The land question in Zimbabwe
James BARNETT Zimbabwe is not the first newly independent African country to be feted by both the East and West. Despite the ripples over 'dissidents' in Matabeleland, Zimbabwe remains one of the most popular stopping-off places in the so-called third world for politicians and investors of every hue. Even the pope is planning a visit in the near future!
something for everyone in tourist brochures, and the same thing could be said for the political scenery. Progressives can support the practical steps towards primary tion with Production, the continuing reprogramme and the various development schemes. businessmen like Mr Chambati (deputy chairman of TA holdings) can rejoice, as he did at a recent public meeting, in the the government and the private sector that together can achieve 'the good life for the majority of people' happy in the knowledge there will be no forced nationalisations. Trade unionists can come and fete the growth of workers committees and the establishment of minimum wage. And the 'law and order' brigade can see strikers put in jail, land squatters evicted, and take comfort in the fact that the State of Emergency (declared by lan Smith the former white prime minister) is still in force and the bulk of the National Army has now been retrained by crack British Army experts.
getting higher prices for their produce, major new road and water development schemes, and the launching of the Adult Literacy schemes. The big commercial farmers are also bene-
The unproductive ones can sell their land to the government at market while the productive ones pay their workers only 50 Zimbabwe dollars and benefit from a guaranteed price and marketing policy. feminists the Legal Age of Majority Act women for the first time, and a special Ministry of Community Development and On the other hand, for confirmed sexists, polygamy is legal, abortion is not, and
(bridewealth) is still a way of maintaining property relations over a vision' it is not easy to evaluate the situation in Zimbabwe now, after only three years of independence. Yet the very fact that so many defenders of Zimbabwe are confused about the direction the government is taking should be a common cause of concern to all socialists.
On the one hand it is not difficult to government supporters inministers, senior civil servants, and senior party officials who speak in
Marxist phraseology of the present "transition to socialism'. At the opening of parliament in June the presi-
"This year will witness the injection of a more extensive and vigorous impetus into our collective efforts babwe would strive for the total elimination of all forms of imperialism, colonialism and discrimination'. . On the other hand, leading defenders of free enterprise the partnership' tween the public and private sector, or in the words of Mr Bell, director of two
*Let Pamberi ne with Zimbabwe) reverberate around the tobacco world and let us become the winners of markets that we were before? (Herald, June 16,
THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME
Let us examine the presumed existence of these two systems in the light of what is still a burning issue today - the land question.
It was widely believed on both sides that land was the central issue in the liberation struggle. There is no doubt that colonial rule was effected and maintained on the unequal carving up of the land along racial lines. The best half of the country's agricultural land was reserved as prime farm land for the white settlers while the bulk of the rest was classified as
(now called the Communal ulation estimates for the two areas were 274,000 whites, and nearly six million
It was a generalised theme of the liberation struggle that victory would bring 'the redistribution of land stolen from our forefathers'. The February 1980 election manifesto of ZANU (PF) committed itself to 'the resolution of the land and agrarian problems as its first major task. The Resettlement Programme, one plank of this policy, was accorded a high priority. Indeed, the new government has committed itself to resettling peasant families by 1985 (about ten to fifteen per cent of the total population). These would mainly be returning refugees landless from the hard-pressed
In the course of the present 3-year total of 260 million Zimbabwe will be needed in capital expenditure to willing-seller, willingbuyer' basis. The British aid programme on land, hammered out at Lancaster ZIMCORD conference, will provide about 33 million Zimbabwe dollars. known from where the remaining 227
Within narrow definitions resettlement has got underway, an estimated 7,000 families have been resettled to date. settlement schemes are also regarded as models for agrarian reform in They are the varieties of collectivisation of agricultural production, they enjoy a higher concentration of agricultural extension workers, at a ratio holds, compared to 1 per 700 households in the Communal Lands, and the aim is to provide income from farming equivalent to the wage of a farm labourer (4-600 Zimbabwe dollars per annum).
Another thorny issue has been continued squatting on resettled land or white farms since IndepenMore often than not most of these squatters have been incorporated into the 'accelerated' (meaning without But it would appear from the president's speech at the opening of parliament in June, that the government will in future take a much harder line on squatters. This assumption was borne out by the recent eviction of 3,000 squatters from the abandoned Russeldene farm - their houses were flattened by bulldozers.
The question is: Resettlement Programme go in redistributing the land? The present answer would appear to be: not very far at all • If the government were actually to pursue its own policy of buying all the land necessary even for the present resettlement requirement, it would bankrupt the country.
The minister of lands himself indicated that 240 million Zimbabwe dollars is needed to settle only 54,000 families on 4 million hectares (Herald, April 17,
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1982). At this rate, an additional 480 million Zimbabwe dollars and 8 million hectares of land would be required to resettle the remaining 108,000 families. This is a much higher cost than the 260 million Zimbabwe dollars mentioned by the president, and much more land than commercial farmers are willing to sell. Even if, by chance, the funds could be found, it would have to be at the cost of channelling funds away from the general problems of development in the Communal Lands to the Resettlement Programme. And this money would go into the hands of a 'willing seller' — an unproductive commercial farmer - not a particularly good investment for a socialist government. In fact, in the July budget, the total sum set aside for the whole Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was a mere 32 million Zimbabwe dollars, and the actual sum set aside for land purchase and compensation was a paltry 26.5 million Zimbabwe dollars. On the basis of simple arithmetic, resettlement appears to be grinding to a halt.
