From independence to the agreement with Pretoria The constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique states that 'power belongs to the workers and peasants, united and led by Frelimo'. The third congress of Frelimo in February 1977 also made it clear that Mozambique has entered the stage of 'popular democracy...in which we socialise the means of production, we create and develop the essential forms of socialist property: state property and co-operative ownership... By taking agriculture as the basis, industry as the motor force and building heavy industry as the decisive factor, we will break definitively with poverty, dependence, and we will build an advanced economy in the service of the people'. (1)
Nothing in that corresponds to the actual facts. Neither from the point of view of the stage that Frelimo claims to have passed: the achieving of elementary democratic tasks such as real national independence, agrarian reform, improvement in the means of existence for the popular masses. Nor from the point of view of progress in the organisation, mobilisation and level of consciousness of the popular masses that such a proember 1981 for example, a purge of the army and security forces was carried out against 'enemies disguised as agents of the state' who mistreat the population.
The two major bones of contention within the ruling team are economic orientation and relationship with the
Eastern European countries. Each shift on these questions leads to a reshuffle of responsibilities in the top personnel. The defection of security chief Jorge Costa to South Africa in
1982 illustrates the depth of the political crisis within Frelimo, a major factor in which is the economic failures of the regime.
At independence, Frelimo nationalised the enterprises belonging to small and middle-sized Portuguese capitalists, as well as of imperialist firms that refused to continue activity under the new regime. The nationalisation of the land, hospitals and clinics, schools, investment property, funeral parlours and small processing plants did not mean taking control over the major share of local capital and production.
The initial distrust of imperialist investors and the size of the state sector (50 per cent of enterprises in 1978) formed a basis for relationships with the Eastern European countries. Economic and technical aid from these countries in return for diplomatic advantages (Maputo following the Moscow line) or material favours (fishing rights for the USSR) accompanied the departure of the Portuguese technicians and the starting up of bureaucratic economic projects.
Corruption, gigantic projects useless for local needs, authoritarianism (4), lack of motivation for the popular masses, combined with the maintaining of capitalist relations and imperialist investment in strategic sectors, would have precipitated economic failure. This was so even before the sabotage actions of the reactionary guerrilla forces of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) or natural calamities such as droughts and floods came to worsen the situation. (5)
A reorientation started in 1979 with the denationalisation of small commerce and a greater openness to foreign capital. A Mozambican official signing an agreement on railway cooperation with South Africa in February 1979 stated that 'We are businessmen. We have to find realistic solutions. Nobody should be surprised at this agreement. Maputo and Latola are the two natural ports for the Transvaal.' (6) 1. Report of the Central Committee to the Third Frelimo Congress, Harmattan, Paris, 1977, p. 50. 2. Speech by Samora Machel Organise the working class for a big production offensive', Maputo, October 1976. 3. Le Monde, April 28, 1983. 4. The forced gathering together of the rural population to which the so-called 'communityvillage' policy leads, like the recent 'Operation Production' consisting of the forced return of the unemployed from the capital to the country, or the re-establishment of the corporal punishments in force under colonialism, are examples.
21 cess would logically entail. Francois CAZALS
It was all the easier for the Frelimo rhetoric to be so radical as it bore no relation to the state of popular mobilisation or social relations. Mozambique's independence on June 25, 1975 did not give rise to a general eruption of social struggles, still less to a revolutionary situation. There were several strikes in spring 1974, usually limited to wage demands. The Mozambican proletariat, a good part of which was emigrant workers in the South African gold mines, did not even have similar experience to the Angolan proletariat, which in 1973 launched a general strike in Luanda.
During this period Frelimo followed a temporising course, most often falling back on the colonial forces to ensure good progress in the transfer of power. Thus, no significant element of an alternative proletarian leadership to the petty bourgeois nationalist current Frelimo, or of the self-organisation of the masses, emerged during the decolonisation process. Frelimo was able, without great difficulty, to impose its complete political hegemony over the mass movement and the state apparatus in construction.
