Bolivian miners take over nationalized mines, forge links with peasants
On August 31, 1982, the thirtieth anniversary of the nationalization of the Bolivian mines in 1952, the new government in Bolivia presented its proposal for co-management of the nationalized concerns. Since then, two opposing positions have developed on this question.
One position is held by the Democratic People's Union (UDP) government. The UP is a class-collaborationist coalition, including the Bolivian Communist Party, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), and the Revolutionary National Movement-Left (MNR-I).
The government's position calls simply for involving representatives of the workers in the administration of the nationalized concerns and in particular of the mines. It is in the worst tradition of reformist co-management.
In opposition to the government's proposal, the miners union (FSTMB) and the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB) call for a workers majority on the co-management boards, which would give the workers' leaders the predominant voice in the administration of the public enterprises.
The confrontation between these two positions came to a head for the first time in April in a turbulent social climate marked by numerous working-class and popular demonstrations against the government's economic measures.
In fact, in mid-March, the UDP government adopted a series of decrees that constituted the "second phase" of its economic program. (1) These included, for example, a 46 percent increase in the minimum monthly wage and increases in the prices of certain necessities.
The Bolivian Confederation of Employers (CEPB) expressed its satisfaction with these decisions. But the COB rejected them. Its traditional leader, Juan Lechin, went so far as to say over the radio that "Hernan Siles Suazo [the incumbent president of the republic] is more right wing than Victor Paz Estenssoro." (2)
Indeed, the proposed wage increases were not sufficient to halt the decline in the standard of living of the Bolivian people, since from November 1982 to March 1983, the cost of living rose by about 300 percent.
At the end of March, therefore, there was a wave of mobilizations. In particular, the health workers went out on a nationwide strike demanding higher wages. Bank workers struck demanding the resignation of the management, after it refused to accept the unions' wage demands.
High school students mobilized demanding lower charges for transportation and school supplies. In the course of their demonstrations, clashes occurred with the police.
On March 14, Juan Lechin said that the economic "correctives" proposed by the government "went against the people's interests" and that "the UDP is taking the side of private enterprise."
While this was going on, the proposal for a workers majority on the co-management boards worked out by the FSTMB leadership was being discussed by the miners. Finally, confronted with the strike of technicians and administrative employers in the nationalized mines, which began April 3, the miners decided to act themselves to apply their own concept of a workers majority in co-management.
On April 19, after a series of local initiatives, the FSTMB, headed up by Juan Lechin, took over total control of the nationalized mines, pushing to the sidelines the Minister of the Mines and the general manager of the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL), both of whom are members of the Bolivian Communist Party. The miners union immediately appointed an administrative council made up of trade-union leaders, including members of the Socialist Party-No. 1 (PS-UNO, a group that has become a broad rallying ground for opposition to the UDP from the left and even of the Bolivian CP, which is divided on this question.
The following article from the May 23 issue of Bandera Socialista, the weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers Party (Mexican section of the Fourth International), describes the miners mobilization.
Victor MURILLO
On April 3, 1983, the technicians and administrative employees in COMIBOL (who are a privileged layer from the standpoint of wages) went on strike in a dispute concerning social services.
In fact, this action was designed to block the discussions initiated by the FSTMB in all the nationalized mines on miners' co-management. In most cases, the great majority of the miners were declaring their support for a workers majority on the co-management boards.
Instigated by the government and the right, the technicians and white-collar workers went on strike in an attempt to cut short the rise in the militancy of the miners.
The miners know perfectly well that COMIBOL lost money in 1982 (more than 110 million pesos, or about 535 million dollars at the January 1983 rate). That is why they are demanding the power themselves to supervise the enterprise, which is the country's major foreign currency earner and employs about 26,000 workers.
It should be pointed out that the Soviet technicians working at the La Palca factory, a high-technology tin-refining plant, also went on strike. This amounted to open collusion with the government against the workers, and demonstrated that the Soviet technicians oppose the miners' demand for a workers majority in co-management.
WORKERS TAKE OVER THE MINES
In this situation, the San Jose miners in Oruro immediately took over the technical and administrative tasks in the mine right from the start of the boycott action by the technicians and administrative personnel.
On April 12, the workers at La Palca took a historic decision. They started up the furnaces again, resumed production, and managed to operate the plant's sophisticated equipment.
