BOLIVIA Editorial WE PUBLISH below a statement from the bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on the wave of anti-worker repression in Bolivia. The declaration was issued on September 23, 1985.
Since the appeal was launched some of those trade unionists who had been arrested, amongst them members of the POR-U (Partido Obrera Revolucionario- - Unificado), Bolivian section of the Fourth International have been released. Others have been deported to the Pando region including our comrade Eugenio Sanchez, a member of the national leadership of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana), the main trade union federation.
As we go to press we learn that on October 3 the COB called off their strike. The hunger strike in the mines is continuing according to unconfirmed sources.
On August 29, the government of Victor Paz Estenssoro, a government elected through a rigged ballot, adopted a series of measures aimed to attack the standard of living and the democratic rights of the working class. Inflation in the country is currently running at the unpreced. ented rate of 14,000%; wages have been frozen for the past four months; the price of oil has risen ten times; all subsidies on basic foodstuffs have been withdrawn; the popular canteens have been closed and finally the peso has been devalued by 95%. At the same time, workers in the public sector have been threatened with sackings if they strike and those trade unionists who organise strike action will, from now on, face six month prison sentences.
On September 19, the government put these measures into practice and deported the entire leadership of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana — the main trade union federation) to the Pando region, the area where the dictator Banzer had previously established a concentration camp. Other leaders, activists and trade union militants have also been hit; massive arrests have taken place and three thousand militants are now in jail. Despite all this, the strike called by the COB against the government's measures went ahead. Fifteen days since the strike call first went out miners and factory workers are still out. Because of this, the government is now threatening further measures; they are seeking to break workers resistance through whatever means come to hand.
It is therefore vital that a campaign of international solidarity be organised and activated. All trade union and political organisations of the labour movement should make their protest heard. In particular they should demand the release of all those militants imprisoned, the return of the COB leaders to their homes, the lifting of the state of siege and the reestablishment of democratic rights. •
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
NICARAGUA The revolution on its sixth anniversary ON THE SIXTH anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution, the increasingly aggressive stance of US imperialism continues to be the dominant factor in the situation. The main priority has to be defence of the revolution in face of the open desire of the Reagan administration to overthrow the Sandinista government.
The damage and the human losses brought about by the attacks of the counter-revolution on Nicaraguan territory have been on the increase since 1983, the year when the contras began their first military operations of any scope.
Thus the number of battles recorded by the Nicaraguan authorities went beyond 660 in 1983, 948 in 1984 and reached 710 for the first six months of 1985. For the first part of 1985 it is calculated that twenty health centres have been destroyed, as well as 14 schools and that a further 359 schools have been forced to close. Physical injuries and losses in production due to contra operations are estimated at 143 million dollars worth in in 1984. This represents 40% exports of Nicaragua. JEAN-CLAUDE BERNARD
In order to step up the military pressure, the contras have succeeded, in the north of the country, in establishing 'regional commando squads' of 1,200 combattants apiece which, through forming a small coordinated group between them and with the help of very sophisticated communications systems, have penetrated Nicaraguan territory. The number of contras in operation at the present time is therefore in the order of several thousands. (1)
1983 and 187 million dollars worth and 53%, respectively, of the total
The contras' tactic is to pursue a war of attrition in order, over the medium term, to weaken the revolution's capacity for resistance. So, their attacks are becoming more and more selective, aimed mainly at the points vital for the development of the country and against the social gains made since 1979. They are also
1. 'La Contra-revolucion, datos basicos,
1980-1985' Centro de Comunicacion
Internacional, Managua.
3
politically selective. The producers' cooperatives started up by Sandinsta activists are coming in for more attacks than individual peasants.
During August 1985, the contras, in addition, launched a limited military offensive in order to gain greater international attention. They attacked a town of 10, 000 people on the PanAmerican highway 130 kilometers to the North of Managua and to the south of one of the cities where the revolutionary mobilization has been the greatest, Esteli.
On August 1, a unit of 150 contras disguised as Sandinista army soldiers entered the town. After a battle that lasted four hours, they were forced to retreat. Their objective cannot have been to hold the town for long; it must have been simply to demonstrate that they had a real presence in the neighborhood of presence in the neighborhood of Esteli.
