International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Southern Africa: Mass Response to New Racist Constitution

· International Viewpoint No. 46, 13 February 1984 · pp 18-23 · 6,360 words

Africa Racism and fascism Trade unions

Mass response to new racist Constitution

The new constitution adopted by parliament in September was put to the vote in a referendum of white voters, the only South Africans with the right to vote in this racist republic. Some 2.7 million are registered to vote in a total white population of more than 4 million.

The proposed new constitution, destined to replace that of 1909 inherited from British colonial rule, projects a presidential system, and the partial and separate involvement of representatives of the 'Indian' population of one million, and the 'Coloured' population of three million state institutions, through separate parliaments in a three-chamber political structure dominate 26 milhon Africacon inuing the total exclusion of

This new constitution aims to break up the formation of a common front for mobilising non-whites. It attacks nothing in the racist conceptions that form the very basis of apartheid. The proposed new Koornhof laws concerning the residence conditions for blacks in 'white zones' testify to the maintaining in essence of the policy of segregation, although the racist government would like to stabilise a layer of black workers in the white zone to satisfy capitalist industry's need for a workforce. (See box)

The November 2 referendum approved the constitutional proposals of the ruling National Party (in power since 1948) by a majority of 65.96 per cent. However, this figure is not without ambiguitites. In the general election of April 1981 the National Party received 57 per cent of the votes and an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats, 131 of 165. The split of the most conservative wing in March 1982 took 17 parliamentary members. This new current, as the Conservative Party, called for rejection of the government's proposals. (2)

Botha succeeded in gaining some of the votes of the traditional supporters of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) a formation that represents the sections of employers regarded as 'liberal', mostly English-speaking, the best known of whom, magnate Harry Oppenheimer, called for a 'no' vote for the governmental proposals.

The fundamental ambiguity in these results is in the exact significance for the white community of the vote for the new constitution. Should this be seen as the acceptance, by a part of the liberal electorate, of a first breach in the fortress of apartheid? Or more simply a reaffirmation of the determination to exclude some 25 million 'Africans' from all political rights while giving limited rights to 3 million 'Coloureds' and 1 million "Indians'? Or is it a combination of the two?

There is a symmetrical ambiguity about the meaning of the 'no' vote. Are these 33.3 per cent of the white electors opposed to the reforms as too many or too few? Or is this again a combination of these two reactions?

These results allow Botha to present himself in the eyes of the white community as the only solution because there is no other credible alternative to ensure their continuing interests, and to promote his policies as the only ones that can prevent unity among the blacks of Southern Africa as a whole and an uprising that would destroy the racist regime.

This meets the needs of those imperialists who were pressuring him to adapt the apartheid system to current economic reality and to their interests. The satisfaction of the White House at the results bears wit-

During the referendum the prime minister Pieter ness to this.

Nathan PALMER

The November 2 constitutional referendum took place in an economic climate rendered gloomy by the repercussions of the international recession. For specific reasons, this has come late to the Republic of South Africa (RSA) by comparison with the rest of the industrialised capitalist world. This gap comes from the role of gold, of which the RSA is the primary producer in the capitalist world, with 75 per cent of its production. As the tried and tested commodity for speculators -particularly since the break-up of the international monetary system established at Bretton Woods - gold for a time protected the South African economy from the crisis.

The maintenance, at least partially, of imperialist investments on the one hand, which rose in 1981 to more than 30 thousand million rand - practically half of their total in Black Africa (3) - and the 18 role of the armament sector on the other, have also delayed the onset of the crisis. (4) These specific elements could also lead to an earlier economic upturn. In fact, there is no exact synchronisation between the economic evolution of the RSA and the imperialist countries on which it depends.

