ter-revolutionary actions directed by the 500 civilian and militia victims of this aggression in the first four months of 1983 according to the Nicaraguan author ities. In the same period there has been more than 58 million US dollars-worth of material damage, which is equivalent to 2 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product.
About 4 million dollars-worth of building material has been destroyed. This is the result of the conscious policy of the counter-revolutionaries. They avoid direct confrontations with the Sandinista army, confining themselves to raids and ambushes.
THE SOCIAL COST
OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION
On May 4 Daniel Ortega gave a detailed breakdown of the social and econmic cost of imperialist aggression. In this he noted the destruction of 40,000 hectares of forest by fire, which had a value of 20 million dollars, and the loss of tobacco, coffee and meat to the value of 4 million dollars.
In order to keep down the price of
Nicaraguan revolutionary government beneath portrait of Sandino' (DR)
certain essential foodstuffs, the government has had to increase state subsidies, which meant a supplementary cost of 120 million dollars in 1982.
results of this in the 1982 financial year
Four years after the fall of Somoza were that the Gross Domestic Product dropped 1.4 per cent, inflation reached 24.8 per cent, unemployment rose noticeably by 4 per cent, affecting 19.8 per cent of the economically active population.
The social cost of the aggression is also increased by the fact that a good part of the economically active population are
10212
With the more and more direct intervention of Honduran troops alongside the
Somocistas, and the increasing number of statements from Washington on the possibility of an intervention by North American troops, a further stepping up in the
Central American conflict has taken place.
It is true that the aggression directed against Nicaragua is not aimed at an immediate overthrow of the Sandinista regime,
The objective rather is to weaken the revodefeat of an entire mobilized people.
lution by military threats and an economic boycott. The imperialists hope that then accept an overall framework of negotiations for they could force Nicaragua to
This would involve in particular the Sandinistas reducing their stabilizing the region.
practical aid to the Salvadoran people.
In fact, imperialism is opposing the extension of the revolution in Central Amer
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador (FMLN) in order to cut it down afterwards.
Thus, what is at stake in the Central American conflict is what happens in the region as a whole. Every increase in participation of American forces in the fighting is aimed both at Nicaragua and at the people's forces of the FMLN in Salvador.
For the imperialists, a serious weakening of the Salvadoran revolution would only be the prelude to new attacks on Nicaragua. Washington is certainly not going to give up its attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government, after having made inroads in Nicaragua through its first counter-revolutionary attacks.
In this article we analyse the effects of imperialist aggression on Nicaragua. In a future issue of International Viewpoint we will look at the present stage of the imperialist operation in El Salvador.
Claude DEVILLIERS
Nicaragua is now a country at war.
The former Somocista guards who have taken refuge in Honduras, aided by Honduran regular troops and financed by the
United States, are attacking from the north. Eden Pastora's troops are attacking from the south.
The immediate objectives of the counwhich would mean a crushing military United States are to maintain a zone of insecurity in the north, and promote a feeling of dissatisfaction among certain layers of the population. Washington hopes that discontent in these sections of the population can be stoked by the impact of the economic and social problems arising from the Somocista aggression and the imperialist boycott.
There have already been more than engaged in defence rather than production. The main part of the defence operations are assigned to the militias. And these forces are organised on the basis of volunteers, who come mainly from the nationalised or co-operative sector, either in industry or agriculture.
A large part of the social and investment budgets have also had to be shifted towards defence needs. one third of the health budget is allotted to needs arising directly from the aggression - sending doctors into the combat zones, setting up field hospitals, etc.
To all this still has to be added all the measures taken by the imperialists to try and stifle the country economically. The most telling of these is the recent suppres sion of the quota for the import of Nicaraguan sugar to the United States. But the recent expulsion of all the staff of the Nicaraguan consulates from six or seven major cities is also a severe blow to the economic plan.
It was these consulates, which are now closed, that authorised the import of spare parts. A good number of these commercial operation are going to be blocked or delayed for several months. And that is without taking into account the fact that it will make it more difficult for American tourists to go to Nicaragua.
Finally, there is more and more pres sure on banking organisations to place draconian conditions on loans to Nicar-
agua - particularly high rates of interest and insurance for example - while the debt-bill of the country is already considerable.
