SOUTHERN AFRICA
dence, the MPLA (Angolan People's
Liberation Movement) and Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front) governments forms of kept the consciously main dependence on imperialist interests.
One step more towards a
'Pax Americana
The bulk of the nationalisations car ried out in this initial period affected only the Portuguese holdings, that is middle industry and commerce. The pillars of these two economies - energy, heavy industry, mines, plantations - remained either under the direct ownership of imperialist companies, or very dependent on technical or commercial
On February 16, 1984, a three-way agreement was signed in Lusaka, the
The parties to this agreement were Angola, the Repubcapital of Angola.
lic of South Africa and the United States of America.
This agreement provided for setting up an Angolan-South African joint
This was for the purpose of reaching a definitive cease fire, commission.
thereby putting an end to the clashes that have taken place regularly on
Angola's southern border since independence in 1975 and the South
African invasion in 1976. In other words, South Africa has undertaken to withdraw its troops from the south of Angola, which it has occupied more or less continuously for years, in exchange for the undertaking by Luanda to restrict the activities of SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) his 'gentleman's agreement' was accepted by the Angolans on the the Namibian national liberation movement, on Angolan terribasis of a vague promise by the South Africans to advance the negotiations on the status of Namibia, which is presently occupied by the racist regime in Pretoria. (1)
On March 16, 1984, it was Mozambique's turn to sign a non-aggression and good neighbour treaty with the South African regime.
tiations lasting several months, in which the declared objective was to study the measures necessary to assure 'that no country can be used as a launching pad for violent actions or aggressions against another', the
South African leaders undertook to stop supporting guerrilla struggle waged in Mozambique by the Mozambique National
The Maputo government, for its part, agreed to no
Resistance (MNR).
longer allow the ANC (African National Congress, South African national liberation movement led by the Communist Party of South Africa, CPSA), to use Mozambican territory for mounting sabotage actions against
In fact, Samora Machel's government asked several dozen
South Africa.
members of the ANC to leave Mozambique.
Claude GABRIEL
The new situation in Southern Africa reflected by the bilateral defence agreements between Mozambique, Angola and
Africa has come about as the result of a combination of factors. One is the depth of the economic crisis affecting the two former Portuguese colonies after ten years of independence, and the guerrilla forces on the economies of these two countries. Moreover the international context marked by the increased and unfaltering support to South Africa by US imperialism, has greatly assisted the drive by the racist regime to bring the independent countries of Southern Africa to heel by brutal pressure.
In countries like Angola and Mozambique, the economic crisis has reached a
Over the last two most critical level.
years a certain number of factors over which these two governments have no control, such as drought, the fall in raw materials prices, the international recession, the rate of discount on the international financial market, etc. have helped to worsen the economic situation.
But, over and above the present unfavourable economic climate, there are underlying reasons why the economic catastrophe in these two countries has
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Pro-Frelimo demonstration in Mozambique (DR) assumed such scope. They have to do with the political nature of the regimes in power since 1975.
After having taken care to first control and then suppress the movement and activity of the popular masses that accompanied the granting of indepenagreements with the West.
Having based their state sector on those enterprises least important for an advance toward real economic independence, the Luanda and Maputo regimes then left the imperialists a free hand to manipulate the relationships between these two countries and the multinationals and Western markets.
This economic compromise went hand in hand with the systematic muzzling of popular demands, and repression of any form of independent expression by the toiling masses. Thus, the trend of development of these regimes could only go in the direction of more dependence on imperialism rather than less. The bureaucratism of the Frelimo and MPLA leadership then took the form of a nomenklatura system determining the distribution of wealth within the ruling layer. (2)
Despite their victory against Portuguese imperialism and their mass following, the MPLA and Frelimo have created dependent states and economies. While, for the time being, their political form remains special, as a result of the specific history of liberation struggles that gave birth to them, the social nature of these states is well and truly bourgeois.
It has once again been proved that the famous 'non-capitalist path of development', celebrated by Moscow and its disciples for the last 25 years as the main road to progress in the 'third world' countries, is a pure fabrication. The claims for it cannot stand up to objective analysis. In less than ten years, the Angolan and Mozambican regimes have shown that, fundamentally, in the realm of economic structures, they have never to break out of the imperialist sphere of influence.