Inflation has dropped slightly, but in June it still reached 12.4 percent. The South African Reserve Bank glimpses signs of a recovery, linked to the beginning of the upturn in the United States. The balance of payments was in deficit by 7,100 million rand, equivalent to 9 per cent of the Gross Domestic Produet, in the first quarter of 1982. By the last quarter of the year it had achieved a surplus of 1,100 million. But the rate of utilisation of productive capacity remained unchanged. The employers organisation for the metal industry (SEIFSA) stated that there was 'no manufacturing recovery yet. Capacity levels remain at some 30 per cent below normal production levels with no turnaround seen until the first quarter of 1984' (5)

Perhaps this is what made the financial supplement of the Cape Sunday Times splash the headline 'For the average South African the worst is yet to come' on August 21, 1983. For this newspaper, the financial situation of the 1. At birth every individual is classified according to the official racial categories, white, Indian, Coloured or African. The term black' used by the opponents of apartheid, groups all three of the latter categories and thus has a political content. 2. The extreme right parties, the Hertstige Nasionale Party (HNP) and the Conservative Party on the one side, and the Progressive Federal Party and the other liberal organisations on the other, each represent about 20 per cent of the electorate. 3. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1981. 1 US dollar equals 1.2 rand. 4. Defence spending in the 1982-83 budget totalled 2.668 billion rand - representing 24.33 per cent of the budget, and 3.36 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982. 5. Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, September 5, 1983.

International Viewpoint 13 February 1984

ordinary person, which already worsened by 50 per cent in 1982, is going to get worse because of governmental policy that has allowed 'consumers to believe that economic conditions have really improved'.

In this economic context there has been a significant growth in unemployment. Official statistics give the grossly falsified figure of 469,000 unemployed among the black population, and a more realistic figure of 18,177 white unemployed. These figures illustrate flagrant inequality because they represent 9 per cent of the economically active black population, and 0.3 percent for whites, that is thirty times less, while the white working population is only 3.5 times smaller than the black.

Some 7 million blacks live and work in mining or urban zones among which are included the townships such as Soweto, which has more than one million inhabitants. These employment statistics are thus deliberate and gross falsifications because they exclude all the black South Africans arbitrarily attached to the bantustans, the pseudo-independent black states — Transkei, Venda Bopuhutatswana, Ciskei - in which the rate of unemployment is much higher.

These official statistics are so unserious that many specialists in their own estimates use a margin of between 1.5 and 3 million unemployed, that is 13 to 27 per cent of the active population. The most worrying statistic is that given by the director of the economic research office at Steelentbosh University, Attie de Vries, who states that unemployment grew by 66 per cent between 1981 and 1982.

Thus, there is nothing at all surprising in the fact that job loss has been at the root of many disputes in the sectors most hit by unemployment (metalworkers, textiles, cars, ete.) which are also the sectors in which the independent trade-union movement has grown most over the last few years. (6) There is a two-fold test of strength between the independent

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NET NIE - BLANKES International Viewpoint 13 February 1984 unions and the employers. While the employers want to adapt their production equipment to the needs of the economic crisis, the union movement is confronted with a real test after several years of uninterrupted growth and development. This context of social confrontation is moreover one of the objective factors pushing the independent unions along the road to united action and the formation of a single workers confederation. However, to achieve this objective would mean that the present differences on the type of federation and its method of functioning would have to be overcome. (7)

Confronted with the government's proposals on a new constitution, the independent unions showed determined opposition.

It was not possible to create unanimity amongst the white electorate on the proposal to create a President's Council (PC — see box). Imitating the type of publicity campaign that accompanied the victory of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, the National Party used full-page advertisements in the press to call for a 'yes' vote in the referendum, with such ingenious slogans as 'South Africa against South Africa? November 2 is the most critical day in South African history'. Moreover, this brought on accusations that the National Party was using public funds for a campaign whose estimated cost was 3 million rand. Coloureds, Indians reject proposals

The PFP concentrated on an oppositional parliamentary campaign rather than mobilising its electoral base. This primarily English-speaking party represents certain sections of the big financial and industrial bourgeoisie. In the first rank of these is Harry Oppenheimer who still controls, although he is no longer president of, the giant Anglo-American group which alone holds 56 per cent of the stock quoted on the Johannesburg stock exchange. (8) The PFP which proposes simply modifying the apartheid system, refuses to recognise the right to universal suffrage, summed up in the slogan 'One man, one vote. It thus contented itself with denouncing the aspects of the government's proposal that it judged 'repugnant' ', that is the excessive powers given to the president of the president's council, and through him to the National Party, in these structures of continuing racial segregation.

This battle was also limited by the adoption of a guillotine motion by the parliamentary group of the National Party, fixing a limit to the parliamentary debate on this question. That means that certain controversial points in the constitutional changes proposed by Pieter Botha's government were adopted without debate. Such a procedure had not been adopted since 1963.

