A crisis of perspective and of leadership
Poland was one of the few European countries where the May Day mobilizations this year were massive and militant. In response to the call of Solidarnosc, several tens of thousands of workers demonstrated, despite violent attacks by the riot police on the marches. Significant also was the fact that there were demonstrations not only in the underground union's traditional bastions, such as Warsaw, where 15,000 people marched, or Gdansk and Gdynia, where there were 10,000 or Cracow where several thousand participated but also in such small cities as Plock, Siedlice, and Radom. In the first, 3,000 people came out; in the second, 1,500, and in the third, 2,000. This is no small thing, when you consider all the blows the underground movement has suffered over the last three years.
Parallel to this, the proposed higher education law abolishing self-management of the universities running into resistance from the students and intellectuals. Rallies have been held in several cities on the initiative of university councils, and masses of names have been collected on petitions in university circles. At the same time, the bureaucracy is trying to eliminate oppositionist intellectuals from university chairs and the Academy of Sciences, as indicated by the case of Professor Leszek Nowak, known for his links with the Poznan workers, and that of Bronislaw Geremek, Lech Walesa's former main adviser.
The price rises, which have not yet been introduced ın every case, are arousing protests in the tactories. The increase in the price of meat, initially schedulec to be into effect in June, was imposed on July 1. It was a real blow for the population. It will come following three years of decline in living standards. According to the official figures themselves, household consumption has dropped by 13%. "Here and there I'm fed up' is replacing 'there's nothing you can do about it,' as you might expect from the grumbling in factories and the threats of stikes and initial strike action that workers driven to despair are starting to resort to." This was reported recently in the Paris daily Le Matin by that paper's correspondent in Warsaw, the Polish oppositionist intellectual Krzysztof Wolicki.
General Jaruzelski's dictatorship responded to this new rise in social tensions by taking a harder line. Since 1982, few strikes have led to satisfaction of the workers' demands. But the bureaucracy is taking a particularly intransigent stance today, as indicated by the long struggle at the Rosa Luxemburg factory in Warsaw. But finally this struggle, like the strikes of the female workforce in Zyrardow ended in partial victories, showing that the regime fears economic strikes.
Moreover, the repression is coming down again. This is symbolized by the sentencing of Frasyniuk, Lis, and Michnik, three personalities in the Polish social number of political prisoners rose to nearly movement. In the first five months of 1985, the persons. During that period also, the police can boast 16 of dismantling several underground print shops and arresting a number of leaders and activists of the underground movement. Finally, the regime has shown its ability to exploit every hesitation by the underground Solidarnosc leadership to tighten its grip and occupy the ground left vacant by the social movement.
Today, Solidarnosc is going through a particularly grave crisis of leadership. This is dealt with in the following article by the editors of Inprekor, the Polish magazine of the Fourth International. It was published in the spring 1985 issue (No. 18) of that journal. The crisis is tending to weaken the union organizationally. In a discussion shortly before his arrest, Wladislaw Frasyniuk, while noting Solidarnosc's strongpoints today - the existence of many underground journals with a large circulation, as well as extensive underground publishing of books and pamphlets, the expansion of trade-union education and its impact, etc - pointed out the weakening of one of the links in the union's chain, "which until recently were its mainstay." He was referring to the factory committees and the information networks in the enterprises.
However, the organizational picture of the union remains uneven. A weakening in some bastions, such as Wroclaw, comes at a time when renewed activity can be seen in Upper Silesia, in Torun. Finally, the fact in itself that the underground press has circulation of several hundreds of thousands of copies and that there are between 800 and 900 regularly appearing journals indicates the organized resistance to General Jaruzelski's junta is still massive.
While the general did not hesitate to proclaim in a long interview published recently in the French Communist Party daily l'Humanite that he has gotten everything in hand, the fact remains that three and a half years after his coup, the Polish regime still has not managed to normalize its rule. Despite being thrown on the defensive, pursued by repression, anc disoriented by the failure of the self-limitation strategy that has prevailed within it, the Polish workers movement continues to demonstrate an astonishing vitality.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
Around the end of 1984 and the start of 1985, the social movement went through two difficult moments. The first was in October-November 1984, following the murder of the priest Jerzy Popieluszko. The second was at the end of February 1985, when there was a new wave of price increases.
The totalitarian regime forced the movement to demonstrate its capacity for self-defense against the crimes of the authorities and the attacks on the workers' standard of living. Solidarnosc did not pass either of these tests with flying colors. To the contrary, it suffered defeats that may cost it dearly.
The way has been opened for the regime to mount new attacks. In partieular, it is threatening to go after a basic historic gain of the workers movement, the eight-hour day. Moreover, it is doing everything possible to wipe out what remains of the self-management gains of the revolution of 1980-81, liquidating university autonomy and sharply restricting the prerogatives of the workers councils to the benefit of the official unions.
The offensive is also being pursued on another front. The penal code and the code of procedure in penal cases are being changed. Penalties are being increased. And a streamlined procedure of convicting people "caught in the act" is being introduced in matters related to opposition activities, opening up the way for the authorities to define offenses as they choose.
The prisons are filling up again, starting with the most prominent trade-union activists and oppositionists. This is testified to by the trial of Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, Bogdan Lis, and Adam Michnik, who, ironically enough, were charged with calling a strike that their comrades decided finally not to hold.
The regime has managed to drive the social movement into a tight corner without touching off counterattacks.
More and more, Solidarnose is displaying an inertia and incapacity that do not inspire confidence in its instinct for selfpreservation.
This very disturbing situation is above all the result of a prolonged grave crisis of leadership in the social movement, which was glaringly revealed again in the tests mentioned above. It is obvious that the movement is adrift, and that it is the leadership that sent it off course. We have long thought, and we have said so in our columns, that this crisis of leadership is the reflection of a crisis of strategic orientation and therefore also of program in the movement.
In the past, we considered that the January 1983 programatic statement of the TKK [the underground leadership] of Solidarnosc, entitled) "Solidarnose Today, ," reflected in a positive way the attempt of a part of the leadership to overcome this crisis. In our opinion, the success of the boycott of the regional elections in June 1984 and the winning of a broad amnesty in July of the same year represented important victories for the social movement.
- However, the advances in the struggle which all that involved have not been put to good use. Instead of being developed, the potential that the social movement continues to represent has been dispersed. In some sectors, it has even disappeared for whole periods. It has been frittered away in ineffective actions, and, in other words, it is weakening. It is time, therefore, to sound the alarm.
The response to the Popieluszko murder
Confronted with the abrupt sharpening of social tensions provoked by the kidnapping and murder of the priest Popieluszko by political police agents
•on October 19, 1984, the Solidarnose leadership reacted symptomatically by damping down the flames. The role that Lech Walesa played proved decisive. The TKK was conspicuous by its absence from the political fray. Remember Walesa's famous statement on October 28, 1984, in St. Brigitta's church in Gdansk: "One of us has done us all a dirty trick, from the premier to the man in the street. And this someone wants us to transform ourselves into cannon fodder without thinking about it ... in order to open the way for shifts in the government ... We will not let ourselves be manipulated, and we are not going to get involved in struggles for power, because we never wanted to take power." But that was not at all the issue then, as a building technician in Gdansk said quite rightly in the underground press:
"I cannot at all see why we should sit back and thereby strengthen Jaruzelski against his factional adversaries, who, the government suggests, provoked this affair in order to oust the general from the chair he occupies. If they had done another sort of a provocation and drowned Urban, or Siwak, that would have been their affair. Bandits fighting for power eliminate each other. But in this case they murdered one of us." (1)
As the masses spontaneously felt, this murder, which was not the first, proved the need for energetic action, not just against the repression in general, but also against political murders directed against the social movement.
