reasons for forward was to stop applying a brake to the workers militancy, and to form a broad left unity in solidarity with the strike. The KESS tried to form such a front in January 1983, but the meeting called for this purpose was sabotaged by the Lal Nishan Party, and the Comthe set back to the Bombay textile workers strike munist Party of India and the Communist Party of India-Marxist.
A historic opportunity to develop a broad working-class united front, on the basis of the self-activity and self-organisation of the textile workers was squandered. The political implications of the strike were ignored. This proved that at-
On January 18, 1982 over 250,000 textile workers in Bombay went on strike. Their demands included wage increases, paid holidays, permanent status for some 100,000 substitute workers, and recognition of their union, the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar
Union.
The number of workers involved and their growing self-organisation and politisation, and the broad solidarity among other workers and peasants made this on f the most important strikes in the history of the international and Indian worker
(see International Viewpoint Nos 18 and 21, 29 November 1982 and movement.
January 10, 1983.)
Now, after 18 months, over half the workers originally involved have gone back to work, and although over 100,000 workers are still continuing the struggle it is clear that there has been a serious setback. The following article from Proletarian Politics, journal of the Communist League,
Indian section assesses the reasons for this. It has been abridged by IV.
Amar JESANI
The textile strike was an expression of workers anger and determination.
for it to have succeeded would have required elements that were lacking in the
Let us look at some of these points:
The textile strike was a product of self-activity and self-organisation of the workers. But this alone does not en-
A politically conscious sure success.
leadership is necessary.
- If there is no clear political strategy from the leadership, or this is confined within the accepted norms of trade unionism, victory is extremely difficult, or will only be achieved at tremendous human and material cost.
This strategy must include a clear perspective for developing a strong solidarity movement. This means aggressive attempts must be made among wide sections of the working masses of India to make known the workers struggle, the need for solidarity and to build support.
This must be done aggressively because the reformists, whether Stalinists, centrists or so-called socialists, will always try to insulate their own base from work-
Thus, for the real success of a strike of these proportions a strategy of extending other sections of the working class is a
Over the last ten years we have seen this type of self-activity and self- organisation several times.
to be extended, and consolidated. Otherwise it takes a rapid downward turn resulting in the defeat of the struggle.
who constitute the
The far left, smallest political force in Bombay, tried to intervene in the strike with a political
But the united body, the
Kamgar Ekta Sangharsh Samiti (KESS)
failed to make any impact and by the end of February it was clear that only the of the Fourth International, Communist League and the Sharmaik Mukti Dal were prepared to make a full commitment to the textile workers
Thus, despite the heroism of the textile workers, and the way forward they through their self-organisation in the mill and area committees, these gains could not be consolidated and extended.
THE ROLE OF DATTA SAMANT
AND THE TRADITIONAL UNION LEADERSHIPS
Datta Samant came to the fore as the leader of this strike because of his known militant approach to leading However, neither he nor the leadership of traditional left-controlled unions could offer any perspective for the strike beyond defending their own trade union base. Samant's role as a strike breaker in
October 1982 transport The long term detrimental effects of this were not apparent in the euphoria of the strike call and the demonstrations around the arrests in October 1982. came clear to those actively solidarity that the textile workers were becoming isolated and that the leadership were aiding this process.
At this point, taking advantage of their isolation, the bourgeoisie went on the of-
Samant was not willing to continuously mobilise the workers on the streets to paralyse the government, and the other union leaderships were eager to crush Samant, who is a threat to them, and betray the strike.
their tactics was apparent when the December 13, 1982, strike call flopped
From this point the downward trend of the strike was apparent. The only way tempts to lead an openly political strike with traditional trade-union means cannot succeed.
SETBACK FOR THE TEXTILE WORKERS
There has been a big setback. More than 50 per cent of the workers have gone back to work, and most of the mills are operating. Those that are not are prevented by the financial difficulties of the owners, not by the lack of workers. Many of those not back at work are prevented by the mill owners refusal to take them back because they are known activists, or because there is no longer work as the mill owners have in effect carried through their planned rationalisations, which were part of the cause of the
Samant and the Lal Nishan Party are not ready to accept this reality. We believe that the struggle should be con-
But it is adventurist to talk of a massive offensive when the workers have just suffered a setback. to defend existing positions, plan a process of reorganisation, to work to increase mobilisation rank-and-file, etc. This should be done at the same time as encouraging discussion on the strategy of
The leadership must be open to criticism and encourage free debate.
other way of continuing struggle' would be to gradually abandon the workers without formally withdrawing the strike call. This would be done by public rhetoric and channelling the workers attention to electoral contests without any efforts to evaluate
We give critical support to the Lal
Nashan candidate against the Maharastra chief minister in the Sangli bye election.
In so far as this electoral contest focuses attention on the textile strike and helps mobilise the masses it will be positive.
But there are some pitfalls, and this may be a sign of a different orientation by the leadership. Since October 1982 the strike leadership has systematically refrained from talking militant actions, demonstrations, pickets,
Samant has said repeatedly that he does not want the strike to become a law and order' issue. In this situation diverting the workers to elections rather than the concrete task of salvaging their basic interests will be fatal.