In addition, some of the English-speaking press of South Africa which usually share the opinions of the PFP were opposed to its call for a 'no' vote.

Tolets

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White Tollets Below The Financial Mail, the Sunday Times and Finance Week called for a vote for the "New Deal' proposals of Pieter Botha. Even within the PFP electorate a majority said in July that they intended to vote 'yes', , and the referendum results clearly demonstrated this shift in voting patterns. (9) However, the PFP could not give up its opposition to the proposals without risking complete capitulation to the National Party.

As for the extreme-right formations, Jaap Marais' Herstigte National Party (HNP) considered the proposed constitution as the 'starting point' for a black majority government, while Andries Treurnicht, the former National Party MP, suspended in March 1982, and now leader of the Conservative Party, accused the National Party of wanting to deny the right to self-determination of the whites.

The prime minister's attempt to woo sections of the Coloured and Indian populations to associate themselves with his projects achieved only a limited success. In fact, it provoked active opposition on a scale unprecedented since the 1950s. Only the Reverend Alan Hendrickse's 'Coloured' Labour Party decided at its January 4, 1983, conference to accept the government's proposals. This confirmed its definitive break with the rest of the oppressed masses who were then left in no doubt as to its collaborationist nature.

This could only stimulate mobilisation, particularly in the local and resi-

Cf International Viewpoint, No 8, June 7, 1982.

International Viewpoint, No 31, May 30, 1983. 8. Robin McGregor's study Who Owns Whom? reveals that seven companies control 80 per cent of the stock quoted on the Johannesburg stock exchange: Anglo-American, Sanlam, Barlow Rand, Anglo-Vaal, Rembrand, Liberty and Old Mutual. 9. 9. According to the poll carried out for the According to the poll carried out for the Afrikaans journal Rapport, and cited in the Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, September 2, 1983, 46.2 per cent 'yes' against 43.8 per cent "no'.

19

The Koornhof proposals on right of residence for blacks in 'white' zones

Officially called the 'Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill' , the Koornhof proposals concern blacks' right of residence in urban zones. Twenty-five per cent of blacks live in urban areas and between October 1976 and December 1981, 8 million of these lost South African national-, ity and were given that of a bantustan. These laws signify new governmental arrangements falsely presented as a loosening of segregationist legislation in the area of right of residence.

Present legislation recognises the right of blacks to stay in town without having to prove that they have accomodation. For this they have to have been born and lived all their lives in town, to have worked there for ten years or to have had a residence permit for 15 years.

The Koornhof proposals would replace these categories by that of Permanent Urban Resident (PUR) which takes in all the people who already have rights under the conditions outlined above and those who have a 90-year lease in a township, if they are citizens of the RSA or an 'independent' bantustan, South African citizens who have lived in town for 10 years (which excludes those who have been deprived of South African nationality) and finally, persons born in towns whose parents are classified as PUR.

For other blacks, the majority, it is illegal to be in town at night, even in a private dwelling, between 10 pm and 5 am without authorisation and without accomodation. During the day they can be in an urban area but not look for work. For that they have to go to the employment office in the area in which they live. This decreases the supply of jobs because the authorities want to encourage the employment of workers classified PUR only. They can ask for a visitors permit for a period of no longer than 14 days per year.

The sanctions against those contravening the laws are:

for authorising a non-PUR to reside under one's roof a 500 rand fine or 6 months in prison and 20 rand per day of continuing contravention;

identical sentences for those illegally in an urban zone between 10 pm and 5 am or looking for work there;

- giving work to a person in an irregular situation is punishable by a 5,000 rand fine or 12 months in prison.

dents associations, religious or student groups of the Cape region - a favoured residential zone for Coloureds - who came together around total rejection of Botha and the National Party's proposals.

