Regime in crisis as the revolutionary forces unite
Alongside a process of unification and strengthening of the revolutionary and popular organisations, the ruling power in the Dominican Republic, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) has been going through an ever deepening crisis. This crisis has been unfolding under the double impact of developments in the Caribbean as a whole and as a consequence of the economic crisis and the pressures being exerted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the government of president Salvador Jorge Blanco.
While class confrontation has been on the increase, so has the pace of developing unity between revolutionary organisations. The years 1970 to 1981 had already seen discussions leading to the unification of three organisations, the Socialist Workers Movement (MST), the Nucleus of Communist Workers (NCT) and the Socialist Party (PS) which were to fuse to form the Bloque Socialista (BS). This revolutionary regroupment, then, whose first actual congress took place in June 1984, became the motor force for a much larger process of unity in action within the working class and popular movement.
The debates between the various political currents continued during this time and culminated in the formation on June 14, 1983 of the Dominican Left Front (FID) which grouped together workers and peasants organisations from the left including BS, the Dominican Workers Party (PTD), the Move-
Patriotic Union (UPA), members of the United Left (IU) and the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), a sympathising group of the Fourth International which subsequently joined the Bloque Socialista. (1)
In 1984, the agreement imposed by the IMF in exchange for renewing a loan of 450 million dollars brought huge price rises in basic goods and provoked a virtual social explosion lasting several days and beginning on April 23, 1984. (2) This resulted in massive repression in which dozens were killed and wounded. The paradox of the situation was that these hunger riots took place on the day of the nineteenth anniversary of the uprising by supporters of expresident Juan Bosch and the military constitutionalists that US imperialism had drowned in blood through the intervention of 42,000 GIs.
Following the hunger riots in April 1984, new activities around new demands began to take place at the beginning of 1985 and this led to the organisation of a 24-hour general strike on February 11, 1985, in the preparation of which the FID played a key role.
In May of this year a delegation from FID were in Europe. We spoke to comrades Antonio Aquino, Carmen Sanchez, and Enrique Pichardo about the developments in the political situation in the country as well as the developments towards unity of the revolutionary forces. The following is a summary of
Anti-imperialist
(MPS), the for Socialism ment that discussion.
Question. How was the Dominican Left Front (FID) first set up?
Answer. The policies of theDominican regime gave way to increased social tensions and a significant denial of basic democratic rights. Up until June 14, 1983, all the strands of the revolutionary movement had been divided into two main fronts. But seeing the depth of the crisis of the regime and the social chaos which exists and recognising the enormous concern felt amongst the Dominican people, they reached the agreement to set up the FID. Of course this came about after innumerable discussions. This political event raised great hopes among the Dominican people but it also created a huge panic among the forces of reaction.
But in any case, this unitary initiative is now irreversible. Revolutionaries today are convinced that without unity, they have no strength with which to achieve possible victory. This recognition of the need for unity has meant that Dominican revolutionaries have been able to put the discussion on the actual situation in the region to the forefront in the joint debates - going beyond any ideological and political differences on the situation of the international communist 12 movement and the international situation in general.
This does not mean to say that we deny the differences which exist between the different components of the FID. Every organisation can put forward its view within the FID, in the way they think best and as each event comes up. But the FID does not aim to deal with such problems within its terms of reference. The main thing is that there is agreement on the fact that we cannot continue under the presence of foreign monopoly businesses, nor in the position of a neo-colonial country and that we cannot tolerate the fact that the proletariat and the impoverished masses in the countryside continue to live under the yoke of oppression and exploitation. So, in that case it is a duty for us to unify ourselves and unite the people.
Strengthened by these two elements, we are certain that no force in the whole world can hold back the Dominican. revolution. Our revolutionary perspective however, is not a long term one. It is our generation that has the task of leading the revolutionary and people's movement to overthrow oppression; of liberating our people; of making our country prosper and of creating the conditions for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the short term. These are our objectives and it is around these that we are united.
Q. The unification of organisations with different political and organisational traditions must pose some problems. How have you sought to resolve the problems of working within the FID and also the question of the relations between the FID and the mass movement?
A. In the first place, within the FID we all share the same views on the analysis of the current situation and on the path that revolutionaries should take. So any problems which may arise are always secondary to this. Also there exists a very good spirit of cooperation between revolutionaries of different organisations. Sometimes in practice, it is impossible to tell who is a member of the Dominican Workers Party the Dominican Communist Party, the Bloque Socialista or the Patriotic Union.
See International Viewpoint, No 76, April 22, 1985. 2. See 'IV" No 53, May 21, 1984.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
This does not at all mean that all the problems are resolved. They still exist and come out in occasional vanguardist or sectarian behaviour. But we usually attribute such behaviour as coming from the past. It is predictable, but it is not the behaviour of the majority current of the FID. It is rather the behaviour of a current in historical decline.