The testimonies collected in the Trinidad hospital exposed the fact that the contras are forcibly reeruiting very young teenagers. The result is a very poor military quality of the contra mercenaries, who are more often used to stage murderous ambushes than for major confrontations with the militia and the Sandinista army. More US aid for the contras
This military weakness of the contras and their inability to strike decisive blows at the revolution must inevitably oblige Washington to increase its aid. The vote of the US congress to give official credits to the contras is going to escalate the amount and quality of the support given to the mercenaries.
The geographical extension of the military operational zones only affects Nicaragua's peripheral regions in the north, the south, and along the Atlantic coast. This means that the contras' areas of activity remain quite close to their training camps in Honduras and in Costa Rica.
Within Nicaragua, the counterrevolutionaries can find places where they can get supplies through terror, corruption and manipulating real feelings of discontent, but their bases are not in the interior.
In combating this aggression, the defense effort of the revolution is based mainly on the productive workers of the cities and on the poorest section of the rural population, small peasants and agricultural workers. This is true, first of all, in strictly military terms. The centers where the militias are most active are the agricultural producers cooperatives, the small-peasant villages, and the urban enterprises.
Reconstruction in Nicaragua (DR)
In the northern regions, the militias are directly involved in the organization of defense and in direct confrontation with the contras. As exemplified by the Somoto region, about 15 kilometers from the Honduran border, the militia is made up of people assigned by each of the cooperatives in the local complex. They serve for six months.
In the building that serves as a command post for the chief of the border guards, young militia members stand guard. They are directly subordinate to the local commander of the Sandinista army. He himself, as he explained to me, sees his task as intricately tied up with the political and military organization of the peasants.
In Region VI, the one around Esteli, more than half of the production workers are mobilized in the militias or in the military service.
The draft that was established in 1984, with the setting up of the patriotic military service, had the explicit objective of broadening the base of the military defense. Nonetheless, a lot of the bourgeoisie are managing to send their offspring abroad in order to get them out of serving the revolution. The result is that the military service is assumed mainly by young people who come from the social base of the revolution.
However, the scope of the confrontation under way in Nicaragua between the revolution and the counterrevolution cannot be reduced to the military aspect alone. The concentration of efforts on assuring the defense and survival of the revolution is leading to a very serious deterioration in the economic situation and a decline in the standard of living of the production workers. In this area as well, it is they who are bearing the basic burden of the defense effort.
The economic problems are growing worse. The pressure of the military aggression is combining with Reagan's embargo and the consequences of the international economic crisis to strangle Nicaragua and keep the revolution from developing the country. Half of the national budget is now going for defense, and service on the foreign debt is absorbing more than half the income from exports, whose dollar values are declining (although the actual amounts exported remain constant). So, there is a scarcity of foreign exchange for imports, and spending for internal needs is being squeezed. Growing economic difficulties
Several phases have to be distinguished in the first six years of the revolution with respect to the economic evolution and its impact on the standard of living of the population. In the first two years, the scope of the most pressing tasks of reconstruction gave rise to a growth much greater than that of the other Central American countries.
The owners of the means of production and the big agricultural estates could keep their way of life if they accepted being deprived of political power. On the other hand, the standard of living of the poorer sections of the population improved both qualitatively and quantitatively. The social base of the revolution was the first to benefit from this, through the efforts made in education, health, and in making it easier for the people to acquire the necessities of life.
From 1981 to 1983, the first blows from the imperialists forced the revolutionary government to make an abrupt change in imports policy. Only those most important to meet the needs of the country's economic International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
development were continued. The middle strata, whose life style involved importing a lot of nonessential goods, suffered the most. On the other hand, the overall standard of living of the the overal standara or living or ne masses was preserved. The prices for the goods included in the "basic basket" of foods were controlled.
To achieve this result, a system of subsidies for necessities was put into practice, reducing their price to the consumer. Everyone in Nicaragua could buy this limited number of subsidized products on the basis of a per capita rationing system. It was even cheaper for the peasants who grew such products to buy them, in some cases, because the sale prices could be lower than the cost of production.
