International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Spanish State: EEC Membership Means Disaster for Spanish Workers

· International Viewpoint No. 51, 23 April 1984 · pp 10-13 · 3,653 words

Spain European Union France

Versión en castellano: E. Español/CEE: En el último vagón, del último tren (Inprecor n.º 37, marzo-abril de 1984)

EEC membership means disaster for Spanish workers The positions of the EEC and the Spanish state on the latter's membership in the Common Market are quite different. The EEC looks at this question in the context of the grave internal tensions it is experiencing, serious imbalances in the productive sectors, the pressure of unemploy. ment today and the immediate disadvantages that Spanish membership will entail for some countries.

Thus, for the EEC bringing the Spanish state into the Common Market, aside from all political considerations, will create upsets and problems of no secondary importance. However, for the PSOE government in Madrid headed by Felipe Gonzalez, integration into the BEC is an essential point in its historic program, and it is prepared to stick to it at any price.

In recent months, mainly as a result of a change in the attitude of France, the outlook for Spanish membership in the EEC has brightened, after many years of half-frozen negotiations, stalling moves and obstacles of all sorts. This shift at the moment has a political significance, since France is no longer opposing the process. But the process of integrating Spain into the EEC can only be concluded by an agreement to which the conditions posed by the EEC seem a formidable barrier.

What is proposed is to sign the agreement next September 30, so that integration into the EEC can begin on January 1, 1986.

However, these dates are out of line with the scope and diversity of problems that have to be dealt with. They are unrealistic moreover in view of the attitudes and tensions existing in the EEC. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the integration of the Spanish state into the EEC will proceed at the tempo these dates suggest.

In any case, the change in the attitude of the EEC and of France is marked, and this raises the question of what reasons prompted this turnabout. With-

WITH THE EEC

Imports Exports Balance

6.1 4.7 - 1.4

6.5 6.0 - 0.5

9.2 8.9 0.3

10.5 10.3 0.2

9.3 8.8 - 0.5

9.9 9.4 - 0.5

9.4 9.6 0.2 out entering into deeper and more complex speculations, it has to be admitted that if the EEC is better disposed today to Spanish membership, this shift has to be seen in connection with the pressures brought to bear by the PSOE government, which is trying to sell Spain's staying in Nato at the highest possible price, by linking this question to full integration into "The West."

Even though all aspects of the negotiations are the subject of polemics and dispute, the problem of agriculture for good reasons stands out as one of the knottiest, since the EEC is burdened by agricultural surpluses, which are a serious drain on the Community's budget. And Spanish agriculture is very strong and highly competitive. This creates tensions that have concrete effects most specifically on French farmers. Spanish membership in the EEC would increase the Community's arable land by 30%, the number of agricultural workers by 25%, and the number of farms by 31%, while it would increase the number of consumers by only 14%. Moroeover, Spanish consumers have incomes markedly lower than the European average.

The EEC's proposal, in its general lines. calls for dividing Spanish production into two big categories. On the one hand, there is fruit and vegetables, which hold

International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

Jesus ALBARRACIN and Pedro MONTES

Given these two contradictory positons te mostly perspecies brad tions, the most likely perspective is that the integration of the Spanish state into the EEC will involve a long and tortuous process of discussion, fraught with tensions and filled with pitfalls. In all likelihood, Spanish capitalism will have to offer very costly deals and quid pro quos.

With the exception of the far left, all the political and social forces in the Spanish state support integration into the EEC. The historic isolation and economic backwardness of Spanish capitalism, as well as the memory of the time when the Common Market was closed to the Franco dictatorship, provide motivations for the "pro-European" sentiment of Spanish society. The result is that no political or social force wants to appear opposed to it.

However, as soon as it becomes clear in the negotiations what costs this involves, what sectors will be hit, what compromises are necessary and what risks have to be run, profound social disaccords will arise, as well as resistance to joining the EEC. It can be said that the prevailing opinion in nongovernmental circles favorable to entry into the Common Market is "membership, yes, but not at any price."

There are reasons for this position. On the one hand, people know about the stiff conditions for joining the Common Market. On the other hand, Spanish capitalism has a very weak industrial structure to face European competition. Finally, it has to be taken into consideration that the present framework of relations between the EEC and the Spanish state has proved rather favorable to the latter.

In fact, the trade agreement signed in 1970 has permitted a considerable expansion of Spanish exports to the EEC, in particular in the industrial sphere. 10

This has gone so far that in 1983, for the first time in history, the Spanish state had a favorable trade balance with the EEC. (See Tables I and II.)

