaw, No. 3, April 25, 1982
15. Pretrwanie, No. 15, May 7, 1982. 16. Leon Trotsky, Once Again, Whither France?
17. CDN, No. 1, March 31, 1982.
While they make it possible to undermine the bureaucratic regime, it is the working class much more than the bureaucracy that has to pay the price for the economic difficulties that can be brought on by halting production.
This is why the concept of the active strike, one of the fundamental gains of the Polish revolution, is so important. It makes it possible, without paralyzing the economy, to impose workers control over production and the distribution of the goods produced. However, even more than a general strike with a passive occupation of the factories, an active strike poses the question of power.
In the case of a prolonged general strike, the paralysis of the factories, of transport, and communications in general means that the state power remains suspended in mid-air, and that it has to break the working class by force or by hunger, or give way to it.
A generalized active strike goes still further because it in fact results in the bureaucracy losing control over the economic and political organization of the country. In one of the clandestine bulletins, it was pointed out that in 1981 in Poland "it became evident that a civil society bound together by solidarity and organization is capable not only of interrupting production for a period but also of resuming production on its own and who believed that they could count on the Polish army because it was made up of "sons of the people." Of course-and this is particularly true in Poland where the ranks of the army are conscriptsclose ties exist between the soldiers and the working class, ties that count in a period of struggle such as we are going
However, as in the capitalist coun tries, in the bureaucratized workers states, the army is primarily a repressive apparatus. It obstructs, keeps close check on, and tries to limit to the greatest possible degree relations between the conscripts and their families, the society. It is a war machine that carries on a constant propaganda campaign around so-called patriotic ideals, which are designed in fact to preserve the authority and privileges of the ruling caste.
it is worth noting what Leon Trotsky said on this subject: would be childish to think that it is possible to win over the entire army by propaganda alone and thereby to make the revolution in a general sense unnecessary. The army is heterogeneous, and its disparate elements are welded together in the iron ring of discipline (20)."
"It is perfectly illusory to think that the 'army going over to the people' can happen as a peaceful simultaneous
The ruling classes facing a matter of life or death never give up positions of their own accord under the influence of theoretical reasoning about the composition of the army. tude of the troops, this great unknown in all revolutions, can only become clear when the soldiers find themselves face to face with the people (21)."
on new bases."
was the threat of such active STRAN strikes, embracing several regions with a perspective of spreading these actions to the entire country that made the bureaucracy decide, the bulletin says, to go into action: "Without any further hesitation, it prepared to establish a state force (19)."
The determination that the workers have demonstrated over the last five months shows that they are far from having given up the demands they were pressing before December. The problem now is how to prepare the way for the transition from the immediate objectives, on which it is correct for the movement to concentrate its forces, on to the more general objectives that have underlaid the whole struggle of the Polish working class for what will soon be two years. come together in the fight of the working class to take control of their own affairs, that is to regain the power that has been usurped from them.
Over and above the debate on the tactical means and the method of struggle to achieve this objective and the many possible steps between strikes at selected points and a generalized active strike there is a question that Solidarity will have to answer if the movement is to avoid being driven back to a purely defensive position, as was the case on December 13. That is the fight to win the army.
### WORKERS GUARDS
General Jaruzelski's crackdown should have opened the eyes of those
No matter how sharp the internal battles may be between the military apparatus and the administrative apparatus and the apparatus of the Polish Communist Party, the junta in power is no less a faithful defender of the interests of the bureaucracy in general. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that 90% of the higher officers in the Polish army are members of the Communist Party and that a number of them have gone through Soviet training schools.
Jacek Kuron expresses the hope that "the movement will undertake immediate and by all possible means agitation among the soldiers and the police. They must be urged to build coordinating committees and contact has to be established with these committees."
Kuron is correct on this point, and he is right as well when he says that a mass uprising against the military dictatorship will only be effective if the resistance movement secures the cooperation of an important section of the troops. before December 13. After the crackdown, many activists were prompted to tion.
Trotsky also pointed out that the decisive sections of the army can only go over to the proletariat if the workers demonstrated to the soldiers "their real determination and capacity to struggle for power to the last drop of blood. struggle necessarily presupposes the arming of the workers (22)"
The question of workers guards (militias) arises here. Such guards, to be really effective, have to be armed. They can be formed on the basis of strike pickets. "In every strike and every street demonstration, it is necessary to porlarize the idea of the need for forming self-defense detachments (23)." "A general strike is a partial strike generalized. A workers militia is strike pickets generalized (24)."
Among the Solidarity leaders, voices are being raised today that testify
18. Karta, No. 12, March 26, 1982, Warsaw bulletin.
19. CDN, No. 1, March 31, 1982. 20. Leon Trotsky, War and the Fourth International.
21. Leon Trotsky, 1905, Editions de Minuit, Paris 1969, pp. 236-237.
22. Trotsky, War and the Fourth International.
23. Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Program.
24. Trotsky, Once Again, Whither France?
17
to an understanding of the need for which rests on force alone cannot readmits-and correctly so-that the latter, avoided (30)."
forming workers guards clandestinely and for them going into action at the moment of decisive confrontation between the class and the military dictatorship. Bogdan Lis pointed this up clearly
"Our struggle is leading to a general strike and, in contrast to December 1981, we will be obliged to take the decision to defend the plants on strike
A large part of the membership of Solidarity has always upheld-and many continue to uphold-the idea of passive resistance, in the sense of refusing to respond by violence to violence. strategy of self-limitation put forward by the majority of the leadership and of the experts in Solidarity is based precisely on the idea that bloodshed has to be prevented at any cost. This idea remains present in a number of the contributions to the ongoing discussion on the strategy Solidarity should follow. They echo the statements of the Catholic hierarchy:
"The resistance of the society to the state of siege may take the form of acts of violence that would pose the danger of degenerating into a vicious circle of terror and repression. acts must be condemned. Opposition to such a process will be effective only if it is progress in achieving an internal detente and a national accord (26)."