There is a further problem inherent in the structures of the FID. Up until November 1984, the FID was a lose coordination and not really a revolutionary front. Delegates from each of the different organisations were represented on the different bodies of the FID. As a result, very often only 15 to 20 per cent of their energies were given over to the FID, the rest of their activity being carried out within the framework of the political organisation they came from. It was impossible to carry on like this, at least not without believing that the FID was only a passive movement of agitation and propaganda. In order to transform FID into a revolutionary movement, organisational measures had to be taken which corresponded to this political decision.
It was also a question of linking the front with the working class and popular masses. This was another important element. The majority of the mass organisations, which over the years have played an important role in the popular struggle, are today under the political influence of the FID.
Some steps forward in relation to the structuring of the FID were taken with the creation of a unified leadership the the form of an executive commission which was a real political leadership, equipped to take decisions without recourse to a plenary assembly. This political commission is the only body which functions on the basis of consensus, all the others being based on majority decisions. In the political commission, the principle of consensus was adopted because if we had pushed for majority decisions, this would have bred mistrust in certain quarters.
At the moment the FID does not have a fixed spokesperson. It has a journal called Abril. The political commission has a spokesperson, but as the leadership of the FID is made up of members of different organisations, the role of spokesperson is rotated every month to a representative of a different organisation. Such a method of organising exists more or less in all the other bodies, but it is not the result of a political decision that has to be implemented at all levels. There are therefore some regions and local committees which do have full-time spokespeople. Such local representatives of the FID are elected by an assembly of members of all the organisations the area, the provinces or the region. These individuals then have both the mal and moral authority necessary to fill the functions of leaders of the international Viewpoint 29 July 1985 and WIEU
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Women peasants demonstrate in Santo Domingo (DR)
FID in those areas. This has allowed us to make great progress at the level of effective action. Nobody challenges the political origins of a secretary of a local committee any more, or of a town or provincial committee.
In fact often, up until last November When we wanted to take any decisions, we had to first get each organisation together separately. Now the political leadership of the FID, the national leadership and the regional, provincial and local leaderships and even the mass fronts, have become collective structures.
It is also important to note that we have created a national department for the mass fronts. This department is subdivided into sub-departments made up of activists responsible for clearly defined areas of intervention; peasants, workers, youth, culture ete. Also before we had no programme or model. Now we have a political project and we know at each point what we want and how we are going to get it.
For many revolutionaries in Latin America, the mass movement is everything and the overall objectives, nothing. That is why we have committed so many errors. In the Dominican Republic, we too have known difficult times because we wanted to give into spontaneism and improvised solutions. We came to the conclusion that it was impossible to act politically on this basis. Of course this reflects a certain political maturity. But the most important thing is that we have succeeded in building an organisation of revolutionaries and in linking that through the umbilical cord of great tactical and strategic capacity to the workers and peasants movement and to the masses in general. The intermingling of the mass movement and the movement of the politically aware has brought about a strengthening of both the mass movement and the revolutionary movement itself, in such a way that it is now impossible for one to develop without the other. This interrelationship has made it possible to achieve unity between the mass move. ment and the revolutionary movement..
The FID is not merely the sum of the political groups which form a part of it. Dozens and dozens of people who were not members of political organisations have joined the FID. That is why the FID cannot simply behave as if it were a grouping of different organisations any more.
Q. In April 1984, the Dominican Republic saw a huge wave of social unrest. The popular masses came out onto the streets to protest against the IMF plan being implemented by the government. What role did the FID play in the political direction of this movement of popular protest?
A. At that time the FID had not reached the degree of coordination and development that it has today. Nevertheless from January to March 1984, we were able to initiate broad mobilisations across the country. The denunciation of government policies and the mobilisations against the DE agreements created the basis for the people's reaction in April 1984. Of course this reaction was also spontaneous but, it was originally organised and decided on by the political leadership of the FID. At that point the FID was not convinced that this movement, which had begun in the localities, would have a national character. It is in this sense that we can talk about a spontaneous movement, without negating the existence of a political leadership of that movement.
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The two elements were both present.
During this 'popular insurrection' fought with stones, the Dominican people did not fire one single shot. The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) government, however ordered the repression which resulted in more than one hundred deaths, five hundred wounded and 5,000 in prison. For the government this did not appear to matter, since on April 26, 1984, the president congratulated the guard and the police on radio and television, for their 'exemplary' conduct.
The events of April 1984 created a new situation in the country. The relations between the classes were greatly changed. The people began to realise that they could not continue to live as they had been. This is what so totally changed the Dominican political scene. From now on was created what we called a pre-revolutionary situation.
