International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

EEC: No Honour Among Thieves but They Stick Together

· International Viewpoint No. 51, 23 April 1984 · pp 6-10 · 4,353 words

European Union Britain and Ireland France Germany

Versión en castellano: Funciones y límites del Mercado Común Europeo (Inprecor n.º 38, junio de 1984)

No honour among thieves but they stick together Since the onset of the twentieth century, the productive forces developed by capitalism have periodically rebelled against the nation-state, as well as against the private ownership of the means of production. Twice, the bourgeoisie has sought to resolve this conflict in a violent way, through the world wars that began in 1914 and 1939. The objective purpose of these wars was to try to create room for one dominant imperialist power (British, German or American) to unite under its sway a much broader sphere than that of the market represented by any nation-state, a unified domain in which capital could be invested and draw profits unhindered.

These two attempts failed. The European Economic Community (EEC) set up in 1958 after the signing of the Treaty of Rome is the first attempt by the imperialist bourgeoisie in Europe to achieve the same end without wars, essentially by collaboration on the basis of negotiations. Ernest MANDEL

(repression) is not sufficient, save in a period of open civil war. It is necessary to get the exploited to accept the general framework of their exploitation as legitimate.

For this purpose, in normal times, the "national" tradition of the hourgeois state and the legitimacy of the institutions of bourgeois democracy play an essential role. To replace these institutions with European ones ("gimmicks," to paraphrase de Gaulle) takes time, a lot of time. There is a marked desynchronization between the tempo of the internationalization of the productive forces, the emergence of supranational institutions of the European Common Market type, and the rate at which broad popular layers - including bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements, as well as the less conscious sections of the working class — are coming to identify with these institutions.

The bourgeoisie is not ready to give up a relatively effective instrument of power in exchange for a new one that has yet to be tested. This is the main reason for the slowness in setting up the machinery of European unity on the political level.

However, there are other factors. There is not only the desynchronization between economies and polities. There is also a desynchronization between the trend toward internationalization of the productive forces and the organizational forms of capital, of the capitalist firms themselves. In every member country of the Common Market, as in the US and Japan, moreover, the bourgeoisie is not homogeneous. It takes the form, rather, of a conglomerate of four elements:

- Multinational corporations producing surplus value in several countries. These are more and more predominant. But this is a relatively recent development. They nowhere hold absolute sway.

- National trusts (monopolies) producing surplus value still essentially in one country

- Small and medium-sized non-

International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

The historic cause of this change in method is the growth in the sector of the world wrested away from capitalist domination in the aftermath of the second world war. The antagonism between the capitalist countries and the workers states became too deep, the risk of additional vital parts of the globe falling out of the sphere of capitalist domination too great, to permit the new interimperialist wars that Stalin in his last days was still proclaiming "inevitable." Inter-imperialist competition continues to operate but within what has proved to be a lasting alliance against all the non-capitalist forces throughout the world.

However, the contradiction between the extent of development of the productive forces and the "national" realm of each imperialist power is more acute than ever. What can no longer be settled by war must, therefore, be resolved if not by consensus, at least by constant bargaining. This led to the attempt to build the Common Market. It was, moreover, only a first experiment in the context of a general tendency. As long as capitalism sur vives, this experimentation may be ex tended to other continents.

Japanese imperialism, unable to hold onto its "East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" (that is, its new colonial empire) after the second world war, is now seeking to create a kind of common market including South Korea and Taiwan, or even the ASEAN countries. Within American imperialism, some groups aim - at least historically — to create a common market embracing Canada and Mexico.

This in no way means the realization of Karl Kautsky's dream of a "superimperialism" organizing the world market peacefully. lo the contrary, every one of these "common markets" would be designed essentially for trade warfare, for 6

The gang of thieves assembled (DR) sharpened competition with all the others. In the longer run, they would prepare the way for a war against the workers states to reconquer the space that capitalism has lost in these countries.

All that such common markets mean is an attempt to make a group of bourgeois states into a basis for interimperialist competition, rather than each one of them continuing to try to compete on its own.

The main obstacle to carrying out such schemes is social and political in character (and ideological, as well). What a common market really means is a new federation of old states, that is, a new supranational federal state. However, the bourgeois state is not just a means for upholding the economic interests of a ruling class. It is also an instrument of social and political power, a means for upholding and reproducing the domination of capital over the workers.