"Silence must prevail during the burial, a silence charged with mourning and hope," Walesa said at the time. "We will all be there, and we hope that all those who hope for dialogue will be there too. Let this silence open the way for dialogue." It did not, of course.
Unfortunately, the Solidarnose regional leaderships echoed Walesa's appeal. For example, the Regional strike committee (RKS) of Lower Silesia called, October 30, 1984, on "its members and the entire population of Lower Silesia to tighten their trade union discipline and close ranks around the president of our union, Lech Walesa, around the national and regional leadership."
The only proposals for action this RKS presented were to "help" the Social Defense Committee Against Violence that was being set up and to "provide protection for persons who could be in danger," as well as to "disseminate in the 1. 'Solidarnose Gdansk, No. 18/120 November 15, 1984. Jerzy Urban, minister and government spokesman, is linked to *Jaruzelski. Albin Siwak, a member of the Political Bureau of the Polish United Workers Party (the CP) and the spokesman of the neo-Stalinist faction of the apparatus, called "The Reinforced Cement."
17
Szczecin naval shipyards during the 1980 general strike (DR)
GENERALNY
STRAJK
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
press and publications suitable examples of a social attitude toward the security apparatus." (2)
Given the absence of any initiative by the union leadership, calls for symbolic actions began to spread, such as for "changing the name of Paris Commune Square to Jerzy Popieluszko Square," or to erect a stone monument in front of the Church of St. Stanislaw Kostka, as the interenterprise group Unia did in Warsaw. (3)
Let us look at the sort of political analysis that was made at the time by the circles close to the leadership of Solidarnosc. In this respect, Jacek Kuron's can serve as an example. At the end of November, he admitted that it was likely that a faction of the regime with influence in the political police was behind the crime, and that the murder was perpetrated in order to impose a more repressive policy.
We also think that this crime was the reflection of factional struggles. In his polemic with Kuron, Jan Litynski, a member of the Warsaw regional leadership of Solidarnose since the beginning of 1985, questioned the usefulness of analyses of this sort on ethical grounds and because they contribute nothing. Everything depends, however, on what purpose they are intended to serve from the political point of view.
If such analyses are the expression of submission, a means of projecting one's own impotence on the society as a whole," if they serve to conceal the fact that the responsibility for this crime falls on the regime in its entirety and if they serve to revive the myth of the "liberals," as Litynski suggests, then he was clearly right. "In a gang," he writes quite correctly, "there can be differences over whether you should liquidate the enemy or buy them off, or intimidate them. But there is no reason for the people to support one element over another." (4)
On the other hand, such analysis can and must serve to point up the contradictions existing within the regime, the extent of cohesion or disintegration in its ranks, its strong points and its weaknesses, and thus to assess the relationship of forces between the regime and the social movement and work out a tactic whereby the latter can alter this relationship in its favor, either radically or just a bit, depending on the circumstances and its opportunities.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to guard against illusions of the sort that can be summed up in the idea if they are fighting, let them kill each other and let's stay out of the business."
Another dangerous illusion is the one expressed by Kuron, when he wrote that if "the police apparatus, which is not under anyone's control, is not only certain of impunity but also so assured of its domination that it acted alone, without any decision at the top and Kuron stresses that such 4ea 18 hypothesis is unlikely, although it could not be totally excluded - "this would mean that in fact there was no longer a government in the country."
However, if the police apparatus had that sort of impunity, it would mean that the government was a police dietatorship, and not that it did not exist. The fact is that Kuron has a strange notion of what a government is.
In arresting the murderers, Kuron considers, Jaruzelski "definitively aroused the hostility of his adversaries in the apparatus, that is his police and those who hide behind them. He has two solutions - to retreat and try to reach an agreement with his adversaries within the state apparatus, which is no longer possible because it is too late for that, or to try to reach an understanding with the society." (5)
This second solution, Kuron explains, will be "very difficult, if not impossible, for the perpetrator of the December 13 operation." But, in an interview given to Agence France-Presse, Kuron assessed the situation as follows: If Jaruzelski "continues to establish order in his own ranks, he will have to come to an understanding with the society." (6)
Reading such explanations, which influence the policy of the leadership of the social movement, simply makes you tear your hair. This whole "second solution" is purely a mental construct, because neither the totalitarian state apparatus as a whole nor whatever faction may dominate within it at a given moment is ever going to accept any "understanding with the society," for the simple reason that this regime is undermined by its internal contradictions.
The regime could accept a tactical compromise with the social movement, if the latter forced it to, but that could only happen in a situation that would be at least prerevolutionary.
So, what does Kuron think should be done on the basis of this wrong and naive political analysis? Since Jaruzelski had opened up a struggle against his apparatus — people were able quickly enough to see what this "struggle," Solidarnosc demonstration in Ursus (DR)
SILANNEL elso a figment of Kuron's imagination, amounted to - then, what had to be done was to put pressure on the government in such a way as not to lead it to resort to terror but to "force it to concede something to the society."
Kuron declared: "Everything that has happened up till now is a form of pressure - mass participation in masses, night vigils, the immense social mobilization, the burial itself .. In this atmosphere of seriousness, meditation, and prayer, there was a clear demonstration of the determination of the society." (7)
However, what Kuron did not say is that this mobilization and determination of the masses once again proved ineffective and the potential was wasted. The only thing the government "conceded" was a show trial of those directly involved in the murder of Popieluszko, in other words, next to nothing.
The Polish episcopate and especially its leader, the primate, Glemp, brought all possible influence to bear to assure that the Popieluszko murder affair would be settled in a way that would not upset the regime, and he threw its weight into the balance hard to hold back the rise in social tension.
This attitude moreover, gained them no recognition. To the contrary, it emboldened the dietatorship, which did not waste any time in stepping up its attacks on the church. We also know what the reaction of the mass of believers was to this. We have been seeing a sharp decline in the authority of the primate and the bishops.
In appealing for calm, Walesa found an ally and a prop in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. But in expressing his confidence in the primate and declaring that "the Church always provides leadership for the nation in crucial moments," he also chose that particular time to go against the dominant feeling of the masses.
It would be hard to find a clearer expression of the crisis, or even the abdication, of the Solidarnosc leadership than those words of a union leader ready to turn the leadership of the social movement over to the ecclesiastical hierarchy! Kuron echoed this opportunistic orientation, backing up Walesa: "In Poland, the Church is the entire nation," he explained in an interview given to Agence France-Presse. He also said, "the episcopate is the highest moral authority in the country." 2. 'Z Dnia na Dzien", Wroclaw, No. 38/340, November 11-17, 1984 3. 'Wolna Trybuna, Warsaw, No. 39, November 7, 1984.