At the end of June the US even decided to blackball all Nicaragua's requests for credit to the international banks. Daniel Ortega explained that, 'the negative influence of the United States on the allocation of credit to Nicaragua has produced a reduction of credits granted from 213 million dollars in 1979 to only 21.8 million dollars today'. (1)
To this panoply of measures should also be added the pressure put on American multinationals in other Central American countries to reduce and limit their deliveries to Nicaragua, in order to stimulate speculation.
THE TACTICS OF THE CONTRAS
Estimates agree that there are about 7,000 counter-revolutionaries Honduras, most of whom are former Somocista National Guards. Half of them have already taken part in actions inside Nicaragua, while a smaller proportion are permanently stationed there. however, the incursions of the Somocistas have been contained by the Sandinista militia. Nevertheless, the fact that some counter-revolutionary nuclei can maintain themselves in certain regions indicates that they have a real, although modest,
This is the case in the backward and traditionally marginal areas in the north, where the weight of the Somoza dictatorship was less direct. For example, it was in the region of Jalapa that Somoza recruited his National Guards. They took refuge in Honduras in 1979, but kept up personal and family ties in the region. Moreover, in four years of the revolution, the social situation in these regions has
The Sandinista authorities estimate that some 20 percent of the 2,000 Somocistas operating in Nicaragua are peasants that they have recruited. Some have been captured by the Somocistas, but others have been attracted by the pay that is Celebration of the revolution (DR)
offered to them, or even enrolled on the basis of anti-Communist propaganda.
The vice-minister for the interior, Luis Carrion, stated on June 18 that, "The counterrevolution has been carrying out a propaganda campaign to create a base of support for itself within the country.
"The social class to which the counter-revolutionaries have been directing their propaganda is the peasantry. trying to win the peasants over, in this they can take advantage of a lot of fac tors, including the fact that the revolution cannot reach every area of the coun try with its ideas and its practice.
"They can also exploit the concrete problems that the peasants confront. The problems are (that is the difficulties of obtaining certain basic products like soap and milk) and the problems the peasants have with the banking system.' The contras tell the peasants that 'because of their debts the banks are going to take their land from them'. (2)
peasants' debts are between 25 and 35 million dollars, and thus cause severe problems for the small and medium-sized landowners who were victims of the floods last year, and only have a low rate of productivity.
For these reasons, despite the difficult financial situation of the country, the Sandinista leaders are presently studying the demand put forward by the National Union of Farmers and Cattle Breeders (UNAG), which proposes that, 'all the debts contracted by the small and middle peasants before December 1982, and still not settled, should be cancelled by the revolutionary government.
While talking of the influence of the counter-revolutionaries in certain backward regions of the country, particularly on the Atlantic Coast, the FSLN representative on the Council of State recently stated that 'the main aim of the counterrevolutionary propaganda today is to the anti-popular potential of these social layers. They represent an unconscious reserve for their own class enemies.' (3)
Through using such a social base the contras would like to occupy 'a portion of Nicaraguan territory and proclaim a government to gain recognition' as Tomas Borge, Sandinista minister of the interior, explained. This would probably be in the Jalapa region. (4)
THE DANGER OF WAR WITH HONDURAS
A new factor has come to the fore in the last few weeks with the more and more direct involvement of the Honduran armed forces in acts of aggression against the Sandinista revolution.
For example, the Honduran artillery took part in a recent offensive by 600 contras near the town of Teotecacinte in the north of the country. What is involved is no longer simply tactical support to the Somocista aggressors, but conscious and deliberate provocation, designed to start a war between the two countries, which would serve as a pretext for direct American intervention.
At the end of June Tomas Borge denounced a meeting that had been held between Somocista leaders, the commander of the Honduran army, and the CIA to perfect a plan for 'a quick war to occupy a part of Nicaraguan territory.
According to the Agencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN) dispatch dated which gave an account of this plan, "The intervention could be supported, according to the evaluation made during this meeting, by the Organisation of American States and by the Chilean government, which would send naval support units to support the invaders.
"The former Sandinista Eden Pastora
This counter-revolutionary would be integrated into the plans of ag.
This explains his final decision to continue the struggle, taken after the tripartite meeting was held in Honduras?