Without the help of technicians, either Soviet or Bolivian, they got the best performance yet out of the furnaces. So despite all sorts of threats and pressures, La Palca was running at full capacity.
The FSTMB then demanded that the authorities in the nationalized mining sector "declare the abandoned jobs vacant." Since the union got no satisfactory response from COMIBOL, it declared on April 18: 1. See "The Bolivian Cauldron" by S. Romande in International Viewpoint, No 22, January 24, 1983; and "The 'Social Truce' Ends in Bolivia," in IV No 26, March 21, 1983. 2. Victor Paz Estenssoro, the historical leader of the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR), originally a bourgeois populist formation, was president from 1952 to 1964, when he was ousted by a military coup. Subsequently, the old MNR broke up into opposing faction-parties. In 1971, Estenssoro's MNR-H (Historico) backed the coup d'etat of General Hugo Banzer, who is today the head of the National Democratic Alliance (ADN).
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"In militant solidarity with the miner comrades in every district, who have kept the mines and treatment plants running despite all the problems and thereby have shown a high level of responsibility to the nation and the society, we have decided to assume supervision over COMIBOL.
"Likewise, we are setting a 24-hour deadline, beginning today at 5:00 p.m. for the resolution of this conflict. We are taking this action to put an end once and for all to the disastrous course followed by people who have been making more and more antilabor and antinational maneuvers."
### WORKERS MANAGEMENT
• AND WORKERS GOVERNMENT
A bit further on, this statement specified: "In taking this initiative to safeguard an industry that brings in foreign currency, which provides jobs, and which is part of the patrimony of the nation, the FSTMB will respond immediately to the demand from the ranks...to form an Administrative Council that will take charge of the nationalized mines in conformity with our plan for workers-majority co-management. This plan points up the close relationship between such measures and a preponderant role for workers in the decision-making centers of political power."
On Tuesday, April 19, at 5:00 p.m. when COMIBOL was occupied, Juan Lechin said the following about the attitude taken by the technicians and administrative personnel: "When the mines were nationalized in 1952, COMIBOL produced 27 million tons of tin with only 135 technicians. Now it is producing less with a far greater number of technicians."
In answer to a question from journalists about what sort of supervision over the mines the FSTMB had assumed, Juan Lechin said: "Yes, this is self-management."
When COMIBOL was occupied, the leaders of the truck drivers, oil workers, and other categories of workers declared that the "only solution for the state companies" was to put them all under workers control. The inhabitants of the El Alto shantytown blocked traffic to protest against an increase in bus fares, and so the whole city of La Paz was virtually paralyzed.
A tense social climate developed, which was aggravated by statements from businessmen expressing their unhappiness about the occupation of COMIBOL. On the other hand, miners in all the coun try's mines sent messages of support to the FSTMB in the COMIBOL offices.
On April 20, the first day of workers administration, a round table sponsored by the United Nations on international cooperation with Bolivia opened in La Paz. Representatives of forty countries and 27 international organizations were in attendance. Only a few streets away from the occupied COMIBOL offices, they discussed means of getting Bolivia out of the terrible crisis it is in. But they 12
Bolivian miners underground (DR) could not come up with the slightest agreement.
Quite nearby, the workers meeting in the COMIBOL offices were discussing how to solve the crisis of the country's biggest enterprise in accordance with the interests of the working class. This is an enterprise, moreover, that can take charge of finding and exploiting mineral deposits, selling and exporting mineral products, importing machines, tools, and consumer goods to meet the needs of the mining centers. MINERS ASSEMBLY CAPTURES THE CENTER OF THE POLITICAL STAGE
The same day, the minister of planning and coordination, Arturo Nunez del Prado, announced at the round table on international cooperation: "Neither the government nor the people want a socialist society, but only a nationally independent society with a mixed economy."
The bourgeois press very reluctantly accorded the occupation of COMIBOL a greater importance than the UN-sponsored round table. At the mining company offices, there was quite a different tempo of journalistic activity than at the National Bank, where the round table was going on.
Two days after the COMIBOL occupation, the bosses, military, and government ministers got together to declare the workers Administrative Council illegal. On April 22, President Hernan Siles Suazo addressed a message to the entire country in which he called the miners leaders "anarcho-syndicalist." Their action, he said, had been an adventure in which they manipulated the workers.
