The present state of the working class in China
This article is from October Review No 74-75, February-March 1983. The translation is by October Review. Zhang KAI
Since the foundation of the new China the Chinese Communist Party has always claimed that the proletariat is the leading class. In fact it is the party that rules while the working class is totally powerless.
In order to develop industrial production, to counter imperialism and the bourgeoisie with the strength of the working class and to avoid opposition developing between the working class and the party, the CCP has been forced to give the working class better material conditions than the peasants.
The strength and importance of the working class increased significantly with the development of industry. According to the official statistics the number of workers in China in 1952 was 16.03 million. This increased almost sixfold by 1981 to 109.4 million. The number of industrial workers rose from about 5 million in 1952 to 46 million in 1981, almost eight times as many.
The value of industrial production represented only 41.47 per cent of the total value of industrial and agricultural production in 1952, whereas by 1981 it was about 70 per cent. Thus, the working class assumes an increasingly favourable position in the balance of social forces.
The living standards of the working class improved relatively significantly during the period of the first five-year plan (1953-57), but did not improve very much during the next two decades, as is shown in the table. i. From the frenetic Great Leap Forward in 1958 until the Foreign Leap Forward in 1978 average industrial wages for 21 years had in fact decreased. ii. The increase in recent years is more rapid, partly due to various kinds of bonuses (generally around 10 per cent), and living allowances (10 to 14 per cent). iii. Average industrial wages increased by 65 percent between 1952 and 1981, but the actual increase was only 15 percent.
Our experience is that cost of living indexes compiled by those in power are always far below reality. It is doubtful that prices only increased by 50 per cent 22 in 30 years. And the increase in workers wages is minimal if compared to the official figures on the increase in value of industrial output. This was 18 times greater in 1981 than in 1952, and 47 times greater than in 1949. This stark contrast between the increase in productivity and the increase in wages obviously causes resentment and loss of the motivation to work among the workers.
The generalised phenomenon of 'no one taking responsibility' ', in the words of Deng Xiaoping, in the factories, and the general indifference and passivity of the workers, have forced the regime to adopt material incentives, to raise the wages of the majority of workers to a certain degree. But inflation in the past few years has offset the increase in wages. Housing is another acute problem. Thus workers tend to pursue more income to improve their living standards. This is what the regime describes as 'individualism' and 'egoism'.
A NEW GENERATION OF WORKERS
From 1949 to 1969 the average annual increase in the number of workers was 2 million. From 1970 to 1981 the figure was nearer 4 million. The proportion of young workers below 35 is thus increasing, reaching 60 million at the end of 1981 - about 60 per cent of all workers. AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGE OF STAFF
& WORKERS IN THE STATE SECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (in renmimbi yuan, 2 RM equals 1 US dollar)
YEAR ALL INDUSTRIAL
SECTORS SECTOR 1952 446 515 1953 496 576 1956 610 674 1958 550 526 1959 524 514 1962 592 652 1964 661 741 1966 636 689 1969 618 683 1970 609 661 1973 614 640 1974 622 648 1977 602 632 1978 644 683 1979 705 758 1980 803 854 1981 812 852 (Note: The 1981 average wage for all sectors increased by 80% compared with that for 1952. The actual increase was 29.4% after adju tment for increases in the cost of living.
This new generation of workers has some specific characteristics. Firstly, the great majority come from the cities. Among new workers entering the factories since 1966, 80 per cent have been from workers families, thus carrying the tradition of workers struggles.
Many of them have also received senior or junior secondary school education. The better education they have received, compared to that of the older workers allows them a wider perspective, workers, allows them a wider perspective, more active thinking, a greater sensitivity to social problems, and stronger desire for changes.
Finally, many of this generation participated in or witnessed the struggles during the Cultural Revolution, thus being able to learn from the lessons of these struggles.
In recent years many young workers have devoted themselves to fighting for democracy. They have published samizdat journals, or participated in local elections. The most active have been arrested. Among the dozens of leaders of the democracy movement arrested in April 1981 were a majority of young workers.
