The death of the
Yugoslav federation
YUGOSLAVIA's latest crisis erupted on May 15, when Serbla and its satellites flouted the Yugoslav constitution by blocking Stipe Mesic (Croatla's representative on the Federal Presidency, Yugoslavia's collective head of state) from taking his turn as president for the coming year.
The voting confirmed the basic division within Yugoslavia: the representatives of Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia and Croatla voted for Mesic; Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro voted against. But the men who cast the votes for Vojvodina and Kosovo had no legal and political right to be there in the first place. MICHELE LEE na and Montenegro and replace them with Serbian stooges.
Kosovo, though abandoned by the rest of Yugoslavia, resisted. There were mass demonstrations of Albanian citizens there, and, in February 1989, a general strike led by Kosovo miners. The province was then placed under military occupation. The following month, with tanks ringing the assembly building and military jets flying overhead, Kosovo deputies voted in the required constitutional amendment.
In July 1990, however, following the break-up of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia and (most important) the establishment of a state of terror in Kosovo, the provincial assembly declared Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Serbia responded by dissolving the provincial assembly and government, and its own assembly voted in a new republican constitution which reduced the provinces to a status lower than that of a municipality.
With the adoption of the new Serbian constitution, the federation as defined by the Yugoslav constitution
A CCORDING to the Yugoslav constitution, the eight-man presidency is made up of representatives from each of the six republics and two provinces. Each of these representatives is elected by secret vote in the appropriate republican or provincial assembly and remains responsible to that assembly. On May 15 each year, the presidency elects a new president in accordance with a strict rota. Thus on May 15, 1989, the post went to Slovenia (Janez Drvnosek), on May 15, 1990 to Serbia (Borislav Jovic) and on May 15, 1991 it was due to go to Croatia (Stipe Mesic).
The system of rotation was established in the early 1970s to express the equal status of members of the Yugoslav Federation.
This constitution was drawn up when Yugoslavia was still a federation of equal nations. But only a year after his rise to power in Serbia, Milosevic began to dismantle it. In 1988, the Serbian assembly adopted an amendment to the republican constitution cancelling Vojvodina's and Kosovo's political autonomy. Nationalist mobilizations were also organized to bring down the governments in Vojvodiceased to exist. Without a functioning assembly, Kosovo representatives in the Federal Assembly and on the Federal Presidency became illegitimate, and with them also the work of these bodies. The other republics, pursuing their own selfish interests, connived at this illegal state of affairs until May 15, 1991, when it was no longer possible to avoid the issue. For if Serbia could get away with vetoing Croatia's representative, then it, rather than Yugoslavia, would decide the coun try's future.
The Kosovo boomerang
The Federal Presidency consequently fell apart. As this author predicted at the time, the boomerang released in Kosovo in 1988 returned three years later to deliver a mortal blow to Yugoslavia. The decision by the Serbian regime to bring down the Yugoslav presidency proves conclusively that it sees federal organs outside its control as an impediment to its own survival.
At the beginning of 1991, Milosevic appeared at the height of his powers. Although the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist party had scuppered his ear 1 7 Communist party had scuppered his earlier plan to use the party machine to win
YUGOSLAVIA for Serbia the hegemony it had enjoyed in pre-war Yugoslavia, the illusion that this could be achieved persisted because of the army's evident hostility to the new regimes in Slovenia and Croatia. With control over four federal units, Serbia now enjoyed disproportionate influence within the federal institutions.
On the presidency, which is also commander-in-chief of the army, Milosevic now wielded four of the eight votes. Furthermore, egged on by renegades such as Mihailo Markovic of Praxis [a prestigious Marxist journal of the 1960s and 70s] fame, he encouraged armed rebellion among Serbs in parts of Croatia (the so-called Krajina) and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in order to undermine these republics' ability to resist. Last, but not least, by winning a huge majority in the 1990 Serbian elections, he marginalized the domestic opposition. Moment of truth for Milosevic
The March 1991 demonstrations in Serbia, however, were the moment of truth for Milosevic. He entered history as the first republican head of state to ask the army to intervene in a domestic dispute. Indeed, Milosevic pressed the army to introduce a state of emergency throughout Yugoslavia. But the Army -keen in principle, but fearing a possible breakdown of discipline in its own ranks — would not comply without the authority of the presidency. The latter, supported by federal prime minister Markovic, refused the request. Kosovo's representative broke ranks to vote with the independent republics.