In order for the bourgeois state to play this role effectively, simple violence

monopoly corporations. While these are only junior partners of the monopolies, they still control a not unimportant part of the production of surplus value. They dominate at the two ends of the industrial chain, in the technologically backward sectors, and in the advanced technology sector. In the latter sector, where the risks remain great, the monopolies commit themselves only after the little people have blazed the trail, and often lost their scalps in the process.

The nationalized sector, the top levels of which are being integrated into the bourgeoisie, if they were not recruited from it at the start.

Of these four components, only the multinationals have everything to gain economically and nothing to lose from the emergence of supranational states. Every other sector of the bourgeoisie runs the risk of losing the benefits of protection and subsidies. They are hesitating to enter into the stepped-up competition that flows inevitably from the widening of the market.

Since this risk is compounded by the political and social risk that the ruling class as a whole has to run, including the multinationals, and since the relationship of forces within each bourgeoisie is constantly changing without any one of the four components being able to bring the others to heel, this lack of economic homogeneity within the European bourgeoisie is another major obstacle to making the qualitative leap forward to economic and political integration of Europe.

When the capitalist economy is expanding, every partner in a capitalist business can get a part of the cake. The same is true for every faction of a "national" bourgeoisie. It is also true for every partner in an "international" bourgeois enterprise. Fighting for survival

Of course, even in a period of expansion competition continues. Some gain morc than others. Some grow stronger at the expense of others. But in general everything is rosy for all of this charming society as long as capitalist property prevails. Thus, the golden age of the Common Market was its first decade, 19581968. The period 1968-73 represented the period of transition.

When the economic crisis erupted, and especially when it took the form of a prolonged depression, competition became fierce. For many capitalist firms, the crisis has posed the question of life or death. They face bankruptcy. This applies both to the multinationals and the "national" trusts, as well as the small and medium business. "Every man for himself" is more and more becoming the rule. What goes for capitalist firms also goes for "national" bourgeois classes and their states. This is why for the Common Market the long economic depression means a long phase of crisis and challenges. International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

If the simple correlation between depression and stepped-up competition were all there was to it, the Common Market would have already disappeared, as a lot of people in fact predicted it would. But it has survived, even if it has become prey to numerous ills. The fact is that the effects of the crisis on the European capitalists are considerably more complex than they might seem at first glance.

While the crisis is sharpening the competition within Europe and thereby obstructing the pursuit of European economic integration, it is also and above all sharpening competition on the world market. And on the world market, the American and Japanese multinationals can rely on states and economic spheres of operation" with a far greater weight than that represented by any of the European imperialist powers taken separately.

Thus, maintaining and reinforcing the Common Market becomes an essential material condition for the big European firms, including some "national" ones, to hold their own against increased American and Japanese competition. Moreover, when the multinationals, both

Short Lexicon of the European Economic Community (EEC) The Six

The countries that founded the Common Market - West Germany. France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. The Ten

The Six plus Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Greece. The Institutions of the EEC a) The European Council of Ministers, the meeting of heads of government which holds the real power in the Common Market. Since de Gaulle, the rule of unanimity has been applied, on which now Britain in particular relies.

b) The European Commission, which is called up to manage "EEC affairs" independently of the Council.

c) The European Parliament, a purely consultative body. The only power it has is to vote on the EEC budget proper. The BEC Budget a) Revenues

- Levies imposed in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy - 1 percent of the income from the Value Added Tax in every member country. This provides about 16% of the total budget.

b) Expenses

Aid to farmers (about 75% of spending). - Aid to disadvantaged regions and sectors. - Administrative expenses. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)

There are unified prices for agricultural products in the Common Market. Countries that import such products from "third countries" at lower prices have to pay the difference into the EEC, which distributes this money as subsidies to farmers.

This protectionist policy has led to the piling up of enormous unsaleable surpluses, which are sometimes stockpiled and sometimes destroyed (dairy products, fruit, wine, etc.)