Despite the hypocritical way these regimes have played up their relations with Cuba, they have completely ignored the warning given by Che Guevara in his famous saying: "socialist revolution or the caricature of a revolution'.
The political and military threats to these two governments from the UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) and the MR guerrilla forces is the second element in explaining re-
Le Monde, February 24, 1984 2. The Stalinist model is faithfully copied in the organisation of the top leading layers of these parties and these states, which are, moreover, not clearly separateu. For example, in the Angolan capital Luanda, there are shops reserved for memers of the central committee of the MPLA.
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
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UNITA, a reactionary guerrilla force
The present leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, was a member of the Union of Pop-
Western countries (France, West Germany, a former organiser of Reagan's presicent events in Southern Africa. they are historically very different. in recent times these two reactionary guerrilla movements have played very similar
Supported, trained and equipped by the South African army and special ulations in Angola (UPA), forerunner of the FNLA of Roberto Holden.
services, their objective is to force Angola regionalist movement, mainly of northern Angolans of the Bacongo ethnic group, and Mozambique to increase their unmany of whom were refugees from Zaire. In the 1960s it organised a Revolutionary productive arms spending
Government in Exile of Angola (GRAE) in which Savimbi had the post of minister gravate the economic situation in these of foreign affairs for a time, and then left in 1964.
two countries. They have been able to benefitting particularly from the freedom of movement allowed by neighbouring use ethnic and regional resentments and
Zambia, UNITA was created by Savimbi in the Moxico region of Angola.
mistrusts that the ruling parties have not statements of UNITA, which received some aid from China, were quite radical.
managed to overcome, to acquire a base
During the 1970s, its propaganda insisted on the 'Marxist-Leninist' character of the and thus enjoyed the support of pro-China organisations which de
MPLA as being pro-Soviet.
In the case of UNITA, it is obvious against the Portuguese troops were never as great as they claimed.
that its impact does not simply come tion continued to exercise, and does still to this day, a mainly regional influence in through intimidation of the population.
the centre and south east of the country, where the Ovibundu are dominant.
the civil war of 1974-76, Jonas
At the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship, it was learnt that UNITA had had a
Savimbi's movement has, in certain lotacit agreement with the Portuguese troops since 1972 to fight the MPLA.
calities, filled a vacuum left by the exchange of correspondance with the colonial authorities, Savimbi wrote:
as we are concerned, we would like the war to be decisively eradicated from the
This opening was left by the MPLA's
We have done everything in our power to weaken the strength of inability to win credibility among the the common enemy....Our analysis has allowed us to designate the MPLA as the principal obstacle to peace, not only in the east but throughout Angolan territory.' peasantry by proposing an agrarian pro-
(Afrique-Asie, July 8, 1974). Despite its anti-white and anti-Coloured verbiage, in gramme meeting their interests. On the
1974 UNITA lined up with the neo-colonialist option of the Portuguese president, contrary, the authoritarianism of the
Spinola, in coming out for "total independence, which must be prepared and
MPLA and Frelimo leaderships in their carried through progressively, and against any idea of immediate independence relationship with the peasant masses,
(O Seculo Ilustrado, Lisbon, September 21, 1974).
and sometimes even their fascination with support of certain white settlers after April 25, and Savimbi kept good contact with collectivisation and pushing towards state the ultra-reactionary group United Angolan Front (FUA) of the engineer Fernando control and centralisation, aggravated the
A former member of the OAS, colonel Armand, then revealed that he was to have organised 'a coup d'etat to put in Jonas Savimbi as president of the Angolan deterioration in relations between certain rural areas and the Luanda and Maputo
UNITA was joined with the FNLA and MPLA in the transitional government installed in Luanda in 1975 following the decolonisation agreements signed at Alvor.