TOTAL Imports Exports Balance 1977 17.8 10.2 - 7.6 1978 18.7 13.1 13.1 - 5.6 - 5.6 1979 25.4 18.2 - 7.2 1980 34.2 20.8 - 13.4 1981 32.2 20.5 - 11.7 1982 31.5 20.6 - 10.9 1983 29.1 19.8 - 9.3

This accord involved a very substantial lowering of the EEC tariff barriers (55% on the average), while the Spanish state maintained very strong protectionist measures both in the form of tariffs and import quotas. (Spanish tariffs were reduced on the average by 26%, but from a much higher level.)

Today, the EEC takes almost 50% of Spanish exports. For consumer goods, the figure rises to 63%. Some 61% of energy exported goes to the EEC, and 54% of agricultural products.

Imports from the EEC amount to a third of Spanish exports in general and two thinds in the case of producers goods. Trade in industrial products remains favorable to the EEC, but the picture of Spain as fundamentally an exporter of agricultural products to the EEC is not confirmed by the facts, even if the EEC dominates trade in all products given their value by sophisticated industrial technology.

Agricultural products - mainly fruit, market-gardening products, wine and canned vegetables - represent no more than a fifth of Spanish exports to the EEC. On the other hand, raw materials and industrial products (mainly automobiles, shoes, automobile spare parts, tires and organic chemical products) account for 70%.

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE SPANISH STATE

(in billions of dollars)

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE SPANISH STATE

(in billions of dollars)

an important place in Spanish exports to the EEC, and which are highly competitive. In this case, integration into the EEC is to be in two stages. In the first, REd ic to ho in to codoc In tha firet which is to last four years, these products are to be left out of the deal. Trade in them will be in accordance with thirdcountry agreements. In a second phase lasting six years, they will be slowly brought into the Common Market framework, subject to reservations with respect to prices and the level of production. The second category includes all other products (with a few exceptions). These will be brought within the Common Market framework in accordance with a "classical" pattern of transition. This would involve lowering tariffs to make them equal on both sides, but there would continue to be a constant watch on this trade.

The subsidies for various products, which are too numerous in Spanish agriculture, would be adjusted to eliminate any inequality that could introduce distortions into the market. Moreover, for specific products, such as wine and vegetable oils, when Spanish integration into the Common Market would swell into the Common Market would swell the Community's surpluses to excessive levels, concrete agreements will be necessary. Such agreements will be aimed mainly at securing drastic reductions in Spain's productive capacity.

This proposal has been assessed very negatively by Felipe Gonzalez's government and the PSOE, as well as by the other political parties and economic sectors concerned. The Spanish plan therefore is to reject the preliminary phases or stages projected for fruit and vegetables, and to conclude an agreement that sets in motion a general process of slow integration into the Common Market, while leaving open room for discussing safeguards and precautions. It involves, moreover, refusing to let the full burden of readjustments in European wine production be placed on the Spanish producers. Fishing war

Fishing is also an area where the problems are very acute. The Spanish fishing fleet amounts to about 70% of the Community's total fishing fleet. And any accord would inevitably involve paralyzing or destroying a substantial part of the Spanish fleet. The EEC wants, in fact, to prolong the present system of licences until 1992, and it envisages no further increases in the quotas for catch imposed today. On the other hand, the EEC is demanding that the Spanish state abrogate the bipartite agreements it has made with other countries, which cover almost 25% of the Spanish fishing industry.

Spanish industry is used to a high level of tariff protection and is less competitive than that of the EEC. It will suffer from the effects of the customs union represented by the Common Market. In this regard, the negotiations have so far produced the following results: International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

THE FOREIGN TRADE OF THE SPANISH STATE IN 1983

(in billions of dollars)

Total

%

Amount

Total

29.1

100

Agricultural

3.8

13

Products

Energy

11.6

40

Raw Materials and Semimanu-

6.8

23 factures

Consumer Goods

1.7

6

Producers Goods

5.1

18

% of GNP

18.4

Total

19.9

100

Agricultural

3.3

17

Products

Energy

1.8

9

Raw Materials and Semimanu-

7.5

38 factures

Consumer Goods

3.8

19

Producers Goods

3.5

17

% of GNP

12.5 a) Elimination of tariffs

There is an agreement on eliminating tariffs between the Spanish state and the

EEC over a transitional period. But there is no agreement on the length of this period, nor on the speed at which tariffs are to be eliminated.

b) A common tariff against "third countries"