The crisis of the regime is very acute and even conservative elements, like, for example, the Catholic Church, are searching desperately for a solution which could ease social tensions. At the moment the Catholic Church is acting as a mediator between the different right wing organisations, so that in the 1986 elections, if they take place, the right can present a united candidature.
The other objective which the right and the Church are pursuing is the signing of a pact between the main union confederations, the government and the bosses. Their intentions certainly don't lead them to hide the reactionary nature of this pact. It is reactionary in the first place because the majority of the Dominican people are not included in it. Roughly 32% of the active population is unemployed with 58% either unemployed or underemployed. All these people are ignored by the right wing who are only interested in an agreement with the minority, to the detriment of the majority. So, even if they get a pact which means adjusting wage levels, that will not significantly alter the position in society of the vast mass of the Dominican people, and still less will it alter the economic situation. Moreover, no selfrespecting union confederation, which 14 takes the views of its members into account could sign such an agreement. It is impossible to reach agreement between the bosses, the unions and the government today because the contradictions in society are too sharp. The forces of reaction are trying, therefore - not to prevent a social explosion, but to postpone it, in order to use the extra time to pull off some other manoeuvre.
Q. What were the political and organisational lessons for the FID of the April 1984 events?
A. Our view is that the revolutionary movement was not, unfortunately ready for an insurrection, and that was painful for us. We came across thousands of people in the town quarters and in country areas who had decided to transform this 'protesta' , which was originally organised to protest against hunger and misery, into a real insurrection that would do away with the representatives of imperialism and with the Creole reaction. But we were not sufficiently prepared and that is the main lesson we have to draw from this situation.
It is not a matter of complaining about this state of affairs but of being aware of the real problems posed. Up until then we had been talking about revolution as something abstract, as if it was just a simple theory. We did not realise in talking about revolution that the reality meant so much more than we had been able to speak about. And everything that we had said until then were merely absurdities or exaggerations in comparison with the responsibility with which we were faced. With all our faults we are the only ones who can take that responsibility. When we saw that the moment had come but that we were not ready to confront the situation, we realised then that this is the worst predicament that can ever present itself to a revolutionary.
Nevertheless, we were able to draw our experiences together. We knew how to pick ourselves up after the fall. We were able to go through that defeat, recover from it and go forward again. That is why we do not see the death of dozens of our comrades in April 1984 as representing a defeat, but as ano important political lesson. We realised that we could not cease to assume the historic responsibility which I mentioned before. That is why we were able to make progress as a result. There is no doubt that another spontaneous outbreak like that which occured in April 1984, is impossible. But so that no one has any doubt about the new situation that we are helping to create; it will be one of massive confrontations!
The editor of the Santo Domingo newspaper Listin Diario, recently looked into the influence of revolutionaries in the protesta on February 11, 1985. He was speculating as to why big business in Santo Domingo and the rich property owners of the Conde Street, of Duarte Avenue, of March 30 Avenue, who certainly did want revolution had supported such a protest movement. What happened, and what this gentleman cannot understand, is that this was a new situation and everyone wanted to get a look in, even the guards and the police. We are no longer merely the little group of young hotheads they used to see before. People cannot accuse us of being young, because we are all over 35 years old and politically, we have matured and that is the most crucial thing.
The February 11, 1985 strike was the result of this development. We organised a general strike, prepared through partial, local, regional and sectoral strikes. Our immediate aim now is to prepare for a second general strike, of greater social scope. We don't want to organise another 24-hour strike, but a much longer strike. Our aim is to draw the protesta movement together at the national level in order to gradually convince the people that the future lies in their hands. From this point of view, the Dominican Republic is not like other countries in Latin America. For example, in Bolivia, we saw a general strike which lasted more than one week. If such a strike had taken place in the Dominican Republic the government could not have continued to hold on to power. No government could survive such a strike, because the Dominican people would not be content just to go on strike. They would be out in streets to settle accounts and get justice.
Q. The establishment of the FID has had consequences for other political forces who exercised or are still exercising an influence among the popular masses. What orientation did the FID adopt in order to win over the popular masses who were still under the influence of these bourgeois formations?
A. We see an important role of the National Coordination of the masses which is in the process of being set up. With 300 organisations at the national level and an implantation in the ten main provinces in the country, this organisation will not simply group the left together.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
### OLIGAR QUIA Y dCUAL EsEL PEAR P Oligarchy or the IMF:, which is worst? In fact, the majority of people who make up the organisations of the Coordination are not left-wing. In the provinces where provincial coordinations are in existence there are Christian organisations or organisations influenced by the 'official' current participating. (3) Such ideological influences still have a hold, but on the political level the masses feel increasingly represented by the FID. On the ideological level we are conducting a campaign amongst the population, in which we are trying to convince them that their future and their destiny is in their own hands.