UNITA and the MNR, advised by the
At this time it then came out against the strikes and mass mobilisations, while
South Africa regime, have been able to loosening its too obvious links with the white settlers.
exploit these weaknesses and carry out in which the popular masses fought alongside the MPLA against the UNITA and their terrorist actions using such bases of
FNLA, and the FNLA forces were evicted from the capital, the UNITA and FNLA, support (see box on UNITA).
organised by agents of the American CIA, took part in the support of the South
African invasion that attempted to overthrow the government formed by the MPLA
Finally, while there was a certain slight
In this regard Savimbi stated, 'One day I learnt that the South Africans had entered Angola with their tanks....Once the mistake was made, then it should
Africa following the independence of Mobe turned to advantage, allowing it to follow through so that the South Africans zambique and Angola and the failure of would take Luanda, and then withdraw and allow us to occupy' (cited by Afriquethe South African military opposition to this, Washington has since stepped up
It is this movement, regionalist, pro-imperialist and allied with South Africa, that its support for the racist regime. And this the United States and the Western countries today present as 'freedom fighters'.
constitutes a third key element in the evolution of the sitation in the region.
Reagan's support for Pretoria
Even though the Carter administration supported South Africa in practice, the arrival of Ronald Reagan in power meant strengthened American military support for Pretoria. The advent of the Reagan government opened the way for a propaganda drive to refurbish the image of Pieter Botha's government in the eyes of American and international public opinion.
Last and most important, Reagan gave the South Africans full diplomatic licence to make regular incursions into Angolan carry out their murderous actions, to bomb Mozambique, and to continue their refusal to grant Namibian independence as was outlined by the
United Nations.
With Reagan, South Africa appeared more than ever as the imperialists' armed force in the region. Washington did its part by blocking any action of the five
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
Britain, Canada, USA) that were supposed to ensure the implementation of the UN resolutions on Namibian inde-
The combination of these three factors thus constitutes the heart of the imperialist offensive in Southern Africa. (3)
There are around 360 American companies with investments in South Africa, mainly in the advanced technology sec-
Theirs investment comprises one fifth of all foreign investment in this country, putting them second behind British capitalists in the list of foreign
American banks have supplied one third of the foreign capital to which South Africa has turned to finance its imports in the last decade. Finally, the exchange of goods between the two countries makes the US the main trading partner of South Africa.
This situation has given rise to great complicity between the capitalists of the two countries, expressed particularly in the relations between the Reagan administration and the South Africa lobby in in the United States. Thus, John Sears,
Two years later, in 1966,
However, the UNITA military actions
This organisaFor this, UNITA enjoyed the After the battle of Luanda, dential campaign, became one of the main leaders of the South African pressure group in Washington, and a certain Don De Keiffer, who was a member of this group up to 1979, was eventually given a post within the Reagan administration and sent on a mission to South
It would however be wrong to contrast Carter's policies with those of Reagan on every point. But it is certain that since the latter arrived in the White House the "globalist' political conceptions, portraying every localised conflict as the result of Soviet manoeuvres and thus a factor in the East-West conflict, have been systematised and generalised.
Chester Crocker, deputy secretary of state for African affairs, in the Reagan
This is probably an offensive throughout 1 One Kes to account ae mo1 f a crisis within the Ethiopian regime and th withdrawal of the Cubans from Ogaden (southwith diplomatic toings and froings for a negotiated solution to
Sunday Times, South Africa, December 14, 1980
17
Adult literacy, an unresolved problem (DR) administration, has topped one explanation of this sort with another.
In Honolulu on August 29, 1981, Crocker explained to the Americar. Veting exercised in Africa by the USSR and its allies worries us particularly. The Soviets are trying to exploit the numerous differences rending Africa, as well as the conflict that is currently taking place — when they're not provoking new problems so as to be able to fish in the troubled waters....As the United States occupies the place of leader of the Western world, it owes it to itself to help Africa put in order a strategic context that is harmful to it.
As for Southern Africa proper, he explained the local situation and stated, 'the political basis necessary to introduce regional cooperatien is sorely lack-
The racial and ennic diversity of these peoples - added to the purely emotional behaviour in response colonialism and the domination of a white minority - constitute an obstacle to understanding between fellow citizens or neighbours? (5)
The United States is thus going to devote itself to encouraging such 'regional cooperation' and 'understanding be-
And its political orientation in pursuit of this has taken a dual form. One side is unreserved support for both the present negotiations between Pretoria neighbouring Angola and Mozambique. The other is backing the constitutional reforms within the Republic of South Africa. reforms are designed fundamentally to create the illusion of granting the vote to certain categories of non-whites, while in fact widening racial divisions. (6)
Such professions of faith go hand in hand with commercial interests. ican investment in South Africa increased by 13.3 per cent in 1981 alone and officially amounts to 2.6 billion dollars.