This movement developed mainly at the initiative of local associations such as the Federation of Civic Associations and the Cape Housing Action Committee (CAHAC). According to the FRA Civic News the Federation has organised several mass meetings to protest against the President's Council proposals: 'Rejecting the proposals as racist because they funetioned within the Group Areas Act and racial classification, and undemocratic because of the qualified franchise, it urged people to boycott any elections and referenda designed to implement the proposals. It put forward as a non-negotiable demand a full franchise for all South Africans and one undivided South Africa nation with no homelands.' (10)

CAHAC stated that it rejected the PC proposals on the grounds that they did not abolish the Group Areas Act, they excluded Africans, they advocated a qualified franchise and that the central government would be concentrated in the hands of a few people in the executive. It saw the PC proposals as a reaction by the government to the growing unity among Coloured, Indians and African people. It demanded a unitary system with one man-one vote.' (11) 'All rights here and now'

The Indian' community also rapidly demonstrated its opposition to the government's proposals. During the election for the South African Indian Council (SAIC) the rebuff was clear. This collaborationist structure created in 1964, was at the start composed only of members appointed by the racist regime. In 1974 its membership was increased to 30, half of whom were to be elected by local Indian authorities.

Thus, those who supported collaboration with the apartheid regime elected each other. Since 1978, the government has concocted a new reform intended to 20

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### SPORTSMAN LAGN

The will warmell, Les beer give a semblance of credibility to this structure, in order to set up the future Indian' parliamentary chamber. Every person classified as "Indian' over 18 years old, and permanently resident in South Africa, including in the homelands, is legally obliged to register as an elector. Official sources estimate that 80 per cent had done so at the beginning of 1981.

In 1982, representatives were to be elected for Natal (the main residence zone for "Indians'), Transvaal and the Cape. Opposition to this new masquerade brought about the formation of the Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee (TASC 10. FRA Civic News volume 1, number 7 Athlone, June-August 1982, quoted in Survey ...1982. 11. An unpublished working paper by CAHA quoted in Survey...1982. 12. The Freedom Charter was adopted on June 26, 1955, by the People's Congress, that is the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People's Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Congress of Democrats thus comprising the three organisations representing the non-white 'peoples', the trade union that is linked to them and an organisation of liberal whites. The Charter constitutes a democratic platform around axes such as the abolition of restrictions on the ownership of land for racial reasons, stating that all land should be redistributed among those who work it. This was around members of the former Transvaal Indian Congress — a member of the Congress Alliance and signatory of the Freedom Charter proposed by the African National Congress. (12)

A big electoral boycott campaign was launched which was very successful -average participation in the vote was less than 20 per cent. While the rate did reach 40 per cent in one Natal constituency it fell to 1.75 per cent in the Fordsburg constituency in Transvaal, a member of SAIC since 1968. The TASC campaign also allowed supporters of the Congress Alliance to re-form the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC).

Supporters of non-racialism often criticise the decision to continue using organisations defined according to the racial criteria established by the apartheid system. They refuse to divide the oppressed into 'Coloured' ' "Indian'

, or "African' and favour bringing together the black masses, in the sense of the non-white masses. On the other hand, within the organisations based on the apartheid system's criteria of racial distinction, petty-bourgeois layers have greater weight. Thus, behind this debate on the national question it is the debate on the class nature of these organisations that is well and truly taking shape.

The new launch of the TIC took place during the TASC congress in Johannesburg in January 1983. It was significant in several respects. First, by the public reaffirmation of the 'Charterist' current defending the Freedom Charter (13). conceived as the basis for an inter-class alliance charged with carrying out the tasks of the democratic revolution, or rather a 'democratic evolution', without ever defining the methods to be used in achieving this aim. The traditional ideas of the Stalinist current incarnated in the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) which is dominant in the ANC, can be seen in this. •13. '[We] hereby declare for all South Africans and the world to know that the struggles of the past 25 years have convinced us that the only viable alternative to the present exploitative and repressive system is one based on the principles of the Freedom Charter.' From the final declaration of the TASC congress, quoted in Grassroots volume 4, number 1, February 1983, the Cape.

International Viewpoint 13 February 1984

Second hu the arestor neominanad of can. Second, by the greater prominence of sections of the churches in general, and the Dutch Reformed Church for Coloured (NGS) in particular, who had until then kept aloof from organisations opposing apartheid. Finally, by the call for the formation of a United Democratic Front (UDF) against the government's constitutional proposals.

The structure of the Reformed Church remains faithful to the structures of apartheid. The main one, the Dutch Reformed Church, has branches (known as Daughter Churches until 1982) in the manner of the integrated trade unions. These were the NGS mission for the "Coloureds', the Reformed Church of Africa (RCA) for the Indians', and the Dutch Reformed Church of Africa Dutch Reformed Church of Africa (NGKA) for the 'Africans'.