Moreover, this confirms the role given to Pastora in the overall strategy of US imperialism even though he still does not inspire complete confidence in the Washsouthern front, on the border with Costa Rica, is not however as serious as that in
Despite the official neutrality of the government in San Jose, Costa Rica, Pastora has the open support of the local authorities and part of the bourgeoisie in the border zone with Nicaragua. A report published in the Nicaraguan daily newspaper Nuevo Diario on June 14, gave proof of the existence of permanent counter-revolutionary military bases in Costa Rican territory, notably in the region of Ciudad Qesada, and the collaboration of the Costa Rican rural guard with Pastora's troops in this area.
On the northern front the situation was made still worse at the end of June by the announcement by the Honduran armed forces that they were sending 1. Agencia Nueva Nicaragua (ANN) Managua July 2, 1983. 2. TersMeltiva Nund al. New York 3 3. Perspectiva Mundial, York July 11, 1983. 4. Le Monde, Paris July 7, 1983. 5. ANN, June 30, 1983.
1,500 supplementary Honduran soldiers to the border zone. (6) In conjunction with the recently undertaken project of building roads along the border on the Honduran side, and the arrival of 150 American marines in Honduras to train Honduran and Salvadoran troops, constitutes a further stepping up of imperialist aggression in Central America.
PREPARATION FOR US INTERVENTION
At the same time official circles in the United States are undertaking an intensive ideological preparation of public opinion for the prospect of sending American troops to Central America. eral E. C. Meyer, the former American army chief of staff, recently state that if Nicaragua invades Honduras, I don't see how we could not go in there, along with representatives of the Organisation of American States, to re-establish the
The general recalled, drawing the lessons from Vietnam, that to win it was necessary to strike at the enemy's heart. When asked if this meant attacks against Managua he replied 'this is not excluded'. (7) The American defence secretary Caspar Weinberger, although he rejected the idea of an imminent American intervention in Central America, nevertheless made it clear that the Pentagon had 'considered all the possible ways of responding to any crisis situation'.
Finally, on June 28 the president Ronald Reagan himself answered a question on the possibility of sending US troops to Central America with this remark, should never say 'never. that they blew up the Maine.' The reference to this historic episode - in 1898 the Americans accused the Spanish of blowing up their warship Maine in the port of Havana - is very significant. The outcome of war, for which the sinking of the Maine served as the pretext, was that the Americans took control of Puerto Rico and Cuba.
The growth of imperialist aggression has brought about a widening and deepening of the mass mobilisation in Nicaragua, which is preparing for an even greater increase of counter-revolutionary man-
This situation has even created a division within the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, opposed to the Sandinistas politically, does not support the imperialist aggression and the actions of the former Somo-
Numerous articles in La Prensa, the bourgeois journal that has been censured many times in the past for its campaigns against the government, reflect this feeling. Certain sectors of the bourgeoisie go even further, taking a position for the defence of national unity against the aggression and denouncing the present imperialist tactic of strangling Nicaragua. clerical hierarchy also find themselves confronted with this problem.
SANDINU KHZ. TELS 25414
The most visible form of the latest upsurge in the mass mobilisation is the growth and activity of the people's mil-
Emphasis is also put on the seriousness of military training for the militia. The militia are responsible for the bulk of the fighting in the north, in coordination with the groups of peasants won to the revolution, and mobilised and armed in the framework of a local self-defence
Overall, the Sandinista People's Army (ERP) has remained in the back-
The defence policy of the government therefore is being based deliberately on mass mobilisation, and it seeks to avoid a direct involving of the army, so as not to disperse it ineffectively.
Sandinista people's militias is quite central, and cannot be reduced to its strictly military aspect. This is a much phenomenon, which begins with the way this mobilisation is built in the work-
The mobilisation is an important factor in the anti-imperialist education and politicisation of the working masses. It the form of revolutionary vigilante groups set up in the local neighbourhoods by the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS) to oppose the activity of the counter-revolutionaries in the
This popular mobilisation should also be looked at in relation to the adoption of governmental measures that, although they are theless help to deepen the revolutionary
New nationalisations have taken place, of those enterprises where were speculating with government loans, and preparing to flee abroad. tion-nationalisations go with the reaffirmation of the framework of a mixed economy for the Sandinista
They are none the less blows against representatives of the bourgeoisie, as was the case with two chemical plants, one of the bosses of which was the former president of the Chamber of Commerce in Managua.