During this whole period the United
States facilitated loans to South Africa to help it out of a very serious economic crisis, due, among other things, to the drop in gold prices and a drop in world demand for minerals.
The South African debt amounted to 9.3 billion dollars at the end of 1981. But Pretoria got considerable aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, with the backing of Western banks, very large credits to help it get out of this difficult situation. This is frenzied borrowing, we have not seen the like since the beginning of the 1970s', wrote the South African journal Rand Mail on February 15, 1982, describing South African dominance
American aid is also given in the mili-
The American government encourages South through the transfer of technology. One example is the sale of a Sperry Univac 1100 computer to the Atlas Aircraft Company which builds military aircraft in the Republic of South Africa. Another is the sale of Control Data computers to
African research group that works for the army.
Reagan has tried to bend the rules setting a quota for direct sales of military material to this racist regime. Thus, in April 1982, for example, American government authorised the sale of 2,500 electrified truncheons for the use of South African police.
Finally, through the CIA, Washington to the reactionary UNITA movement of Jonas Savimbi. On May 6, 1980, Ronald Reagan answered a question about this: 'Let's be frank, I will give them arms [to UNITA]. nothing against someone who wishes to free themselves from the yoke of a foreign power, in this case the Cubans and East Germans. I don't see wouldn't give them arms for that.' (8)
Overall, this policy aims to strengthen the racist power and make it the decisive link in the resistance to the 'Soviet threat' in Southern Africa. In future, Washington will make the departure of Cuban troops a precondition for applying its so-called policy of pressure on South Africa to get it to recognise Namibian independence. Washington also gives aid with strings attached to the countries in the region, in order to persuade them to defer to their dangerous neighbour.
Dependence on South Africa on one side and the imperialist market on the other is a characteristic of all the neocolonial states of Southern Africa. These countries import a good part of their cereals from South Africa, the country through which they export their mining production. The dependence of these regimes on South Africa for foodstuffs goes along with a network of infrastructures completely oriented towards Pre-
Moreover, a slice of these neotoria. colonial economies, notably in the mining sector is partly the direct property of South African interests. This is the case, for example, for certain mines in Zambia and Botswana, while 20 per cent of the Gross National Product of Lesotho derives from the wages of 141,000 workers from this country employed in South
The weight of these dependent relations with South Africa has already made itself felt in the past through the moderating pressure of certain of these states during the struggles for national liberation in the region. Thus, Zambia several times assumed the role of spokesperson, or even the intermediar;, for the racist regime in Pretoria, during the diplomatic negotiations on the struggles for independence in Angola and Zimbabwe. It should also be said that this country has several times only avoided famine or revolt by importing cereals from South Africa at the last minute to offset its cereal deficit.
With the independence of the Portuguese ex-colonies and of Zimbabwe, South Africa tried to replace its former protective wall of Portuguese colonialism and the racist regime of lan Smith in Rhodesia, by creating a sort of regional 'common market' involving the most dependent states in the region.
themselves from this South African economic tutelage, several states (South African Development and Coordinating Conference) in 1980.
The objective of this association of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
USA-Document, US Embassy, Paris (retranslated from the French).
See International Viewpoint, No 46, February 13. 1984, on the proposed constitutional changes.
See Inizrnational Herald Tribune, March 31, 1983. However, the real figure for direct and indirect American investments could reach a much greater sum, estimated at 14.6 billior by the Washington Post of July 30, 1983. 8. Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1980. Retranslated from the French.
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, is to rationalise relations between these countries in order to promote a better integration of their resources and their infrastructures. But, to do this, the SADCC had to fall back on international capital. The score of industrial projects in operation. financed by Western countries represents the equivalent of 240 million dollars of financial involvement. And, under the pretext of seeking to emancipate the member states' economies from South African tutelage, this neo-colonial association supported by international — particularly European — finance, in fact emphasises the integration of these different economies into the world capitalist market.
