International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

The Workers Party and Deepening Crisis in Brazil

· International Viewpoint No. 35, 1 August 1983 · pp 6-8 · 3,256 words

Latin America World economy Germany Trade unions

The Workers Party and the deepening crisis in Brazil Social tensions have been rising very rapidly in Brazil since the start of the year, when the government, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, launched a new austerity offensive.

In April, the desperation of masses of people condemned to long unemployment and deepening hopelessness, exploded in Sao Paulo.

A crowd tried to break into the mansion of the state governor, ironically a representative of the "liberal" bourgeois opposition to the dictatorship. Furious crowds smashed store windows and clashed with police for three days running.

In May, the IMF refused to grant Brazil a 400 million dollar instalment on a loan that the country was counting on to pay back short-term credits. The refinancing of the massive Brazilian foreign debt of around 90 billion dollars seemed to be getting shakier and shakier. Throughout the following months the international financial boides have threatened repeatedly to withold loan payments unless the Brazilian government squeezed harder to get the money owing to the imperialist banks.

In early July strikes of engineering workers started to grow in Sao Paulo against the government' austerity plans. The walkouts started with a strike by workers at three state-owned refineries who feared that the government would order big layoffs as part of its program for cutting state expenses, as demanded by the IMF.

The leadership of the Brazilian Workers Party (PT), a class-struggle formation that came out of the rise of militant workers' struggles, is centered in Sao Paulo, the country's key industrial center.

The rise of tensions and polarization is a crucial test for the Workers Party and the trade-union laders who are its principal figures.

Elements in the Workers Party, particularly among its elected representatives, have shown signs of wanting to pursue a parliamentarist course and follow in the footsteps of the liberal bourgeois oppositionists who are becoming so quickly discredibted by their complicity with the government's austerity policies.

These tendencies have been opposed by the historic leadership of the PT, which aruges that the party should take the lead in the growing mass struggles against austerity.

The following article describes the rise of social and political tensions in Brazil employees on the basis of the expected rate of inflation. At the same time, the cost-of-living indexes began to be doctored by taking out certain items whose prices had risen particularly sharply. This was to justify a slowdown in wage increases and cover up the decline in buying power, which has been quite spectacular since the early 1970s.

Finally, on February 18, the government announced a major devaluation of the cruzeiro against the dollar, cutting the exchange value of the Brazilian currency by 30 percent. This had the effect immediately of increasing the cost of service on the debt, which had been 12.5 billion dollars. The economics bosses, on the other hand, estimated that there would be a trade surplus of 6 billion dollars in the current year instead of 1 billion last year.

Nonetheless, by March and April, it was becoming clear that the steps taken were insufficient and that the government would have to go back into negotiations with the representatives of imperialist finance.

For the first time, President Joao Baptista Figuereido admitted publicly that the perspective for this year is a 3 to 4 percent recession. In March the inflation rate was 10 percent and created fears that the annual inflation rate would exceed 150 percent. What is more, an official of the Brazilian Institute for Economic and Statistic Analysis presented a scarcely optimistic outlook for the Brazilian financial situation.

"Supposing that we achieve a 6 billion dollar trade surplus this year, we will need 15 billion dollars in credits to meet the obligations falling due. But as of now only 11 billion are assured....If the missing 4 billion are made up by revolving credits, we will find ourselves facing the same problem next year." (2)

But, in the first quarter of 1983, the foreign trade surplus was only half what it would have to be to reach the 6 billion dollar surplus for the year that the Brazilians are counting on.

At the very time when the failure of the measures taken at the beginning of the year started to become clear, the rebellions of unemployed people in the Santo Amaro neighborhood in Sao Paulo in early April started ringing alarm bells for the government.

According to a poll taken in the first quarter of the year among the bosses organizations in 620 companies, Sao Paulo lost close to 4 percent of its industrial jobs in that period of time and 19 percent in the last 27 months.

In order to promote exports, average per capita beef consumption was cut from 17 kilos per year to 12. And finally the withdrawal of subsidies from cer1. The November 14, 1982 Brazilian elections brought a clear defeat of the governmental party, the PDS, which won only about a dozen state governorships, while the governorships of the more important states fell to the liberal opposition parties, the PMDB and the PDT. As for the PT, it got relatively modest scores,' a national average of 3 percent, except in Sao Paulo, where it got 10 percent. 2. Le Monde, May 3, 1983.

and the debate in the Workers Party. Daniel JEBRAC

The results of the November 1982 elections ended up giving cause for satisfaction in a lot of quarters. (1) The bourgeois liberal opposition could rejoice because it won a clear victory in terms of the number of votes it got. Moreover, it gained control of the governments of the country's most important states (with the exception of Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco).

The regime, on the other hand, could take comfort in the fact that it had avoided the electoral rout it so much feared, and thus retained the means for designating the next president in 1985.

What is more, despite the electoral defeat of the government party, the Democratic and Social Party (PDS), the regime gained an appearance of legitimacy that it very much needed at a time when it had to face difficult international negotiations.

