against the opposition of Britain, represent the divisions among the bourgeoisie internationally about the
Mitterrand's austerity policy solution to this question and Britain's role here.
But I think that for conscious revo-
Since the election of the Mitterrand government in France on May 10, 1981 there lutionaries the key question is to realhave been a series of strikes in the car industry, although most other industrial secise Ireland's strategic importance.
It's tions have stayed quiet despite the austerity measures introduced by the government.
a country dominated by imperialism.
In early March Penny Duggan spoke to Jacques, a member of the LCR (French
It is also a country that is on the edges section of the Fourth International) who works at the major Flins plant of the naof Europe and part of the EEC.
So tionalised Renault company about these strikes, and particularly that at Renault there isn't any solution here that is a
The question resolves itpartial one.
self into the victory of imperialism or the victory of the workers.
The victory of imperialism would have consequences world wide. To mention just the entry of the 26 counties into
NATO and the establishment of Ireland as an armed beach head in the deployment of Cruise missiles and in the war drive of imperialism.
A defeat for imperialism would have the opposite effect.
In the words of both Lenin and James Connolly - it would provide a spark for fuelling the
European revolution. So, the national question in Ireland isn't some sort of optional question, it's a strategic question
It's not in world revolutionary politics.
something that exists on the sidelines.
It's something that demands action now.
Q.
So, just to end can you tell us what People's Democracy will be doing in the next while?
A. I should say at this point that PD has been going through a difficult period since the ending of the hunger strike.
This was partly due to an overestimation of the possibilities of the situation, also to the failure of our organisation to realise the full meaning of the programme of
Flins itself.
Question. Why have we waves of strikes in the car industry?
Answer. To answer that question I'll just have to go back over what has happened in the car plants in the past few
There was a series of struggles and strikes as early as Autumn 1981. These started in Renault Sandouville, continued in Renault Billancourt and Renault Maubeuge. A series of strikes broke out in Renault Flins itself in April 1982. This started among the fork-lift truck drivers. The main question was grading, which in effect meant wages.
The drivers went on strike, blocking the production lines and quite rapidly, within a week, these several hundred workers won their demands.
After this, the unskilled production workers, seeing that it was possible to win, also went on strike on the question of grading weeks. They also blocked the production lines, and were locked out by the management. Nevertheless their strike ended in what they considered was victory. So, one after the other, the fork-lift drivers and the unskilled (OS) workers went on
For years this had prevented any real organisation of the workers, and thus any struggles against the bosses on work conditions or wages.
The strike by the OS workers at Flins, who were mainly immigrants, while the fork-lift drivers, and the workers involved in struggles the previous Autumn, were mainly French, had given the immigrant OS at Cirtoen and Talbot the confidence to go into struggle. After these strikes, the CSL lost considerable support and the CGT (Confederation Generale du Travail - CP dominated union federation) grew rapidly, with thousands of workers joining. Thus the power of the employers in the factory, who work hand in glove with the CSL, was considerably weakened.
I would say that in these first strikes in 1982 the aspect of workers dignity vis-a-vis the bosses was crucial. After the May/June strikes at Citroen and Talbot the situation was quite confused - with the employers attempting to go back on the gains the workers had won. At Flins the situation returned almost to normal, although there were small sectoral conflicts involving a few dozens or hundreds of workers.
Trotskyism in Ireland
We've recently had our annual confer- In large measure, they gained the con- this year? ence and that's meant a new turn for the organisation. This turn is in the direction of developing our programme, building our organisation, and making a real turn to the Irish working class. I think that to understand this, in general terms, what you have to understand is the dynamic of the Irish revolution.
What you have is a politically conscious vanguard which organises traditionally around the Republican moment. Then you have a layer of workers in struggle that traditionally organises through the trade-union movement. The sectoralist way in which both these structures organise means that neither by themselves can lead to victory. What People's Democracy represents is a politically conscious movement organised around a Marxist programme. What we're trying to do now is strengthen that political consciousness in order to make the fusion of all three traditions a reality. 14 strike and won. fidence to do this from the victory of Mitterrand and the Socialists in the May 1981 elections. Up until that point the memory of the Flins workers was heavily marked by their last strike in 1978, which ended in failure. This was a strike in the press shop which was ended by the intervention of the police. Forty-eight workers were sacked as a result.