'Tygodnik Mazowsze', Warsaw, No. 110, December 13, 1984. Jan Litynski is a veteran member of the KOR, former editor of the bulletin 'Robotnik' ('The Worker'), and an expert for Solidarnose. In 1985, he joined the underground leadership of the union for the Warsaw region. 5. "Tygodnik Mazowsze', No. 107, November 22, 1984. 6. 'Liberation' Paris, December 1-2, 1984. 7. "Tygodnik Mazowsze', No. 107.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
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Solidarnosc on the streets (DR) announcement of Popieluszko's death. There was such disorganization that we have a right to wonder whether our leaders are prepared to offer a common solution to the problems that will arise in the future.
"Several struggles are looming up in defense of the present working hours, for self-management, for wage raises to match the coming price increases, etc. Does Lech have a clear and thoughtout position on these questions? Is the TKK capable of foreseeing events, or at least meeting in time? In any case, masses for the 'repose of the soul' or 'for the fatherland' will not be enough, especially since for a lot of people they are beginning to become a routine taking the place of any concrete activity?!
The journal continued: "Thanks to the union's inconsistency and to the appeals for calm that relaxed the social tension, it was Jaruzelski who profited from this tragic death ... In this way the system got out of a difficult situation, which it itself provoked, unscathed. Alas, the society was not so fortunate. It suffered grave shock and frustration, without preparing itself for the next blow." (9)
Wyzwolenie ("Liberation"), a Warsaw workers journal, wrote the following about the demonstration at the burial of the murdered priest: "This crowd was not an anonymous mass without any will of its own. This crowd knew why it had assembled and what convictions it wanted to demonstrate by its presence. This is why the primate's sermon expressing yet again his belief 8. "Solidarnosc, No. 18/120. 9. Ibid.
19
When the leadership of the social movement loses its authority, it should do everything possible to regain it, and not try to hide behind another institution.
### Rising criticism
To judge from some articles in the underground press, a number of activists were not convinced that a lessening of social tensions - by means of appeals for calm or declarations that the social pressure had already brought victory -could lead to anything.
A part of the underground press took account of manifestations of discontent with the attitude of the Solidarnosc leadership, of the sometimes violent criticisms and frustration that it engendered. The poll conducted by the editors of the Gdansk Solidarnosc revealed this clearly enough. Here are some of the responses it got:
A welder said, "Jaruzelski and his cronies are criminals all right, but we ourselves are responsible for Popieluszko's death. What did we do about it when the union activists were kidnapped before? We were thrown into a quandary .. The lack of reaction from the society gave the government enough nerve to go after the priest. It's time to realize that any one of us could be the next."
A clerk said, "These appeals coming from every direction for 'reconciliation around Father Jerzy's coffin' are something I can't accept. You can't compromise with evil. The fact that such appeals are also coming from the mouths of Church representatives set my teeth on edge. It's International Viewpoint 29 July 1985 one thing to forgive the guilty in accordance with Christian morality (and by the way the guilty have not shown the slightest sign of repentance). It is another thing to call for sitting down at the same table with murderers."
A teacher gave this response: "All these appeals from the president of the union for calm have done as much harm as good. Because in this way Walesa blocked a lot of spontaneous initiatives, such as student protest meetings and general assemblies in the factories organized by the self-management councils." (8) To this list, we could also add the strike for which preparations were underway at the Huta Warszawa steelworks. It was finally called off after many interventions from the union leadership.
This same publication in Gdansk reported that "the organized response of the society after the priest's death was not very energetic, although indignation was at a peak. This indignation was not used to make the government understand once and for all that such acts do not pay. The only somewhat serious warning was given in Gdansk.
"On November 6, in response to the call from the Regional Coordinating Committee (RKK), 15-minute work stoppages took place, in particular in the northern port, in some sectors of the Gdansk shipyards, in the Gdansk naval repair yards...
"On the other hand, contradictions appeared. Walesa appealed for calm. Gwiazda and Walentynowiez called for a strike. The RKK called for a 15-minute stoppage. As for the TKK, it did not have the time to meet after the
In defense of trade union democracy
We publish below an article written under the name of Oskar by the president of the Provisional Commission of Coordination of Coal Mines (TKKG), of the Solidarnose trade union in the region of Upper Silesia. This text was published in the March 1985 issue of Glosno, the monthly journal of that organisation.
Within the trade union movement, we often see small and cohesive groupings of leaders who begin to be separated from the mass of workers and who develop outside of mass control. The reason this occurs is because within a trade union, as within any mass organisation, a certain division of labour is necessary. Within this framework there are certain duties which bring with them greater involvement in decision-making, better access to information, contacts with people, in other words, which involve exercising a wider influence. This division of tasks tends to reproduce itself because too frequent changes in allocation of key duties run counter to the need for greater efficiency.
The appearance of such groups of leaders, acting in an antidemocratic way is greatly encouraged by the fact that some people in positions of responsibility do sometimes try to make themselves indispensable, to concentrate all decisions concerning the region into their own hands or into the hands of a small group of people in whom they have confidence. The fact that such militants have a certain influence on decisions taken, and the lack of democracy can lead to a situation where these leaders begin to act in their own interests and not in the interests of those who elected them.
But this is not necessarily always the case. A leading section of the union can be forced to act effectively in the interests of the members, if only because, if they do not, the members might start leaving the union.
In our region, we began to see a tendency toward the development of groups of leaders cut off from the base. But Solidarnose can overcome such developments because of the special situation we are in: those people who are concerned with analysing and developing a critique of the trade union movement and in other places are outside of the movement are members of Solidarnose here and are able to intervene in order to ensure that the debates on all the key problems can be conducted in the best possible conditions. And insofar as such a discussion takes place within the trade union itself, then a democratic character for the discussion can be retained.
It is always useful to recall the essential conditions for the maintainence of trade union democracy; such as the right to criticise any body; the right to freedom in act and react to any attempt at censorship of the independent underground press and finally, the guarantee of the facility and not only the abstract right to create groups and oppositions within the trade union on condition that such groups respect the statutes of the union.
To speak out in opposition within the trade union is seen by many as showing a lack of feeling. But such oppositions exist in the real world and have done since the creation of our union. The proof of this is the critical voices which are willingness of some people to put their own conceptions into practice, to take responsibilities in such and such a field of trade union work, or to convince others of the validity of a given point of view. This type of attitude is sometimes mixed in with personal ambitions or with differences of opinion or ideology or with both at the same time. The important thing is that this comes out into the open, because if these differences are kept behind closed doors, that will greatly increase the risk of manipulation and violation of the statutes. In contrast to this, an open struggle by bringing to light the different tendencies and orientations within the union, can force the members to declare their own views on this in full knowledge of the different motives.