Mozambique, therefore, has found itself specialising in the role of a transit port for the export of the regional mining wealth, and benefits from many Western loans for modernising its railways and ports. While that might for the time being have given Zambia a port on the Indian Ocean, freeing it from dependence on the South African ports - in fact it did not because of the numerous sabotage actions against the Mozambican communication network by the MNR - this would nonetheless not have radically transformed its dependent relations with the international capitalist system.
The European Economic Community (EEC), has also shown itself to be more attentive to the SADCC countries' requests for loans since Mozambique and Angola declared their intention to participate in the EEC-ACP agreements, the Lome Convention, to which all the other SADCC countries belong. Countries such as France, West Germany and Italy have a direct stake in playing a political card which could promote their interests in a zone where British and American capital is dominant. But the international economic crisis, the drought, the specific crisis of these states have all contributed to weaken this whole project and its International Viewpoint 4 June 1984 internal thrust towards autonomy from the South African economy.
On the one hand, the United States general policy on aid and loans is not favourable to such costly projects for redirecting economic development in the present business climate. And, on the other, the reduction of the American contribution to the International Development Association (IDA), subsidiary of the world Bank, along with American domination within the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, also make it a lot more difficult for the EEC to engage in 'autonomous' operations, particularly in a region with such complex geopolitical factors as Southern Africa. A serious failure for the Kremlin
Eager as they are to make lucrative investments these countries, the European governments do not have any great political capacity for putting across an alternative orientation to that of the United States. An indication of that is the Namibian affair, where the famous 'group of five' of the Western countries charged with conducting the negotiations for Namibian independence has now been resoundingly upstaged by the tripartite negotiations between Angola, South Africa and the United States on this question. Moreover, the French government has recognised the uselessness of participating in this 'group' and left it on December 7, 1983.
In the light of these events, there can be no doubt that recent events in Southern Africa, diplomatic and military, are directly related to the application of American strategy to which Mozambique and Angola have chosen to yield. These events thus come fundamentally within the context of a 'pax Americana' project for Southern Africa. They are only secondarily South African manoeuvres. In the popular neighbourhoods of Luanda (DR)
The Soviet Union has based its whole policy in Southern Africa on its relations with the countries it regards as progressive, and its support for the ANC in South Africa. The latter movement, which, among other things, engages in armed actions, is controlled by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and is aligned with Soviet foreign policy. It generally presents itself as the vanguard leadership of the South African people for its liberation, that is to say as a liberation movement.
On this basis, for a long time the ANC has been able to organise some of its actions from base camps in Mozambique and Tanzania especially. But, for the ANC as well as the Kremlin, the strategy they follow depends to some extent on the relations established with the regimes in these countries. The theories on the "progressive' or 'non-capitalist', or even 'revolutionary' character of the Angolan, Mozambican or Tanzanian regimes, only serve after the fact to consecrate the diplomatic, political or military relations that Moscow has established with these countries. Moreover, the Soviets have made no effort to analyse these terms, never going beyond quite vague formulations in their characterisations of these regimes.
As the economic crisis has speeded up, the process of political realignment in this region of Southern Africa, the Soviet leadership and, with it, that of the ANC, now have had to change their tune. Konstantin Chernenko, the Soviet leader, recently bitterly commented: 'By playing on the need of the South African peoples to live in peace and stability, the United States and certain of their allies are trying to impose their designs on the peoples of Southern Africa. But these peoples will see themselves whether the security of their states is now guaranteed against aggression from the Republic of South Africa' (9)
All those who, for the last ten years, have constantly emphasised the growth of Soviet influence in Africa, now have to draw a balance sheet of their method of analysis. There is no doubt that the Stalinist leadership has tried to go as far as possible in obtaining diplomatic positions in Southern Africa, without having to risk a real confrontation with imperialism. In fact, its strategy is simply that of adapting to the conjunctural aid needs of the bourgeois nationalist leaderships in the countries concerned. The Soviet leadership has never developed a policy that could favour the independent interests of the toiling masses in the whole region, masses who have been subject to the omnipotence of regimes which allow them scant possibility for autonomous mobilisation.
Soviet diplomacy today is paying the price for this orientation. The Soviet Union is probably going to lose some diplomatic support or other advantages it has gained. But it should never be for-
Le Monde, April 7, 1984.
