Guate - despite th the struggl
*The women were raped and the people Dave HAYES
Since the 1954 CIA-organised overthrow of the 'reformist' Arbenz government, Guatemala has had series of military regimes. An initial guerrilla resistance led by Yon Sosa and Turcos Lima got started in 1962, but was stamped out by brutal repression in 1967.
To date, more than 50,000 people have been killed by these repressive regimes. But, with the formation of the Central American Common Market and the exploitation of nickel and oil resources, the economy grew significantly There was a certain industrial development.
Army commanders amassed personal fortunes through state-aided development projects, particularly in the north. Displacement of the inhabitants in those areas meant massacres of the Indians, who constitute more than half of Guatemala's population.
However, by 1982 this relative stabi-
Australian workers are not beaten or demoralised.
If the oil workers are able to defeat the wage freeze, they will set an example that is likely to be taken up by many other sectors. 1983 could be a very hot year for an Australian ruling class already reeling under the sudden impact of a crisis to which they believed themselves to be immune. mala e massacres e continues herded into the churches. then tortured lity was being severely undermined. First, the economic boom ended. The Central American Common Market, broke up. And the world recession set in (GNP rose by 7.4% in 1976, by 3.5% in 1980, in 1981 by 1%; and in 1982, it is expected to drop by 3.5%).
This crisis was aggravated by poor capitalist management of the economy, resulting from the scramble by various corrupt army eliques to corner various markets and projects. At the same time, the spread of the resistance frightened off both local and foreign investment.
THE GUERRILLA RESISTANCE
The second factor in the breakdown of stability is that the revolutionary forces learned some lessons from the defeat of the 1962-67 guerrilla struggle. They came to understand that systematic mass work, particularly among the poorest, Indian majority in the altiplano (the highlands in the centre of the conand massacred. Children were smashed against the ground or else taken by the feet and their heads crushed against the tree trunks and then their still warm brains eaten. Occasionally the soldiers get the children to play and then throw a grenade into the middle of the group....Many are cut up and killed with machetes....Soldiers take out the still throbbing livers from their victims and eat them as if they were some sort of delicacy' some sort of delicacy. (Report published at the end of 1982 by Bishops See of San Christobal de las Casas — Le Monde, February 4, 1983.)
*Rios Montt is a man of great integrity faced with a challenge from guerrillas armed and supported from those outside Guatemala...Rios Montt is getting a "bum rap." (Reagan, during his December 82 trip to Guatemala, Le Monde, December 8, 1982.)
Guatemala has the largest population and economy of all the Central American states and, according to a former US secretary of State, the outcome of the guerrilla war there 'has much more important consequences in terms of dangers for the interests of the United States than the war in Salvador'. (Inprecor, No 127, May 31, 1982).
After Reagan's recent trip to Guatemala the official embargo on military aid imposed by Carter in 1977 was lifted. Spare parts for helicopters — vital equipment in counter-insurgency operations — are already on their way.
Some of the 'authoritative' press claim that Rios Montt's regime has the guerrillas on the run. Has the Reagan administration and the Guatemalan military junta stabilised one of the key countries in the Central America cauldron?
and massacred. Children were smashed against the ground or else taken by the feet and their heads crushed against the tree trunks and then their still warm brains eaten. Occasionally the soldiers get the children to play and then throw a grenade into the middle of the group....Many are cut up and killed with machetes....Soldiers take out the still throbbing livers from their victims and eat them as if they were some sort of delicacy. (Report published at the end of 1982 by Bishops See of San Christobal de las Casas — Le Monde, February 4, 1983.)
*Rios Montt is a man of great integrity faced with a challenge from guerrillas armed and supported from those outside Guatemala...Rios Montt is getting a "bum rap." (Reagan, during his December 82 trip to Guatemala, Le Monde,
Guatemala has the largest population and economy of all the Central American states and, according to a former US secretary of State, the outcome of the guerrilla war there 'has much more important consequences in terms of dangers for the interests of the United States than the war in Salvador'. (Inprecor, No 127, May 31,
After Reagan's recent trip to Guatemala the official embargo on military aid imposed by Carter in 1977 was lifted. Spare parts for helicopters — vital equipment in counter-insurgency operations — are already on their way.