On the above, opinions are divided. Some think that the lack of democracy in the functioning of the union constitutes a mortal danger in the current situation. Others argue that it is precisely the discontent of the activists, especially among leading members, which poses a threat to the union. In my opinion this discontent and the conflicts which result are proof of the strength and vitality of the union. Who can seriously believe that such internal tensions represent a danger for Solidarnose? On the contrary, they are a condition of democracy because they encourage a critical approach in relation to overall aims and methods of action. There exists amongst us people of many different opinions and uniformity, silence and absence of conflict can only be achieved by papering over real differences and thus changing the union into some kind of mutual admiration society.
When we examine the different internal conflicts within the union, we could be tempted to adopt the view of one particular section, for example that of the intermediary layer, or that of the regional leaders. Now, as I have personally come to realise, violations of the statutes take place at all levels of the union, from the workplace level right through to the TKK. To adopt the view of the intermediary layers could lead to an exaggeration of the radicalism of the trade union masses. It is. understandable that the regional leaders should emphasise this radicalism in order to strengthen their own position, as much in relation to the TKK as to their 'protectors' Furthermore, their popularity can grow if they base themselves on the opinions of the most active minority, who are often the most radical. However the results of opinion polls which I have managed to gain access to are far from showing a growing radicalism amongst Solidarnosc supporters. They show rather that the latter are expecting [from their leadership] both an intransigent attitude to the regime and a capacity for compromise. If therefore, we cease to look from the standpoint of the discontented regional activists and if we accept the existence of differences leading to conflicts and tensions within the union, if we accept the underground structures which are already in existence and the possibility of creating new ones which are also autonomous, it will be apparent that the current situation of the union is not so bad.
Perhaps the best situation would be precisely the one with which no one - neither the 'activist troublemakers' or the 'dictatorial regional leaderships' or the silent TKK' at first raised against the decisions and behaviour of some of our regional leaderships, the leaderships in the factories or at the national level. Evidence of this is also shown in the increasing will seem satisfied.
combine a union democratic in chara
Yet these are the people who can help to which is both effective in practice and icter. 'provocation.' They did not understand that the only way to avert provocation was to reunify the scattered structures of the union by basing them on the activity of the masses ...
"The next day, everthing was back in order. The directors of the big plants reported the accords with the "unionists who represent the workers," whom no one knew. The deputy premier, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, declared that
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985 that Poles will meet around a table for genuine dialogue, dialogue that the Church has always wanted and has not ceased to call for, met with silence. Fifteen minutes later, this same crowd interrupted Walesa with shouts of "Solidarity, Solidarity!' and pledged its dedication to the union.
"The government understood the mood and convictions of this crowd better than some opposition leaders and 20 experts. The militia back and stationed
[police] were pulled
around the outskirts of the neighborhood. The Zomo [riot police] did not intervene, even when a demonstration of several tens of thousands of persons reached the center of Warsaw. It was there that the demonstration dispersed. They had not been told how and why to fight. Neither Lech Walesa nor, the TKK told them that. Everyone was afraid of an imaginary
Lech Walesa received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983 (DR)
while the members of the government had gone through a difficult period, Solidarnose was not and never would be accepted by them as an interlocutor. Rakowski knew very well that it would soon be the government that would distribute the cards. The differences and divisions in the state apparatus were adeptly displayed in the knowledge that some opposition leaders would fall for this maneuver and call for limiting activities in order to make it easier for Jaruzelski to combat the advocates of extreme methods and the hard line.
"This enabled the apparatus to minimize the social costs of its crime. A veil was cast over the other murders and crimes, from the murder of the student Stanislaw Pyjas in Cracow in 1977 to the murder in 1984 of the peasant Piotr Bartoszcze. The three assassins of the priest Popieluszko were portrayed as black sheep who happened to turn up by chance in the good family f the police and security forces.
"Everything was back in place. On the one side was a compact group of gures and pawns representing the goverment, on the other were some solated pawns in the guise of the Comttees to Defend the Law and Legality. The government had achieved its ends. It was once again dealing with a small group of public oppositionists, little group that can be easily controlled and held back. The fact that the 'public opposition' itself sought such an outcome changes nothing in the affair." (10)
Finally, in the Lenin steel plant in Nowa Huta, the information service International Viewpoint 29 July 1985 of the underground workers committee said that since we were paralyzed by appeals for calm from the bishops and from Walesa we found ourselves unable to protest." It raised the question, "When will we finally stop being afraid of the word provocation, which paralyzes us so effectively and which destroys our instinct for self defense?"
The statement continued: "We need be a little less docile if we want to stop this chain of unpunished murders, 'die on our feet rather than live on our knees, as we like to sing, but only sing. Only Gdansk on October 21 (in a demonstration in front of the monument commemorating the December 1970 uprising) and the traditionally militant Wroclaw dared protest. But as early as October 28, those with authority in Gdansk were calling for calm.
"On October 25, after the traditional mass in Mistrzejowice church, the calls for a demonstration near the Arch were considered a provocation. The same thing happened in Warsaw on October 28, after the mass in Zoliborz, when a large group of youth from Nowa Huta wanted to demonstrate their feelings more energetically.
*Is the absence of a calculated and cooly-made decision a reason to paralyze spontaneity? The belated initiatives, which were more apparent than real, of some Nowa Huta leaders (soundings for a symbolic strike in the steelworks without any leadership being given!!!) will not make good the weaknesses in organization and liaison, which are still quite amateurish.
"Can anyone tell me why nothing stood in the way of calling a demonstration on June 17, 1984 [the date of the local elections boycotted by Solidarnosc] and why this was impossible today? When will we finally admit and say it openly that our structures cannot respond quickly and in an organized way, and that not even the most fervent prayer can make up for this weakness?
"If we have decided to fight, then et us fight with the understanding that we are fighting to win and you cannot fight without taking losses. There will be losses. What we have to worry about is making sure that they are not for nothing. If we have accepted the leadership of this struggle, let us lead it without being afraid to take the responsibility for decisions, otherwise we will be condemned to sit in despair, waiting for a miracle." (11)
The most violent criticism of the attitude of the Solidarnosc leadership took after the murder of Popieluszko was in Hutnik, which is also published in the Lenin steel plant. *Exhibiting his suffering and taking advantage of his martyrdom has nothing to do with trade-union action any more than hiding under the cassocks of the clergy and talking nonsense about the power of the union structures in the shadow of the sacristies. Show us, if you please, sacristies. snows, you pease, gentlemen, that these structures exist by their activity and that they are based on your work. Let the rank-and-file activists get some feeling of this work at the top. Let them see and feel that this structure is not some astral body but at part of the union Solidarnose ...
"We rank-and-file unionists are looking to you leaders, and in the meantime we are doing what we can. We hope that the confidence we placed in you when
Solidarnose was working openly will not be disappointed. It may still not be too late. But it is high time to stop resting on you laurels and to undertake serious work, and serious reflection.
And if any of you do not want to do that, so much the worse for them. Every organization has its sacred cows.
Solidarnose is, doubtless, no exception to this rule." (12)
Ineffective actions The call for a 15 minute strike on
February 28, 1985, was not followed by euphoria in the factories. First of all, the workers realized that such an action was only symbolic and could not lead to a change in the government's policy. They also feared that it would be followed by repression, since this sort of strike makes it easier for the political police to arrest the activists.