From that point up until 1981, there were a few fragmented and sporadic struggles, but nothing much. But after the May 10 election victory the workers felt they could go on strike without the CRS (militarised police) immediately appearing in the factory.
After the Flins strikes in April 1982, there was a series of strikes at Citroen and Talbot. These strikes were to deal with an old problem that these workers had: the presence of a fascist union, the CSL (Confederation des Syndicats Libres, Confederation of Free Trade Unions).
Then what happened in January
A. This relates to the wages policy of the government and management. Austerity measures have been in force since 1982 that have driven down the buying power of the workers. The Renault management planned to limit wage rises to 7 per cent for 1983, with another 1.5 per cent eventually if the company made a profit - which in effect was an anti-strike clause. And 7 per cent as everyone knows is below inflation.
That was one aspect. The other was that after the April 1982 strikes the management undertook to set up training programmes that would enable the work. ers to reach higher grades, which would mean higher wages. Very little was done on this, which created an atmosphere of discontent, expressed in the sectoral struggles I mentioned earlier.
This discontent was to be expressed
greatest force in the strike that broke out in the paintshop at the beginning of January. Just before that there was a dispute in the R5 body shop. That could have extended, but the workers there decided to stop.
The next day the paintshop went on strike around two essential 300 francs wage rise for all, and regrading, which would also have meant wage increases. The demand was for almost all the workers to be moved to the top OS grade, and those already in it to be moved up - in effect that meant the creation of a new grade. There were also minor demands on working conditions, provision of showers, replacements so that workers on the line could go and piss, ete.
These demands challenged both the management's wages poliey, whole career system in the Renault company, which is very complicated. Everybody knew that if the spray painters won these demands, then one after the other every other section would come out for
The workers settled into the strike, and the management quickly responded by a lockout. This took us by surprise, that it was done so quickly. Then we were faced with the classic problem of a struggle at Flins. It is an enormous plant, with 18,000 workers, and many sections are miles apart. So the blokes don't know each other. To extend and generalise struggles is very difficult, although this is of course very important, particularly when, as in this case, the demands are those that can unity the workers.
despite the fact that the demands concerned all the OS workers, that is, the majority in the plant, a large majority found themselves simply spectators. situation of course was not helped by the rapid lockout. There is another difficulty. The workers can live as far as seventy miles from the plant. Therefore, to propose, for example, an occupation has been impossible up till now. We did so in April 1982 - the idea seemed to the other workers to come from another and manoeuvre to get the spray painters back to work and stop the flames spread-
Their final offer was accepted. This gave between 190 and 275 francs according to category. The fact that this diffferential offer was accepted shows that there are still divisions among the workers according to grade. But the struggle was a real success. Some of the workers got very nearly 300 francs. And they had to give all the workers in the company 120 francs rise per month. wages policy of 7 percent for 1983. It probably represented between 8 and 11 per cent according to grade.
These rises were won by the struggle. All the previous negotiations had got nothing - and not even the most bureaucratic trade-union leadership could have put the frighteners on the car industry employers, but on all the big employers. They see it as a 'bad example' for other workers who are facing attacks on their buying power - and have the example of Renault before their eyes.
I should just add that at the same time as the paintshop strike, there were two other smaller ones involving a few dozen workers. These were in the plating and delivery sections. They also took up the demand for 300 francs for all. But in the plating section it was also a bit like April 1982, on the question of workers right to self-organisation. This section has not had a strike for fifteen years. Traditionally the supervisory personnel are fascist inclined, and working conditions are very
In these rather particular conditions the strike ended more or less in de-
The delivery section won a half-
It was very difficult to link up these sections that were in struggle at the same time. The CFDT tried to make links a uttle bit. But the CGT tried not
There are some particular problems in organising struggles at Flins. the tradition of blocking the line - that is, to physically block the production line which runs like a serpent through the facimmigrant workers in particular are very reluctant to meet, have discussions about what to do, and vote. Because they feel to vote is to divide. So the only time they will vote is when they're sure there's almost total agreement - like when the first offer was rejected, or the second accepted.