In fact, with a foreign debt now exceeding 90 billion dollars, of which nearly one fifth is in short-term credits, and with its foreign currency reserves vanishing, the Brazilian government had to recognize that it was in a situation of insolvency and turn to the International Monetary Fund to negotiate new credits and a rescheduling of payments on its debt. In the press, this unavoidable move by the chairman of the Brazilian central bank, Carlos Langoni, was portrayed as national humiliation.

In December 1982, the IMF granted a whiff of oxygen and a respite for Brazilian finance. The most cynical, or the most frank, of the Brazilian bankers did not make any bones about saying that their American colleagues scarcely had any choice. Given the volume of the debt to American banks, a financial crash in Brazil would threaten to set off a chain reaction, to say nothing of the political repercussions in the region.

In exchange for its concessions, the IMF put on pressure to get the regime to reconsider the system of semiannual wage adjustments and to tighten up on public spending. State expenditures were immediately cut by 20 percent. Thus, in early January 1983, the government announced that it was suspending indefinitely the construction of the Iguape I and II nuclear reactors on the coast near Sao Paulo. The wage adjustment system became the target of several attacks aimed at imposing an outright wage freeze.

Several state governments arbitrarily set the annual wage increases for public

tain agricultural products (such as cereals and sugar) is going to lead to an increase in the price of bread.

So, the government and the governors of the big states are living in dread of a social explosion. For the moment, they are putting through more and more little "packages" of measures, the famous "pacotes," on a week to week basis trying to meet the demands of the creditors without driving the mass movement to desperation. But there is less and less room for maneuvering.

• In this situation, it only took a few months for the bourgeois opposition parties, which head such state governments as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Minas Gerais, to show their true face.

When President Figuereido appealed for a national truce in March, they all fell into line. The Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), led by Iveta Vargas, daughter of the former dictator Getulio Vargas; and by former president Janio Quadros, went so far as to make an open parliamentary pact with the PDS.

With the 13 PTB deputies providing the margin, this coalition has a majority of 248 seats out of a total of 479, as against 231 for the opposition as a whole.

The PMDB, the main liberal opposition party, ducked its head and put the wraps on its demand for direct election of the president. Tancredo Neves, one of its main leaders and governor of the state of Minas Gerais, talked about the imperative needs of dealing with the crisis: "The crisis today is graver than the one in 1964 [when the dictatorship was established]. In 1964, there was a crisis of government and not of the system. There were economic problems. But we did not have the sort of international context filled with apprehension that we do today."

Brizola himself, who, on the eve of his election as governor of Rio, was being portrayed as a wild-eyed trouble maker, declared after a meeting with Figureido: "The important thing now is not to look for differences but to look for what can unite us."

Brizola's party, the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), voted with the PDS in Rio Grande do Sul and concluded a national pact with it. This was not without ulterior motives. Brizola has presidential ambitions and is favored in the polls, but he thinks it would be premature to make his move in the 1985 presidential elections. So, he has proposed prolonging

Figuereido's mandate by two years (until 1987). In exchange for that, he wants direct election of the president at that time on the basis of universal suffrage.

If the form and date of the election is not changed, the next president will be chosen in 1985 by the vote of an electoral college, which would assure an automatic majority for the PDS, unless this organization goes into such a deep crisis that it starts to break up, which cannot be excluded.

More concretely than the conciliation at the top, the policy of the opposition parties in the states they govern is unmasking them in the eyes of the workers.

The state of Sao Paulo alone has a public debt of 4 billion dollars. In Sao Paulo, as in Rio, the promises of social reform made in the election campaign, the promises to create jobs, are being put on the long finger, while the governors of these states - Franco Montoro and Leonel Brizola — are working hand in glove with the big employers organizations. In Sao Paulo, Montor sent the cops against the rebelling unemployed in Santo Amaro.

Only the Workers Party (PT), in conformity with its basic options, firmly rejected the proposal for a truce made by Figuereido, just as it refused (although this was not without hesitations on the part of some of its deputies) to participate in the "opposition" governments in Rio and Sao Paulo.

TRABALA ELIBE

The PT was formed during an upsurge of the mass movement, based on the big strikes of engineering workers in 1979 and 1980 in the Sao Paulo suburbs. This momentum enabled it to win legal status in 1981 and to build its membership to more than 300,000. At that point, it went directly into an election campaign without having been able to consolidate itself as an activists party nor to root itself in real mass work.

The November 1982 election results put an end to this period of euphoria.

Outside its birthplace, the state of Sao

Paulo, where it got 10 percent of the vote, the PT remained a small party. The disappointment did not fail to have an effect. In certain states where the party was least well established, it has practically disappeared. Even in Sao Paulo, the local units have had problems in functioning, and the congresses held in recent months have indicated a general difficulty in assembling a quorum for the meetings preparatory to these congresses.

Only roughly half the local units were able to do this.

There is an obvious danger that the

PT may be reduced to the currents and activists already organized in the far-lett groups and lose its mass character. While this threat is real, it has been used mainly as a pretext in the recent period for an offensive by the moderate right in the party, which is aiming to transform the

PT into a mere parliamentary machine.

This offensive has come, mainly, from certain PT deputies who are tempted by the idea of coalition with the bourgeois parties and participation in the «opposittion" state governments, especially in Rio.

