NICARAGUA Interview with Tomas Borge ON THE occasion of the sixth anniversary of the Sandinista revolution the Nicaraguan journal, Pensamiento Propio published the following interview with Comandante Tomas Borge, a member of the national leadership of the FLN, minister of the interior and president of the Commission for the Autonomy of the Atlantic coast area. In the interview Borge makes a critical assessment of some aspects of the revolutionary process in particular with regard to the problem of maintenance and strengthening of the political hegemony of the FSLN. Although he is optimistic on a general level he does not attempt to paper over the weaknesses of the revolution and in particular the problem of the political and ideological confrontation with the internal enemies
Question. How would you judge the level of participation of the masses in the revolutionary process?
Answer. I think the question should be turned around. The revolution is not an event in which the people participate to a greater or lesser extent. On the contrary, the revolution would not exist at all if it was not for the people. But if the people are not totally integrated into the revolutionary process, it is not their responsibility. It is the responsibility of the vanguard, of the leadership bodies who have not at a given moment been sensitive enough to involve themselves in the mass movement and evaluate the wishes of the mass of the population.
In this sense it is important to understand the fact that, at the time of the victory, the FSLN had no experience of power, that it was not even constituted as a political party. It was just a politico-military grouping which, in the beginning, had not even managed to insert itself among the broad masses and provide a lead. At the start, the aims of the mass struggle were in the nature of a protest. That was to be expected since they could not have gone beyond this rather limited and sectoral vision without some kind of political guidance.
In any case, errors or weaknesses which have produced a certain decline in mass participation in some areas must be blamed on the revolutionary leadership. But it is also important to understand that such errors are of the revolution. almost inevitable in the type of situation we are facing, when our revolution is being harassed by an especially aggressive US government, stemming not only from the nature of imperialism itself, but from that deep-rooted hatred that the president, Reagan, has for Nicaragua.
Q. We often say that the basic tenets of the Sandinista revolution, that is to say, the mixed economy and political pluralism are merely tactical in nature. Is that really the case? How do these issues influence the development of mass participation?
A. The Sandinista revolution took place in a certain geo-political area, in the United States' backyard. It was not on an island like Cuba and our revolution is much more influenced by the situation prevailing in the region. This geopolitical factor forced us, independent of our own will, to encourage political pluralism and a mixed economy. The development of this tactic became transformed into a strategy and today the mixed economy, for example, is no longer an operational choice or a camouflage, it is a strategy.
This particular schema made the task of the revolutionary leadership vis-a-vis the masses much more difficult. Political pluralism, the mixed economy and the more general aspects of the revolution have tended to sow confusion among the masses. There is not, and there could not have been an ideological project that was as clearly defined as the Cuban one.
A delegation of American Christians, hel Our project is much more muddled and complicated and such muddled plans confuse the masses. Up until now, we have not been capable of making the people understand this complexity and it is possible that we are still not capable of it. Anyway, sometimes we have not given our ear to the concerns of the masses. We have not even had enough clarity of vision ourselves to understand the very complex nature of the whole process.
Q. Could you give a concrete example where this contradiction between the popular nature of the revolution and the framework of political pluralism and the mixed economy, that is national unity, has come out?
A. A very clear example, is that of the issue of freedom of speech. We have had to live with this principle, without being able to explain exactly what it really meant. It took on the meaning that it is usually given in Latin American and in other capitalist countries. And, in some ways we actually accepted that concept.
But if we examine the problem more deeply, what freedom of expression are we really talking about? La Prensa is not just the object of censorship. It operates its own form of censorship, that is, it censors the revolution, it does not provide infor8
I by the Contras (DR) mation on the revolution because it is tied to certain class interests.
At the same time the Nicaraguan people, the masses, have never experienced such freedom of expression as now; in public places, in the 'meet the people programmes with the leaders and also freedom of expression in writing, on radio and television. Of course there are limits, mainly for bureaucratic reasons and because we have not got our ideas on the role of the media completely clear. But despite these limitations, the people are able to express themselves. There exists real freedom of speech in Nicaragua.
Nonetheless we have to live with this other aspect of freedom of speech, that which the journal La Prensa enjoys in order to attack the revolution and which we have to defend and justify in front of US congress members, in front of our European friends and in front of the governments of Latin America. And we do it even though we know that there is an almost insoluble contradiction between this freedom of expression and the defence of a political strategy for defence of the revolution which has to survive, which has to preserve its space and live up to the concrete demands of the masses.