10. Wyzwolenie', Warsaw, No. 3, December
1984.
11. 'Solidarnose Zwyciezy, Nowa Huta, No.
21/66, November 2, 1984.
12. Hutnik Nowa Huta, No. 20/92
November 6, 1984.
21
Last but not least, this strike call was a surprise for everybody, and the workers feared that it would not be a success. "The decision to strike was met first with skepticism by the activists: Who will see that it takes place? What good will it do? Is this going to be effective?'" That is what appeared in the commentary of the Inter enterprise Council of Solidarnose in Poznan, although the authors added that "with time the readiness to protest increased." (13) Did the same happen in all the plants in the country? Certainly not!
Nonetheless, leading up to February 28, tension did mount in a series of big and smaller enterprises. And there were some more or less large actions in a number of them, despite the rescinding of the strike call. This was the case notably in a shop of the Rosa Luxemburg factory in Warsaw, the Huta Warszawa (a quarter of the workers in shops W47 and W-48), at Ursus (the ironworks, a part of workers in the repair service and the ZPT sector), at FSO (in units nos. 5 and 7, to which can be added the cutoff of the current in factory No. 6, where the majority of the workers are where the majority of the workers are soldiers), and so on.
At the Rosa Lumb try the short strike was the start of a longer struggle for a wage increase of 2,000 to 3,000 zlotys a month.
However, over all, there were not a lot of actions, and in some regions, such as Upper Silesia, there were none at all. Moreover, where strikes took place, they affected only part of the workers, those in certain shops, and often only part of the workers in those shops. Was this because the strike call was rescinded by Walesa and Bujak? Or did it testify to a loss of confidence by more and more sections of the working class in the Solidarnose leadership and a growing skepticism about the generally ineffective forms of action proposed by this leadership? Both factors undoubtedly weighed in the balance.
The Solidarnosc leadership assigned a not inconsiderable - importance to the February 28 strike, although it was supposed to be very limited and in fact only symbolic. Nonetheless, it seems that it was supposed to open the way for winning an economic reform that even the legal Solidarnosc, with capacities for action of another magnitude, had proved incapable of forcing through.
Moreover, it should have been clear for a long time that a genuine economic reform, one in the interests of the workers, that is, one involving self-management, can only be put into practice by the social movement itself. It can, therefore, only be put through in opposition to the regime. But Bujak again presented the all-too-familiar illusions, declaring: "As long as the government can get out of its difficulties by raising prices, we cannot expect an improvement in the economic situation. It is only when it no longer has that possibility that it 22
Solidarnose members participate in official demonstration on May 1, 1983 (DR)
will start to look for other solutions, that it will be forced to carry out reform. Thus, stopping the price increases is very important, if only for that reason. Scattered economic strikes, even victorious ones, can wipe out the effects of the price rises only for given social groups; they will not bloc the economic policy. It is for this reason that we are calling today for a mass action." (14)
To justify rescinding the strike, Walesa and Bujak claimed that the preparations for a national action have achieved their goal; they have forced the government to make a tactical retreat. (15) And Walesa was quick to add his traditional commentary: "If the government is prepared to understand the majority of society, we will place all our powers, both physical and intellectual, on the alter of the fatherland." (16)
The commentary of the editors of Tygodnik Mazowsze was in the same vein: "Lech Walesa and the TKK have called off the strike, because the government suspended the decision that provoked it. Now we must demonstrate our good will and wait for the next steps. At worse, the price rises in question will go ahead with some small modifications and spread out over time. In that case, we will be obliged to call another strike." (17)
This issue of Tygodnik Mazowsze reached most of its readers at a time when no one any longer had the slightest illusion about the "success" achieved. Moreover, when the vanity of the hopes that the government had "understood" bs the "majority of society" became glaringly apparent, Walesa did not offer a word of self-criticism. To the contrary, he said: "We did not have any choice [i.e., he and Bujak]. On the other hand, a lot of enterprises did not play the game and got involved in strikes. The workers had the right to do this, and they were right, because the government acted in a cynical way." (18)
So, to sum it up, Walesa was right, and the workers who did strike, taking no account of his "game," were also right. Where is the logic in all this?
Henryk Wujec explained the attitude of the two union leaders in the following way: "The government's decision [to suspend some price rises] seemed to be an important concession. Formally, it was taken under the pressure of the official unions, but in reality it came about because of the pressure brought to bear by Solidarnose. In the face of a prevailing feeling that the question was settled, it would have been wrong to maintain the strike call...
"It was only on the evening of March 1, when the government explained its decision in detail, that everyone felt deceived, really everybody Now people think that calling off the strike was a mistake. Some even go so far as to compare the situation with that of March 1981. I think that this state of discontent is a favorable factor, that it will bear fruit in the future, when another big protest action is called." (19) In other words, the mistakes of the Solidarose leadership will have positive results! 13. 'Komunikat', Poznan, No. 6, March 1985. 14, 1985. 15. Tygodnik Mazowsze. No 119, February 28, 1985. 16. Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18. "Z Dnia na Dzien', No 10/354, March 17-23, 1985. 19. "Tygodnik Mazowsze', No. 120, March 7, 1985. Henryk Wujec, a former member of the KOR and editor of the journal Robotnik', was elected to the regional leadership of Solidarnosc in Warsaw and to its presidium in June 1981
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
In the magazine z Dnia na Dzien, a reader wrote that "The wish to see a bad master become a better one is the wish of a slave. If we want freedom, we all have to aim at setting up our own power, a power that serves the people." (20) This conviction has been building up for a long time now, although it has not yet reached the leading circles of Solidarnose. But it is certainly not the sort of "success" achieved on February 28 that will make this objective seem like a realizable goal.
The structures of the social movement that are less tightly controlled by the TKK did not consider it useful for their part, to try to pull the wool over anybody's wo eyes. The Provisional Committee of Solidarnosc in the Bydgoszez took its distance from the decision of the national leadership, arguing that "the announcement of a monetary suspension of the government's project was only an apparent concession, in particular since the official communique on this question said nothing about the projected increase in working time."
In a statement cast in a rather ironic style, the Bydgoszcz leadership said:
"We ourselves do not see any reason to call off the scheduled action, and so we leave the decision to those who initiated it." (21)
The organ of the Interenterprise Workers Committee of Solidarnosc (MRKS) in Warsaw, went right to the point, saying: "We've been had." (22) The main union journal in Poznan wrote: "Facing such an attack by the regime, we can only defend ourselves by fighting in a determined and consistent way. Retreating even an inch is certainly not the best way to resist, any more than is attributing to the government honorable intentions dictated by a concern for the good of society. This can only make easier the job of the Communists, who are trying to soften us up.' I don't mean to say by this that a strike is the best form of struggle, but the calling off of the strike revealed the indecisiveness of the Solidarnosc leadership. And it cannot afford that. It could cost too dearly, and it is once again the society that will have to pay the price." (23)
The Poznan section of the Fighting Solidarnosc Organization stepped up the tone: "Once again we have the proof that we can count only on our own strength. We cannot count on any good will or desire for an understanding. We paid a high price for abandoning the tactic that had been decided on, we will pay a still higher one in the future." (24)
Despite appearances, by issuing a strike call first and then taking it back, the union leadership did not change its tactics, while it did make a turn about. The strike was called "in a cold way," taking, not only the masses of workers, but even the union activists by surprise. Henryk Wujec admitted this after the fact by acknowledging that International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
"the announcement of the strike was a shock for everyone." (25)
A section of the activists, inspired by a spirit of militancy and solidarity, took up the call, trying to assure that the strike gained the greatest possible success. In so doing, they showed a greater sense of responsibility than the TKK that called this strike. A 15 minute work stoppage, even nationwide was by no means the sort of action that could change the relationship of forces in favor of the workers. It could at the most help to prepare a more prolonged action, and that is no doubt the way that it was understood by the workers at the Rosa Luxemburg factory.
