The agricultural problem in China
Feeding China's huge and expanding population is a major task requiring huge resources. The article we publish here looks at the development of agriculture in
China since 1949 and explains the problems confronted today.
This article was originally published in October Review, a revolutionary Marxist
The translation is by journal published in Hong Kong, in April 1983.
Review.
Bai Zhang BING
The total value of agricultural production in China increased by 85 per cent between 1949 and 1957. This increase was a result of the land reforms, the state's irrigation projects, and the enthusiasm of the peasants.
Per capita grain consumption during this period was 406 catties (1), with a 19.5 per cent increase in the population. This was quite a low figure, but over the subsequent 21 years it fell lower, and the 1979 figure was only 16 catties higher than that for 1957.
The Chinese Communist Party has adopted a policy of developing heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture. The capital for industrial development came mainly from agriculture, which was also severely damaged by the Big Leap Forward campaign.
THE EFFECTS OF THE 'BIG LEAP FORWARD'
During the second five-year plan, between 1958 and 1962, the total value of agricultural output decreased by an average of 3.16 billion yuan per year (2 yuan are approximately equal to 1 dollar). The total loss of 15.8 billion yuan during this period more than offset the 15.75 billion yuan increase during the first 5 year plan. Per capita grain consumption fell by 19 per cent to 329 catties in 1962.
The following comparison between the increase in the value of agricultural production and the increase in the amount of grain procured by the state illustrates the effect:
Increase in Increase in agricultural grain procured production by state 1958 2.4% 10.5% 1959 -13.6% 23.6% 1960 -12.6% -11.5%
As can be seen from the table the situation in 1959 was the most acute, with the decrease in agricultural production and the largest increase in the amount of grain taken by the state, 64.12 million tons, compared to 45.97 million tons in 1957, an increase of 39.5 per cent. Grain exports also rose continually, 2.09 million tons in 1957, 2.88 million tons in 1958, and 4.15 million tons in 1959.
Thus, during the severe famine in these years there was not even enough seed for sowing. In 1960 the death rate reached the historic rate of 2.5 percent, 17.08 million deaths, compared to 6.78 in 1957. An increase of 10 million!
After this catastrophic experiment China's grain imports in 1961 were higher than exports, for the first time in history. Imports have remained higher than exports ever since, increasing from 5.8 проні million tons in 1961 to 13.43 million tons in 1980. The same situation exists for sugar.
### INCREASE IN PRODUCTION
LAGS BEHIND INCREASE IN RESOURCES USED
From 1957 to 1979 grain output has only doubled. But in the same period the agricultural working population has also risen by 52.4 percent, from 193.1 mil lion to 294.25 million. In addition the resources used increased massively. The total mechanical power used increased 110 times. For every mou (2) of land the amount of electricity used became 236 times greater, of chemical fertiliser 33 times greater, insecticide 11 times greater. Fixed assets were 5.3 times greater in 1978 than in 1957. However, while one yuan of fixed asset could realise 2.37 yuan of gross income in 1957, this figure declined to 1.29 yuan in 1978.
The labour power and capital invested in agricultural production raised the costs of production. However, the general index of procurement prices (i.e. paid by the state enterprises) for subsidiary agricultural products only rose by 46.2 per cent over the 1950 figure in 1957, and 165.5 per cent in 1979, that is a rise of 119.3 per cent over 22 years. This resulted in an almost com1. 1 catty equals .605 Kilograms. This figure is therefore approximately equal to 246 kg. 2. 1 mou equals 613 square metres or approximately 1/6 acre.
plete lack of profit in agricultural production. Quite a lot of production units had remained in deficit for long periods. The readjustment by an average of 20 per cent in the procurement prices alleviated but did not solve the problem.
### COSTS AND PRICES
To take for example the Heilung Jiang province. For the eight years of 1971 to 1978 the total output of the five main crops (corn, soya, rice, sorghum, wheat) was 146.5 billion catties and total cost of production was 18,197 million yuan. thus, verge cost l pron per Thus, the averge cost of production per catty of grain was 0.124 yuan while the average selling price was 0.1 yuan per catty, meaning a loss of 0.024 yuan for every catty of grain produced by the peasant.
Between 1959 and 1977 the grain production per nou of land increased by 14.8 per cent, while the work days required increased by an average of 57.4 per cent. Thus the costs of production increased significantly. In fact, from 1962 to 1977 production costs more than doubled, but the procurement price only increased by 37.5 per cent. The increase in the official procurement price in recent years has still not caught up with production costs.
One particularly weak aspect of China's agriculture is its resistance to natural disasters. In recent years the area hit by natural calamities has been about 20 million hectares, that is about 15 per cent of the cultivated area. In 1980 the calamity area was about 30 per cent of the total cultivated area.