To celebrate the fourth anniversary of the July 1979 revolution a new parcel of uncultivated and abandoned landholdings will be distributed to about 8,000 families which is an increase in scope of the land reforms already made. law on housing has been adopted that will legalise and systematise the seizure of rented apartments. This will have its effects on the standard of living of former tenants, by sharply reining in real estate the imperialist that Nicaragua is suffering, the fundamental democratic rights of the popular masses are being extended. The process of trade-union unification that has been in progress for two years, since the formation of the Trade-Union Coordination of Nicaragua, is increasing in scope. This ongoing liaison committee includes - with the exception of the two organisations led by bourgeois forces, the Nicaraguan Confederation of Labour (CNT) and the Committee for Trade-Union Unity (CUS) which hold themselves aloof - all the other unions, the Sandinista Confederation of Workers (CST), and the Association of Workers Countryside (ATC), the 'CGT-Independiente' controlled by the pro-Soviet Nicaragua Socialist Party, the Action Committee for Trade-Union Unification (CAUS) led by
Communist Party, another Stalinist faction, ment of Popular Action (MAP).
At the political and institutional level the last few weeks have been marked by the close of the discussion on the status of political parties in the Council of State, some weeks after the adoption of decrees on the role and place of trade unions in the revolutionary process. This discussion made two key points clear: 1985 is being maintained for general legislative elections, and the fundamental democratic liberties are being guaranteed in the context of a country under
The details of the rights given to recognised parties - today about a dozen of them — are in Article 6 of the law on parties, and are not without interest. All the more so as there was a real debate on this
Political parties are authorised to carry on propaganda and recruitment work continuously throughout the country, to 'hold private meetings and public demonstrations', to have access to the media during electoral campaigns, to criticise the public administration and proconstructive solutions', to make alliances between themselves to 'accredit representatives to [what will be called] the National Assembly of Political Parties, to ask for their integration into the Council of State, to compete in the elections and present their own candidates, to have their own resources and offices throughout the country, and to *collect the funds necessary for their functioning'. (8) that at the fourth anniversary of the fall of Somoza, imperialist aggression, is, therefore, a task of the for anti-imperialist activists throughout the world.
International Herald Tribune, July given to the Washington Post,
Barricada, Managua, June 16, 1983.
The Workers Party and employees on the basis of the expected rate of inflation. At the same time, the cost-of-living indexes began to be doctored by taking out certain items whose prices had risen particularly sharply. This was to justify a slowdown in wage increases and cover up the decline in buythe deepening crisis in Brazil ing power, which has been quite spectacular since the early 1970s.
Finally, on February 18, the government announced a major devaluation of the cruzeiro against the dollar, the exchange value of the Brazilian cur-
30 percent.
Social tensions have been rising very rapidly in Brazil since the start of the year, the government, under launched a new austerity offensive.
In April, the desperation of masses of people condemned to long unemployment and deepening hopelessness, exploded in Sao Paulo.
A crowd tried to break into the mansion of the state governor, ironically a representative of the "liberal" bourgeois opposition to the dictatorship.
smashed store windows and clashed with police for three days running.
In May, the IMF refused to grant Brazil a 400 million dollar instalment on a loan that the country was counting on to pay back short-term credits. The refinancing of the massive Brazilian foreign debt of around 90 billion dollars seemed to be getting
Throughout the following months the international financial boides have threatened repeatedly to withold loan payments unless the Brazilian government squeezed harder to get the money owing to the imperialist banks.
In early July strikes of engineering workers started to grow in Sao Paulo against the government' austerity plans. The walkouts started with a strike by workers at three state-owned refineries who feared that the government would order big layoffs as part of its program for cutting state expenses, as demanded by the IMF.
Workers Party (PT), a class-struggle formation that came out of the rise of militant workers' struggles, is centered in Sao Paulo, the country's key industrial center.
The rise of tensions and polarization is a crucial test for the Workers Party and the trade-union laders who are its principal figures.
Elements in the Workers Party, particularly have shown signs of wanting to pursue a parliamentarist course and follow in the footsteps of the liberal bourgeois oppositionists who are becoming so quickly discredibted by their complicity with the government's austerity policies.
These tendencies have been opposed by the historic leadership of the PT, which aruges that the party should take the lead in the growing mass struggles against
The following article describes the rise of social and political tensions in