From that point, the 'people's power' it claimed to stand for did not leave any room for the initiative and the autonomy of the mass movement. This 'people's power' was imposed from the top in order to structure the new state apparatus and organise the workers for production, in line with the bureaucratic methods inspired by the Soviet model.
Having refused to grasp the opportunity offered by the spontaneous strikes of spring 1974 to raise the level of consciousness and independent activity of International Viewpoint 4 June 1984 the proletarian masses, Frelimo then saw the mass organisations only as instruments to combat indiscipline at work. According to the established formula of the time, productivity was 'the barometer of the political consciousness' of the workers. (2)
From the outset, these structures (political ginger groups, production councils) were marked by bureaucratism and were more niches for careerists than factors in the self-organisation of the masses. In the successive balance sheets of the Frelimo leadership, moreover, they were criticised for this time after time. For example, the fourth congress of Frelimo in April 1983, was the occasion to note that certain cells of the party 'instead of working for the masses, close themselves up as if they were private clubs' , and to denounce those who 'enter the party to make their careers' . (3) Economic failure of the regime
In order to retain a certain contact with the mass movement, which was a specific feature of the Mozambican regime, the central leadership of Frelimo effectively engineered denunciations of the bureaucracy and the corruption of middle layers of the state and party.
Sometimes the purges reached the highest levels and the denunciations made by Samora Machel accused certain ministers. In 1978 the minister of agriculture was expelled from the central committee because of accusations of elitism, individualism, egoism, liberalism...
There were many settlings of internal accounts and ministerial reshuffles, sometimes lifting the veil which hid the authoritarianism of the regime. In Nov-
In March 1980, Samora Machel pleaded for the reestablishment of a hierarchy in the state sector, opposing the 'dispersal of power' and the 'constant practice of calling everyone "comrade"! (7) He launched an appeal to emigrant small industrialists, traders and farmers, assuring them of financial guarantees if they returned to Mozambique and insisting that: "There is a place in our economic development for the participation of other countries, international firms and foreign capital in general'. (8)
Mozambique made no secret of its interest in the EEC-ACP aid and commerce agreement between the European Community and 63 African Caribbean and Pacific countries, and Western investors once more became seriously interested in this country. (9) This economic reorientation was further emphasised during the Frelimo fourth congress MATTHA in 1983. (10)
The compromise reached with the Republic of South Africa cannot be judged simply as a realistic recognition of the unfavourable balance of forces in the region. This is because Frelimo has done nothing to help the evolution of the balance of forces in a favourable direction, by mobilising the masses against imperialism for example, as the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua has done.
The path to a real break with imperialism in the present conditions of Mozambique is indeed very narrow, but Frelimo never, at any point, tried to follow it. At the time of independence, when the state of mind of the masses would have allowed them to do so, the Frelimo leadership called for peace and accomodation. After that, without even recognising the workers rights to trade unions, it imposed an economic policy over which the workers had no control whatsoever. Changes in the orientation of this policy were also made in a completely bureaucratic manner. But no steps towards real independence were taken. The agreement with Pretoria
South Africa, principal trading partner of Mozambique, remained its main supplier. The port of Maputo, like the Mozambican railways, still works at 60 per cent with South Africa. For a country that specialises in railway and port services, this is enormous. There are South African technicians permanently employed by the firms that use the port of Maputo. The 45,000 Mozambicans that work in the mines of the Transvaal account for one third of Mozambique's foreign currency earnings.
Mozambique remains extremely dependent on South Africa for food, a dependence increased by recent bad harvests. Imported wheat comes from France or the United States, maize (200,000 tons in 1981) from South Africa. Rice, as well as fish, has to be imported. Agricultural products for 22
Samora Machel (DR) export (cashew nuts, cotton) are mainly sold to the West, and productivity has still not returned to pre-1974 levels. Until 1980 and the export contract with the USSR, Mozambique's sugar production was sold to the USA. The electricity from the Cabora Bassa dam (Portuguese property until 2014) is destined for South Africa and should cover 10 per cent of its needs, at a cost below that of production. The town of Maputo on the other hand, is supplied by this electricity repurchased from South Africa.