For our part, we are not favorable to violence for the sake of violence, and we are opposed to terrorism and indivi-
If a terrorist attack disturbs the minority in power, it is only for a short time, whereas ientation that terrorists attacks introduce into the ranks of the working masses themselves is much more deepgoing. all you need to accomplish your objective is to get a revolver, what is the purpose of all the exertions of the class strug-
The only way of convincing the workers who are tempted to engage in terrorist actions of the ineffectiveness of individual violence is to offer them methods of struggle that enable the masses to resist the assaults of the regime and win victory, including on the mili-
They cannot be convinced by preaching passivity to them.
We reject the doctrine of the pacifists who reject the use of violence in all circumstances, because this inevitably means the defeat for the working class at the hands of a minority that has arms and is determined to use them to preserve its power. The whole history of workers uprisings in the so-called socialist countries demonstrates this. Therefore, the appeals launched by the church to sist the temptation to hate are useless.
"We turn to the church in the expectation that it will tell us what to do, how to defend ourselves. And what do
"Do not let yourselves hate' When the church warns us against the use of force, it is appealing much more to the regime, nounce it...But can society-the workers and the youth-renounce it (23)?" This question was posed by an activist full of doubts about the attitude of the church.
The objection will be raised that for 16 months the workers were able to find a path that enabled them to avoid shedding blood, and that this was essential in view of the trauma left by the bloody suppression of the workers uprising in December 1970.
But to arm to defend yourself does not mean immediately opening fire. The use of force is less necessary to the extent that you have force-in this case, armson your side. If the workers guards, which began hastily to be set up the very week before the crackdown, had been able to resist the tanks of the police with something more than bare hands, who knows what the attitude of the would have been, what would have been the outcome of the fight, and even if there would have been a fight?
The objection could also be raised that the "reasonable"attitude of the Polist working class since the crackdown has prevented bloodshed, by contrast with what has happened under other military dictatorships, notably in Latin America.
But, as the author of a document circulating in Poland stresses, "the situation in those countries is different in any case inasmuch as the state is not the employer, and the military regime is obliged to stop at the factory gates. That is why in those countries, police sanctions are much tougher, because it is impossible to apply economic sanctions against labor as a whole. That is why police repression is relatively limited here (29)."
The fact remains that if the Polish working class decides to go openly onto the offensive, as it began to do in early May, the military regime will not hesitate to use force and arms. The workers cannot wait passively in the hope that the will also demonstrate guards may seem insufficient in the face of military forces armed to the teeth and with very advanced technical means. But if such units have the support of the entire working class and the society, they will be a decisive element in opening the way for revolutionary fraternization between the people and the army, by de. monstrating to the soldiers that the workers are determined to resist the shock troops of the regime. And the workers will have added an invaluable ace to their hand for winning over to their armed struggle "this great unknown in all rev-
More and more Polish trade unionists agree that the errors made by Solidarity before December 1981 must not be
Polish revolution was supposed to triumph in legality, without violence, without resorting to force " we read in an underground bulletin. "We all shared the conviction-naive as it seem today-that recourse to force could be
Before December 13, Jacek Kuron declared himself in favor of nonviolence Today he says: "It has to be acknowledged that violence yields only to violence, and it has to be said clearly that the movement will not refuse to use force."
What should we think, therefore, about the arguments that such a strategy is inapplicable in Poland inasmuch as it would increase the risks of Soviet intervention? It cannot be denied that such a danger exists. shown by experience that the USSR is determined to intervene-even indirectly-in the Polish situation in order to try to force acceptance of subjection?
If the Polish workers are not prepared-and they are not-to renounce their aspirations, they have to continue to search for a way that will enable them fi nally to take control of the affairs of the country. And it is obvious that it will be hard to win such a victory if they remain isolated, if the workers in the other coun tries dominated by the Kremlin bureaucracy do not follow their example, if their struggle is not actively supported by the workers movement in the capitalist
However, unless the objectives put forward by Solidarity since August 1980 are explicitly abandoned, there is no other way out but to try to build up a more favorable relationship of forces. And this has to be done on the basis of the understanding that the best way to make the enemy retreat is to make them feel your strength, relying on the fact that the Polish workers are not the only ones who aspire to the establishment of a radically different society.
In an article published clandestinely, we can read: "Not only in Poland, but also in other countries in our camp, the demand for thoroughgoing reforms in the management of production and directing public affairs has been ripening for a long time. To be sure, the economic crisis in Poland is particularly deep. But this crisis is manifested in all the countries in the Eastern bloc (including the USSR) by declining production, increased indebtedness to the West, and technological underdevelopment.
"In certain countries, embryonic forms of an independent trade-union movement have already developed. And, while for the moment it does not seem that the Polish revolution has found imitators, it is no less true that East Europe has entered into a period of profound transformation, which may of course be delayed but cannot be stopped by force. And it is in this perspective that we must consider the events in Poland (31)"
Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 11, War26. Theses of the Social Council of the 27. Leon Trotsky, The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Kirov Assassination.
28. Tygodnik Mazowsze, No. 9, April 6, "Tentative d'analyse de la situation du pays," published by the Bulletin d'information, No. 28. Paris.