International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Europe: Albania: Half Victory, Half Defeat

· International Viewpoint No. 294, November 1997 · pp 6-8 · 1,607 words

Those who wanted to vote again Milosevic's candidate for the Serbian presiAlbania Half victory The Albanian insurrection stopped halfway. Victory has been seized by a "Socialist" party whose first concern is "disarming the armed citizenry" Georges Mitralias In late June and early July the dictatorial president Sali Berisha's suffered a crushing electoral defeat, and Fatos Nano's socialists took a majority of seats large enough to enable them to revise the constitution. So, at first glance all is well in a country that, just four months ago, was at the edge of civil war.

The first lesson to draw from these events is clear: struggle pays! President Berisha and his police regime, which seemed unshakeable, have been swept aside. The central demand of the Albanian people has been satisfied. The road travelled in only four months is enormous. The Albanian example will not fail to inspire all those — in the Balkans and elsewhere - who face antidemocratic regimes of the same type.

That said, this indisputable popular victory has nonetheless left a bitter taste. First, victory was usurped, seized by those in the elite who got along well with Berisha, his secret police and their "pyramid schemes," and those "oppositionists" who limited their protest to a few calls for dency, Zoran Lilic, could either abstain or vote for Vojislav Seselj. The ultranationalist, who rose to fame as the leader of a racist militia during the civil war, received more first round votes than any other candidate. But since less than half of eligible voters participated, a new election will be held within three months. The danger of the truly fascist and centralising policy (threatening Montenegro and Kosovo) that Seselj represents may lead to the mobilisation of the abstentionists in the re-run. Deals between the Socialist Party and part of the opposition could also take place. Or the opposition may again try to form a coalition against Milosevic and Seselj.

Seselj's social basis is among ethnic Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. They are unwelcome in Serbia, where they are concentrated among the poorest part of Serbian society. The drama is increasingly that the extreme right is the only force which has a "social" discourse. The "left" which aspires to integration in the "modern" , civilised world, does not share this concern. Like left parties across Eastern Europe, it concentrates on supporting liberal policies and NATO membership, rather than "social demagogy". , half defeat help directed to the European Union and the United States.

The election winners do not intend to satisfy any of the people's other demands (full compensation to the victims of the "pyramid schemes" , arrest Berisha and his collaborators, dismantle the repressive apparatuses, etc.) Nothing suggests that those who won the June 29 elections are qualitatively different from yesterday's executioners.

While Berisha sits safe and secure in the new Albanian Parliament, banking establishments like Vefa, enriched by the "pyramids," continue their activities as if nothing had happened. The Nano government has other things to worry about. For Nano, the top priority is "disarming the armed citizenry"! Not disarming bandits, note, but "the armed citizenry"!

It was the armed citizens and their insurrection which obliged Berisha to form the "transitional" government of Socialist Party leader Bashkim Fino. It was armed citizens who freed Fatos Nano from Berisha's jails. It was the armed citizens who resisted repeated attacks and obliged the regime to accede to elections. And it was the armed citizens who voted for the Socialists and their allies on June 29th.

It is as if all this never happened. For Fatos Nano, like for the IMF, the European Union and western editorialists, it was all only "Albania's tribal traditions

Bosnian mixed results

Unlike the Serbian presidential elections, Bosnian municipal voting mobilised a huge proportion of the electorate (including "absentee" participants, who cast votes in their commune of origin, rather than where they live now).

The final results were not known as we went to press, but it seems that those in the Republika Srpska (RS) who opposed Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's SDS voted either for Seselj's Radical Party, or the Socialist party (SP), which supports the president of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic has succeeded in ensuring that new parliamentary elections will be held in November, as Plavsic has requested

The implementation of the Dayton agreements is the pre-condition for any international subsidies to re-build the wartorn Republika Srpska. As a result, Plavsic, like Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, has decided to collaborate with the western powers in the trial of the most extreme war criminals. This could prove to be an important source of resistance to Seselj.

In Plavsic's stronghold of Banja Luka, coming to the surface" when the financial pyramids collapsed!

But the Albanian people's armed insurrection did happen. Despite its (understandable) programmatic limits, its (predictable) democratic illusions and its (excusable) organisational weaknesses, the insurrection established a counter-power, and dominated the Albanian political scene through four long months which made Albania tremble.

