Failing to carry out such reforms, which would guarantee bourgeois law and order and the security of property - not against state expropriation but against vandalism - would mean that most of the Iranian capitalists, who are currently living in the West, would not have the confidence to return to Iran.
• Could you give some details on the progress of the "normalization"?
Not long ago, Mr. Nourbaksh, the head of the Iranian central bank, was in the
United States trying to contact Iranian capitalists there and persuade them to go back to Iran. But he is unlikely to have much success if things in Iran stay as they are. In fact the current trend is the reverse; the capitalist economy is not really functioning in Iran.
This reform, however, is a far more difficult business than defeating the bourgeois liberals, such as Bani Sadr and
Bazargan. But following the death of
Khomeini, the consolidation is really being pushed through; the "pragmatists"
have gained the upper hand.
Six months ago there was an election for the Supreme Council of
Islamic Experts (Khobregan), which is ultimately chosen by the Guardian
Council. This body was
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selected by Khomeini and then by his successor, Khamenei, and is the real power centre in the country.
It is the Khobregan council that chooses the religious leaders such as Khomeini or, at present, Khamenei. The elections to this body were due six months ago. However, the law for the elections was changed in order to favour Rafsanjani's supporters. Previously any Ayatollah could stand for this council but on this occasion all the Ayatollahs were required to do a written test in order to be a candidate for this body. The leader of the radical faction, Kerubi, was thus excluded from the council.
There were different lines during the Gulf war. One was that taken by Rafsanjani and the National Security
Council, the other by Kerubi
(who is speaker of the parliament). Both talked about peace, but posed it in a dif-
IRAN ferent way. Kerubi travelled through the Muslim countries looking for support for a peace resolution but he did not succeed. Then he took the position that Iran should take Iraq's side against America, and this was used later as a reason for pushing his supporters out of the institutions. Rafsanjani came out of the war strengthened.
In the parliament deputies such as Montashemi or Khalkhali were saying that Iran should join the war on the side of Saddam. This meant both political and military support. When the war finished they were in a weak position. They came back to the parliament and said that they hadn't really meant it.
The radical faction have a magazine called Bayan. The first issue of this magazine was banned by the regime, but after a few months it was permitted. At first it was very popular, it was hard to get hold of copies. People could read different political opinions in it. For example, there was a letter from Kerubi to Ayatollah Sanai calling on the latter to intervene in the matter of the elections to the Khobregan. Sanai did not take a strong position against the radical line. But after the war the magazine has lost its appeal.
The radical faction tried to impeach the (relatively competent) health minister, who was a weak link in the government. They won in the parliament, which they dominate. Whatever the government does the parliament opposes. Two days before the Khobregan election, the radical faction wanted to pass a resolution on the conditions for election to the Khobregan, saying that everyone can be a candidate. The supporters of Rafsanjani won in the parliament; the first victory for the pragmatist line there since the revolution.
Then there was the impeachment of the minister of education. The discussion on this question became very violent. Rafsanjani's supporters openly confessed that the country is ruled by a bunch of hooligans. Finally Kerubi, the leader of the radical faction, proposed that the members of parliament give a vote of confidence to the the minister, which he got.
A month ago an ayatollah stated openly that there are two organs in the country, the government and the parliament, and that they cannot work together. Therefore, he said, we must dissolve the parliament. This is now one of the main issues. The problem is that Rafsanjani has no base among the activists comparable to that of the radicals.
Recently there have been rumours about putting a prominent member of the radical faction, Ayatollah Khalkhali, on trial for indiscriminate killing, and in particular for the execution without trial of Homaida, a prime minister under the Shah. Such a trial would of course be a big blow to the radicals, but not a decisive one - Khalkhali is a much discredited and deeply hated figure.
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15
IRAN
The government is trying to integrate the so-called revolutionary institutions — the pasdarans and committees — into the regular state institutions, the army and the police. However the army has not found the pasdars acceptable. There is too much bitterness. Furthermore, the regime does not yet feel confident that it can totally detach itself from its base in the Islamic committees, pasdars and so on.
There is a custom that notables from around the country go to see the religious leader. In the past two weeks, all these highly publicized meetings have been with army personnel. This means something. It is a part of the process of centralization.
Furthermore, recently Khomeini's son, a hardliner, withdrew as leader of the annual Haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). He said that his mother was sick. This was a concession to the Saudis but also to the western powers, who are in Saudi Arabia. They don't want someone in Mecca who is going to start demonstrations against the Wester presence, as Khomeini had promised. • How does the general population feel about all this?
They are fed up with the whole regime.
Compared to income, prices are astronomical. There is galloping inflation, mounting unemployment and the education system is in a shambles — the majority of schools work on a two or three shift a day basis. Intellectual and artistic activity has been totally suffocated, to say nothing of political repression and women's rights.
Many thought that the consolidation of Rafsanjani's position would mean an improvement. Such people have been deeply disappointed. If there has been any change, it has been for the worse. For example, during Moussani's premiership, the price of a Peykan (an Iranian-manufactured car) was 450,000 Tumans on the black market (the official price being 120,000 Tumans). Now the black market price is 2,200,000 Tumans (official price 500,000).1
More than 90% of the people are against the government and the regime as a whole. It is very difficult to find anyone who supports the regime, and even those who do are ashamed to say so in front of others. This is true even of commitice members or pasdars. People do it to get money to live. Even four or five years ago people were ready to give their lives for this government and would strongly defend their decision. It is no longer like that. Then people would volunteer. There is no more ideological mobilization.
