MOZAMBIQUE.
ember 1981 for example, a purge of the army and security forces was carried out against 'enemies disguised as agents of the state' who mistreat the population.
The two major bones of contention the ruling team are economic
From independence to the agreement with Pretoria orientation and relationship with the shift on these questions leads to a reof responsibilities in the top The defection of security chief Jorge Costa to South Africa 1982 illustrates the depth of the political crisis within Frelimo, a major factor in
The constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique states that
"power belongs to the workers and peasants, united and led by Frelimo'.
The third congress of Frelimo in February 1977 also made it clear that
Mozambique has entered the stage of 'popular democracy...in which we socialise the means of production, we create and develop forms of socialist property: state property and co-operative ownership...
By taking agriculture as the basis, industry as the motor force and build.
ing heavy industry as the decisive factor, we will break definitively with dependence, and we will build an advanced economy in the service of the people'. (1)
Nothing in that corresponds to the actual facts.
point of view of the stage that Frelimo claims to have passed: the achieving of elementary democratic tasks such as real national independence, agrarian reform, improvement in the means of existence for the popular masses. Nor from the point of view of progress in the organisation, mobilisation and level of consciousness of the popular masses that such a process would logically entail.
It was all the easier for the Frelimo rhetoric to be so radical as it bore no relation to the state of popular mobilisation or social relations.
independence on June 25, 1975 did not give rise to a general eruption of social struggles, still less to a revolutionary situation. There were several strikes in spring
1974, usually limited to wage demands.
The Mozambican proletariat, a good part of which was emigrant workers in the
South African gold mines, did not even have similar experience to the Angolan which in 1973 launched a general strike in Luanda.
During this period Frelimo followed a temporising course, most often falling back on the colonial forces to ensure good progress in the transfer of power.
Thus, no significant element of an alternative proletarian leadership to the petty bourgeois nationalist current Frelimo, or of the self-organisation of the masses, emerged during the decolonisation pro-
Frelimo was able, without great difficulty, to impose its complete political hegemony over the mass movement and the state apparatus in construction.
From that point, the 'people's power' it claimed to stand for did not leave any room for the initiative and the autonomy of the mass movement.
This 'people's was imposed from the top in order to structure the new state apparatus and organise the workers for production, in line with the bureaucratic methods inspired by the Soviet model.
Having refused to grasp the opportunity offered by the spontaneous strikes of spring 1974 to raise the level of consciousness and independent activity of
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984 the essential Neither from the the proletarian masses, Frelimo then saw ments to combat indiscipline at work. According to the established formula of the time, productivity was the barometer the political consciousness of the the outset, (political ginger groups, production councils) were marked by bureaucratism and were more niches for careerists than factors in the self-organisation of the masses. In the successive balance sheets of the Frelimo leadership, moreover, they were criticised for this time after time. For example, the fourth congress of Frelimo in April 1983, was the occasion to note that certain cells of the party 'instead of working for the masses, close themselves up as if they were private clubs', and to denounce those who 'enter the party to make their careers'. (3) Economic failure of the regime
In order to retain a certain contact with the mass movement, which was a specific feature of the Mozambican regime, the central leadership of Frelimo the bureaucracy and the corruption of middle layers of the state and party.
Sometimes the purges highest levels and the denunciations made ministers. In 1978 the minister of agriculture was expelled from the central elitism, individualism, egoism, liberalism...
There were many settlings of internal accounts and ministerial reshuffles, sometimes lifting the veil which hid the authoritarianism of the regime. In Novwhich is the economic failures of the
At independence, Frelimo nationalised the enterprises belonging to small middle-sized Portuguese well as of imperialist firms that refused to continue activity under the new regime. The nationalisation of the land, hospitals and clinics, schools, investment property, funeral parlours and small processing plants did not mean taking control over the major share of local capital and pro-
The initial distrust of imperialist investors and the size of the state sector (50 per cent of enterprises in 1978) formed a basis for relationships with the Eastern European countries. and technical aid from these countries in return for diplomatic advantages (Maputo following the Moscow line) or material
(fishing rights for the USSR) accompanied the departure of the Portuguese technicians and the starting up of bureaucratic economic projects.
Corruption, gigantic projects useless for local needs, authoritarianism (4), lack of motivation masses, combined with the maintaining of capitalist relations and imperialist investment in strategic sectors, would have precipitated economic failure. even before the sabotage actions of the reactionary guerrilla forces of the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) or natural calamities such as droughts and floods came to worsen the situation. (5)
A reorientation started in 1979 with the denationalisation of small commerce and a greater openness to foreign capital. A Mozambican official signing an agreement on railway cooperation with South Africa in February 1979 stated that 'We are businessmen. We have to find realistic
Nobody should be surprised at this agreement. Maputo and are the two natural ports for the Trans-
Report of the Central Committee to the Third Frelimo Congress, Harmattan, Paris. 1977, p. 50.