Now production ceilings are being set in some spheres, with penalties for coun tries and businesses that exceed them. These threaten to fall in particular on coun tries and Sectors in which small farmers predominate, such as Ireland in the first instance (with regard to dairy production) and cattle raising in the second. The European Monetary System (EMS)

The fluctuation of exchange rates is limited to a 2.5% shift in either direction by means of central bank intervention and even reciprocal loans (Britain does not participate).

The first, still hesitant step toward creating a common currency for the Common Market, the ECU (European Currency Unit), was introduced in 1979, replacing the UCE (Unite de compte europeenne - European Accounting Unit), which was instituted in 1975. The ECU is still only an accounting unit and not a real currency. The EEC has neither a central bank nor currency reserves of its own. The ECU is issued for internal usage to the countries that signed the December 1978 currency accord that gave rise to the EMS. The ECUs held by the central banks of the nine countries concerned (the Ten, minus Greece) are issued to them in return for their depositing 20% of their gold and dollar reserves in the accounts of the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation.

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European and extra-European, are on the rise and the relative strength of the workers movement has not been broken by the depression, the individual "national" imperialist states seem singularly ill-equipped to play their allotted role of cushioning the shock of the crisis. This is in contrast to their performance on the eve and in the aftermath of the second world war, when they fulfilled this function under the most diverse political forms.

In view of the gravity of the economic crisis, the European bourgeoisies need a more effective anticrisis instrument. There is no objective possibility for getting anything else, at least in the medium term, in Europe than a European bourgeois federation. The idea of a "world state" is only an empty dream.

For all these reasons, the impact of the crisis on the Common Market has not led to its breakup, to its disappearance pure and simple. The result rather is that it has been "blocked" at an intermediary stage between a mere free-trade zone and a new supranational federal state. This in fact is exactly what we predicted. Nothing in the events of recent months offers a basis for reassessing this forecast. Balance sheet of the EEC

To understand the reasons why the Common Market has become "blocked" halfway on the road to real economic and alical interation cape rese political integration of capitalist Europe, have to look at the nature of the changes that have taken place within the Euro. pean bourgeoisies over the past quarter of a century.

In other words, we have to draw a balance sheet of the projects that have been accomplished and of the hopes that have come to nothing, the hopes aroused in the bourgeoisie and among its ideologues by the birth of the Common Market. This accounting has to center around what is fundamental for the bourgeoisie. what Is fundamental for the bourgeoisie, that is, its ownership of the means of production (in the economic and not just the legal sense of the term) and the power to decide on employing the machinery and labor that this involves.

In the sphere of finance capital, there has been genuine success. Substantial progress has been made in integrating the banking systems of the Six (and to a lesser extent, the Ten). The financial market has been Europeanized, as evidenced by the role of Luxembourg as a center for issuing European loans. The market for Euro-Dollars has lost all "national" character. (1) "Common" opposition to American and Japanese finance capital has increased, with the Swiss and Canadians occupying an intermediate position.

On the military level, integration has made spectacular advances. There is no longer any "national" arms industry, except for small arms. That is, the production of airplanes, tanks and artillery has been internationalized in Europe. There are no longer any essentially "German," "British," "French" or 8

"Italian" heavy weapons. All such arms are produced in common. In a nutshell, this is a drastic change by comparison with the situation in 1939 and 1945, to say nothing of 1914.

In the sphere of industry, there has been very widespread disappointment. The hope that the Common Market would stimulate the interpenetration of capital, giving rise to more and more firms like Dunlop-Pirelli and FIATCitroen, has to a large extent failed to materialize. Some new firms of this type have emerged, such as PhilipsGrundig recently. But this is far from being the predominant trend.

Moreover, there are also as many examples of associations between European firms and American or Japanese multinationals as between "European" firms themselves.

As regards so-called North-South relations, the EEC has emerged as a neocolonialist force (the Lome Accords, Lebanon, etc.)

Finally, in the field of agriculture, integration has run into a total impasse. Nowhere has a North American type agribusiness emerged, with a sphere of activity (production) extending across the territory of several "national" states. European capitalist agriculture remains confined to relatively small surfaces, even if landholding continues to become more concentrated.

Today the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) no longer looks like a transitional institution geared to opening up the way for real concentration in capitalist agriculture. It seems rather to have become a durable system serving to protect an uncompetititve agriculture on the world market. As a consequence, it has become the Achilles Heel of European capitalist integration, the occasion of a succession of crises.