### BUREAUCRACY'S POLICIES
WEAKEN RESISTANCE TO NATURAL DISASTERS
Much of the adverse effect of these natural disasters stems from long term practices that have upset the ecology, causing increasing soil erosion, silting up of rivers, and decreasing the forested areas. A number of irrigation installations, because of severe silting, no longer function to drain off floods, store water, or generate electricity. Nature's punishment for the wrong policies of the bureaucracy is just beginning, but those who suffer are the people.
In the different regions the geographic differences imply a different potential for agricultural development. The imbalance in the distribution of farmland and the population puts great strain on the production and supply of agricultural products.
Of the 30 provinces and municipalitiies in China, in 1979 11 had a surplus of food, 6 were self-sufficient, and 13 had insufficient supplies. Some 27.46 per cent of the population had insufficient food, mostly in the northwest.
The transport of food from the south to the north also increases the strain on the backward and inadequate transport facilities. Areas suitable for other industrial crops but not grain are forced to grow grain.
Over the last 30 years the population has almost doubled but the amount of farmland has decreased. The statistics show that the total area farmed was 1,468 million mou in 1949, this increased to 1,619 mou in 1957. Since then the area has declined, reaching 1,492 million mou in 1979, a decrease of 8 per cent in relation to 1957. The amount of farmland per head of the population has dropped sharply.
There are four main reasons why the amount of farmland has decreased. The first is use of the land by the state to build towns, factories, mines, highways, railways, irrigation and military facilities.
Then use of the land for building connected with working the land, basic farmland constructions, commune-run enterprises, houses for peasants. Land has also been converted to other use, such as forestry or stock rearing, or there has been desertion of land because of natural disasters and salinisation of the soil. Lastly the amount of farmland reported has been incorrect in the past.
Despite repeated directives by the central government this trend is still continuing.
For the peasants the increase in the procurement price for grain has brought only a modest improvement in their livelihood, and is still some way from a reasonable exchange price between agricultural and industrial products. Changing to growing industrial crops would bring a quick increase in income. But this would run counter to the principle of the planned economy of 'guaranteeing basic grain self-sufficiency. This is why the 1983 economic plan stresses that the total area for growing grain must be stabilised at the level of 1.7 billion mou, and demands that the cotton-growing area be decreased.
The official slogan is for the value of industrial and agricultural production to increase three-fold by the turn of the century. However, this policy is confronted with three problems — the increasing population, the decrease in farmland, and insufficient investment. ibility poin policy now is the espon- The main policy now is the 'responthat is in essence the transfer of the responsibility and burden of developing agriculture from the state to the local regions and the peasants.
Agriculture in China is fraught with many basic contradictions. Increases in production place a severe strain on trans-
Chinese peasant farmers (DR) port, and much food is rotten before it arrives at its destination. Procurement centres are inefficient, and prices fixed by bargaining and thus lack of standardisation. Limited rations of fuel, insufficient and poor quality storage, and inadequacies in the transport and processing of food have led to a piling-up of problems.
For the state another factor is the large amount of its revenue spent on agricultural subsidies. For example, in 1978-81 the increase in the procurement price of subsidiary products, and the purchase of over-quota products amounted to 44 billion yuan, partial exemption of tax in the countryside cost 7.8 billion yuan, the cost of subsidies to diesel and electricity used for agriculture, coal, meat, eggs, poultry, imported crops, cotton, sugar, chemical fertiliser, and insecticide, etc. totalled 34.1 billion yuan. The total sum was 85.9 billion yuan, comprising 26 per cent of the state revenue. This is a significant burden on the state, which has been in deficit since 1978. In 1981 revenue was 5 per cent lower than in 1978.
A further heavy burden on the state has been the significant increase in the amount of over-quota products acquired by the state. The increase between 1980 and 1981 was 32.5 per cent for goods obtained through price increase, 37.5 percent for those obtained by bargained price, and 29.6 per cent for those obtained at market price.
In 1979 the price of crops purchased by procurement was raised by 20 per cent, and over-quota purchase by 50 per cent. The average increase of the procurement price for subsidiary produets was 18 per cent.
The retail price index rose from 130.3 in 1978 to 138.6 in 1979 as a result of the rise in the index of procurement purchase of subsidiary agricultural products from 217.4 in 1978 to 265.5 in 1979. To quieten popular dissatisfaction with these retail rises the state had to issue 5 yuan per month to every staff member and worker as a subsidy for subsidiary foods.
Thus the bureaucracy finds itself in a dilemma in how to deal with the agricultural problem. If agricultural production is reduced, the state will have to spend foreign currency to import grain, cotton, and sugar. But if agricultural production s maintainer procurement, and subsidies to stabilise prices.
25