In conditions of severe repression workers in general have not actively fought for better working conditions and democratic rights. Still, local slowdowns or strikes have occasionally occurred. The outright removal of the workers right to strike from the Constitution reflects the ruling team's fear of this.
The CCP organ Red Flag carried a series of six articles by Yu Yannan on the Chinese working class. These articles revealed a 'different understanding' of the young generation of workers among the CCP cadres. Some think that the "basic situation of the young workers is very bad', some that the political quality of this generation of workers has much deteriorated'. and some even that they have lost the class nature of the working class'
Yu Yannan represents the official view. He considers that 'the class concepts of today's working class are fading, and that bourgeois and other non-proletarian ideas have quite seriously eroded the ranks of the working class'
If this is true, then the primary responsibility lies with the CCP and its rightist policies in recent years, and the extravagant lives of the bureaucrats. In any event, such comments reveal the mutual lack of contidence between the bureaucracy and the workers.
OPPOSITION BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
This mutual lack of confidence is rooted in the opposition between the ruler and the ruled, the privileged and the oppressed. This expresses itself in many material ways. 1. Statistical Yearbook of China PP 435-6, English edition.
Yu Yannan's article Strenothen the tu tannan's article Strengthen the links with the worker masses' outlines three ways in which the party cadres on a national scale' have 'departed' from the worker masses. These are:
1. 'Some party cadres exploit their influence for their own self interest; at present, incorrect practices in the arrangement of work for the children of cadres or in the distribution of staff housing are quite general and the worker masses are resentful of this'
2. 'Some party members give a bad example, they opt for easy jobs and avoid difficult ones, scramble for benefits, and misbehave in their jobs. some young workers remark that "if such people are admitted into the Party, I will not enter the Party":
3. "There are too few party members on the frontline of production. More party members go into the management sectors, causing a relative concentration of party members there. The more arduous labour the work requires, the fewer the party members. This is a serious question related to the class nature and mass base of our party.' (2)
Party cadres in the factories and enterprises, by faithfully implementing the CCP's orders and supervising the workers, are given special powers and interests. Large numbers of opportunists strive to become party cadres. Workers that join the party are either assimilated into the bureaucracy, or become frustrated and demoralised.
There are manv examples of the divide There are many examples of the divide between the CCP and the workers. Inheriting the Stalinist tradition, the CCP has launched campaigns to produce model workers to serve as an example in hard work and support for the regime in the factories. But these campaigns have not achieved the expected results. In fact, many model workers are isolated by the masses. Yu's article gives some illustration of this.
According to investigations by the authorities, 66 of the 126 model weavers in the country have met with ridicule and censure. Large numbers of facts show that the malpractice of isolating and attacking progressive workers exists to different extents in many regions and units, and they have a certain universality?
The article recommends that intermediate and backward workers must be educated to treat progressive workers correctly. Yu explains that the majority of the progressive deeds are overtime work, overfulfilment of the production quota, willingness to suffer austerity, etc.' (3)
To supplement the campaign to learn from model workers the CCP has recently used bonuses to create division and competition among workers. However, the unrewarding outcome for them has been that most bonuses are shared collectively among the workers, without the original aim of increasing production being achieved.
In order to alleviate the tension, and to better implement its policies, the CCP has been compelled to introduce the system of workers congresses. (4)
Yu's article explains that, Investigations show that, at present, a rather tense relationship between the cadres and the masses exists in some enterprises. The workers lack their rightful democratic rights, and this has become one of the main factors directly affecting the political enthusiasm of the masses. In the enterprises, the so-called relationship between the cadres and the masses is to a large extent the question of the relationship between the party and the masses?
The ordinance on the workers congresses was promulgated less than a year after the formation of Solidarnose in Poland, indicating the fear among the bureaucracy of Polish-type developments in China.
Reports indicate that at the end of 1981 about 0.1 million enterprises (about 26 per cent of all the enterprises in China) had established workers congresses. Yu's article reveals the effectiveness of the present system, at present only a minority of workers' congresses operate well, a considerable majority of units show varying degrees of formalism, or simply making a gesture towards democracy, in their workers congresses, raising strong objections from the broad layers of workers.'