However, no larger scale preparations were underway for such an action. The strike, at most, could show that Jaruzelski has not yet succeeded entirely in bringing the workers to heel, but everybody knows that. So, what did the TKK expect to gain by calling this strike? Undoubtedly, it hoped once again that the government, prompted by an unwarranted fear, or worse, an imaginary good will, would make a gesture that could be interpreted as a first step to the "understanding," which is in fact impossible.
This is why the TKK took the government's cynical maneuver as a gesture of good will, and why Walesa and Bujak immediately called on the workers to reciprocate and "await the next steps" of the regime. This is why Bujak and Walesa directed a retreat, without even consulting the other members of the TKK. In fact, this led to a serious mixup, because the next day 33 union and opposition leaders, including Janusz Palubicki, Grzegorz Palka, Jacek Kuron, Lech Dymarski, and Marek Edelman, called for going ahead with the protest action on the scheduled date. This is also why the only conclusion that Walesa and the underground leadership of Solidarnose could come to was to say that General Jaruzelski was not an honorable man, as if everyone did not know that well before February 1985, at least since December 13, 1981.
In their eagerness to conduct an orderly fencing match with the general, the TKK yielded ground, and this had an influence on the relationship of forces, which they have no right to trifle with, since it was won by the action of the social movement as a whole. It is not a pawn on their private chess board. The price that has to be paid for this setback is a weakening of the workers ability to mobilize in defense of their interests, a weakening of the feeling of solidarity, the growth of a feeling of impotence. You cannot change the policy of a regime or alter the mood of the masses by magic calls and false interpretation of events.
What we said about the slim chance of success for the strike called for February 28, 1985, does not mean that it was not necessary to respond to the price rises decreed by the government and that it was not necessary to prepare the conditions for a struggle. It means first of all that what was needed was less talk and more action, and consistent action implies serious preparation.
- First of all, there should have been the broadest possible consultation of the union membership. This should, even in underground conditions, have been started early enough to give sufficient time. The trade-union press could have helped in this regard. The government, in any case, knows what sort of initiatives the Solidarnosc leaders propose, and it would be illusory to think that they could organize a mass action that would take it by surprise. To the contrary, it is of the highest importance that the greatest possible number of trade-union activists and readers of the independent - press be informed of what is being prepared.
- Secondly, the action should have been built by mounting massive information campaigns sufficiently far in advance, explaining in leaflets, ete. why and how to struggle.
- Finally, what was needed was to build a strike that would be more than purely symbolic in some big factories where the conditions are most favourable, factories that could hold out a few days, even if they were isolated in the action. And a campaign of support for the struggle in these factories should have been built through leaflet distributions, street demonstrations, etc. in order to spread the strike.
That is the way to respond to the government's new price rises, which will not be long in coming. A general strike, even a short one, could be called if there were a powerful legal union, as there was before December 13, 1981, and if the working masses were conscious of their power. On the other hand, in a situation of retreat, where the workers movement is on the defensive, general actions have to be built patiently and the workers have to be convinced that such action is possible. They will be persuaded not simply by the statements of the movement leadership or articles in the underground press but by the example provided by the sections of the working class that are ready to fight.
This is not speculation but the lessons of experience, confirmed by February 28, because it was on that day that the struggle of the workers at the Rosa Luxemburg factory in Warsaw started, to the surprise not only of the national leadership but also of the regional leadership of Solidarnosc. This struggle lasted for several weeks, stopping and starting as one or several sections of the factory went on repeated strikes for a 20. 'Z Dnia na Dzien", No. 9/353, march 3-9, 1985. 1985 [nformator Bydaoski", Bydgoszez, No. 75, March I, 1985. 22. 'CDN-Glos Wolnego Robotnika', Warsaw, No. 105, March 8, 1985. 23. 'Obserwator Wielkopolski, Poznan, No. 90, March 1985. 24. 'Solidarnos Walezaca', Poznan, No. 5/32, March 10, 1985. 25. Tygodnik Mazowsze', No. 120.
23
few hours. The demand was for a wage increase of 2,000 to 3,000 zlotys a month.
This demand was certainly a popular one in a lot of factories in Warsaw. What was the attitude of the regional leadership of Solidarnose (the RKW)? It did not make a statement on the struggle in this factory until March 18, to say nothing of the additional delays before it could be published in the clandestine press. It told the workers at Rosa Luxemburg: "You can count on the help of all the Solidarnosc structures active in your region." (26)
By all accounts, the RKW's support was purely verbal, and the workers got no help in their fight from the regional leadership. There was no massive leaflet distribution to point out the strike at Rosa Luxemburg as an example and call on the workers in other plants to support it by undertaking own strikes for the same or similar demands. There were no posters, no slogans on the walls, although there has been no lack of this sort of thing in Warsaw in recent times. In a nutshell, there was nothing but a routine attitude.
If we take seriously the statements by Walesa and Bujak about "effective preparations for a national action" set for February 28, how are we to explain the fact that a few days after this action was called off, the RKW, led by Bujak himself, proved unable to offer more than verbal support to the workers in a factory on strike? Less was done to support this struggle than the KOR managed to do in July 1980 when a strike broke out at Ursus. But the possibilities are incomparably greater today, or at least that is what Bujak says.
Was it reasonable to hope that the strike would spread? It is impossible to answer that question, but when the first strikes broke out in July 1980, we did not know either that in August they would touch off a wave of strikes affecting the entire country. The possibility should have at least been tested, but this opportunity was not utilized. The workers at Rosa Luxemburg remained isolated, although they appealed for soldarity.
The Solidarnosc Workers Committee at the factory made a statement saying: "In response to the price rises, the workers at the Rosa Luxemburg factory staged repeated strikes over the month of March. On March 26, the strike was maintained for four hours to demand that the management carry out its promises to increase wages. The government did not give in. Today, it is persecuting and firing those workers who give it trouble. Nonetheless, the government is afraid!