Since January 1981, the Spanish state has observed rules laid down for tariffs by the EEC, and an accord already

EUROPE

CONSE

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+ +

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EUROPE

COUNCIL

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Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (DR)

IMPORTS

EEC EEC% of total Amount % 9.4 100 32 0.8 8 20 0.9 9 8 DIES 3.6 38 53 0.9 9 50 2319 3.3 35 64 5.9 109 EXPORTS

9.6 100 48 1.8 19 54 1.1 11 61 2.9 2.9 30 38 2.4 25 63 1.4 15 42 6.0 exists for adopting the EEC tariffs. This agreement will go into force in conjunetion with the dismantling of the Spanish tariff system in force for commodities subject to tariffs more than 15% above those of the EEC and, from the time Spain is admitted to the Common Market, for commodities on which the duties are below this ceiling.

c) Trade quotas

There is an agreement on eliminating quotas for imports from the EEC, as well as on establishing a transitional period for quotas on exports of ten products (certain kinds of color TVs, tractors and seven textile products).

In addition to all these trade mechanisms, Spanish industry can also be affected by the elimination of subsidies, the adoption of the Value Added Tax, and the freedom that will be extended to industrial concerns in other EEC countries to set up plants on Spanish territory.

Integration into the EEC can, however, offer certain advantages for Spanish industry. One such that should be noted is increasing trade with countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Mediterranean countries that today have agreements with the EEC. Spain could benefit because in general it would face lower tariff barriers in these countries than it does today.

Other possible advantages that may be envisaged are the following: the lowering of costs for raw materials (which will result from the fact that the EEC tariffs are lower than the existing Spanish ones), and the opening up of European markets for the multinationals established on Spanish territory (such as General Motors,

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Ford, etc.) and for advanced technology sectors.

But in general, integration presents serious difficulties for an industrial structure such as that in the Spanish state, which is not very competitive.

From the standpoint of foreign trade, integration into the Common Market will have some important repercussions. It will boost imports from the EEC coun tries (the 1970 accord is better for Spanish industry than the integration that is to come and from third countries. This will result from the lowering of tariffs and the ensuing liberalization of trade, as well as from the trade agreements signed by the EEC, which will then have consequences for Spanish industry. As for exports, those going to certain areas of Latin America may be negatively affected, since the tariffs applied to the Common Market are higher than those presently accorded the Spanish state. And the existing trade accords with Spain will not be continued after it is integrated into the EEC. All this will bring on a decline in Spanish foreign trade, thereby putting pressure on the balance of payments and giving rise to new pressures for devaluing the peseta. Industry threatened

Thus, exposed to foreign competition, Spanish industry will suffer more than it will gain from the customs union with the EEC. What is more, competition on the Spanish internal market is also going to sharpen because European products will enter without the handicap of tariffs. Spanish industry will no longer be able to count on the enormous subsidies that it enjoys today, and so forth. Finally, the elimination of trade barriers will facilitate the integration of European production processes in Spanish industry, in the sense that each stage of production will be done in the country where the costs are lowest. This could have particularly grave consequnces for some branches of Spanish industry. What change for Spanish workers? (DR)

The sectors in reconversion pose still other problems with respect to integration into the Common Market. In steel, the Spanish state specialized particularly in the production of steel for export. In fact, while internal demand has been declining, exports have grown, going from a million tons in 1974 (9% of domestic steel production) to 6 million tons in 1980 (45% of domestic production). Given the import quotas currently set by the EEC, more than 80% of these exports go to markets outside the Community. This could change drastically after Spain joins the EEC. It is obvious how much of an interest the EEC has in the restructuration of the Spanish steel industry, to see that its existing productive capacity is reduced.

In the case of the textile industry, there are less problems. But the Spanish textile industry will gain no substantial advantages. Both Portugal and the Spanish state are major exporters of textile products. But Portugal is more of a threat to the EEC, because Spain's efforts to specialize in high-quality products limit the possibilities for massive exports to the BEC.

As regards shipbuilding, while the industry in the EEC drastically needs renovation, the Spanish industry is relatively modern. It has no need to cut capacity in order to adjust to decreased demand. Spanish membership in the Common Market will swell the EEC's shipbuilding capacity by 25%. This will also have negative repercussions on the Spanish industry, because 90% of the parts suppliers are small Spanish firms. This contrasts with the Greek and Portuguese shipbuilding industries, which have to import these produets. With integration, the Spanish state will have to lower its protective tariff barriers and as a result it risks seeing the disappearance of this sub-contracting industry.