One of the main figures of the NGS and, as will be seen, of the UDF, is Allan Boesak, director of the Bellville Mission on the Cape. He was one of the founders of the Alliance of the Black Reformed Christians of Africa on October 27, 1981, at Hammanskraal. This alliance was to serve as a stepping stone for his election, in August the following year at Ottawa, as president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, and where he would denounce apartheid as a heresy against the Evangelists. The NGS decided to affiliate to the South African Council of Churches (SACC), whose secretary is Bishop Desmond Tutu, although it is a minority within it.

But Allan Boesak is not content with battles with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. He also occupies a key position in the alliance and the structures advocated by the 'Charterist' current. During the TASC congress, denouncing the decision of the Coloured Labour Party, he called for rejection of the government's proposals to install a President's Council, and concluded his speech with words, 'All, here, and now', signifying the demand for 'All of our rights for all South Africans, here in a united South Africa, and now is the time? (14)

This was also the conclusion of his speech at the central launch meeting of the UDF on August 20, 1983, at the Cape. During his remarks he criticised those "black or white who depend upon economic exploitation and human degradation to build their empires' '. (15)

On June 25 Allan Boesak also took part in a tribute paid to Canon Calata, a member of the ANC since 1930 and a former member of its National Executive Committee, who had just died. Concerning his presence at the UDF launch the Cape Times wrote, 'He was clearly the man 6,000 people came to hear and see. Although he is one of the UDF patrons and not a member of the executive, he appears to be one of the major forces behind the anti-government grouping' (16)

The change in position by this branch of one of the most reactionary and antiCommunist churches demonstrates two things. First of all, the crisis of the political domination of the apartheid system International Viewpoint 13 February 1984 and all the institutions organised according to its principles. Secondly, the desire of certain specific social sectors not of the working class to have an effect on the broad movement that is developing, and not remain marginal to the development of political opposition.

The project TASC developed in January 1983 — to create an umbrella body of local organisations intervening in all sectors of the mass movement - was outlined in the following terms: "To fight the PC proposals, our people must come together in a broad front. A front means the coming together of all organisations in our communities. To become part of this front, organisations must believe in creating a non-racial South Africa; they must accept the need to unite in struggle with all South Africans, irrespective of race, who belive in the struggle for a free South Africa' (17) Launch of the UDF

The high point of this initiative was a rally of several thousand people at the Cape addressed by Archie Gumede, son of a former president of the ANC and president of the Free Nelson Mandela Committee (ANC leader in life imprisonment), as well as Allan Boesak. Archie Gumede was elected president of the UDF together with Oscar Mpetha (released on bail) and Albertine Sidulu (wife of another ANC leader imprisoned with Mandela). The other speakers were Thozamile Gqwetha (president of the South African Allied Workers Union -SAAWU), Helen Joseph, former secretary of the South African Women's Federation, and representatives of the Islamic Judiciary Council and the Natal Indian Congress.

Among the other organisations participating in the UDF, the white students organisation NUSAS, and the groups representing 'Coloured' sections such as the Western Cape Traders Association should be mentioned. Even though they do not constitute the active wing of the

UDF the presence of these forces has a particular significance. Along with the weight of the Churches, their presence gives the UDF a hybrid social nature.

The big coverage given to the creation of the UDF by the liberal English-speaking press has relegated the initiative of the National Forum Committee held in May at Hammanskraal near Johannesburg to second place. This assembly was initiated by the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) (18) and personalities such as Bishop Desmond Tutu and Neville Alexander. The NFC, whose manifesto is substantially more radical than that of the UDF, is to hold its next convention at Easter 1984. (19)

However, the show of strength in the launch of the UDF and the press coverage it got should not give the impression that all the mass organisations in the Republic of South Africa are already united behind its banner. There are still many associations, particularly in the Cape region, such as those close to the FRA or to the South Africa Council of Sport (SACOS) that are organised on a non-racial basis and are opposed to the regime, which have remained outside this movement.

But one also notices the absence, most importantly at the national level, of the non-racial and independent workers union organisations. Apart from the SAAWU, whose membership has been eroded by the severe repression, particularly from the Ciskei authorities, only the 14. Grassroots id. 15. Cape Times, August 23, 1983. 16. Cape Times, August 22, 1983. 17. Grassroots id. 18. The political heirs of part of the black consciousness movement, a section of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) has evolved towards a class understanding of oppression in the Republic of South Africa. It is the only political organisation of the black consciousness tradition that has a national implantation. 19. 'Our struggle for national liberation is directed against the system of racial capitalism which holds the people of Azania in bondage for the benefit of the small minority of white capitalists and their allies, the white workers and the reactionary sections of the black middle class.'