Many foreign companies, including sometimes even South African, have kept their interests in the country. They have interests in cashew nuts, cement production, or the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline to Zimbabwe, owned by the British firm Lonrho. Many Western countries have been active in Mozambique during the last few years. In 1983 Esso and Shell invested 60 million dollars in oil exploration.
Brazil participated in agro-industry projects in the Limpopo valley, an area where a programme for the socialisation of agriculture was put into operation by Bulgaria, which has since been largely dismantled. Italy is playing a leading role in the spread of Western technology in Mozambique.
The economic aspect of the agreement with South Africa, like the probable inclusion of Mozambique in the EEC-ACP agreement, will probably increase this economic, technological and financial dependence of Maputo. Commercial exchanges with South Africa are going to increase still further, particularly the use of the port of Maputo, with the construc5. The Mozambique National Resistance is a coalition of reactionary groups, financed originally by the Portuguese billionaire Jorge Jadim, supported by lan Smith's Rhodesia and then by South Africa, and recruiting among the former colonial military of Mozambique. It is trained and supplied by South Africa and, since 1980, operates particularly in the south of Mozambique. Its strategy is to sow terror and cause the maximum amount of damage to the Mozambican economy. One of its leaders, Orlando Cristina, since mysteriously murdered in South Africa, stated explicitly the goal of the MNR: It is a military and not a political organisation, which concentrates its efforts on overthrowing Machel. It is determined to liberate the Mozambican people from the Marxist oppression forced on it.' (To The Point, July 13, 1979).
According to Frelimo, Mozambique has lost since independence about 3.8 billion doltion of a mining terminal in 1985.
A well-informed bourgeois review recently noted that 'the possibilities of joint South
African-Mozambican investments in the port and tourist sectors are being studied, as well as the possible future creation of a
Mozambique-South Africa chamber of commerce. (11)
The South African firm Rennies has already proposed to build a tourist complex worth 40 million dollars. The multinational Lonrho has also proposed to invest in this sector.
with South Africa
The agreement represents a culminating point in the is evolution of the regime since independence. Nonetheless, it seems a good bet
S that this course will aggravate conflicts within the state and party apparatuses and give a new impetus to the process of social differentiation within the coun
S try, and poison relations with the Eastern bloc countries.
Far from putting an end to the politt ical crisis of the regime, the deal with
South Africa is likely to sharpen it. At the same time, however, it is unlikely that the popular masses, excluded from all these decisions, will enjoy a process b of political liberalisation similar to the present process of economic liberalisation. Perhaps to forestall future demands in this area, Samora Machel recently defined the role of the trade unions, g which are said to be in the process of formation in Mozambique. They are to be strictly instruments for organising production, substituting for the previous structures which no longer have any d attraction for the masses.
lars, 248 from the drop in South African trade.
1
568 million from the drop in the number of working in the South African
Mozambicans the cessation of
2,647 million from mines, a payment in gold of the miners' wages, and 333 from the attacks by the MNR and a million
South Africa.
Le Monde, February 28, 1979.
6.
7. Le Monde, March 22, 1980.
Cited by Demain l'Afrique, Paris, April
8.
7, 1980.
For an analysis of the EEC-ACP agree-
9.
ment see International Viewpoint, April 23,
1984.
10.
One of the directives adopted recommends a fusing economic mechanisms to stimulate insector, particularly vestment the private in e food stuffs'.
Another advises greater recourse a to 'foreign capital'.
. Le Monde, May 3, 1980.
11. Marches
Mediterraneens,
Tropicaux et
April 27, 1984.
1
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984
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