Now all the conflicting forces in the picture have to be labelled as "national," "sectoral" or "political special interests.

In the case of West German imperialism, over the past 25 years capital accumulation has become much more dependent on foreign markets. The share of exports in the Gross National Product has grown from 15 to 33%. And the Common Market represents West Germany's main outlet. Therefore, it is determined to maintain it at any cost and is ready to pay the bill. It is the main source of financing for the EEC which in reality has become a disguised form of subsidizing West Germany's big export industries. Which countries benefit?

Likewise, the Benelux countries and Italy have seen the importance of the Common Market grow greatly as the main outlet for their exports. Some 70% of Benelux exports go to the EEC. Since they are much less competitive than the West German ones on "third markets," they cherish the EEC as the apple of their eye. For these countries, the collapse of the Common Market would be a real economic catastrophe.

British imperialist interests are deeply divided in their attitude to the Common Market, which explains moreover why Britain joined so late, only in 1973. Those sectors of the economy traditionally oriented toward former British colonial possessions and the Commonwealth, as well as those most closely associated with the US, were the most reticent.

The most modern sectors of industry were the most favorable to the Common Market. Today, this division continues to run deep both in the bourgeoisie

Euro-Dollars are dollars belonging to either non-Americans or Americans deposited in non-American banks in Europe.

CFDT (France) contingent on European-wide 35-hour week march (DR)

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SELBE PROBLEME | SELBEk

ROSL-MеC1 MEME CL

International Viewpoint 23 April 1984

as a whole and in Margaret Thatcher's Italy, Ireland, Greece and Denmark than scored some points - is advanced tech

Conservative Party. Nonetheless, one gets the impression that The City [high finance], which is more powerful under Mrs Thatcher's governemnt, is saving "yes," even if only a "yes, but... " to Europe.

There remains the base of French imperialism. It has gone through the most spectacular flipflop. Under the government of General de Gaulle (19581969), the Common Market was accepted only on a lot of conditions - priority for the Common Agricultural Policy, unanimity in decisions, ete. Then under the governments of Georges Pompidou, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and, subsequently, Francois Mitterrand, the "yes, but" became a "yes" without reservations.

The historical trend is clear. In 1975, 25% of French exports went to its Common Market partners. Today, it is more than 50%. Over the last 25 years, the weight of agriculture in the French economy, and hence of the rural bourgeoisie in the ruling class, has steadily declined. Paris is no longer prepared to sacrifice the interests of the future of vital sectors of industry in order to get immediate advantages for its big grain and sugar-beet growers. Of course, this does not mean that it is not the small farmers specializing in animal husbandry who are called on to make the main sacrifices. So, there is an almost totally solid Franco-German, or rather, Franco-German-Italian bloe in defense of the Common Market against Margaret Thatcher's obstruction.

The failure of the European Council meeting in Athens last December and then of the meeting in Brussels in March were above all the result of fighting over relative pennies. (2) Because of its massive agricultural imports from "third countries" outside the EEC, Great Britain is obliged to pay large contributions to the EEC budget. It demands reimbursal of about three fourths every

The principle of the rebate is accepted, as is its approximate size. A minor difference remains. Margaret Thatcher is demanding £750 million (around a billion dollars), and her partners are prepared to pay £600 right away.

Behind this wrangle over megapennies, there is a question of principle. Margaret Thatcher would like to block any progress by the Common Market institutions toward more advanced economic, financial and political integration. She would like to consolidate the principle of a right of veto over EEC decisions and the rule of unanimity. In that respect, she is the heir of de Gaulle's policy, just as Britain today stands in the position of the "weakest great power" that was formerly occupied in the EEC by France. (4) She would like eventually to get rid of the Common Agricultural Policy. Here she is already coming into conflict more with International Viewpoint 23 April 1984 with France or West Germany.

However, in this tug of war, Britain is in a weak position. Its partners know that the price that they would pay for maintaining the Common Market without Britain, or even if membership were reduced to the Six, would be less than Britain would have to pay for breaking with the BEC.