21

The new constitutional proposals The constitutional arrangements submitted for the approval of the white electorate in the November 2 referendum included:

- A president of the Republic who would combine the functions of head of state and head of government. The president would be elected by an electoral college of 50 whites, 25 Coloured and 13 Indians appointed from among the majority parties in Parliament, and all members of the President's Council. The president chooses the cabinet, formed by 25 members of the President's Council. The president is not responsible to Parliament and can dissolve it.

The cabinent is composed of parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians who govern with the president and deal with major laws.

- The President's Council decides what is in the competence of Parliament and what is only within the competence of the president and his council. The council will play an arbitrating role. Its decisions are final and beyond the courts. Its composition will be 42 per cent 'president's men'. . Among the parliamentarians will be 33 per cent whites, 17 per cent Coloureds and 8 percent Indians.

Parliament will have three separate chambers: the white House of Assembly (divided between the National Party, the Conservative Party and the FPF), a Coloured House of Representatives (with particularly the Labour Party represented) and an Indian House of Deputies. These two last chambers replace respectively the Coloured Representative Council and the South African Indian Council. The president is responsible for black affairs.

The new constitutional proposals The constitutional arrangements submitted for the approval of the white electorate in

- A president of the Republic who would combine the functions of head of

The president would be elected by an electoral college of 50 whites, 25 Coloured and 13 Indians appointed from among the majority parties in Parliament, and all members of the President's Council. The president chooses the cabinet, formed by 25 members of the President's Council. The president is not responsible to Parliament and can dissolve it.

The cabinent is composed of parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians who govern with the president and deal with major laws.

The President's Council decides what is in the competence of Parliament and what is only within the competence of the president and his council. The council will play an arbitrating role. Its decisions are final and beyond the courts. Its composition will be 42 per cent 'president's men'. per cent whites, 17 per cent Coloureds and 8 percent Indians.

Parliament will have three separate chambers: the white House of Assembly (divided between the National Party, the Conservative Party and the FPF), a Coloured House of Representatives (with particularly the Labour Party represented) and an Indian House of Deputies. These two last chambers replace respectively the Coloured Representative Council and the South African Indian Council. The president is re-

Council of Unions in South Africa (CUSA) at a national level is participating in the UDF, while it also supports the NFC.

This union organisation had 40,000 members in 1982, and is approaching 100,000 today, thanks to the growth of the miners union. Thus two thirds of the independent union movement remain outside the UDF, such as the most powerful organisation, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), that had more than 100,000 members in 1982 and presently has around 120,000. The UDF has decided to form a delegation to have talks with FOSATU.

The FOSATU made public its position on the UDF, adopted at its central committee meeting on October 15/16, 1983. It explained its reasons for non-affiliation to the UDF as follows: *FOSATU has decided that it will not affiliate to the UDF. FOSATU believes that the unity of purpose created within worker-controlled organisations whose class base and purpose are clear would be lost within an organisation such as the UDF. The UDF represents a variety of class interests with no clear constitutional structure within which the majority of citizens can control the organisation. The UDF does however have a progressive policy as regards the political oppression of the majority of South Africans and for this reason FOSATU welcomes and supports its opposition to the proposed constitution.'

In fact, FOSATU waged its own campaign against the referendum, centred on 22 the demand 'One man, one vote. This campaign particularly took the form of the mass distribution and wearing of stickers on this theme by the workers in the enterprises where the federation is implanted, and a systematic appeal to the managements of these workplaces, charging them to state clearly their positions on the referendum and to reveal whether they had given financial support to the referendum campaign.

Despite the defection of the majority of the union movement the launch of the UDF remained, in the eyes of its creators, a spectacular success. Official sources estimated that the cost of the launch was 120,000 rand.