Some of the 'authoritative' press claim that Rios Montt's regime has the guerrillas on the run. Has the Reagan administration and the Guatemalan military junta stabilised one of the key countries in the Central America cauldron?
try) and alongside the militant Christian "local communities' • was essential to build the basis for a successful people's war.
Victory in Nicaragua and the upsurge in El Salvador gave a new fillip to what was the longest tradition of guerrilla struggle in Central America.
In February 1982, the revolutionary groups - the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), ORPA (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms), the FAR (Revolutionary Armed Forces), and the PGT-Nucleo Dirigente (Leadership Nucleus of the Guatemalan Workers Party, a faction of the CP) formed a united revolutionary front called the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union).
During 1981, revolutionary military and political activity increased. It spread to 19 of the 22 departments of Guatemala, and some military experts were giving the regime only about two years to survive.
Thirdly, the crisis of bourgeois leadership, already severe because of the rise of the resistance and the state of the eco- of the resistance and the state of the economy, was made worse by the way President Lucas Garcia's clique took over more and more of the economy and state apparatus. Traditional bourgeois sectors and the other army cliques were in open war against Lucas Garcia and among themselves.
In this context the March 1982 elections resolved nothing since the Lucas Garcia group flagrantly stuffed the ballot boxes. Amidst a general outery from the other bourgeois parties (no real opposition of popular forces could participate in the elections), a group of intermediate ('young') officers seized the initiative and installed a triumvirate that included Rios Montt.
Contrary to some observers' analysis these officers did not represent a 'reformist project. Their main concern was the Lucas Garcia's regime's lack of a coherent political and military strategy to defeat
TRA PGT Nucleo de Direccion Nacional the revolutionary forces. In this respect, their interests coincided with those of US imperialism. This is despite the fact that the coup went against Washington's line of combining a facade of elections with aid for offensives against the guerrillas, who were supposed to be "backed by foreign powers and unwilling to abide by constitutional democracy. Stephen Bosworth, deputy undersecretary of state for inter-American affairs, even said publicly:
"The military coup d'etat can put an end to the political paralysis which exists in the country. (Inforpress, May 6, 1982.) THE PROJECT OF THE NEW REGIME
The strategy of the new regime was to launch a more coherent counter-insurgency campaign, combining repression with political and ideological measures.
Victims of a death squadron(DR)
### FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES
FAR ORP A ORGANIZACION
DEL PUEBLO EN ARMAS Its objectives were the following: to destroy the revolutionaries' social base, to build greater support for the regime in the countryside and the towns, to break the international isolation the regime, and to lay the groundwork for a restoration of direct American military aid.
The general aim was to draw the bourgeoisie and the middle classes (and even the less organised masses) behind the junta's national reconstruction project.
The 'anti-corruption' campaign is a key part of this. The police service and administration in Guatemala City were 'reorganised'. For a few months the 'death squads' were encouraged to leave fewer corpses in the city streets. But in practice the operation involved removing the Lucas Garcia clique from key political and administrative posts. Only a small number of people were arrested, and all were later released. and all were later released.
In fact this demogogic campaign is a handy cover for Rios Montt - now that he has eased out the other two junta members - to build up today his own clientalist base.
Martial law was imposed shortly after the coup and is regularly renewed. Thus, with the political parties also suspended, the Rios Montt group has a free hand for militarising and centralising all political and civic life under its control. This puts it in a good position for any future elections. In exchange for official American aid, there was an unwritten agreement to call elections. Rios Montt has announced he will issue a decree on elections on the March 23, 1983, anniversary of his coup.
RIOS MONTT, MAN OF GOD
The regime is relying on a specific, if bizarre, ideological instrument. Rios Montt is a member of the 'El Verbo' (The Word) protestant evangelical sect (linked
19
to Gospel Outreach in the US). He projects himself as a man of god fighting for moral order against corruption and atheistic communism.
Such US-based sects arrived in force after the 1976 earthquake — to aid with reconstruction. Since then they claim to have converted 22% of the population. They have vast financial resources. Over and above the extent to which the CIA directly works with them, they generally have an anti-Communist, conservative ideology. One of Rios Montt's religious confessors has stated, for example: "The Evangelist recognises the need for firm authority for the sake of protecting the innocent and establishing law and order'. (Quoted in the Paris daily Liberation, December 6, 1982).