After 1984, growing economic problems made it impossible to maintain the standard of living of the masses any longer. For that year, the drop in the buying power of the minimum wage is estimated at 30%. (2)
The economic measures announced in January 1985 represent a sharpening of this trend. The subsidies on necessities have been eliminated. They are to be removed gradually over this year. For example, in August, the subsidy on milk was taken off, and the price of a litre of milk went from 12 to 18 cordobas. [The exchange rate is set in trade of twenty cordobas to a dollar. The parallel-market exchange rate is 650 cordobas to a dollar]. This results automatically in a rise in the prices of necessities. Inasmuch as a large proportion of the budgets of familes of modest income goes for these products, it is the poorer sections of the population that will have to bear the burden of these measures.
Another decision, announced on May 1, worsens the situation of productive workers. In order to cushion the decline in the buying power of the national currency observable in recent years, wage supplements in kind were given to the workers. Thus, they got some of the products they helped to make. This was the case in particular, in the textile and beverage industries. The quantities increased, and in order to get rid of them the workers sold them on the parallel markets that have flourished in Managua. The ending of wage supplements in kind, therefore, means a net loss in buying power for the workers concerned.
Alongside these measures, it was envisaged to increase the wages of productive workers and open up special supply centers reserved for them. Wages have, in fact, been increased but they have gone up more slowly than prices. In May, the minimum wage went from 3,000
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985 cordobas to 4,500 cordobas, while ends alone.
The social base of the revoluthe rise in prices is estimated at around 100%. Thus, the decline in tion - the production workers in buying power has been about 50%.
the cities and the countryside - is the section of the population that
The setting up of supply centers for productive workers slow and is being carried o dance with administrati that are sometimes way with demands of day-t One example of the still functioning of this netw long waiting lines on Satu people do not work, whil days the traffic is small, alt are goods in the centers.
This clear decline in t of living of the workers more worrying because different strata of the unevenly. The city of M been unable to get under problems associated "informal economy," t economy that exists ma currency exchange and trac A number of stratas ar from the inflation and vantage of the shortage: and speculate. The "informal sector" of the economy has been mobilizes most to defend the revoluut in accor- tion but it is also the section that ve criteria bears the greatest burdens to support out of line it in every area. And this does not o-day life. fail to create difficulties. precarious The FSLN and its activists do not ork is the try to deny these problems. The rday, when commitments to political and e on week- trade union pluralism are not being nough there put in question, and this obliges the
FSLN to take the lead in providing ae standard explanations, to continue to promote is all the the development of a mass move. it affects ment, and in this way to demonpopulation strate its vanguard role anagua has For example, right after July 19 control the Barricada published a series of inwith the vestigations indicating the motivations ne parallel of members of the vast crowds that nly in the came out for the celebration of the ling sectors. Sixth Anniversary of the revolution. e profiting Barricada did not play on the presence taking ad- of hundreds of thousands of people i to hoard to paint a comfortably reassuring
All the articles in this study indicated the gravity of the problems of life, low wages, rising prices, long bus rides ete. Desnite these problems.
bus rides, etc. Despite these problems, all these people came out for July
These are not just marginal prac-
19 - that was the central thread of tices by a bourgeois layer that can be the series.
easily pinpointed. They reflect deeper
In a "face to face with the people"
economic problems. Growing at a meeting with the construction workers rate of 6% a year, the population of at the end of July, President Daniel
Managua has reached a million,
Ortega discussed with one of the a third of the total populatoin of traditional sectors of the working the country. The number of proclass in which the influence of the two ductive jobs is not growing at the union confederations linked to the same rate. The uncontrolled popu-
Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and lation growth, therefore, is swelling the Nicaraguan Communist Party the numbers of those engaged in
(PCN) is still significant.
the parallel economy.