Considering this picture, it is not surprising that the employers have taken the position expressed by the chairman of their association, Ferrer Salat, that is, "Yes to the EEC, but not at any price." in dore, sut drawn up views of the still A document drawn up in 1981, and still ployers on integration.

On the dismantling of Spanish tariff barriers, the bosses demand a transtional period of "no less than ten years," in which the process is to proceed at an even rate in order to avoid pitfalls in the negotiations. And they want a "security clause" to apply to imports of any products from the EEC that start to grow too rapidly. As for quotas, the bosses want a procedure similar to that applied to tariffs, but after a transitional period.

Regarding the more important aspects of the other problems, the positions of the employers are as follows: freedom of movement of labor and capital to Spain following membership, a reasonable waiting period for setting up plants, deregulation of the Spanish labor market, delay in imposing the VAT, and introduction of the latter in conjunction with a cut in employers' contribution to social security, and so forth. Grim future for workers

As is obvious, this amounts to a body of demands clearly designed to assure better protection of Spanish industry during a transitional period. But it also represents an attempt to take advantage of Common Market entry to gain certain historic demands of the bosses, such as an easing of regulations governing the labor market and reduction of employers' contributions to social security.

As is indicated by what we have just written, integration into the EEC will profoundly shake up the productive structures of Spanish capitalism. In agriculture, it should lead to cutting pro. duction, eliminating surpluses, and at the same time to a process of capitalization and concentration that runs directly counter to the agrarian reform demanded by the rural workers, who still make ed by the rural workers, wno still make up a considerable proportion of the economically active population. In the case of industry, the basic sectors will have to make major cuts in their productive capacity. And, in general, it will be necessary to undertake a process of adjustment and incorporating new technologies in order to meet EEC competition.

Leaving aside the question of how harshly and rapidly these transformations are carried out under the pressure of the EEC's imperatives, they coincide with the economic program of Felipe Gonzalez's government, which calls for "modernizing the economic system and putting it in order." Since taking office, this government has turned its back on the PSOE's timid election promises and imposed a very severe austerity policy. At the same time, it has set in motion a program of industrial reconversion aimed fundamentally at cutting productive capacity and increasing the productivity and profita-

International Viewpoint 23 April 1984 vierte en lo tuyo

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bility of the sectors concerned. (1)

It can be said that from the outset, therefore, that the economic policy of Felipe Gonzalez's government has been oriented in the direction required by entry into the BEC, and the perspectives that have apparently opened up today will only result in increasing the brutality of this economic policy, under the pretext and cover of the EEC's demands.

For Spanish workers, the tightening of this policy ensuing from Common Market entry will have disastrous effects on wages, social benefits, jobs and job security. But the severity of these blows can only be appreciated when you consider the conditions the Spanish workers face. Their average wage amounts to just over 50% of the average wage in the EEC. Social benefits are starkly inadequate, as shown by the following figures:

The average pension amounts to only 70% of the legal minimum wage, which itself is set at a ridiculously low level (the equivalent of about 230 dollars a month). Average employment benefits are only 60% of the minimum wage, and only 28% of the jobless get these benefits. As for unemployment, the official figures already estimate it at 2.5 million persons, which amounts to no less than 19% of the economically active population, as opposed to 11.2% for the European countries belonging to the OECD (Organization for Economie Cooperation and Development).

If the workers have to endure more austerity to compensate for the onslaught of EEC competition, if the level of unemployment is sent plummeting by this dismantling of production sectors and boosting of productivity, then the future looks very bleak for the working class - unless the workers can force the PSOE to modify its plans. Up until now, this government has shown an unrelieved brutality and insensitivity to the social consequences of its policy.

This insensitivity may lead the PSOE into making a very great historical error if it continues to push its policy with the same intensity. The deterioration in the living standards and working conditions of Spanish workers has reached the point where the potential for social explosion should not be underestimated.

Obviously, we cannot make mechanical projections that such an explosion will inevitably occur and lead to a solution favorable to the workers. But it is clear that the objective conditions for clear that the obiective conditions for this are building up.

The big workers parties in the country and the majority in the Workers Commissions (2) are favorable to the integration of the Spanish state into the EEC. This is a major obstacle to achieving one of the fundamental objectives of the Spanish workers, which is precisely to prevent this incorporation into the Common Market. 1. Cf. Inprecor, IV's French language sister publication, No 163, December 19, 1983.

The country's largest trade-union confederation, dominated politically by the Communist Party and splinter groups from it. International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

IRELAND

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