Yu explains that 'the primary reason lies in cadres in leadership positions'. He gives concrete examples, 'a considerable number of cadres in leadership positions...fear that if the power of the workers congresses grows, their own power will diminish. The party organisations in some enterprises assume full control...all matters are discussed and decided by the party committee, and then adopted by the workers congress. Some cadres in administrative leadership positions only think of convening the workers congress when they come across difficulties such as unfulfilled production tasks...some comrades even think that enterprises under state ownership should have the managers appointed by the state and endowed with full powers, and workers have no right to join the management.' (5)
These words draw a vivid picture of bureaucrats clinging to power and using the workers congresses only as an instrument through which to exercise their power. However, the workers are also using the rights they are given under this system. Even though the ordinance did not state that the workers congresses would have the power to elect factory managers this has been done on an increasing scale, dealing a blow to the bureacratic privileges of the nomenklatura system.
### CONTRADICTIONS
IN IDEOLOGICAL WORK
In January 1983 the CCP propaganda department and six other units convened a working conference on ideological and political work among the staff and workers of the whole country, with the aim of 'mobilising the whole working class...to guarantee the successful realisation of the programme of the 12th Congress of the CCP.'
The CCP has used its massive propaganda machine to carry out ideological work among the workers, but has failed to overcome the existing contradictions. The CCP has ascribed the failure of this to the cadres, 'During a rather long period people have had a very narrow and simplistic understanding of this work. In the ten years of turmoil [i.e. the Cultural Revolution] it was even treated as a way to 'make the masses suffer. This has caused the worker masses to be distrustful and fearful.' (6) 2. Red Flag No 23, 1982. 3. Red Flag, No 22, 1982. 4. Refer to 'Analysis of the workers congress system in China', October Review, No 56 August 1981, and Polish Events have Repercussions in China' International Viewpoint No 17, November 15, 1982. 5. Red Flag No 20, 1982. 6. People's Daily, January 23, 1983, Editorial.
Chinese workers look at luxury items in shop window (DR)
Chinese workers look at luxury items in shop window (DR)
This remark is straightforward in describing the CCP's ideological work, and the reaction of the masses. How will the CCP carry out its ideological work this time? It confidently claims that if its orders are carried out 'there will surely be improvements'. However, its orders have not yet been announced and so it is difficult to tell what the suggested remedy will be.
But, from the theme of the report at the above-mentioned conference, it seems that the remedy this time is 'reforms' - 'reforms in a general and systematic way, in a decisive and orderly way'. Hu Yaobang said, 'the Four Modernisations (7) cannot be attained without reforms, this is what comrade Deng Xiaoping has been stressing in the past few years.'
But how have the 'democratic reforms' fared in the last few years? The right to strike has been abolished both de jure in the Constitution and de facto. Samizdat publications and organisations have been strictly prohibited. People holding different ideas from the official version have been heavily penalised...
Economic reforms have been carried out for several years, primarily partial reforms to the economic management system. The central administration has delegated some power to the local levels. However, power has gone to cadres in leadership positions in the enterprises and not to the workers. The power to manage the economy and production is still in the hands of a handful of cadres. Part of the reform has been the replacement of some bureaucrats by technocrats.
The official appeal for an 'orderly' reform implies only moderate personnel changes and rejects a radical reform carried out by the worker masses. Such moderate reforms would not abolish the political and economic privileges of the various levels of cadres. The working class is still deprived of its interests and powers.
Furthermore the CCP has been clamouring for a change in the system of the 'unbreakable rice bowl' , i.e. secure jobs. The cadres in the enterprises now have the power to dismi sandorkers, the tet the power to dismiss workers, the responsibility system' and the system' are practised. Underfulfilment of the quota or the contract terms can lead to penalty or dismissal. This reform threatens the workers job security, meanWorths there to nor and liveantee of the ing that there is now no guarantee of the
Such a reform cannot possibly achieve ideological persuasion. The tension between the regime and the workers will intensify, not lessen. It will be more difficult to heighten the workers enthusiasm for production. 7. The Four Modernisations' were introduced at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. They are: industry, agriculture, science and technology. - IV
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