Q. Which union has the majority in the plant? And can you tell us a bit about how they organise?
A. Until last year it was the CGT which had the support of the majority of the workers. But in April 1982 the CFDT clearly advanced, and the relationship of forces changed. This was confirmed in the elections for the Comite d'Entreprise (1) which took place just after the paintshop strike. There the CFDT got 47 percent and the CGT 43 percent. In the previous elections two years ago the CGT got 56 per cent and the CFDT
I should explain that this strength is not reflected in actual union membership. The rate of actual union membership in Renault Flins is less than 10 per cent. But, as it is the unions who put forward the lists for candidates to be elected both to the CE, and as the equivalent of what you would call shop stewards, their influence is much stronger than it appears.
The low rate of unionisation is partly explained by a distrust of the unions. And that many workers identify the workers representatives almost as part of the institution of the factory rather than their own. So there is a tendency at Flins that negotiations there are a direct ne gotiation between direct shopfloor representatives and the management, rather than it going through the structures. This helps the tendency towards self-organisation. Though it is under-developed. For example, the strike committee in April 1982 was not elected, but was the workers who are accepted as leaders by the others who came forward and constituted
The shift between the CGT and the CFDT took place because in April 1982 it was the CFDT that seemed closest to the planet. 22220
The management locked out not the likely to join the dispute - some 11,000 plant.
But the painters continued their strike. Management offered an increase of 140 francs per month, but this was massively rejected. During January the paintshop at Renault Billancourt went on strike for essentially the same demand - 300 franes for all. Most of their demands were granted quite rapidly and they were back at work within a week. Then the trim shop at Billancourt went out for the 300 francs.
The management were getting really worried! They knew that if the demand and the strikes began to spread they would be in real trouble. So, after the massive rejection of their first offer by the paintshop at Flins they decided to try
What then happens is that those workers who come after that particular section have no work - no cars are passing in front of them. So they say - why come
We're not working, it would just mean losing wages. It's not a wrong tactic in principle, but it's not a very good one - it creates enormous problems in extending a strike.
The workers on strike either spend their time in their own section - or parading throughout the factory all day long calling on the other workers to come out on strike. With a plant as enormous as Renault Flins, and sections that are so spread out, the only way to keep up solidarity, and reach the other workers is in this way — staying together and moving round the whole plant. It is a bit suryou're used to another plant, pickets on the gates, etc.
Then there's another problem. The workers, that basically supported the struggle through and through. CFDT at Flins is a bit particular - it is known as left wing, and oppositional to the leadership. In April it supported the moves towards self-organisation by the workers — the formation of a strike committee and so on.
These attempts were quite limited, and were not taken up again in the paintshop strike. That was largely due to the fact that there were fewer workers in struggle. The whole factory was not on strike so, the need for a strike committee appeared less clearly. And then you had the two unions who each did their own thing and didn't try to get together — there was absolutely no attempt at unity.
Comite d'Entreprise: a parity body between workers and management which is supposed to discuss questions of the organisation of the plant and workforce.
15
worrying, but it is an old problem at Flins.
The press talked a lot about the fact that it was immigrant workers on
What effect did this have among The media have presented strikes of both last April and this January as simply strikes by immigrant workers. This is not exactly true - there were French workers involved in the strikes. But it is undoubtedly true that the bulk of the workers, and the most combative, were immigrants.
But the question was a revolt by the unskilled workers against their conditions - and the majority of the unskilled car workers in the Paris region are immigrants. It's as simple as that.
The racist campaign against the striking workers, particularly the speech by the prime minister Mauroy, was disgusting nounce the strikes as a plot by Islamic fundamentalists to destabilise the French car industry is just crazy. Flins those who were most taken aback by this attack were the militant immigrant workers themselves, who have nothing to do with Islamic fundamentalism.
Mauroy talked about Shiite because there aren't any Shiites in Morocco, and most of the immigrant workers are Moroccans. It's just the same old trick as the right wing government used to use every time there was a workers struggle to play it down. To say it was a plot hatched in Moscow or something. It's exactly the same system workers struggle is a plot manoeuvred by I don't know who or what.
Of course the immigrant workers do have their cultural traditions, and most of them are believers. But that has nothing to do with why they strike for better
But all this is a very serious problem. It had a very precise purpose — to intimidate the immigrant workers, and sow divisions between them and the French work-
And it is worrying because it is not clear it did not succeed. Obviously there were divisions before, and this campaign has increased them.
What do you think will happen
A. It's difficult to say. The French and immigrant workers do not have the same level of consciousness, do not have the same attitude towards the govern-
The immigrant workers were overjoyed by May 10, 1981, the promise of change. Of course, they hadn't been able to express their opinion because they don't have votes.