"The government is trying to black out news about the strikes at 'Rosa? It does not want others to follow our example, and for the whole world to see that the 'normalization' in Poland is pure fiction. Despite everything, our 24 strike had an impact in the country and abroad. We call on all the workers, especially the women in Zyrardow, Lodz, and other cities. [the Rosa' workers were mainly women] to demand wage increases that will fully compensate for the rise in the cost of living. This is the only way to force the government to retreat and to protect our children from poverty. We in 'Rosa' will not give up our demand for wage increases of 2,000 to 3,000 zlotys. We demand real reforms that can get us out of this crisis!" (27)
Time running out
In the past, the editors of the Polish Inprekor have often taken a critical attitude toward the underground leadership of Solidarnosc. At the same time, we have believed that criticism should be serious, well thought out, and objective. We continue to hold that position. We are aware of the difficulty of leading a mass movement that has been forced underground, and that it cannot be judged by the same standards as a party of cadres.
There are very few precedents in history of underground social movements lasting a long time, and so there is little experience to which the Solidarnosc leaders can refer as a guide for coordinating the action of the movement, for building leadership bodies, and for assuring that they operate effectively. If anyone thinks that there are easy answers to these questions, they are gravely mistaken.
However, the present situation of the social movement in Poland, especially its crisis of leadership, cannot be explained by the objective situation alone. Subjective elements also play a very important role.
What is going on inside the TKK? In September 1984, shortly after taking the leadership of the Gdansk Regional Coordinating Committee of Solidarnose and after joining the TKK, Bogdan Borusewiez gave an interview in which he said quite a few important things about these problems. 28) Here are some significant excerpts.
"For a long time, by its existence alone, the TKK has exercised a brake on the social movement. Without the TKK, from which the people expected a call to rise up, such an explosion could have taken place several times during 26. Statement of the Regional Executive Committee (RKW) of the Solidarnose union in the Mazovian region (Warsaw) issued on March 18, 1985. 27. 'Solidarnose Walezaca', Poznan, No. 7/ 34, April 7, 1985. 28. Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the founders of the KOR, later an inspirer of the fight for free unions on the Baltic coast, one of the inspirers of the August 1980 strike in Gdansk, was later removed from the Gdansk regional leadership of Solidarnosc. He went underground on December 13, 1981, played a major role in organizing the underground union in the region, and took the leadership of it after the arrest of Bogdan Lis in June 1984. 29. A spontaneous strike broke out then the State of War. The classical example of the braking role we have played is the strike of October 1982, after our union was outlawed. (29) But there were other moments when the level of social mobilization was very high. However, since there was a group that was supposed to give the signal, people waited. Up to the middle of 1983, the society was expecting decisions that the TKK was unable to make." Why was it unable to make them? "Because it was incapable of assuming the responsibility for a possible failure."
From what did this fear of respon- 1AT sibility spring? First of all, the TKK has seemed not to realize that you can suffer losses not just if you fight, but above all if you fail to respond to the attacks of an adversary and let them get what they want without mounting any resistance, or offering only symbolic opposition.
Borusewicz's interview, moreover, is filled with despair and defeatism. Of the TKK, he says: "With its present makeup, no view predominates, so the attitude that prevails is an idea of holding out, of doing something, of a long march. [He did not explain what the other views were. - Inprekor.] But a march has to have a destination."
The journalist interviewing him noted that in the consciousness of society, there was only a vague idea of the goal. "In our minds also," Borusewicz continued. "So, we hold out, we build the press, and that's all. The social resistance will flag. Normally, a revolutionary wave never lasts more than two or three years. Here, it is ebbing a bit more slowly. The social movement can only defeat the state apparatus in a confrontation concentrated in time. We have to know how long we have to hold out."
Looking at the TKK's activity from this standpoint, Borusewicz said laconically and brutally: "If we stopped issuing declarations, we would no longer have any reason to meet." He added, nonetheless: "As I said, the activity will flag, up until a certain point when it mounts suddenly again toward a new explosion." (30)
But the social movement is not the sea, and its leadership bodies are not bits of driftwood carried to one level or another by the tide, independently of their will. The level of organization, the tactic employed, the strategy laid out are also factors that influence the in the Gdansk shipyards. Actions were on the point of breaking out in other big industrial centers. Mass demonstrations and clashes took place in Nowa Huta, in particular, Instead of calling on people to support and spread the strike, the TKK issued an appeal for a symbolic general strike for November 10, more than a month later, thereby demobilizing the workers. Finally, the two strikes, the one in Gdansk that lasted four days in isolation and the one called for the following month, which failed to bring the workers out, ended in defeats. On several occasions, when there have been tensions, the TKK has called for preparing for a general strike some time in the future, without these appeuis ever leading to concrete action. 30. 'Kultura', Paris, No. 11/446, November 1984.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
dynamic of the social movement, which help to determine the ebb and flow of the tide. The social movement is not a disciplined army that can be sent into combat, regardless of the mood of the masses, by means of a militant slogan.
Moreover, these two extreme ways of viewing the reality of the movement are often taken at different times by the same leaders who make up the TKK, leading them from passivity to adventurism and vice versa.
To go back to Borusewicz's prognostication about a low point in the activity of the social movement after which it will suddenly begin to rise again toward a new explosion, it is to be feared, given past experience, that the TKK will not be able to take the responsibility for a possible defeat at that point, and that it will again play the role of a brake. Why is this so? First of all, because the Solidarnose leadership remains attached to the idea of a "self-limiting revolution," as we have pointed out several times in Inprekor. But in the context of an ebb in the revolutionary wave, there is less revolution and more and more self-limitation in this strategy, which resembles a house of cards.
The perspective of a social explosion, real or imaginary, is seen as threatening to bring a collapse of the present regime and bring on inevitable military intervention by the Kremlin. Bujak sometimes goes as far as saying that he considers himself part of "the generation that will bring down this system once and for all." But this is not a coherent political line.
The political orientation of the TKK, of Lech Walesa, and the dominant currents in the intellectual circles that influence the Solidarnose leadership goes in the direction of an understanding with the totalitarian regime with the aim of achieving the "common" task of getting the country out of the economic crisis. And this would postpone to better days, if not forever, any structural change in the system of political rule. The only life preserver, therefore, is supposed to be reformism in a nonreformable regime, "the construction of a self-managed society within a totalitarian state," as Kuron is fond of saying.
But this is not all. There is also and above all the fact that the present leadership does not know what the social movement should aim for and where the revolutionary dynamic that Borusewicz refers to delicately as the "tendency to explosion" leads. For the TKK, the problem is to cushion this danger, or even prevent it, because an explosion without political perspectives in the short or long term could easily lead to defeat.
Before going any further, it should be noted that this argument is not all that convincing, because historical experience has shown, even recently in Poland, that during an explosion of mass struggles, the social movement can rapidly define the political perspectives that are essential for its mational Viewpoint 29 July 1985 political activity in the intermediate term. And it is possible that longer term perspectives could be worked out on the road. At least, that was the tendency in the Solidarnosc movement during the revolution of 1980-1981.
A program to solve the crisis
During the periou of revolutionary upsurge between August 1980 and December 1981, the Polish social movement reached general conclusions about its aspirations and strategic objectives. Over and above defending the rights, the dignity, and the material and moral interests of the workers, as well as seeking a guarantee of broad democratic freedoms, it aimed for a genuine socialization of the means of production and the state, that is, a system of rule based on the principles of democracy, pluralism, and wide-ranging workers and social self-management.
