The Bolivian cauldron
-radicalization deepens
When the Bolivian junta agreed to relinquish power to a civilian Argentina, where the dictatorship is on the ropes. But it is also goverhment on September 17, it was standing on the brink of an Uruguay and Chile, where the mass movement is
The workers movement had reorganized and carried out a The debacle of the military dictatorship in Bolivia came in vast general strike against the regime. So, the military withdraw- the context of the growing crisis of U.S. imperialist dominaal was something between a retreat and a headlong flight. It left tion of Latin America, in which the immediate flashpoint is the instruments of bourgeois rule in Bolivia extremely weak radicalization in Bolivia must certainly be an encouragement abyss.
happening in reviving after years in
Central America.
of savage repression, as well as in Brazil.
The opening up of the way for a mass ened, and opened the way for a new rise of mass movement to revolutionaries in Central America, and in fact it objectively that could lead in the relatively near future to a fundamental social confrontation.
the new international context is having a ma-
Bolivia is a small country, but the implications of the process jor effect on the consciousness and confidence of the left and that has begun go far beyond its frontiers.
revolutionaries in Bolivia.
was a key part of the system of military dictatorships that was them cracking, and they know that the Brazilian and Argenbuilt up in the entire southern part of South America, including tine military can no longer intervene against them as they did
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay - the decisive region of in the past. The advances of the fighters in Central America the continent.
In fact, the Brazilian and Argentine dictatorships were direct-
Likewise, the struggle of the Indian people in Guatemala is an ly involved in building the military regime in Bolivia.
encouragement to the most advanced elements of radicalizing
Thus, in many respects,
Bolivia was the weakest link in a peasant movement, which is mainly Indian.
chain of dictatorships that were a vital bulwark of imperialist
Thus, in a sense, Bolivia has become the front line in the and capitalist domination in Latin America. It was the first to second front that is opening up in the fight against imperialbreak, the others are beginning to crack. This is most evident in ism and capitalism in Latin America.
ism, generally under the pressure of a of a government of national unity. Since
S. ROMANDE
LA PAZ - The resignation from the new cabinet January 9 of the MIR ministers is an indication of the pressures on the government that came into office here in
October in the wake of mass mobilizattions, which forced the military to relinweakens imperialism. more radical traditional base.
What the leading bourgeois politicians now see as necessary to build a stable capitalist government is a so-called reunification of the MNR, which would mean a split in the MNR-I. The MNR-I parliamentary faction, led by Alvarez Plata,
They see the dictatorships around the MIR is a newcomer and relative outsider in the conservative camp, it plays the more adventurous game. It could expect a bigger role in a broader coalition.
THE SITUATION REMAINS quish power.
The MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario-Movement of the Revolu- left. tionary Left), although it traces its origins from pro-Cuban guerrillas, is now a con- then be beefed up with an alliance with servative formation. It stands on the right wing of bourgeois nationalism.
The resignation of the MIR ministers was part of moves to rebuild a bourgeois government more stable than the present UDP (Union Democratica Popular), which is a coalition of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) and the two offshoots of the old bourgeois nationalist party, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR).
The MR was the party that came to power on the back of the revolution of 1952, which it progressively liquidated. As it moved to the right, opening the way for a new cycle of military dictatorships, the party split.
The MNR-Historico, led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, represents the sections that openly collaborated with the dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer at the beginning of the 1970s. The MNR-Izquierda (Left), led by the new president, Hernan Siles Suazo, represents those sectors that remained attached to the old populfavors such a "unification."
But it is opposed by the party apparatus and the
This "historic reconciliation" would the ADN of Banzer, the strongest righwing bourgeois party, in the framework
### UNSTABLE
The reason that such maneuvers have begun so early and are being pursued with such haste - even at the risk of rocking a precariously stabilized situation - is that the Bolivian bourgioisie and its UDP/MIR demonstration September 1982 (DR)
3
representatives are well aware that the present balance cannot last very long. They are already preparing an alternative to the UDP government.
Parallel to these party-political maneuvers, the representatives of the Bolivian bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism are trying to rebuild the unity and credibility of the armed forces. On December 28, the director general of the customs service, Carlos Montana, announced that the former head of the junta, General Garcia Meza, who was stripped of his military rank and fled to Argentina, would be charged with smuggling.