In the building industry, more-
It is estimated that more than over, on the same site you find half of the economically active workers paid by the state and workers population of Managua are selfpaid by private subcontractors, with employed as street sellers, artisans, the wage differentials that result or in providing services. The gap from this. Several leaders of the between this sector and the produ-
Independent General Confederation of ctive workers has so widened that
Labor (CGT-I), which is close to the today the minimum income of an
PSN, put questions directly to the ice-cream vendor is at least three
"Comrade-President" about wages.
times the minimum wage of a pro-
Rank-and-file workers raised their ductive worker.
problems. Others attacked one or
The compromises required by the another leader on the platform alongmixed economy are also leading to side Daniel Ortega.
inequalities between the productive
While some leaders in their answers workers and holders of means of hid behind the technical complexity production. This is particularly true of the problems and bromides about in the countryside, where the large the difficulty of solving them quickly, landowners can draw subsidies in
Ortega constantly referred to the dollars. This possibility, initially problems created by the imperialist authorized for cotton producers, was aggression, politically justifying the extended in the summer of 1985 to compromises that the revolution had big livestock raisers. The superto accept with social strata other vision of the use of these subsidies than the workers and peasants.
is still not very tight, and it has been shown that they are not being used by the bourgeoisie for productive
2. 'Pensamiento Propio', April 1985.
----- photo credits and running heads -----
picture.
Reagan envia otra flota de guerra al Atlántico Haneery Jew aren July 1983: *Reagan sends another military fleet to Nicaragua' (DR)
The Sandinista Workers Confederation (CST) is the urban mass organization that confronts most directly the problems affecting production workers. This organizaiton dates back to the victory of the revolution, and thus is still in a stage of consolidation. It has to forge a whole generation of activists to give impetus to mass activity in the working class. Facing the competition of the other union confederations, whose influence has greatly declined but which have maintained the confidence of veteran cadres of the workers movement, the CST is reflecting the discontent that is widespread among wage earners both about wages and supplies.
In August 1985, the CST started up a vast discussion among the workers in order to prepare the way for a national discussion on the balance sheet of its activity on September 7-8, 1985.
The objective of this discussion was summed up as follows by the CST itself: "The CST calls on all Nicaraguan workers to take up a mass discussion for the following objectives:
"To measure the successes and problems in the work of the union to carry out the resolutions adopted by the Fourth National Assembly of the Unions and the orientations of the National leadership of the FSLN.
"To evaluate the positive and negative effects of the economic measures taken by the revolutionary government in the context of the latest aggressions by imperialism.
"To present our own proposals vigorously to the revolutionary govern. ment with respect to wages and prices policy, supply, work contracts, and the commitments of the union movement in the areas of military defense, civil defense, and production in economizing and rationalizing our human and material resources." (3)
In the Managua region, more than 1, 500 workers belonging to more than 15 enterprises participated in the preparatory assemblies. In its 6
August 19 issue, Barricada presented some of the conclusions of these assemblies: "The workers raised the problem of the supply centers and expressed the opinion that the prices are too high by comparison with production costs. The workers consider that the excessive bureaucracy of the institutions leads to a series of deficiencies in public administration and in the resolution of problems. They pointed out those institutions that have not given the necessary support to the innovations campaign [that is, the workers proposing technical innovations to cushion the lack of spare parts owing to the US embargo]. They noted that there has been lack of speed on the part of the Ministries of Labor and Industry in offering a response to the financial problems of the enterprises. They called for a review of the workers wages and for a rapid solution to pending cases. In the application of the austerity and economy measures, they have found resistance from the administrators, and they demand that these measures be applied not just to the workers but to all sectors." (4) The morale of the masses
While the decline in the standard of living is undeniable, it is not producing a loss of political confidence in the revolution, its gains, or its vanguard. Tangible proofs of this are the success of the July 19 celebration, as well as the inability of the forces opposing or competing with the FSLN to crystallize the discontent that exists.
The effect of the political compromises that the regime has made in order to divide the bourgeoisie should also be considered. The Sandinistas have sought to involve some of them in the battle for production. Along with this, they have tried to get diplomatic support from other countries in Latin America.
These compromises are leading to inequalities in living conditions between the productive workers mobilized in the mass organizations that support the revolution and the bourgeois and trading strata that have been deprived of political power. There is thus an unstable balance between the demands of mass work focused on the social base of the revolution, and the demands imposed by the political compromises that have been made to gain breathing space for the revolution.