At the age of 18 boys have to join 16 the army. At the start of the revolution everybody was a candidate for International Viewpoint #209 • June 24, 1991 the committee. Five or six years ago the army could recruit from volunteers. Now they conscript draftees from the army into the committees. This worries the government.
Some of the committees support Rafsanjani, others Kerubi or other leaders. They fight each other. In Tehran there have been inter-committee battles over the Hejab (the veil). In the east of Tehran I know of a case where a committee was attacked by the pasdaran.
Rafsanjani and the government do not control the committees, but he does have control via a special ministry over the pasdaran, and this is one of the main reasons why Rafsanjani wants to smash the committees and integrate them with the regular police.
All these factional battles take place on the pretext of the Islamic hejab. This was also true during the struggle against the left. The question of women, especially of Hejab, was one of the central themes of counter-revolutionary mobilization. The fact that the left did not recognize the importance of consistently defending women's rights, facilitated this.
Shi'ite ideology is extremely reactionary on the question of women. Hatred of women is deeply rooted amongst the fanatics who make up the base of the regime, and it is thus no wonder that the radicals have kept resorting to antiwomen themes.
Six months ago, Rafsanjani raised the issue of "temporary marriage" , in reality religious permission for prostitution. His critics raised a great hue and cry about this, but Rafsanjani demonstrated that his critics had no grounds in Islamic law. He raised the issue because of the reality. Prostitution is very widespread, people cannot marry because it is too expensive.
Rafsanjani also referred to fact that there were a large number of widows of men killed in the war.
There is a place in the east of Tehran where such widows live; it is visited by
Mullahs.
There is a discussion about legalizing brothels going on in the Minister of the
Interior. The only problem is that you can allow a Muslim man to go with a non-
Muslim woman, but obviously a Muslim prostitute cannot be with a non-Muslim man. The man marries the woman for five minutes and then it is "legal" from the religious point of view. You have to go the notary office for the marriage, but there are not enough notaries. This is what it's like.
The papers were full of the opinions of
Ayatollahs on the issue.
• What was the popular feeling about the war in Iraq?
Maybe fifty percent of the population supported Iraq against America. People could see the way that the US army was bombing Iraq. It was the brutality of the attack that aroused sympathy. There were only a few people who directly backed e Tracis and most percent supported saying: why did Saddam do such a stupid thing as invading Kuwait? Thus basic anti-imperialist feeling remains stronger than anti-Arab or anti-Iraqi feeling, despite the Iran-Iraq war.
There was a demonstration organized by the "radicals" in support of Iraq, which was quite small, about 5,000 people. On the other hand there was a spontademonstration at Tehran neous
University with about 2,000 people when the war broke out.
There were also demonstrations by the radicals outside the British
Embassy over the trial of an Iranian accused of setting fire to a bookshop in London. There was a hunger strike by the man's family, but Khamenei came and told them to stop it and go home. Thus he was supporting
Rafsanjani, although he had been the head of
Kerubi's faction. Nor did he object over the exclusions from the
Khobregan.
•
Are there any concrete forms of resistance such as strikes or national struggles?
I have not seen evidence of this.
The Kurds continued some resistance until 1982. About five or six years ago there was a car demonstration by supporters of Bakhtiar.
An important thing that has happened recently is a move by some writers. A well-known poet, Shamloo, who had opposed the Shah was giving interviews last year in
Germany and America, saying that
there is repression in Iran and writers cannot publish their books.
After his interview other writers also began to talk in the press about their rights. Three months ago, five famous writers in Iran signed a petition saying that they want to rebuild a writers' association. Other writers expressed their support. Shamloo is presently in America — he is unwell. But he has expressed his support for such an organization. He savs support for such an organization. He says he is going to go back and join it. This could be a very important step in the intellectual circles at least in Tehran. This is reminiscent of Iran in 1979. In another interview he said that a poet must be able to read his work in front of people.
Perhaps this kind of thing is getting into the papers as part of the government's efforts to improve its image in the West. • What has become of the Iranian left?
Inside the country it has disintegrated and people are demoralized. The Iranian Revolution was a very complex event. Most of the schemas of the left organizations, with extremely few exceptions, turned out to be in glaring contradiction with the real course of development and the outcome.
The worst of all was the Stalinist schema which praised the Mullarchy as national-revolutionary and anti-imperialist and supported it all along the line. The events in the Eastern bloc have definitely not helped.
People came out of jail and found that the organizations had gone and many had left the country. Given the crisis in Iran there is big pressure to find a job. It is not only a matter of a lack of activity, but of people renouncing their ideas.
But in fact a solid organization could do a lot now. The government is divided and in crisis. The old organizations of the left have disappeared. When we were active as Trotskyists we were under pressure from both sides, and both sources of pressure are now weak.
About two months ago there was a meeting of about a hundred in Khuzestan where I could read my poems. All my poems are against the government and people wanted to discuss. In queues everybody talks against the government. It is not just people from organizations.
Nor does it seem obvious that the government, even if it can carry through centralization, can resolve the economic crisis, which weighs on people more and more with ever higher taxes, soaring rents and so on. If there was a genuine election they would all be thrown out. Their base is in the military organs, regular or irregular.
At the moment there is no sign of a popular explosion, although in the future anything can happen. * 1. Under the Shah the price of a paykan was, at its height, 40 to 50,000 tumans.
IRAN / YUGOSLAVIA