In an apartment belonging to the fugitive general, government agents found a stock of TV sets and electrical appliances worth 200,000 dollars. According to Montana, in 1980-81, about 60% of such imports passed through the hands of "leaders of the previous government."
The transfer to the reserve of the other three heads of the last junta, Celso Terrelio, Guido Vildoso, and Alberto Natush, was announced on December 28.
About 14 former officers have been purged from the military. This is no more than prettying-up operation, since it is well known that the military was up to its neck in the cocaine traffic. The Bolivian military had reached a stage of corruption heretofore unknown even in the long and sordid history of Latin American uniformed gangsterism. It has now to be reorganized and have its image refurbished. That is essential for maintaining capitalist rule in Bolivia.
The U.S. embassy is openly involved in this operation, publicly pressing for a purge of the officer corps. The U.S. ambassador meets at least once a week with the chief of staff of the military and the chief of police.
### UDP LAUNCHES AUSTERITY
PROGRAM
Nonetheless, there is no serious effort to attack military corruption. imperialists and the bourgeoisie are interested in is a little image renovation and reorganization of the military commands. This is an essential counterpiece to the political maneuvers because restabilization would undoubtedly involve a new coup, and Washington wants some sort of political cover for it.
The response to the MIR withdrawal from the cabinet revealed quite clearly the political situation of the government. an attempt from the right to destabilize the UDP government, and there was a strong reaction to it, especially from the union.
It is not that the masses regard the UDP cabinet as their government. But they do see it as the result of their strug. gles, and, to a certain extent, as the guarantor of their democratic rights. Needless to say, the UDP is playing this card for all it is worth, warning the masses not to put too much pressure on it because this could help prepare the way for a coup.
Bolivian women mineworkers (DR)
Nonetheless, the tension between the government and the people sharpened notably when the new cabinet announced its first series of economic measures on November 6. These are entirely in accord with the demands of the International Monetary Fund, to such an extent that Juan Lechin, head of the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB) proclaimed that the government was following the line of the IMF.
However, the COB leadership is leaving the ball in the government's hands, doing nothing to propose alternatives or to actually mobilize the workers.
The policy the government adopted was to grant subsidies to the big exporting sectors, that is, the private sector of mining (the so-called middle-sized mines), which is more profitable than the nationalized sector; agribusiness; and petroleum and gas, which is a mixed sector. There is a state oil company, but imperialist concerns have a major weight, both in extraction and exploration.
At the same time, the government's measures amounted to an austerity program for the masses. The minimum wage was set at 8,490 pesos. However, one of the key demands of the movement that forced the military to relinquish power was for a minimum living wage and the miners union estimates this to be around 40,000 pesos for a family of five. Not one of the unions demands a minimum wage less than 23-25,000 pesos.
The government froze wages, calling for a "social truce" for 100 working days. But at the same time, it increased the charges of vital services, such as transport and electricity, which make up a big chunk of the workers' unavoidable expenses. The cost of electricity was hiked from two to three times, depending on the incomes of the users.
The higher costs of electricity were particularly resented. In fact, this touched a number of sensitive nerves. The government has recently nationalized the Bolivian Power Company. This is a typical example of a Bolivian concern. For fifty years, its owners put scarcely any money in it. Now, in order to develop it, the government is upping the charges to acquire funds for investment.
Typically the Bolivian bourgeoisie does not invest its own money in the country; it invests only when it gets subsidies. And then the profits of public corporations are siphoned off to build the private sector.
So, protests developed electricity price hikes in both the neighborhoods and unions, involving, in particular, petition campaigns.
Actually so long as the government accepts the structural context in which it finds itself - the rules of the market and capitalism in general, the existence of an unrepresentative right-wing majority in parliament - it has very little room for maneuver.
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
The foreign debt stands at 3.8 billion dollars, a huge sum for one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population of only about 4 million. It is estimated that in the coming year, payment on this debt will absorb more than 80% of for-
The Bolivian national bank estimated in early December that the great majority of enterprises in the country are working at about 47% of capacity, which represents economic collapse comparable to the crash of 1929. The official unemployment rate is 30%, and this is to say nothing of the unregistered unemployed and the underemployed, who make up a large percentage of the potential workforce in all underdeveloped countries, and particularly in Bolivia.