Margaret Thatcher's defiance, moreover, lasted only a week. The failure of the Brussels European Council meeting means in the first instance that for the moment London is not collecting the £600 million rebate promised. On March 21, 1983, in the House of Commons, Margaret Thatcher threatened to stop paying the EEC duties on agricultural products imported by Great Britain from "third countries." That was an open violation of the Treaty of Rome. Her European partners retaliated by announcing that in that case they would continue to operate the EEC without Britain. The City of London got Mrs Thatcher to think again.

In fact, the European conference in Brussels marked a strengthening rather than a weakening of the EEC. There was a solid front of nine countries. Everyone agreed to an increase in the share of taxes going to EEC revenues. This will rise from 1 percent to 1.4 percent of the income from the Value Added Tax in every country, and subsequently go up to 1.6%. On the other hand, these two increases are insufficient to achieve a real expansion in the activity of the EEC. Everyone but Britain agreed to reconsider the unanimity rule in the EEC Council of Ministers, if only by stages. What explains this?

Over the last years, the European imperialists have lost ground in the competition with American and Japanese imperialism. The deterioration in the position of European capitalism in the leading sectors over the recent years stands out clearly in the two following tables.

But the game is far from over. The decisive area - aside from the sphere of finance capital, where European unity has

Table 1 Share of the World Market for Electrical and Electronic Equipment (%) 1978 1981 Japan 22.9 26.8 US 22.6 23.9 EEC 29.8 22.9

1981 1981 (Annual production (Number of in number of units) robots installed) Japan 5,231 11,000

US 2,129 8,130 EEC 1,459 4,017 (four main countries)

nology. In this respect, the verdict is brutally clear. Agnelli, chairman of the board of FIAT, put it categorically -on its own, Italy can only finance a second-rate technology. The same could be said fundamentally for France, Britain and West Germany.

On the other hand, if you combine the financial, technological and scientific strengths of the main European powers, the situation changes completely. Joint enterprises requiring an advanced technology, such as Airbus (air transport) and Ariane (space and telecommunications) have been successes. For the technology of the day after tomorrow, the Common Market is developing the ESPRIT program, a gigantic scheme for building a thermonuclear reactor called JET, and a program for building an optical computer that would work many more times rapidly than electronic computers.

The decline of British imperialism and the "deindustrialization of Britain" (which is temporary) reflect the incapacity of the middle-sized imperialist powers to keep up with competition in the advanced fields, which now affect key sectors of the world market. If they were left to rely on their own inadequate national resources, West Germany, France and Italy would follow Britain i into decline. In joining together, they have no assurance of winning the game, but they have at least a chance. The realization of this very important fact by the big European monopolies has saved the Common Market, despite all the pressure of the crisis and competition.

It is a sign of the times that despite all the denunciations about the cost of old white elephants and the magnitude of Britain's budget deficit, already before the Brussels summit, Margaret Thatcher paid up the two billion francs needed to get the Airbus flying. This is a joint French, German and British enterprise. It is one thing for her to try to polish up her somewhat tarnished popularity at home and reinforce her reputation as the "Iron Lady." But the historical interests of the British bourgeoisie are something else again. Ultimately they will prevail.

The pressure of the crisis, stepped-up competition, the rise of protectionism and sectoral conflicts are still operating. They will continue to weigh on any new advance in European integration. Thus, the fundamental features of the situation have in no way changed. 2. See Inprecor, IV's French sister publication, No 163, December 19, 1983.

For the year 1982, Britain demanded a rebate of 10.2 billion francs on the 13.6 billion franc British contribution to the EEC budget. The nine other partners in the Common Market. agreed to reimburse 5.1 billion. The final agreement, after bargaining, was around 7 billion francs, or about half the British contribution to the EEC.

It was France that pushed through the so-called Luxembourg compromise in 1966. This is a precedent that a member state of the EEC can demand that a decision can be taken only by unanimous vote when it involves a vital interest for the state concerned. In March, the Irish minister of agriculture, Austin Deasy. resorted to this procedure to negotiatite a special status for his country during the discus sion on dairy production quotas.

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SPANISH STATE_

← EEC: For an Anticapitalist Alternative! For a Socialist United States of Europe! — Appeal of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International · Spanish State: EEC Membership Means Disaster for Spanish Workers →

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