This operation is reflected in the proposal that in the future votes at PT congresses should be calculated not on the basis of the number of members but of votes won in elections! When you realize how much the electoral system promotes patronage relationships and how unequal the means of the candidates are, it is clear that accepting such a proposal would put the PT into the mould of the organic law decreed by the dictatorship to control the political parties.

This attempt seems, however, to have been stopped by resistance from two quarters - from the activist base of the

TERRA RDADE! DULT

'Jobs, Land and Liberty' (DR) party, which made its feelings known the congresses in the big states such as Sao Paulo, Rio, and Minas Gerais; and from the historic leading nucleus of the PT, trade union leaders such as the chairperson, Luis Inacio Da Silva "Lula," and the general secretary, Jaco Bittar.

At a meeting of the national leadership of the party on April 16, "Lula" said, in fact: "Our party cannot be content trail after the church and the trade-union movement and wave its colorful banners in demonstrations. We have to reach directly into the masses, without any intermediaries and organize and lead the struggles. We have to organize nuclei in the neighborhoods and in the various categories of workers. We also need to put forward our own proposals for action and get out of the role of bystander that we have fallen into at the moment."

This reaction against a parliamentarist drift has been reflected in real steps forward in organizing the party's trade- union activity around the perspective of a general strike against the government's measures. A circular from the party secretariat reminding the elected representatives of their obligations with respect to party discipline raised a big furor. ("Lula" explains his view of it in the following interview). It even got its author, Jaco Bittar, denounced in the bourgeois press as a Stalinist. So finally, the PT managed, despite the temptations of some of its elected representatives, to

7

PIR

PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES maintain its independence from the bourgeois "opposition" governments.

However, in the course of this healthy defense of the party's original principles, the leading nucleus tended to elevate itself into a faction above the battle. Certain signs give cause for concern that a false balancing between the various trends in the PT could lead to a restriction of democratic life inside the party to the disadvantage of the left currents that have helped actively to build it.

The first such sign was the heavy-handed operation of the national leaderdevrimci sosyalist

Marx Yaşıyor! 8 ship in the municipality of Diademe. Winning control of the government in this working-class city of 300,000 inhabitants was the PT's major electoral success. What is more, the PT leadership in Diademe was known to be combative and radical, in the image of the new mayor, Gilson Luis Correia de Menezes, an engineering worker who pledged to organize a broad network of people's councils to support the new municipal concil.

When it came time to name the new municipal executive, however, Gilson

Devrimci Sosyalist A new revolutionary Marxist journal in Turkish is now being published in Britain.

The current issue contains articles on the crisis of capitalism in Turkey,

- the crisis of the Latin American dictatorships,

- the question of the united front.

Each issue costs 0.75 sterling, 3 DM, 8 FF, 2.5 Swiss Francs.

To order copies or for further information write to:

M. Cattlin, PO Box 50, London N1, Great Britain.

pulled a slate of designates out of his hat, who had been backed behind the scenes by the PT national leadership against the will of the local majority. Since the January 4 operation, the conflict has not died down, and Gilson was again outvoted in the recent local congress of the party.

The second sign was the launching in early June of a manifesto signed by 113

PT personalities from Sao Paulo, including "Lula," Djalma Bom (a federal deputy), Irma Passoni (a state deputy), and

Gilson. This manifesto had the merit of reaffirming the fidelity of the PT to its origins and its program ("Jobs, Land, and Liberty"). (3)

The statement also confimed the decision that the party is to be an activist party, a fighting party, and a class party, and thereby rebuffed any parliamentarist temptations. But it made a dangerous equation between the "individualist behavior" of some deputies and activists who "subordinate themselves to parallel leaderships and give priority to propagating their own political proposals over those of the party."

This was not the most convincing accusation coming from leaders who often function themselves as an informal network, parallel to the elected leading bodies, and who backed an operation running roughshod over the regular local bodies. But this manifesto indicates, nonetheless, the desire to consolidate a leadership nucleus differentiated on the right from the deputies who are making googoo eyes at Brizola and on its left from the politically more clearly defined revolutionary currents on the local and national levels.

The weakness of this organizational operation lies precisely in its lack of political perspectives. While it reaffirms the past gains of the PT, the manifesto is notable for the weaknesses of the proposals it offers.

However, once you go deeper than the combinations at the top to real choices in action, you find the active force of the whole body of components that make up the richness and vitality of the PT. The unfolding of the PT congresses in every state tend to show that it would be difficult to divert this force by any kind of an apparatus operation, as long as the party remains rooted in mass mobilization, in the unions, and in the fightback against the government's measures.

In fact, under the impact of the crisis, unemployment, and the attempts to freeze wages, the process of recomposition is continuing in the unions, and a strong campaign is taking form against the various moves to impose wage freezes. It is by remaining faithful to its origins that the PT will be able to gather new forces and move on to a higher stage in building a party of the working class. 3. This was the electoral platform of the PT for the November 1982 elections. It has since become the programmatic reference point for the PT.

← Four Years After the Fall of Somoza · Danish Dockers Propose Programme for Fighting Government →

Something wrong on this page?