The National Party did not have much to say on the creation of the UDF. Chris Heunis, minister for constitutional development and planning, refused to make any comment. (20) The remarks of the leader of the NP parliamentary group were mainly directed at Treurnicht's Conservative Party as well as the PFP -*The Conservative Party and the PFP had a new bed-mate in the shape of the UDF in their struggle against the proposed constitution.' (21)

The PFP's welcome was less lukewarm. Van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the opposition, called it ' "A very important and significant development" which the government would ignore "at its and South Africa's peril" . The quick and spontaneous mobilisation of the interests of close to a million people clearly demonstrated "an incredible gap" in the country's political structure? (22)

The national television network SABC was challenged by Alex Boraine, president of the PFP executive, "The coming into being of the UDF is the most important development in South Africa since the 1950s. But the silence of SABC was deafening. Its bias is not only breathtaking, but it is also dangerous. The SABC continues to lull the whites of South Africa into a false sense of security. It is making the same tragic mistake made by the media in the days of change in Rhodesia [Zimbabwe]. Then there was a deliberate attempt to withhold all the truth from ordinary people.' (23) Alex Boraine also challenged the government over the manoeuvres aimed at sabotaging the UDF's rally, the distribution of fake leaflets for example.

Many leaders of the UDF could take these remarks as their own. However, this does not mean at all that the black masses of Southern Africa identify the UDF with the liberal white sectors who represent the modernising sections of the employers. For the black masses who are looking for a united framework for mobilising against apartheid the UDF appears on the contrary as an enormous hope. The militant nature of the different UDF gatherings testifies to this.

But the very nature of the unity achieved within the UDF by the character of its components and the absence of the majority of the independent trade-union movement of the black workers, immediately restricts the ability of this coalition to respond to the expectations of the oppressed masses. This is all the more so insofar as the basis of this body is limited to the struggle against the government's constitutional arrangements, which have now been approved by the majority of the white electorate and thus passed into reality. The question which is thus posed is the ability of the UDF to constitute a credible alternative to the regime and the effect of this unity on the mobilisations to come.

The internal dynamic of the system of capitalist and national exploitation based on racial discrimination puts out of the question any possibility of negotiating a parliamentary transfer of power.

The transition in Zimbabwe that the Lancaster House agreement made possible is quite unthinkable in this form in the Republic of South Africa, where the economic structure and the development of the movement are different. Proclaiming yourself an organising force for democratic aims does not answer all the questions of the revolution in Southern Africa.

Even from the ANC's point of view, which remains the principal popular political opposition force behind the UDF, the question of definition is decisive. In the ANC's journal Sechaba in October 1983 it was explained that, The UDF mobilises all people into one mass movement and co-ordinates community resis20. Cape Times, August 22, 1983. 21. Idem, August 27, 1983.

Idem, August 22, 1983. 23. Idem, August 23, 1983. • International Viewpoint 13 February 1984

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APARTHEID tance, but it does not purport to be a substitute movement for the accredited people's movement.

At present the ANC has a real influence in the mass movement. This is as much through the historic figures of certain of its leaders, under whose auspices, official or not, the UDF was created, as through its members activity in the unions or community and other associations. The armed struggle, which essentially takes the form of attacks in the urban zone, helps to strengthen the idea that the ANC is active everywhere and thus is behind everything which moves. However, its strategic orientation is still articulated around its relations with the 'democrats' and thus in part with the white liberals. The alliance formed between sections of the Church and the supporters of the Freedom Charter within the UDF is one response to the growth of the mass movement. The future relations of the UDF with the trade-union movement remain one of the unknown elements in the situation. There could be a rush to influence this latter at the time when the question of trade-union unity is to be discussed. (24)

The UDF remains a coalition at the top and not an organisation based on individual membership. It is looking to unify the mass movement under its own leadership without giving any clear perspectives for mobilisation. The question of the future of the UDF and its popularity among the black masses remains linked to its ability to achieve this unification in a lasting fashion. Its immediate perspectives are around continuing the mobilisation against the government's constitutional proposals, but the UDF is not the only force at work in this struggle. 24. The declaration of the ANC's executive committee welcoming the launch of the UDF took the opportunity to criticise those who, while posing as socialists, champions of the working class and defenders of black pride, seek to divide the people and divert them from the pursuit of the goals enshrined in the Freedom Charter. Through their activities, these elements share a hatred for the Charter and for mass united action no less virulent than that displayed by the Pretoria regime.' International Viewpoint 13 February 1984

DOCUMENT-

New organization of American revolutionaries:

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