The army high command, shaken by the Serbian demonstrations, now rallied
• VOJVODINA color SLOVENIA
YUGOSLAVIA RZELO 18 International Viewpoint #209 • June 24, 1991 behind Markovic (though not all of them unequivocally).
Milosevic, defeated in the presidency and challenged at home, now opted for a strategy of making the federal institutions unworkable. His immediate response was to denounce the Federal Presidency as an agent of Yugoslavia's destruction, and Markovic as a western stooge. On March 18, the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro and Vojvodina resigned from the presidency.
Milosevic declared that the presidency no longer existed, and (somewhat inconsistently) that Serbia no longer recognized its authority. At a hastily convened secret meeting, he told local government heads that Serbia was in a de facto state of war. Milosevic's bluff was called, however, and two days later it was back to business as usual on the presidency -but only for the time being.
The Kosovo representative was placed summarily under house arrest and replaced by a man appointed by the Serbian assembly. The new man, Sejdo Bajramovic, is an oddity even for recent Serbian politics: elected by 0.03% of votes in his Kosovo constituency (Albanians had unanimously boycotted the Serbian elections), this retired army sergeant is renowned only for his addiction to tombola. Vojvodina and Montenegro also came up with new presidential representatives.
Between mid-March and mid-May Yugoslavia lived a charmed life as a country tottering on the brink of civil war and/or military coup, while its high politics became more and more of a charade. For several weeks during March and April republican heads met in conference at different luxurious locations, accompa-
LACEDONIA SERBIA KOSSOVO nied by a swarm of journalists, in order supposedly to forge a new consensus. These meetings, all of which ended in failure, served only to shore up Milosevic's position in Serbia. His strategy of destabilization, if anything, gained a new lease of life. The following brief survey of some of the key events in the period between the end of March and the middle of May give the reader an idea of how this strategy works.
A strategy of provocation ON March 31, an armed unit from "Krajina" (a part of Croatia where Serbs form a majority) tried to occupy the Plitvice National Park in Croatia, and were repulsed by the Croatian police. At Jovic's request, but over Slovene and Croatian protests, the Federal Presidency met in emergency session and ordered the army to occupy the park.
• On April 18, some 750,000 Serbian workers declared a general strike and the republican government quickly met their terms for the sake of Serb national unity.
• On May 2, in Borovo Selo in eastern Croatia, Serb militants ambushed a bus carrying Croatian police, killing twelve. Serb Chetniks, a proto-fascist nationalist formation, boasted publicly of having taken part in the massacre. The fact that some of the victims had been severely tortured gave credence to their claim. There followed another emergency session of the Federal Presidency, and another threat of military takeover - and another part of Croatia was occupied by the army.
• In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb followers of Milosevic set up two new "Krajinas" as a future part of Serbia, and henceforth refused to recognize the authority of the republican government.
• By now, an anti-army mood had become entrenched in Croatia, reaching a high point on May 6 in Split, when 30,000 workers massed outside the navy command centre demanding an end to the blockading of Croatian villages by the "Krajina" militia (with army complicity). A soldier's death led to yet another emergency session of the Federal Presidency, at which the army was given additional policing powers in Croatia.
• Fearing that a military occupation of Croatia was imminent, the population of several Croat villages and towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina took to the streets to block army tanks moving towards Croatia. The army sent in a parachute unit to "liberate" its troops. Thanks to the combined efforts of the Croatian and Bosnian presidents this particular conflict was defused.
• In the Dalmatian ports of Zadar and Sibenik, however, anti-Serb riots and destruction of Serb property erupted, after a local man was killed by a "Krajina" activist. Anti-Croat riots and destruction of Croat property followed in
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They have shown, in other words, that they no longer recognize Yugoslavia."
If so, then war remains the only option. Ever since the March demonstrations Milosevic's regime has been sliding fast to the right, embracing cooperation with the Chetniks. His followers outside Serbia -Milan Babic, in the Croatian "Krajina" and Radovan Karadzic, his counterpart in Bosnia-Herzegovina — are openly collaborating with the Chetnik leader Vojislav Seselj.
Judging by the growing occupation of Croatia, by KOSOV the disintegration of the authority of the government of Bosniaty and the main opposition parties, was established, its chief aim being to create "one state for all Serbs" the slogan of the Serbian extreme right.
• Political ferment has also been evident in Montenegro, where the opposition has left the republican assembly for good.