Calling it an "irritating violation of the constitution," Siles Suazo declared the occupation of COMIBOL illegal and assured the population that he had the necessary authority to deal with the workers, who, he said, "by their inopportune initiatives could throw the country into anarchy and bring about the downfall of the country and the collapse of democracy."
In the same message, the UDP president said that he would not accept workers-majority co-management, that there would be no workers control in the private enterprises, and that the economy would remain mixed.
Under the pressure of the workers action, the president spoke clearly for the
first time to the workers who brought him to power, the workers to whom he had promised co-management and workers control.
By publicly coming to the defense of the bourgeoisie, declaring the miners outlaws and calling them anarcho-syndicalists in cahoots with the far right, Siles Suazo revealed his true class nature. He also forgot that it was the workers, particularly the miners, who by shedding their blood and waging a general strike brought down the dictatorship of General Garcia Meza.
The Bolivian Communist Party, which is part of the government coalition, is implicated in Siles Suazo's course. If it were genuinely representing the workers' interests in the UDP government, it would have broken immediately with the regime on this occasion. To the contrary, it went along with President Siles Suazo's attacks on the workers and adopted an ambiguous attitude toward the issues.
In reality, the Communist Party's attitude is clear. It is following the logic of reformism. Only this could enable it to remain part of a government that declares publicly to the international community that it does not want socialism but only a nationally independent society based on a mixed economy, and at the same time holds up this bourgeois democratic government to workers as a socialist one.
WORKERS AND PEASANTS UNITY
On Fridav April 22 On Friday, April 22, the peasants the peasants fighting for their most pressing demands, set up road blockades, paralyzing La Paz, Oruro, and Potosi. No one could enter these cities. The people who were caught on the road formed an ongoing picket in front of the government offices in La Paz until the conflict was resolved.
The mine technicians and administrative personnel also marched through the streets of La Paz demanding that the government act against the FSTMB and the workers administration of COMIBOL.
The peasants, for their part, let it be known that they were not demonstrating only for their own demands but were also expressing their solidarity with the occupation of COMIBOL, with self-management in the state enterprises and workers control in the private ones.
Thus, the two most important sectors of Bolivian society, the miners and the peasants, concluded a de facto alliance that raised the perspective of a workers and peasants government as the only alternative to the capitalist crisis.
In the papers, big headlines played up the fact that in reality there was another government confronting Hernan Siles Suazo and his vice president, Jaime Paz Zamora - a government represented by
Juan Lechin and Genaro Flores, the main peasant leader.
On Monday, April 25, a special national assembly of the trade unions in the state mines opened in La Paz, following the call of the FSTMB. Support was total for the COMIBOL action, and the decision to fight on until workers-majority co-management was won in the state mines was reaffirmed.
A nine-point platform was then adopted (see box) expressing the determination of the workers. It ended with the following statement: "The National Assembly -of Miners...proclaims a state of emergency in the nationalized mines."
DECISIVE STEPS BY MINERS ASSEMBLY
The miners general assembly continued on April 26. The session that day was devoted to an examination of President Siles Suazo's message denouncing the occupation of COMIBOL. In a 17point document, the FSTMB refuted Siles Suazo's assertions one by one. The entire Bolivian people could follow over the radio the miners assembly discussions exposing the UDP president.
In his speech to the people, Hernan Siles Suazo had claimed in fact that he could not be against the FSTMB, because he was one of the founders of the union.
In their assembly, the miners proved that the president played no role in the founding of the FSTMB nor did he ever play any role in the people's struggle when the chips were down, and what is more, he was going against the FSTMB now by rejecting workers-majority co-management.
The FSTMB's document answering the president ended with the demand for
"the institution of workers-majority co. management as quickly as possible for the good and peace of the country. This is the way to attack immorality, to beat back the rush for government jobs, to honor those who have fallen in the social struggles, this is the way to say 'enough!' 'enough!'"
In the closing session of the miners assembly, which had already declared its support for the struggle of the United Confederation of Working Farmers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), Genaro Flores appeared in the hall. He received an enthusiastic welcome from the miner delegates.