Speech by Samora Machel 'Organise the working class for a big production offensive, Maputo, October 1976
Le Monde, April 28, 1983. The forced gathering together of the rural population to which the so-called 'communityvillage' policy leads, like the recent 'Operation Production' consisting of the forced return of the unemployed from the capital to the coun
For the re-establishment of the corporal punishments in force under colonialism, examples.
21
In March 1980, Samora Machel pleaded for the reestablishment of a hierarchy in the state sector, opposing the 'dispersal of power and the 'constant practice of everyone "comrade"
(7) He calling an appeal to emigrant small launched industrialists, traders and farmers, assuring them of financial guarantees if they returned to Mozambique and insisting that: There is a place in our economic development for the participation of other countries, international firms and foreign capital in general'. (8)
Mozambique made no secret of its interest in the EEC-ACP aid and commerce agreement between the European
Community and 63 African Caribbean and Pacific countries, and Western in-
Samora Machel (DR)
export (cashew nuts, cotton) are mainly vestors once more became seriously inthe West, and productivity has terested in this country. (9) This econstill not returned to pre-1974 levels. Unomic reorientation was further emphatil 1980 and the export contract with the
MATTHA
USSR, Mozambique's sugar production in 1983. (10)
USA.
The electricity the from the Cabora Bassa dam (Portuguese property until 2014) is destined for
South Africa and should cover 10 per cent of its needs, at a cost below that of gion.
production. The town of Maputo on the other hand, is supplied by this electricity repurchased from South Africa.
sometimes even South African, have kept their interests in the country. They have interests in cashew nuts, cement production, or the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline to
Zimbabwe, owned by the British firm been active in Mozambique during the last few years. In 1983 Esso and Shell invested 60 million dollars in oil exploraaccomodation.
participated in agro-industry projects in the Limpopo valley, an area unions, where a programme for the socialisation of agriculture was put into operation by whatsoever.
Bulgaria, which has since been largely dismantled. Italy is playing a leading role
But no pletely in the spread of Western technology in taken.
The economic aspect of the agreement with South Africa, like the probable inclusion of Mozambique in the EEC-ACP
The agreement with Pretoria agreement, will probably increase this technological dependence of Maputo. Commercial ex-
South Africa, principal trading partner changes with South Africa are going to inof Mozambique, remained its main supcrease still further, particularly the use of plier.
The port of Maputo, like the
Mozambican railways, still works at 60 the port of Maputo, with the construcper cent with South Africa.
For a country that specialises in railway and port this is enormous.
There are services,
5.
The Mozambique National Resistance is a coalition of reactionary groups,
South
African technicians permanently inally employed by the firms that use the port
Jadim,
The 45,000 Mozambicans and then by South Africa, and recruiting among of Maputo.
the former colonial military of Mozambique.
that work in the mines of the Transvaal is trained and supplied account for one third of Mozambique's since 1980, operates particularly in the south of
Mozambique.
Its strategy is to sow terror and foreign currency earnings.
cause the maximum amount of damage to the
Mozambique deremains extremely
Mozambican
Orlando Cristina, since mysteriously murdered
South
Africa for food, a pendent on in dependence increased by bad the MNR:
recent
*It is a military and not a political which concentrates its efforts on harvests.
Imported wheat comes from organisation, overthrowing Machel.
France or the
United
States, maize erate pression tored ple o The Point
(200,000 tons in 1981) from
South
July 13, 1979).
Rice, as well as fish, has to be
Africa.
According to Frelimo,
Mozambique has imported.
Agricultural products for lost since independence about 3.8 billion dol-
22 tion of a mining terminal in 1985. A well-informed bourgeois review recently noted that 'the possibilities of joint South African-Mozambican investments in the port and tourist sectors are being studied, as well as the possible future creation of a Mozambique-South Africa chamber of commerce. (11)
The South African firm Rennies has already proposed to build a tourist complex worth 40 million dollars. The multinational Lonrho has also proposed to invest in this sector.
The agreement with South Africa represents a culminating point in the evolution of the regime since independence. Nonetheless, it seems a good bet that this course will aggravate conflicts within the state and party apparatuses and give a new impetus to the process of social differentiation within the country, and poison relations with the Eastern bloc countries.
politdeal with it. At unlikely b ( g any lars, 248 from the drop in South African trade. 568 million from the drop in the number of Mozambicans working in the South African mines, 2,647 million from the cessation of payment in gold of the miners' wages, and 333 million from the attacks by the MR and South Africa. 6. Le Monde, February 28, 1979. 7. Le Monde, March 22, 1980. 8. Cited by Demain l'Afrique, Paris, April 7, 1980.
For an analysis of the EEC-ACP agree ment see International Viewpoint, April 23, 1984. t 10 One of the directives adopted recommends 'using economic to stimulate in- a vestment in the private sector, particularly food stuffs'. to 'foreign capital'. Le Monde, May 3, 1980. Another advises greater recourse a 11. Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens, April 27, 1984.
International Viewpoint 4 June 1984