19
gotten that the highest price will be paid by the popular masses of these countries. However weak their level of consciousness, the workers and peasants in these countries never got any help from the Kremlin's policy in understanding the real nature of their governments. In ten years of independence, the practical experience of these populations is not so much that the economy has remained under the control of the capitalist market, but that the regime's arrogance and bureaucratism grew with the blessing of the Soviets, with their military aid, and the presence of their advisors, those from Czechoslovakia and East Germany for example. It is undoubtedly the case that ten years of unconditional Soviet diplomatic support for these regimes have encouraged an anti-Communist sentiment among the
The Cubans have not totally escaped implication in this negative balance sheet either. Their intervention in Angola in 1975, alongside the MPLA and against South African troops and the reactionary UNITA and FNLA, was absolutely necessary to achieve the political independence of these countries. But, when the MPLA regime proved incapable of unifying the popular Angolan masses around policies which corresponded to their interests and, in particular, to resolve the agrarian question, the Cubans were left in a position where they had to remain for a prolonged period, to protect a fragile regime from UNITA. Doing this, they took the risk of becoming mired in Angola, without ever being able to stabilise the situation. A new situation
During the last ten years, the Cubans have also been content simply to praise the Angolan and Mozambican regimes. Today, there is more and more talk of preparations for the departure of Cuban troops from Angola. While the Cubans restated their positions on Namibian independence and South Africa in a joint communique with the Luanda regime, there is no doubt that the Castroist regime sees the latest events as a setback for its African policy. (10)
It would be particularly educative for the anti-imperialist movement if the Castroist regime would one day draw a sheet of its orientation Sending hundreds of African country cannot substitute for an internationalist policy of support for the peoples of these countries. place, this practice is coupled with unconditional support from the Cubans for the regime in power. Moreover, it is subordinated to the demands of supporting these regimes militarily.
In Angola, for example, the Cubans stood by without flinching when the Committees of Popular Power that arose during the Angola civil war were being
Nor did they balk at the National Union of Angolan
Frelimo supporters, building a new future? (DR) Workers (UNTA) being regimented and subjected totally to the aims of the MPLA leadership. They were witnesses to the repression of strikes, the growth of corruption and bureaucratic rottenness in an MPLA wracked by numerous internal struggles.
circumstances, could massive Cuban presence in Angola be seen solely as an 'internationalist' act against South African intervention? In any case, the Cuban military presence could only prevent the South Africans from pene trating too deeply into Angolan territory; it could not block their incursions altogether.
The explanation of the real economic crisis that the dependent economies of Angola and Mozambique are suffering from, and the military threats they face from nearby South Africa, are not sufficient today to explain the present evolution of the regimes that the Cuban leadership not so long ago was describing as 'revolutionary' . This is shown, among other things, by the example of the steadfastness of the Nicaraguan leadership which has mobilised the masses against imperialism. The difference thus resides in the different nature of the regimes in question.
All these political changes in Southern
Africa should not, however, lead any one to think that the South African regime can achieve victory in the class struggle in South Africa itself. The ANC is going to have to readjust its policy. is no evidence that Pretoria has been able to seriously undermine this movement, which retains big political influence within the country. For a majority of the oppressed people in South Africa there can now no longer be the least illusion in the Mozambican or Angolan 'model'
The 'armed struggle' preached by the ANC has at the same time lost a lot of its credibility, at least in its present form of raids organised mainly from outside of the country. On the other hand, the various factors are now converging to increase the weight of social struggles within South Africa. The most important of these are the battles being waged in connection with the rise of the independent trade-union movement and local community associations. All these movements have formed without external aid or influence. The new relations between the racist regime and the Angolan and Mozambican governments are hardly going to have any direct influence on them.
Paradoxically, at the moment when the Botha regime is full of optimism because it has scored a good point over the Soviet Union and the ANC, the mass movement in the country has never felt itself so powerful and determined to fight. And there is nothing to indicate for the time being that Pretoria's success in the field of foreign poliey is going to help it achieve any quick change in the domestic relationship of forces.
Thus, it is more necessary than ever to follow attentively the development of social struggles in South Africa and to ensure that the diplomatic recomposition going on in Southern Africa does not interfere with solidarity for the struggle of the South African masses. 10. The communique signed by Fidel Castro and the Angolan president Dos Santos reported in Le Monde, March 21, 1984.
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984