In the name of the Bolivian peasants, he expressed his support for the occupation of COMIBOL and came out for workers' majority co-management and an alliance between the workers and peasants. He said that the future of the country depended on unity between the miners and the poor peasants. He explained that he was against destroying the coca trees, and that it had been discovered how to use coca leaves for medicine and food.
SEND THE FBI BACK TO THE US
Juan Lechin answered that Flores could count on the support of the miners, from whom American imperialism want to take the only thing that made it possible for them to resist hunger and bear the superexploitation in the mines [that is, the coca leaf].
RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MINERS ASSEMBLY
The National Assembly of Miners:
1) Declares, on the basis of the positive results reported by the mines and the FSTMB, that an experiment in workers administration of COMIBOL has begun in Bolivia and that this is the result of the revolutionary consciousness of the Bolivian miners.
2) Unanimously and firmly expresses its approval of the unions in the mines that have formed production and administration councils, through which, in the framework of workers-majority co-management, the workers have taken charge of the main source of national wealth.
3) Unanimously and firmly expresses its approval of the FSTMB executive committee's work to form and organize the administrative council at COMIBOL.
4) Calls on the production and administration councils in the mines to persevere in their work so as to assure that the process of production is improved and expanded in conjunction with technical and administrative reorganization of COMBOL, and so as to assure the establishment of a production plan that will lay the basis for a real policy for the mining industry.
5) Calls on the Executive Committee of the FSTMB, which has the unanimous support of all the miners in the country, to take the necessary steps to consolidate the advance toward workers-majority co-management of COMIBOL.
6) Decides not to give up the occupation and supervision of the mines and to the contrary to reinforce the organization of production and administration councils as the precondition for workers-majority co-management.
7) Declares that the struggle for workers-majority co-management of COMIBOL is inseparable from the struggle for national liberation, which, through the defence and consolidation of the democratic process, will lead to the achievement of the working class' strategic objectives.
8) In view of the COMIBOL's technical and administrative deficiencies, the National Assembly of Miners demands that urgent attention be given to defining the relationship between COMIBOL and ENAF (the national petroleum-refining company) in accordance with the interests of the nationalized trust.
9) Declares a state of emergency in the nationalized mines.
The above points were unanimously approved by the National Assembly of Miners.
(From Combate, organ of the POR-Combate, May 1-15, 1983.) 13
Cocaine control is so important to the
US, Juan Lechin added, that it sends FBI agents here, who are in fact mercenaries and instigators of coups d'etat. These agents should be made to work in their own country and not Bolivia, they should demonstrate their proficiency there in policing the cocaine trade.
As the miners assembly was ending, the CUTB won a complete victory, forcing the government to issue decrees granting them the following gains:
- Participation by the peasant union organizations in planning the Ministry of Agriculture's development projects.
- Formation of an executive committee to administer the emergency agriculture plan, in which the peasant leaders would take part along with the government authorities.
- Authorization for the National Investment Institute to finance a study of organizing the cocaine industry for legal purposes.
- Extension of the general labor law to seasonal workers in the cotton and sugar-cane industries.
- Authorization for organizing transport cooperatives for livestock raisers.
- Turning over uncultivated lands reverted to the state to peasant communities whose livelihood is threatened.
The peasants know that it was by mobilizing and paralyzing the western part of the country that they won this victory. They also know that their miner brothers also contributed to this success, and they are not going to let themselves be cheated of their victory.
MAY DAY - THE CLASS CONFRONTATION SHARPENS
May Day came at a time when the morale of working people throughout the country was at a high point, following the concessions that the government been forced to make. The state mines were controlled by workers councils, the peasants were making steps forward in organizing and doing this in unity with the miners. The government was in a weak position and was involved in forming a new cabinet. It was looking for a solution to refurbish its fading credibility in the eyes of the masses.
May Day highlighted the break between the workers and the UDP government and saw the military whet their bayonets. In his Labor Day speech to the country, President Siles Suazo said: "Unless co-management is on a parity basis, the Bolivian state will be weakened."
For its part, the COB called on the workers of the country to demonstrate in support of workers-majority co-management in the nationalized mines, workers control in the private sector, and participation by the COB in deciding the policy of currency exchange rates.