Q. How far can one justify the lack of any criticism and self-criticism of the revolutionary process on the grounds of defending it? Is there a balance to be found? On the other hand what are the effects of reactionary propaganda on the masses?
A. First of all we have to clarify what kind of criticism we are talking about. Can we say that the journal La Prensa is merely exercising its right of criticism. No, it is not a question of criticism. The freedom to criticise should not be confused with the freedom that La Prensa and Radio Catolica have to express their opposition to the revolution. When we pose this question we must ask ourselves what form of criticism do the newspapers Barricada or Nuevo Diario or the Sandinsta television network or Radio Sandino or the Voice of Nicaragua, exercise? And we should pinpoint the errors we commit, because we do commit errors. Criticism must be constructive and the critcism of La Prensa, and Relio Catolica and all the propaganda thrown at us from outside, only aims to destroy. Constructive criticism is the only acceptable kind in the revolutionary process.
Nevertheless, in our country, the criticisms of the opposition parties, even if they themselves never manage to regroup the masses around them, do manage to influence people's perceptions. That is to say, that this propaganda does not have sufficient influence to attract people but it has enough to sow confusion. Propaganda about supplies, or the war or patriotic military service, for example, is not going to convert the masses to social Christianity but it can create confusion.
I think that there exists an intermediary layer of people who are not supporting any one of the parties and who are capable of going along with the revolutionary process on certain points and discussing on many others. For example, there are sections of the population who honestly think that we should negotiate with the counter revolutionaries. For our part we have tried to explain that a dialogue of this type would end up denying the very existence of the revolution and I think we have provided these arguments but we have not pushed them home.
In fact, reactionary propaganda, which on many points is the same as counter-revolutionary propaganda itself, has succeeded, in the sense that a section of the population, not a majority, but an important section believes that a dialogue with counter-revolutionaries would be positive. Some say that this would improve the situation and bring about peace. Others are content to say that the government should decide.
Q. Would you say that the International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
fundamental problem of mass parti- example, through the 'house to cipation on the basis of this ideologi- house' campaign which was organical confusion is mainly to be found sed in the run-up to the elections or in the towns? Isn't it more difficult trogh the construction of the to fool people in the war zones, special brigades like the fifth where they have more opportunity anniversary brigade which goes into to compare fine speeches with reality? the most backward areas in order
A. There are sections in the urban to do political work? areas who are confused but religious A. Yes, but its a more basic and reactionary propaganda, like direct question. What it amounts to is that counter revolutionary propaganda also the ideological organisation of the gets into the rural areas. We must enemy is stronger than ours from the not underestimate the work that the structural and technical point of Church is doing in the rural areas on view. We have to be everywhere the Pacific. I would say that in the at once fighting a war, solving econosame way that the counter-revolu mic problems, conducting a strug. tionaries have targetted the north gle on the international level. Our and the centre of the country as a cadres are within the infrastructure, priority, the reactionary religious the administrative areas, in the sector have prioritised Region IV, Ministry of the Interior and inside near Managua and in particular Masaya. the structures of the party with They are there. They haven't got organising responsibilities. machine guns. They don't fire bullets In contrast to this, the enemy but they fire ideas and these are an can concentrate exclusively on the ideological confrontation. That's
In the rural areas the war does where they have their best cadres. indeed play a clarifying role but there The Church is a very strong organisais also a lot of backwardness. You tion. It has its generals, its officers have to understand that in the war in the field, its best cadres - scholars areas, military strength and the sign in theology, used to talking, who are of military strength are very import- assigned to the ideological struggle. ant. That is to say that an enemy Our cadres for the ideological struggle unit which arrives well armed and are not very numerous and are not with plenty of demagogic speeches the best. The house to house' camp. can really throw the population into aign had to be done by comrades who confusion. On the other hand one themselves are only just learning. of our own units can commit serious Imagine Comandantes Joaquin errors if they don't take this into Cuadra, Omar Cabezas, Hugo Torres, account. This can happen if our forces William Ramirez, Monica Baltodano, tum up, too cocksure of themselves Lenin, Cerna or Father Miguel d' ideologically in the sense that the Escoto going from house to house. muchachos are convinced that their Well, that is what the Church does. cause is just and that it should be Why do you think that the Catholic recognised as such by the peasants. In hierarchy was so insistent that we so doing they act more like soldiers should allow the ten ecclesiasties, defending a cause than as political the ten leaders of the ideological spokespeople. It should not be like combat, back into the country? (1) that and it is not so much like that Imagine if ten of our comandantes now. were to die just like that. The blow we struck them then was of that