• In the Serbian part of the Sandjak, which is largely Moslem in ethnic terms, a Moslem National Council was set up, aiming at winning local autonomy.
• Also in May, the Serbian authorities distributed firearms to all Serb nationals in Kosovo, who proceeded to practice by shooting unarmed Albanian civilians.
In mid-May, a constitutional crisis was added to this inflammable mixture. On May 10, a federal assembly session broke up in confusion when the delegates from Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo refused to recognize Bajramovic as Kosovo's representative on the Federal Presidency. Vojvodina and Montenegro then withdrew their own candidates. On May 15 they, together with Serbia and Kosovo (represented temporarily by the vice-president of the Serbian assembly) cast their votes against Mesic.
The country was suddenly left without a head of state. Federal premier Markovic, supported by the army, proposed a compromise: Slovenia and Croatia should accept Bajramovic in return for Serbia voting for Mesic. Slovenia refused this shabby deal, but a desperate Croatia agreed - and was tricked.
In the assembly, Kosovo delegates protested against their rights being traded in such a cynical manner — Serb delegates responded by questioning their very right to sit in the federal assembly. Eventually, although the Slovene and Albanian delegates, accompanied by many Croats and Moslems, voted against Bajramovic, his confirmation went through.
But the farce reached its apex when, at a renewed meeting of the presidency, Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo solemnly proceeded once again to vote against Mesic. The Slovene, Croatian and Macedonian representatives then packed their bags and went home. Milosevic's second attempt to destroy the Federal Presidency has succeeded. His next target will be the federal government.
### Seething chaos
The logic behind this combination of crisis at the top and seething chaos below was spelt out by the Serbian branch of the Alliance of Forces of Reform (which supports Ante Markovic): "By obstructing the election to the post of president of the member from Croatia, Milosevic's personal regime has completely revealed its full intentions in regard to the future of Yugoslavia. We are witnessing the final act in the destruction of Yugoslavia, which has been pursued over the last few years in accordance with a clear plan: to force Slovenia to leave the country; to cause chaos within, and the territorial disintegration of, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; to transform Macedonia into a southern province of Serbia; to provoke a military intervention in the name of protecting Yugoslavia; to stop all economic and political changes that could bring Milosevic's personal regime into question.
"By their refusal to accept the constitutionally prescribed procedure for electing the president, the representatives of so-called "unified" Serbia, acting as Milosevic's personal executives, have shown that they do not recognize the equality and sovereignty of the other republics, or
Herzegovina, by the growing number of incidents involving armed civilians, and by the rising number of dead it would be fair to say that civil war in Yugoslavia has already begun.
The destruction of the Yugoslav presi dency, on the other hand, has left the Yugoslav army without its civilian commander-in-chief, strengthening the hand of putschist currents within it. There is little doubt, however, that a military coup would only hasten the disintegration of the army. This is why the army leaders, working with Markovic, expressed their support for Mesic's election.
But time is running out for Yugoslavia. Only a miracle — in the shape of a democratic alternative emerging in Serbia, strong enough to remove Milosevic — could save it now. Such a miracle almost materialized at the beginning of March, when Serbian democracy suddenly displayed its tremendous potential. Then the youth demanded an end to Milosevic's politics of war. It was cast aside, however, by the main parties of the opposition, eager to join Milosevic in his megalomaniac quest for a Greater Serbia ("one state for all Serbs").
Herein lies Serbia's tragedy. The so-called democratic opposition seems to be unaware that Milosevic is grooming the Chetniks not simply as a striking force against the Croat, Moslem, Albanian, Slovene, Macedonian, Hungarian etc "national enemy" but also as his personal insurance against any velvet revolution" happening in Serbia. It was only in the aftermath of the March demonstrations that the regime decided to legalize Seselj's Serb Radical Party.
Serbian democrats would be wise to heed the words of Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Albanian Democratic Party, are all potential Albanians." *
NICARAGUA «A revolutionary force" THE "truce" which the Sandinista trade union confederation, the National Front of Workers (FNT), had granted to the Chamorro government so that it could launch its new economic plan is approaching its end. However, strikes have continued in the public sector.
On April 27, 1990, an attempt was made on the life of president Violeta Chamorro; the police are pursuing inquiries in circles linked to the rightwing Contras. Some of the latter, supporters of "commandante" Ruben - himself close to Vice-President Virgilio Godoy - have threatened to return to armed struggle if leading Sandinista, Humberto Ortega, is not dismissed as commander of the military forces (see IV 205).