### 'BEANS AND GUNS'
Copied from US policy employed in Vietnam, the "beans and guns' policy calls for the neutralisation or destruction of rural villages suspected of being sympathetic to the guerrillas. Within the framework of this policy the largely Indian rural population is being massacred and their homes, animals, and crops burned. After that, aided by Protestant sects and more recently by Guatemala's National Reconstruction Committee (CRN), the army returns to the area, herding the survivors into 'model villages'
These villages which were known as 'strategic hamlets' in Vietnam, are actually glorified concentration camps, where people are forced to collaborate with the army in return for food. This collaboration includes participation in peasant 'militias' (to 'defend' the villages against guerrillas) as well as the reconstruction of villages destroyed by the army.
It is estimated that as part of this plan 5,000 people, essentially Indians, have been massacred since March 1982. Thousands fled to the more inaccessible mountains. But the revolutionary organisations cannot provide food for, or protect, such Demonstration against repression(DR)
large numbers. Therefore, most are forced to return to these 'model villages'
RESISTANCE REORGANISES AND
FIGHTS ON
Given the denounciation of the genocide in the world press in the last six months, the reality of the resistance itself has been a little submerged. Some observers have gone further..."it (the regime) has come close to eliminating the country's guerrilla movement as a serious political threat'. (Economist, December 18, 1982).
It is obvious that, faced with the scale of the counter-insurgency campaign, the revolutionary organisations had to make a considerable effort to adjust their logistic structures. Such vast movements of people implied big organisational changes. The mass organisations and revolutionary groups have to take greater precautions in conditions where the people are held hostage in these model villages and are constantly being threatened with reprisals. The army has not directly defeated the armed resistance in open battle. The resistance is still intact.
Total press censorship under martial law means that foreign correspondents cannot easily get information about army losses. The revolutionary organisations can often get news of losses inflicted on the army only some weeks after the events.
The January issue of Solidarite Guatemala published in Paris, estimates 500 army losses in October - indicating that after a certain lull rebel military actions are still possible in most of the country. New fronts have been opened up by the EGP (in a new zone), the FAR (in the centre of the altiplano) and the ORPA (in the capital where it has been traditionally weak).
According to Inforpress (No.525-7, January 1983) there was more than one officially recognised action in the first fortnight of 1983, and on January 1 14 soldiers were killed in one clash.
The regime has made much of the
'calm' in the capital. On January 20, three police stations in three different zones of the city were attacked and two other actions took place. The death squads are now daily leaving their victims' corpses in the capital. Antisubversive military tribunals executed four EGP militants on September 4, and today ten more militants are threatened with execution.
THE STRENGTH OF THE RESISTANCE
The revolutionary forces are well enough implanted on a national scale to withstand such large scale attacks. The declaration by the faction of the PGT (the Guatemalan CP), which had previously rejected the people's war strategy, that they want to join the URNG further strengthens revolutionary unity.
The revolutionary forces are strongest outside the cities, but have not yet established zones similar to those held by the FMLN in El Salvador. The struggle will be long, but a victory in El Salvador would help bring it closer in Guatemala.
THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY
A barrage of official reports have blasted the Guatemalan regime in the last six months - from Amnesty International, the US National Coun cil of Churches, the American Watch Committees, and others. The United Nations adopted a resolution condemning the regime on December 17, 1982 (by 79 votes for, 16 against, and 45 abstentions).
The Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples recently held an investigation of the repression in Guatemala and issued a report condemning the government.
Emergency action is necessary to save the lives of the ten militants currently threatened with death sentences.
In addition to building protests against repression, it is important to build a movement against imperialist intervention. The recent official renewal of US aid means that the Guatemalan question can be raised within the framework of the ongoing campaign against US intervention in Central America. (But we should not forget the Israelis -previously the main arms suppliers -the South Africans, Chileans, Argentinians, and Taiwanese. While embargo was in force, all of them funnelled in military assistance on behalf of the US.)
Equally important is the campaign to send direct aid to the URNG. In Europe, the front has launched a fund drive in support of its struggle. It desperately needs more resources to better defend the people against the regime.
Finally, a political campaign to get the labour movement and governments to recognise the URNG as a "belligerent party, as had been proposed by the Tribunal of the Peoples' would offer an important protection to the Guatemalan people.
LA LUTHA GOMRATUA IE LOR
TKAKAJADURES
FUCR
20