Q. In the three-month courses order of things. It is logical that the at the Military Academy which young Church stipulate that the condition people in military service do, is there for dialogue with the government any kind of political training or indi- is the return of these ten ecclesiastics. cations given of how to behave with And during this time what do you the people? think they have been doing? Well,
A. I think that at the begin- they've been preparing quick seminars ning we didn't stress that aspect at in order to produce new cadres of the Military Academy. Then exper- course. ience showed us that people had to We, on the other hand only have be educated for this. Nevertheless, the Sandinista Youth and some I don't think three months is enough workers organised in the Sandinista We still prioritise military training Defence Committees to rely on to wage a house to house campaign. over political preparation. I think we should include within this They do it but their arguments are political preparation training on influenced by contra propaganda. human relations. Sometimes a smile These are not embattled cadres, they at the right time can do more than have their own doubts. Our one big a scientific manual. advantage is that we are astride the horse of history. That is a big advan-
Q. Would you say that the FSLN tage. And this horse of history is is beginning to realise the need to forging straight ahead at a gallop. strengthen the ideological battle, for Sometimes it gets tired, sometimes
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985 it gets confused but it never turns back. In contrast to this, the enemy possesses the major disadvantage of going against the current of history. Moreover we have the power and that also gives us more means to confront the influence of the enemy on the masses.
If we had an ideological army, it would be very easy for us to fight the enemy on this terrain. But as we don't have very strong cadres in this area we have to make use of coercion by the state in order to compensate for our weakness in this confrontation.
We have not completely lost. Far from it. The fundamental task of the hour is to win the military war, and avert direct US intervention. Then we can put all our efforts into the ideological war, which in the long run is the most important.
Q. Couldn't we lose the military war as a result of not winning the ideological war?
A. If we abandoned the ideological war, yes. Only at the moment we are prioritising the military war without abandoning the ideological war. We have forces directed towards holding in check the ideological offensive of the enemy and our main forces are assigned to fight the military enemy. When we are able to put our best cadres into the ideological field, there will be a qualitative change in the situation. For the time being we are hitting the enemy's logistical rearguard, their supply centres. This can in the short term, but in a qualitative way, turn the situation of the war around. The counter-revolutionary war is historically destined to fail in the short term. I am talking about the next year or two.
Q. Within this time limit, what are the prospects for a war of devastation? What chance have the counter-revolutionaries got of increasing the level of instability in the country and of creating an interior battle front?
A. Imperialism wants to destroy us. They think that coercive economic measures and a counter-revolutionary war can undermine the internal situation. But this shows a total misunderstanding of reality. It is a strategic, historical error on the part of the US government because they should understand that real revolutions, that is those which succeed in changing the nature of the ruling bodies because they have changed the class domination of the state, are irreversible.
1. On July 9, 1984, ten foreign priests were expelled from Nicaragua, accused of being involved in intensive political work against the Sandinista government.'
Even the errors of revolutionaries cannot turn back this process unless the latter begin to quarrel over power, then the structures of the government will be weakened by internal disagreement, as happened in Grenada. It was indeed revolutionaries who killed the revolution in Grenada, not imperialism. What happened in Grenada could only happen here if revolutionaries started to tear each other apart and to fight each other for a share of the power or began to seek individual power. This is the dream of the enemies of the revolution.
Q. You are in charge of special areas I and Il and you are president of the National Commission for Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast. Could you tell us what this project means for Nicaragua?
A. The autonomy project is a conjunctural response. It is a project with great scope. It is a contribution by Nicaragua to human understanding. The project is the legal expression of a recognition by the revolution of the situation of marginalisation and oppression that the indigenous communities and ethnic groups have been suffering for centuries. The revolution is taking on board these historic demands and is committed to respond at all levels. The plans for the autonomy of the Atlantic coast area proposed by the Nicaraguan republic are not merely based on an academic discussion on the problem of indigenous populations. It is not a matter of creating state aid for these people. The plan envisages intellectual cadres working in the region in every area whether it be economic, political, cultural or social.