The first governmental measures, the halt on expulsions, the regularisation of the status of those without papers, gave confidence to them, and a favourable impression of the government.
They felt as if an additional major obstacle that they faced, of continuous police harassment, the risk of being expelled if they so much as opened their mouths or went into struggle, had dis-
So they felt more confident about going into struggle. And they saw for example that in April 1982, when there were strikes, and the production lines were blocked, that the CRS did not immediately appear in the factory as they had every other time, like in 1978 So, the April 1982 strikes and the victory they won increased their confidence.
Among the workers today it's a bit different. There's a widespread feeling that it's not normal to go on strike when you have a left government. There is the idea that this government, elected by a majority of the working class, should satisty their demands. workers have the feeling that to go on strike puts the government in the wrong, and it's better to avoid it. Some workers have gone beyond that and explain that it is not strikes that hurt the left, but the struggle to have our demands met. the vast majority of French workers are not on this level today - and this creates a sharp division between French and immigrant workers which is very dangerous.
Obviously the ministerial speech, the racist campaign, struck a chord among the workers, and the effects are still un-
But I can see the effects every The Moroccan comrades were com letelv shocked bv these sort of state ments, and don't understand them. They say they would rather deal with the CRS than this sort of thing - which is so pernicious it's much worse than the CRS you can confront physically. Many of the immigrant workers are very angry, quite justifiably.
But what is worrying is that some of the immigrant workers are tending to say, •We're fed up with being the ones who fight first, and fight for all, when the French workers do nothing or much less. We're the ones who bear the brunt of the attacks. We're fed up and we're not going to move unless the French workers do first.' I hear this every day.
Doesn't it just sound like what the government is aiming for? To produce a situation of passivity and division among the workers. It's extremely worrying.
But do you think this will last? You have also said that the workers are full of confidence in their ability to
Well, this is a new situation. On the one hand there is the confidence and mobilisation among the workers. On the other hand there are these elements of division, which have of the French workers could grow, and it remains to be seen how far the immigrant workers refuse to move.
From this point of view the response to the attempts to sack elected workers representatives after the strikes at both Citroen Aulnay and Renault Flins was very important. At Citroen the CGT responded weakly. But in Flins the CFDT reacted immediately and called a strike -it was CFDT members who were threat-
The CFDT felt in a strong position the elections which had just been held, as I mentioned earlier. was a big success, 2,500 workers. years since there was such a big strike the CFDT leadership to vote to support the Renault Flins section.
Were there any women workers involved in the struggle?
Very, very few. There are very few women workers at Renault, it's very much a man's world, so that already makes it difficult for women to get involved, and they are in marginal or auxiliary sections, not production. one woman trade-union militant who is a shop steward but it took years for her to become accepted.
Of course, the trade union could do a lot more in the way of education and enMuslim immigrant workers who of course have a particular traditional view of wo-
There are Spanish and Portugese women workers here but
Q. Finally can you just tell us what intervention the comrades of the LCR have
Really, we've only been present again over the last two years. our intervention was from the outside through leaflets and so on. Now we have comrades working in Flins.
We're known as trade-union militants to the mass of the workers, and as members of the LCR within the union. We've shown that we're there in the struggles and we have ideas to offer about how they can be carried forward undoubtedly a recognisable political force with our own ideas. I would say we have as much weight as the other Trotskyist organisation, Lutte Ouvriere, who have been in the plant for years.
This is a favourable situation for us because the workers are asking political questions and want answers. ample, we're just coming up to the municipal elections, and they're saying, We voted in 1981 and we're still waiting for change. I'm not going to go out on Sunday to vote.'
Whether they would be ready to vote for the sort of alternative we offer in 'La Voix des Travailleurs Contre l'Austerite' the LO and LCR, see IV No 23, 7 February 1983) is another
We were not able to do much about the electoral campaign during the strike - it would have seemed a diversion from the struggle. Anyway, the workers live in such dispersed areas we couldn't tell what effect it would have
But the outcome of the elections will have an effect - if the right come out well, the bosses and the formen will feel themselves much stronger, more arrogant. They'll be stricter on the line, and the workers will feel demoralised. workers feel deceived by this government and they're looking for an answer.