Class differences have widened and this has provoked indignation among the people which is pushing them to act. I do not want to imply by this that all the masses are under FID influence. We are conducting a campaign to change the way people think and we hope we can win out in the short term.
Q. The mass mobilisations of January 1985 put the FID to the test. What balance sheet would you draw of these activities?
A. On this subject we published a text called "A balance sheet for action. In fact, it is more than a balance sheet because it defines the political orientation we intend to follow in the future. The mobilisations at the beginning of 1985 were a success. They represented the response of the Dominican people to anti-working class policies.
On January 28, the partial work stoppages began. The government gave the order for repressive measures, International Viewpoint 29 July 1985 thinking that the events of April 1984 were about to repeat themselves. But we were not about to do anything foolhardy. Of course we wanted to lead the people to take power, but we were not going to do so on January 28.
We wanted to articulate our protesta, to strengthen our degree of organisation and build on a series of elements which existed already in ordere to approach the decisive moment of the seizure of power. That is why, when the government sent troops into the streets, we replied through work stoppages. The troops couldn't find anyone to fight because they had been sent to fight people who were not even in the streets. The work stoppages and mobilisations ended in a 24-hour strike on February 11. This was an important political event.
It is difficult to paralyse 90 to 95% of the economic activity of a country. But in Santo Domingo, trade and industry ceased to function. Even the tourists, who before the strike were ensconced in hotels, now deserted. The JanuaryFebruary mobilisations were a shot across the bows from the Dominican people, announcing the beginning of a long period of struggle against their oppressors.
The first task now is to take forward the mass struggle against the IMF, and in order to conduct it successfully, we must have a precise orientation. The next goal is another national strike, much longer and more broad in scope than the previous one. This action should bring in new social layers who became involved in the recent strikes. Partial, even local, regional or sectoral strikes can serve to prepare the second national strike, so that it can be more widely taken up and can last longer.
At the level of demands, we need to focus on expropriation or on state control of finance capital and not the whole of capital. Today that means nationalisation of the banking system and control of currency. All the popular should join the National Coordination of the masses. Organisations should be established at the base of this Coordination at municipal, regional and national level. Finally, we are aiming to take up this mobilisation within the framework of a process of accumulation of forces and radicalisation of the struggle.
Q. The radicalisation of the popular movements in the Dominican Republic is undeniable. But twice now you have described the pre-revolutionary character of the current situation. Could you tell us what aspects of the situation have led to this characterisation on the part of the FID?
A. There are several factors involved. The most important are those which we have insisted on throughout this interview, that is to say the progress that has been made in coordinating and organising the masses as well as the influence that the FID has gained. But there is also something else. The dominant groups, for example, the party in power, the PRD - have been deeply discredited in the eyes of the masses and the other upholders of the system are in an even more lamentable state. This is a political aspect of great significance and that is why the Church is intervening as a mediator, without being able to get an agreement between the different political formations of the regime. They are hoping that we will be content with an electoral contest with the right. This is the trap that they think we will fall into. The FID has not yet diseussed this question. But we would prefer not to have to discuss it at all, our most cherished wish being that the final confrontation will take place before that date. But if this confrontation does not come and we are forced to discuss the election issue, we will do it later. For the moment, this discussion is not a priority for us.
The ecclesiastical hierarchy has reappeared on the political scene and this is the real proof of the weakness of the regime. Of course, the Church is an ideological power within the system but in general it prefers to keep a distance from politics in order to better deceive the people.
Moreover, the main structures of the regime, that is the chamber of deputies and the senate are going through a permanent crisis. Last year, two months went by when these bodies were unable to sit because they could not even get agreement on choosing a secretary. For a whole period there were even two presidents in each of the chambers. Since November 1984, a proposed budget has been before the chamber, but the elected representatives have not yet managed to get a quorum to discuss it.
The Dominican Republic is drifting, nobody has any confidence in its institutions and even those who defend the regime are getting worried by the situation. The level of corruption and decay that this regime has reached is unbelievable. It has no authority any more. In the town of Santiago, for example, the governor has not been fulfilling his functions for some time. Also, the central bank has simply become an accounts office. It does not control the issuing of money. The ruling groups are coming up against another basic problem; that of a people rising up against an anti-national and antipopular agreement with the IF; and of a revolutionary movement with a real base amongst the masses. These are the objective factors which have created the new situation. That is why we say we are in a pre revoiutionary situation. Everyone agrees that the regime is on the verge of a total collapse. 3. The 'official' current consists of mass organisations which, like the General Union of Dominican Workers (UGT) are linked to the official ruling party, the PRD.
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