But perhaps a greater political problem is the nature of the Development Programme for land and agriculture as a whole, and the future for the estimated 70 to 80 per cent of the population who depend on the land for subsistence and survival.
A CONTRADICTORY COMMITMENT
ZANU's election manifesto approached the problem gingerly. While committing the party to swift collectivisation of peasant agriculture and the establishment of state farms, it retained the somewhat contradictory commitment to maintain an efficient core of large-scale com-
Later, the Plan stresses the absolute priority of development in the rural areas (the Communal Lands), while recognising the 'dualism' of the economy in general, describing the peasant sector as 'underdeveloped, poor in physical, agricultural and social infrastructure' and the
'advanced, dynamic, diversified'. Indeed, 90 per cent of the value of all agricultural produce marketed through official or formal the large-scale commercial although, up to the present drought at least, peasant families were more or less feeding themselves, and were estimated to consume 80 per cent of their own provices and markets, thus forging links with the national economy and stimulating development of local markets with regional specialisation and informal my emphasis) employment opportunities?
Of course, there is also strong emphasis on improving productivity in all systems of agriculture, while the Communal Lands are singled out as already having a co-operative tradition eminently suited to 'communal management of common assets', which can achieve 'the realisation of an agrarian system able to optimise land-use patterns and maximise group and individual investment and effort.'
Notably absent from the co-operativisation plan are the commercial farmers.
mercial agriculture. Influential commentators like Roger Riddell (chief economist of the Confederation of Zimbabwean Industry - CZI) has recently over 80 years of systematic material and Communal Lands is laudable and necesreiterated this theme in the recommendations of the Riddell Commission/Inquiry into Prices, Incomes and Conditions of
New areas of land (should) be acquired to absorb the population that is in excess of the safe carrying capacity of the present-day peasant sector while assuring that commercial farming land is able to continue to provide the bulk of the nation's basic food requirements, surplus for export and for the provision of inputs for industrial production.'
While it is tempting to view the maintaining of the private sector as a "holding operation', to maintain food and export earnings, etc. during the transition to socialism, a closer reading of the Three Year Transitional Development Plan reveals that either now or in the future. In the opening pages it states that the government *recognises the existing phenomenon of capitalism as a historical reality because it cannot be avoided, has to be transformed as a partner in the overall national endeavour to achieve set goals.' 24
And how could it be otherwise after racial exploitation? The point is, one reads the Three Year Transitional Plan in the hope of discovering an overall strategy to confront and change the prevailing social relations of production -namely that the bulk of the country's prime farming and ranching land is in the hands of big commercial farmers and multinationals and that 70 per cent of productive capacity (much of it derived from agricultural raw materials) is owned by foreign capital. If such a strategy is there, it is written in invisible ink.
NO STRATEGY FOR CHANGE
Instead statement after statement from ministers and other party leaders, while criticising what is called the essential "dualism' of the economy, continue to prescribe ways for its maintenance, albeit in a new form. For agriculture this means that development should take place principally and only within the Communal Lands which must receive "balanced investment in growth and rural service centres. This must bring the rural population into close contact with ser-
Nkomo and Mugabe (DR) While commitment to investing in the sary, it would be as well to remember that the Plan envisages that 41 per cent of investment outlined is to come from the private sector - that is nearly 2,500 million Zimbabwe dollars. highly improbable that this will be used in projects that promote genuine socialist transformation. any really socialist ideas in many of the 'development' projects funded by aid programmes.
The USA now boasts that Zimbabwe is the recipient of the largest American Aid Programme in Africa, and agriculture is a prime target. The Zimbabwean government has just negotiated a plump loan of 31 million Zimbabwe dollars from the World Bank for agricultural development. It seems unlikely that this will be jeopardised by promoting socialist agriculture. And on this point the Three Year plan is cleverly worded - the stated goal is the 'integration' of the commercial and peasant agricultural sector into one system -which system is not specified.
To summarise, without an overall radical agricultural reform, combining the nationalisation of the large landholdings,
the redistribution of land, and to aid the small producers as partners in a workers and peasants alliance, one can state that what Mugabe means by 'socialist transis nothing other authoritarian regimentation of the African small peasantry, and defence of big private property.
It is easy to find other indicators of this apparent new 'dualism' of public and private sectors. Perhaps the most glaring recent example is the growing cost of the Hwange II power project. ment has reluctantly purchased 40 per cent of the shares in this thermal power plant - commissioned by Smith in UDI days - at higher than market prices in order to keep it going.