Where are the insurgents now? What of their insurrection? At first glance, they have vanished without a trace. Even in the rebellious and suspicious South, Fatos Nano is celebrated as the country's saviour. For the moment, the new government rules as absolute master and there is no obvious discontent.

This is no surprise. The insurrectionary committees were not prepared for such a change in the situation. Having accepted the possibility of a proxy victory over Berisha, the rebelling citizens and National Salvation Committee put their trust in the Socialists who had promised them the earth

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND EDUCATION the opposition (mainly the Socialist Party) seems to have won a majority of votes.

Another feature of the elections in the RS is the strong result of the "Coalition for a single and democratic Bosnia," dominated by the SDA of Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, a "Bosniak" (Bosnian Muslim), in alliance with Haris Siladjic, . whose party split from the SDA, and two smaller parties. Thanks to absentee ballots, the coalition could even win a majority of votes in Srebrenica, ethnically cleansed of its Muslim majority during the war. The coalition seems to be in the lead in most of the municipalities in the Muslim-Croat Federation, including the capital, Sarajevo.

The Coalition's defeat in Tuzla by the multi-ethnic and democratic United List led by Selim Beslagic confirms the popularity of the mayor and his centre-left supporters. But it also reflects the fact that much of the town's refugee population chose to vote in Srebrenica, from where they were expelled.

Another factor to watch was the strong result of the Social Democratic Party, in Sarajevo and elsewhere. It surprised observers by doing better than Beslagic's United List everywhere except Tuzla.

It remains to be seen where to situate (including their defrauded savings). Tired and frightened by Berisha's tension strategy, and the development of uncontrolled Mafia-style armed gangs, in the end they preferred to await solid evidence of the new rulers' capacities. Their national co-ordinating committee met for the last time in Vlore on July 11-12 and adjourned without setting another meeting.

Still, the co-ordination had the time to warn that the Nano government will be judged on its actions. And they affirmed that all the initial demands remained. And significantly, they preferred not to answer the new authorities, who were already demanding that they lay down their arms. With one voice, all Albanians declare even now that will only surrender their arms when they have their money back.

No stabilisation, even the most basic, of the economic situation can be foreseen in the medium term. If we add the Nano government's firm intention to apply the full IMF "reconstruction programme" which plans as a priority "drastic cuts in public spending" " then it's not difficult to

Europe *

Zagreb

CROATIA

SERB

Belgrade

REPUBLIC

•Bihac

*Banja

Luka

SERBIA

BOSNIA

*rajevo

CROAT-MUSLIM

FEDERATION

Mostar

Dayton agreement line

Adriatic

MONTENEGRO

Sea

KOS.

ovo

100

ALBANIA 1 such a party in the broad spectrum of central and East European "social democratic"

parties today. But their votes certainly express a popular resistance to nationalist and neo-liberal policies. These results sound like an open criticism of the

OSCE policy which, both in Brcko and in

Tuzla, made last moment concessions to the local dominant nationalist party

(respectively the SDS and HDZ) who wanted to boycott those elections for fear of their own defeat. *

The new prime minister and Socialist Party man Fatos strong

Nano: "the central axes of our foreign policy will be Albania's joining the European

Union and NATO, as well as developing our relations with the

United States."

imagine what might happen in this country where unemployment has reached 80% and 40% of the population lives below the absolute poverty line.

The Socialist Party's state of grace can't last forever. Given that the new regime's margin of manoeuvre remains very narrow, despite its total faithfulness to the west. and especially to its patron, the

US, much will depend on how hard it will

(soon) demand that the "armed citizenry"

turn in their guns.

A slide to authoritarianism can't be ruled out: the IMF insists that as an absolute condition for any extension of credit, that the Nano government have total control over all Albanian territory.

control over all Albanlan termitory.

But the Albanian people is still on the alert, and could again take to the streets to push through its demands. And the next time, it will doubtless do so with many fewer illusions. *

7

The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: an overview by Catherine Samary

• £5/$6.50. Cheque payable to P. Rousset, HIRE, Postbus 53290, 1007 Amsterdam, Netherlands.

* Spain

← Europe: Ex-Yugoslavia: Polarisation Continues · Europe: Spain: ETA — A View from the Left →

Something wrong on this page?