International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

The Struggle in the Workplaces in Besieged Nicaragua

· International Viewpoint No. 22, 24 January 1983 · pp 6-7 · 1,488 words

Latin America

The struggle in the workplaces in besieged Nicaragua

Recently Heinz Liechti toured Nicaragua visiting factories, agricultural cooperatives, and unions and discussing with many workers, peasants as well as trade-union activists and leaders. In the following article, he points up some of the problems of the Sandinista unions in the present stage, as imperialist pressures increase.

MANAGUA — The San Antonio sugar mill in Chichigalpa, the largest in Central America, has a permanent workforce of 1,000. During the harvest, it takes on an additional 5,000 seasonal workers. The mill belongs to the Pellas family who thus own the biggest private enterprise in Nicaragua.

The Pellas family controls 35% of the national sugar production. The other 65% is in the state sector. The San Antonio workers are among the most conscious and militant in Nicaragua. So, it might be expected that nothing could happen in the mill without the agreement of the Sandinista union, the Ronaldi Altamirano CST, which won its authority during the Sandinista insurection.

THE BOSSES HAVE NOT GIVEN UP

However, since one of the foremost goals of the revolution is to raise production, the bosses have been able to block many moves by the union to improve working conditions. So, the CST cannot show that it has won new material gains for the workers.

One of the objectives of the bourgeoisie is to divide the union movement. It managed to accomplish this in a certain number of enterprises. The method was, right after the Sandinista victory, to grant wage raises higher than those provided for in national targets set by the FSLN.

By means of such material concessions many workers at the San Antonia sugar mill were literally bought. More than 500 workers resigned from the CST. The bourgeois "union," the CTN/CUS claims that it recruited all these workers. A careful study by the CST showed than this was an exaggeration. Only 150 workers joined the yellow union.

THE SANDINISTA RESPONSE

A turn took place in 1981/82. In July 1981, the CST and the Sandinista technicians exposed the policy of the Pellas 9 family in a document addressed to the government. It showed that owners were following a line that went from ignoring the laws against the sabotage of production to "decapitalization" of the enterprise. A demonstration of 2,000 workers backed up the demands that the government deal with the machinations of the Pellas family.

Finally, before and during the last harvest, the CST in the mill was able to go back on the offensive. Since the Pellas family made no attempt to organize the harvest properly, the CST, with the support of the FSLN, presented the bosses with a precise plan for bringing in the sugar cane. An ultimatum was delivered. Either the Pellas carried out the harvest according to the plan, or the CST would take things in hand and expropriate the machines necessary to do it. Pellas had to give in.

In addition, a conflict broke out in a subsidiary. In Rio Grande, the yellow unions dominated in the mill. They had succeeded in driving out the CST. They negotiated a contract with the boss. But he violated 48 of the 50 points agreed on. A conflict ensued.

Despite the division that existed, the CST intervened and backed up all the demands the yellow union was making on the bosses. This exemplary line of working-class unity not only forced the boss to respect the contract and to grant other demands but also led to the total collapse of the bourgeois unions.

Today, the CST local in the enterprise is able to analyze the economic situation of the concern is a detailed and precise way. Nonetheless, its sphere for independant action is limited to monitoring production. It must submit the results of its studies to the government, which alone in this stage of the revolution can set aside the prerogatives of ownership.

Francisco, the union secretary, explained to us it was to be hoped that the enterprise would be socialized totally in the not too distant future. For the time being, it was necessary to keep a close watch on everything the boss did. The militia unit at the plant is maintaining an armed guard over the installations.

ICI-THE LINE OF A MULTINATIONAL

The conditions are still more difficult in Nicaragua's biggest agro-chemical concern, ICI - Casa, a subsidiary of the British chemical trust, ICI. Of the 65 workers in the factory, 50 were members. of the CST up to a year ago. The management left no stone unturned to sabotage production and divide the union. It demanded that the government maintain the fiscal concessions that had been granted by the previous regime.

When the FSLN refused, the company started to organize an investment boycott. The British parent company set up a competing plant in Guatemala. Then, it obliged the Leon subsidiary to buy raw materials at high prices in Guatemala and to sell its finished products there at low prices. In this way, more and more capital was drained off from the Leon enterprise.

The management went so far as to poison the finished products destined for Costa Rica, thereby destroying the plant's market in that country. The union found itself denied any access to the company

*Participatern the revolution, increase production.' (DR)

participa en la revelucion la produccion

TODOS SOMOS RESPONSABLES DE LA PRODUCCION

MINISTERIO DEL TRABAJO

books. The CST union secretary in Leon was even barred from the plant.

Since the FSLN did not want to take on a multinational, the ICI - Casa workers got practically no political support. The management pushed its offensive still further. Workers who were ready to join the yellow union got wage increases. A tennis court was built for it. The yellow union got a loan for building a headquarters. More than thirty workers left the CST, and some of them joined the yellow union. The boss forced the CST union secretary to do a job outside the plant - transporting material to Honduras. Reluctantly, he accepted the assignment. On the road, he just missed being caught in a bombing of his truck. After

In the Lars PALMGREN The following article is from the new year double issue (1-2, 1983) of the Stockholm monthly magazine ETC.

In mid-December war broke out again in Nicaragua.

At least a thousand counterrevolutionaries hit military and economic targets in the northwest of the country.

The Sandinistas accuse Honduras of opening up their territory to the counterrevolutionary forces, saying that the attacks are launched from across the Honduran border.

The Honduran authorities strenuously deny the Sandinistas' accusations, arguing that what is happening in Nicaragua is strictly internal to that country. The Honduran government has even claimed that the Sandinistas are using the claim about counterrevolutionary camps as a pretext for attacking Honduras.

Who is lying?

All indications are that the Honduran government is the big lier. But both the U.S. and the Honduran government have stuck to the same story, and up till now no one had seen the camps.

However, ETC's correspondent was in the border area when the fighting broke out, and along with three other jounalists, he was able, for the first time as far as we know, to visit one of these camps. His report indicates that not only does the Honduran army know about these camps but that it works in close collusion with the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries.

Across the Honduran border, the terrain rises 79 meters, and the vegetation changes from tropical to tall pines, rather like Vastmanland in Sweden. Here between Paraiso in the west and Las Trojes that he refused an order from the company to take material to Guatemala.

THE SANDINISTAS' HANDS TIED

It has been possible for the bosses to get away with this cunning divisionist line up till now essentially for two reasons. First, the agrochemical workers were among the best paid before the revolution. Since the FSLN has been concerned mainly with raising the minimum wage, the revolution has not brought any material gains for the workers at ICICasa.

multinational, since the company is a there is no opening to de camp of the "C in the east, several tens of thousands of Nicaraguans took refuge during Somoza's time. After the Sandinista victory, most of them went home. But in the past two months, about 4,000 new refugees have arrived. Most of them are in the tract around Las Trojes, five hours journey from the capital of the department, Danli.

The road leads to Las Trojes reminds you most of a newly built logging road.

Immediately after coming off the main road, we ran into two Honduran soldiers who were on their way to their base in Las Trojes.

Julio, one of them, was 21 years old, and had been in the army for four years. A small mustache adorned his upper lip.

After a half hour of small talk, we started to talk about Los Contras, the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries.

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