The prices of consumer goods, according to the government itself, have sky rocketed by 1,300% in the last year. At the start of 1982, some 25 Bolivian pesos bought one U.S. dollar. In March it took 44. Today, the subsidized export sector is allowed to buy dollars for 200 pesos. The official rate is 211 pesos to the dollar. And the black market rate is 300 to 330 to the dollar.
Its attempts to obey the laws of capitalist economy are bringing the UDP government into conflict even with its own bourgeois supporters. It is the sections of the Bolivian bourgeoisie dependent on the internal market that support the UDP. And the November 6 measures mean a continuing disastrous drop in the buying power of the Bolivian people, a corresponding contraction of the internal market, and hence dismal prospects for the capitalists who are trying to enrich themselves from it.
In this situation, the support of the cooperative, and to prepare the way for
Bolivian Communist Party is crucial for a more right-wing regime.
the government. It is the only way the workers movement can be kept in line.
The PCB holds the key lever in the trade-union movement, since it controls the miners union, the organization of the most advanced and economically decisive section of the working class.
The game this party is playing is a classical Stalinist one, combining support in practice for the government's austerity policies with demagogic left language and gestures.
Unfortunately, the Cuban leadership is reinforcing the PCB operation by uncritically boosting the UDP government, despite the Fidelistas' historie differences with the Bolivian CP. On the other hand tha ordoninationa linked ered away. ses. population.
overwhelmingly The government of this failure.
For example, it world price. even unavailable.
THE ROLE OF THE BOLIVIAN CP
The influence of the Partido Socialista-
Uno, the party to the left of the UDP in parliament, is increasing rapidly. It is not much of an organizing force but established a presence on the parlia mentary level before the coup, and now serves as a rallying ground for the growing with the government, and thus as a key barometer.
The expanding influence Uno also reflects the failure of the UDP government to carry through even a serious program of dismantling the dictatorship. The PS-Uno's platform is essentially one of pressing for democratization, in particular for a thorough cleaning out of the military.
Another key gauge of the radicalization of the masses are the elections held recently in the trade unions. In every case, the left has made a very strong showing, and in important cases won the
At the Huanuni mine, for example, one of the most important working-class centers, the POR-Combate (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Revolutionary Workers Party, Bolivian section of the Fourth International) ran a slate together with militants coming from a Maoist background. It got 707 votes as against around 400 for the CP one.
Militant slates including the POR-C have also won in the health workers union and the teachers union. POR-C played an important role in leading the strike of the La Paz health workwho were demanding the right to organize, which the government wanted to deny public workers. essentially victorious, although there are still restrictions on public-worker unions.
The POR is campaigning for the immediate granting of a 23,000 pesos minimum wage. It opposes the government's demand for a 100 day social truce under the slogan "People who are hungry cannot wait 100 days." It is pressing for the COB to draw up a workers and peasants plan for dealing with the crisis. In fact, faced with the passivity of the Lechin leadership, local unions have been dethat the COB call a meeting to discuss program.
The POR-C is putting forward a program of democratic rights, for the right to organize for public workers, the right to criticize parliament, the right to demonstrate, and for the organization of workers self-defense by COB to prevent any future coup. In fact, representatives of the paramilitary groups organized by the dictatorship are still everywhere in public life - to such an
This year-end speech the president himself felt compelled to bewail this "disgrace.
The POR-C argues, along forces in the labor movement, that either Siles Suazo is serious about getting rid of the paramilitaries, in which case the COB should help; or, if he is not, the COB
VIVA LA RESISTENCIA POPULAR
PARTIDO OBRERO
REVOLUCIONARIO COMBATE
should do it. supervise industries, private firms. War II. about setting up Committees to Defend the People's Economy (CODEPs). The POR-C seized on this to start a campaign for forming such bodies and making them into effective means of controlling the economy.
In general, the POR-C is actively working to build joint action with as broad a spectrum of forces in the labor movement as possible on every issue where there are opportunities for concrete struggles. Openings have appeared for such common action not only with local forces in the unions but with PCP activists in various areas who are more militant in practice than the line of their party.
An extremely important political process is opening up in Bolivia, which will have an important impact on the other, much larger, countries in the Andes and in southern Latin America, where the workers movement is reviving.