The tasks of politicalizing the masses have become more difficult than in the period when the revolution could begin to satisfy the immediate demands of the poorest sections of the population.
All these factors are leading to a more complex situation for the mass organizations whose function is both to apply the orientations of the FSLN national leadership and to be the organized means for expressing the immediate aspirations of the masses.
One of the most striking characteristics of the Nicaraguan situation is the continuing capacity of these organizations to mobilize, when the war of aggression against Nicaragua is naturally tending to impose a united political-military command at all levels. Such features are still more marked in the countryside, in which the progressive application of the land reform is opening up a space for new advances benefiting the poor peasants. Moreover, the peasantry is shot through with social contradictions that make it the immediate battle ground between the revolution and the counterrevolution.
The agrarian reform has continued to advance at the same rate since 1981, without any slowup. The policy that has been in effect up till now is being changed in two respects. On the one hand, the cooperatives, to which most of the land was given, are getting a lower priority. In Region VI, Esteli, where there is a sharp social polarization between the mobilized poor peasants and the counterrevolution, the tendency has been for land grants to be given more to individual peasants.
Moreover, there have been cases, where the revolution has not hesitated to upset its plans in order to respond more rapidly to the demands of the peasants. What has happened in the Masaya region, sixty kilometers south of Managua is indicative of this new course. This region is not a focus of military attention, since it is far from the areas where the contras operate. So, it did not get priority for solving the problems that might exist. Thus, six years after the revolution, many poor peasants hardly managed to survive on their tiny holdings, and were obliged to go to work as day laborers on the big cotton plantations or livestock ranches in the dry zone, in the northern part of the department.
These big estates belonged, notably, to Bolanos, the president of the COSEP, the confederation of employers. The peasant mobilization that began in June, thus, had a target particularly representative of the bourgeoisie that remains in Nicaragua. Demonstrations and marches were organized. The banners said: "We want Bolanos' land: He's got a lot of it!"
The movement was largely spontaneous at the start, but very quickly, the National Union of Farmers and
3. *Trabajadores,' August 1985. 4. Barricada, August 19, 1985. International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
Stock Raisers (UNAG) began building the movement and took charge of the demonstrations and of pressing the demands. On June 14, Comandante Jaime Wheelock told the peasants in Masaya that 323 square kilometers of land in the northern part of the department were going to be converted into a "development and agrarian reform zone."
In an initial phase, more than 5, 000 hectares of land were given to 1, 600 peasant families. The lands given to the peasants were expropriated from Bolanos. Other estates belonging to big landowners have been the subject of negotiations. The government has bought some and made some trades.
The FSLN leader for the region, CA Barrios explained: "The peasants don't want the land just to feed themselves but they also have a bigger say in things. It is our task to respond to their aspirations. Masaya could be the point of departure for a series of actions throughout the country." (5)
In fact, the revolution has greater margins for maneuver in the countryside. Speeding up the agrarian reform does not create additional expenses but has only political consequences. The problem is to strike a balance between meeting the immediate needs of the revolution and the imperatives of neutralizing the social strata that are hesitating between the revolution and the counterrevolution.
The mass work of the UNAG is at the heart of these conflicts. This is why it is the mass organization with the most room for developing its own policy to serve the revolution. Unlike the CST, the UNAG has thus organized demonstrations of thousands of peasants mobilizing to press their own demands.
Inasmuch as the present situation in Nicaragua is one of a sharpening confrontation between the revolution and the counterrevolution, there cannot be any stable balance in the relationship of forces between the contending camps. The stepping up of the aggression is aggravating the social contradictions within Nicaragua. And the FSLN is consolidating its vanguard by continuing, despite the most difficult sort of problems created by the war, to stimulate the organization of the majority of the Nicaraguan popular masses.
Nicaragua is launching a solidarity campaign entitled "Nicaragua Must Survive." The stakes of the war that is underway are clear. It is an unequal contest between the main imperialist power and tiny Nicaragua. Everything that can help to loosen the vise must be done. C
5. All the figures and quotations concerning the Masaya movement have been taken from "Telex Envio', No 62.
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985