Various ministers are busy discussing the workplans which directly affect the Atlantic coast. All this is happening at the same time as the meeting of regional and national commissions on autonomy. It is these commissions which are thrashing out the guidelines which will govern autonomy and which will also, and above all, oversee the process of popular participation. The project of autonomy is a national project. Through this process, the country as a whole will grow richer. The Atlantic side because it is the possessor of autonomy and the Pacific side because it will benefit from the cultural heritage of the Atlantic. And finally both sides will be the richer because the project will sweep away prejudice and misunderstanding.
Q. Comandante, what are the implications of the plan for autonomy on the development of military activity on the Atlantic coast?
A. The plan for autonomy is a 10 political project. The problem calls for a political solution. We have never conceived of a military solution and we have corrected any errors tending in that direction. We do not believe that the demands of any indigenous peoples within Nicaragua, nor the demands of any ethnic community to be without justification. We make a distinction between the just demands of those who have been dispossessed and the unjust demands of the enemies of the country. We have sorted the grain from the husks. The indigenous peoples are on our side. Nicaragua is the first country in Latin America to recognise the multi racial character of our country.
Q. Faced with the prospect of a prolonged war and an economic crisis, what, in your opinion, will be the political drift of the population?
A. Firstly, as I have already said, I do not think that the war will go on indefinitely. But, in the event that we are not obliged to confront a US invasion, the ideological war and the conspiracy will take on a fundamental importance. We must therefore put all our efforts into the development of our counterespionage services and lean even more heavily on the masses in order to confront the situation.
Anyway, I think that the political tendencies currently shaping up within the masses are basically of three orders. There are two active sections, the counter-revolution and the revolution. This last one is the most powerful since those sections who support internal reaction and the counterrevolution have always been in a minority. And then, as I have already said, there is a third, intermediary section of the population which tends to vacillate or at least allow themselves to be dragged along in the revolution. This can depend sometimes on rather tenuous factors like a particular social programme, a children's playpark, things like this, which can help to claw back the support of the most backward sectors.
Q. Do you think that the economic boycott will bring about important changes in Nicaragua's economic relations abroad, like a greater alignment with the socialist countries or with Latin America?
A. I think that we will get a significant amount of aid from many countries in the world, mainly the socialist countries. But such aid will not solve our economic problems. Nevertheless, for the moment, this will not change the Nicaraguan model. With time, some natural changes will come about. These will not be foreed but will come about as part of a process, when we reach a certain stage of development which cannot be determined by decree. This should be a natural process, like the trees that blossom after the rain.
Our political goal is to link up completely with the countries of Latin America, but that depends on the changes which have come about and are coming about in those countries on which the Nicaraguan revolution has an influence. The ruling elites in Latin America have a horror of revolutionary change and that is why they prefer to opt for democratic change. These countries have an interest in not allowing the Nicaraguan revolution to be crushed but they also have an interest in making sure it doesn't go beyond certain limits. What would happen if the revolution were destroyed? The reign of the gorilla' dictators would come back in Latin America, the military would come back to power in Uruguay and Brazil. If that were to happen the next stage of development could not come about without revolutionary struggle.
That is why all these governments have an interest in the Contadora remaining in being (2) because the Contadora is both a barrier to direct intervention and an instrument for influencing Nicaragua's policies. In fact, when we signed the Contadora Pact, that implied certain concessions. They were necessary for peace, but they were in the long run concessions. The Contadora is thus a way of exercising an influence in the direction of the democratic model, as those governments who are part of the Contadora as well as the other governments of Latin America, conceive of it.
In spite of all this, even if, at times, the Contadora has a more aggressive stance toward the United States, it is vital to bear in mind that fundamentally this represents a non-hostile disagreement with the US. The development of the revolutionary process in Latin America itself constitutes an antagonistic challenge for imperialism. And although relations between the Contadora and the US are not fundamentally antago. nistic, nevertheless, the challenge is maintained because it corresponds to objective factors. The Contadora represents an attempt to find a nonviolent solution to the Central American crisis but also in every other country in Latin America, even if this is not specified in their speeches or in their legal limits. The Contadora is not going to dissolve. It represents an objective need and that is why it won't dissolve.
2. The Contadora group involves Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela and is seeking to find a negotiated solution to the conflict between the US and Nicaragua. International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
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