It is said that the World Bank made it a condition of its loan that this project was continued, but as these conditions are not public information, this cannot be
What is known is that the cost to the government of this development (including loan repayments) has pushed up the price of electricity by 30 to 50 per cent
The effect of this increase alone on the rapidly rising cost of living is likely to be substantial. The government is still trying to negotiate a lower tariff for industry, in an attempt to prevent them passing on the whole cost to the consumer.
The irony of the situation in a country that is immediately threatened by South Africa is that the main beneficiary of the Hwange project appears to be one of the largest American multinationals, Anglo-American, who receive a guaranteed rate of profit on every ton of coal mined at the Hwange colliery. As the local magazine Moto pointed out, 'Anglo retains management of the project and thus the of transfer pricing to ship Africa, (and untaxed) profits to South
Some local economists (see Moto May 1983) argue the case for energy co-operation within the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADOC), and demonstrate clearly the need for a regional electricity grid at a fraction of the cost of independent projects like Hwange. tions coming thick and fast in the wake of major loans from the World Bank and the IMF such a strategy is unlikely.
Indeed, the visit of the IMF team to Zimbabwe early in 1983 hardly aroused any interest. Yet the size of the sum borrowed, and the interest rate on repayments and the conditions for the loan are still unknown. What is known is that the Zimbabwean dollar was devalued by 17 per cent at the end of 1982 - although finance minister zero said that this was not at the behest of the IMF, it was simply a coincidence. Interest rates have increased to 9.5 per cent, government spending has slowed down and concessions have been made to corporations, reducing and relaxing controls on remittances of corporation profits send abroad.
The recent budget, announced in July, includes major cuts in public spending, with a few exceptions such as defence, home affairs, and education. these measures are conditions of the loan or not hardly matters. The fact that they coincide with IMF thinking leads to only one conclusion - that maintaining the profits of the private business sector and the higher income minority important than the needs of the vast
Nor are these isolated examples. The government is desperately trying to attract capitalist investment to Zimbabwe, and most economic measures taken by the State are supposedly in order to pro-
'sound economic footing of which Mugabe makes so much play.
It is perhaps then the final irony that, sufficient in food resources, it is in food manufacturing that foreign investors have shown keen interest. Heinz baked bean is about to make its American-controlled Heinz has taken over locally-based Olivine Industries.
Gradually, the beautiful Zimbabwean dream is transformed into a horrible vision of peasant farmers in partially developed rural areas growing fields of beans on 'co-operatives' set up by World Bank 'developers' who sell them at statecontrolled prices to Heinz, mum-wage workers pack them in (local, cheap) tins, after which they are sold and peasants at prices they cannot afford, and the profits are shipped back home to Reagan!
A major factor determining this attitude of ignoring the needs of the masses is the almost total lack of open political discussion in Zimbabwe. In some cases this amounts to a real fear of expressing political views, particularly if they could be construed as radically critical of govbe sought to hold any kind of meeting, this is frequently refused particularly in the case of ZAPU and UANC (the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union of Nkomo, and Muzorewa's United African National
There are very few Marxist or any political books or pamphlets to be found. In the few public forums where views are expressed it is clear that there is an abysmal lack of any kind of political education. The two daily newspapers are empty of real political comment or debate or even of real news apart from ministerial speeches and visits. THE NEED FOR POLITICAL DEBATE
Speeches by party members are one of the few forms of 'mass communication' both in the townships and the rural areas.
always take the form of a long latest programmes or policies of the government, on this there is no discusssion. the government constantly uses the election of ZANU in 1980 as its mandate for every step it takes in whatever direction.
This does not mean that there is no 'dissent'. Clearly the continuing disturbances in parts of Matabeleland and the Midlands reflect this, however fragmented and incoherent it might be. And Mugabe criticism as the work of dissidents. any case the 'dissidents' are certainly not one homogeneous group but a fragmented and frustrated response to the severe limitations on life in post-Independence
Although we do not condone the antisocial acts of banditry, theft and murder, we have to recognise that undoubtedly whole communities have been intimidated by the National Army under cover of smashing the "dissidents', and that ZANU ex-combatants everywhere have been singled out for rough treatment ranging from threats to torture. This is not a situation that encourages people to voice their political criticism openly.
Nor is generalised frustration at the lack of real change confined to Matabeleland. In the Communal Lands in particular, even in ZANU strongholds, it is not hard to find people voicing feelings of having been 'abandoned' by the government - by the same 'freedom fighters' that they fed and supported during the
In the towns, industrial disputes not uncommon, although weak and
But, as yet, none of this constitutes
Many significant force. Whatever the different motives of "dissidents', their tactics in the present situation are clearly mistaken. 'guerrillaism' nor common banditry can form part of an effective strategy of struggle against the combined forces of capitalism which continues to form the base of the Zimbabwean economy.
Mugabe remains a very popular figure, and Zanu (and ZAPU) still enjoy popular support. But there is no doubt that this is accompanied by a growing feeling of frustration that the expected fruits Independence are fading into the distance For the time being the politicians can blame the prevailing drought for many of the current hardships. Once that is over the stark realities of Zimbabwean capitalism will remain.
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