The program of the Self-Managed Republic outlined in the resolutions of the first national congress of Solidarnosc and given concrete expression in union work and self-management activity was not the application of any doctrine. It expressed the natural aspirations of the working class for political and social liberation, which little by little took on a conscious form. It was, it is important to remember, the collective product of the working class itself, open to the contributions of other social groups with which it allied itself in the struggle against the totalitarian regime and whose legitimate interests it was prepared to guarantee in accordance with its demo. cratic sentiments.
These programmatic gains have been more and more eroded after the introduction of the State of War, in the difficult conditions of underground work. To a large extent, the working class has no longer been able to express its will and its collective aspirations, in any case, not in a concentrated way. This would undoubtedly have been different, if political organizations had formed before December 1981, based on the workers self-organization and self-management current, and then gone underground.
The state of the underground press today illustrates this problem. On the one hand, we have, to speak in general terms of course, an atomized press, limited to individual factories, and often of a narrow political scope. On the other hand, we have a nonfactory press published by intellectual circles generally cut off from the working class. To this day, the press of the pro-self-
Just out - Polish Inprekor In this issue; an analysis of the crisis of leadership within Solidarnosc (a follow up to the article in Inprekor 18 which is reproduced here ): On the repression against the left in Yugoslavia (with the positions of R. Radovic, P. Imsirivic and M. Nikolic, three of those facing repression): Special dossier on the Ukraine (including articles on national oppression and the social structures in the Ukraine, dissident workers speaking; and resistance and repression in western Ukraine): Statement from peace activists in the East and the West: Special on Nicaragua including an article on imperialism versus democracy; the revolution and underdevelopment, free elections, a conquest of the revolution; the issue of the Indian Miskitos and the Church divided. To order Polish Inprekor, write to PEC, 2, Rue Richard Lenoir, 93100, Montreuil, France. One copy; 2.5 dollars or £1.20. Subscription (six issues); 12 dollars, £7.50. Cheques/postal orders should be made payable to International Viewpoint and marked 'for Polish Inprekor'.
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Communism in the worst tradition of interests and which have been left the Polish extreme right, and, more isolated, such as the strike at the Rosa widespread, a backward hostility to the Luxemburg factory. Because building ideas of the left." up and spreading such struggles is today
Lepkowski went on to say that it the main, if not the only, chance for could be considered a "tragedy of our a new rise of struggles that could open revolution that it has been invaded the way for a new phase of the Polish by political traditionalism, often mixed revolution. up with obsessions and phobias engen- It is, therefore, necessary that the dered by the policy of the regime or enterprise and interenterprise structures inspired by it." (31) most conscious of the immediate and
Along with these negative aspects, strategic interests of the working class, we also have to note the present tendency as well as their press organs, try to to look for hope in Ronald Reagan's establish direct coordination among imperialist policy, because it is anti- themselves. Such "alliances" should, of Soviet and anti-Communist, to look course, be open to all the trade-union for hope in the Pershings, because they structures of intellectual circles ready are aimed against the USSR, and more to support them or cooperate with them, generally to look to "the West," seen as well as to any political group that as an ahistorical abstraction devoid of stands for a consistent workingall class content. This is leading Poles class policy, which implies support for to turn their backs on the liberation the ideals of self-organization and selfstruggles in the West and the national management, as well as of workers liberation movements in the Third solidaritv. both on the national and
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1980-81, "ideas" of reprivatizing the work for the dev hould have both a litical character and elopment of tactics at least on a scale where it could have a real influence. It is, however, such a press that must maintain the continuity of the most important working-class programmatic gains of Solidarnosc, popuof production means surfacing he capital are
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In the beginning, ne social movement alternative to the present leadership such alliances would larize them, systematize them, and develop them.
The way in which the underground leadership bodies of Solidarnose are functioning today is fostering a fragmentation of the aspirations of the working class and diffusing its determination. None of the underground factory committees of Solidarnose is capable of expressing this will and these aspirations. At the same time, there are almost no coordinating bodies at the national in Solidarnosc, already cor
To a certain extent, of Solidarnose has cont development of these pl partially it is yielding passive in the face of th exert. In the statements c in the press it controls directly, the concept Managed Republic is be the content that Solid: in the past and being g fused enough. have to operate independently, the leadership both as regards defending the ributed to the programmatic gains of Solidarnose enomena, and through their press, workers education or remaining circles, etc.; and as regards the tactical e pressure they tasks of defending the rights, dignity, if the TKK and and interests of the working class in all or influences the enterprises in which they are active. of the Self- These alliances will also have to ing emptied of focus social pressure on the Solidarnosc irnose gave it leadership in order to get it to modify ven a meaning its orientation, or at least its attitude and regional level that are the emanation of these factory structures, unlike the situation in certain regions in 1982.
The conditions of underground work favor the opening of a gap between the ranks and the regional leaderships and the TKK. Today, when the leading bodies of the social movement are not a direct emanation of the working class and are not under its control on a day-to-day basis, and when there are still no working-class political organizations, the programmatic gains of Solidarnosc are being pushed aside by various ideological currents based on quite narrow circles. In the absence of anything else, these small groups can present themselves as the voice of the people, while the social forces of the working class cannot express their views of them.
"If the still vague vision of a self-managed republic could have been developed and made concrete, in a few years we would have an independent Poland, a Poland of modern democratic socialism," Professor Tadeusz Lepkowski wrote justly. But, he added, more than once we have seen in the Polish revolution ideological phenomena alien to it. He cited "strong and stubborn antithat makes it hard to discern what it toward the immediate needs of the social originally meant. movement. Finally, they will have to
So, it is not surprising that this defend the working-class principles of leadership is disoriented when the union democracy that are part of the question arises of where to lead the tradition and heritage of Solidarnosc. In movement in order to prepare it for new this way they will help to counter the revolutionary confrontations. dangers posed by alienation from the
We will of course come back to the underground national and regional leaderfeatures of the crisis in the Polish ships by applying these principles within social movement and the political them. conclusions that flow from this. At the same time, it is necessary to But what has to be said at this point defend firmly the unity of the workers is that immediate and long-term and of all working people within the actions have now to be undertaken framework of Solidarnose as a single, as rapidly as possible to stop the move- pluralistic union movement. Differences ment from sinking deeper into crisis over tactics, strategy, the action program, and at the same time to foster alterna- and even the program for building the tive tendencies. Self-Managed Republic, may arise among
To indicate what sort of actions are these workers alliances and other currents needed in a general way, we might say and structures in the leadership of first that an energetic effort is neces- Solidamosc. But these differences must sary to restore what was the driving not be erected into barricades. The force of Solidarnose in 1981, that is, barricade that is needed has to be built a program of struggle for political by everyone working together, whether democracy and workers self-management they want to or not, against the based on a genuine socialization of the totalitarian regime. main means of production.
Moreover, these actions should offer practical support to the struggles waged 31. T Lepkowski, 'Mysli o historii Polski by the workers in some factories in ¡ Polakow' ("Thoughts on the History Poland and the Poles""), 'Zeszyty Historyczne,
Russian feelings, an outdated anti- defense of their material and moral
Paris, No. 68, 1984, p. 152.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
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