Other slogans were also put forward. They included rejection of the demands 14
SUPPORT COMBATE
Combate, the organ of the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido
Obrero Revolucionario - POR, Bolivian section of the Fourth International) regularly reports the work of the
POR-Combate and working-class struggles in the country.
For example, the latest issues that have reached Paris, Nos. 117 and 118,
April 1-15 and May 1-15, focus on the fight for workers-majority co-management in the state enterprises.
The themes taken up by Combate are the central ones in the Bolivian workers mobilizations. Issue No. 117 for example has an article describing the debate going on in the miners movement on workers-majority co- management. The following issue,
May 1-15, gives the position of the
POR-Combate on the FSTMB's action of the International Monetary Fund, suspension of payments on the foreign debt until the country was able to meet its obligations, solidarity with Nicaragua and the Salvadoran people, punishment of those who perpetrated crimes under the military dictatorships and all those who violated human rights, implementation of the agrarian program presented by the CSUTCB.
The vice president, Jaime Paz Zamora, marched with the cortege of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), his party. As for the president, he did not even venture out on his balcony to view the parade.
THE MASS RADICALIZATION
WORRIES THE REACTIONARIES
The commander in chief of the armed forces, General Alfredo Villaroel, and the chief of the general staff, General Luis Anez, said in Cochabamba that the armed forces were getting more and more worried about the occupation of COMIBOL. It was rumored that Rico Toro, a military gorilla in exile in Argentian is already preparing a coup for June. What is certain is that the break developing between the workers and the government is posing the question of who governs in the country, in the mines, and in the countryside. If the military had an alternative plan, they would not have hesitated to attempt a coup d'etat before now. This situation cannot go on forever. (3)
This is a process in which, despite their victories, the workers and peasants are not yet masters of the country, even though they hold the main state enterprise in their hands. The government remains in the hands of reformists and bourgeois democrats. There is not yet a revolutionary situation, since dual power does not yet exist. However, the situation could evolve in this direction if the workers and peasants forces take a clearer attitude toward the government. This would involve consolidating workersmajority administration in COMIBOL and taking control of COMIBOL, and it publishes a long document from the miners union responding to the president's attacks on their struggle.
Each of these issues also, of course, take up international questions, in particular the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Central America.
However, given the economic crisis afflicting Bolivia, it is difficult to assemble the resources necessary to keep a workers press coming out regularly. So, we are appealing to all those who want to help assure the regular publication of the revolutionary
Marxist press in Bolivia to send financial contributions to International
Viewpoint, 2 rue Richard-Lenoir,
93100 Montreuil, France. Checks should be made out to Paniel Bensaid, with "for Combate" written on the back. establishing the independence of th workers and peasants from the ruling classes. This independence could be embodied in the COB and the formation of a broad united front of the workers organizations, parties, and people's councils. This front should also show an openness to discontented middle layers that are incapable of playing a leading role in this process.
The Revolutionary Workers PartyCombate (POR-Combate), Bolivian section of the Fourth International, is striving to direct the sentiment for unity toward the formation of a united front. It is pursuing this objective by encouraging the organization of people's councils in the neighborhoods, mining centers, and peasant communities, and by encouraging these councils to group around the COB. An important aspect is preparing for selfdefense in every union, neighborhood, and community in order to prevent yet another massacre. There must not be another slaughter of miners and peasants, and this can only be prevented if the workers defend their gains with their own militias.
At this crucial moment in the struggle of the Bolivian working class, the international solidarity of workers throughout the world is vital. 3. The right is reacting more and more sharply to the mass mobilization. Some sections of it are focusing on the demand for the ouster of the Communist ministers from the UDP government. Others, such as the former dictator Hugo Banzer's ADN and Paz Estenssoro's MNR-H go further. They call for a struggle to wipe out "anarchy" and "halt the advance of Communism in Bolivia." Following in their wake, two former military officers recently expelled from the armed forces, ex-colonels Norberto Salomon Soria and Javier Alcoreza, respectively the former chief of fighter aircraft and former minister of finance, put a document in the papers under the slogan: "Against Communist Dictatorship, Elections in 1983." In this document they say clearly: "Only one solution is left for our armed forces - to demand that the government of the country be put in the hands of the Supreme Court so that it can...call general elections for July of this year." (from the Mexico city daily, Uno mas Uno, of April 4, 1983.)