NICARAGUA Dismantling the Sandinista state ONE year after the transfer of power on April 25, 1990, from the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to the National Opposition Union (UNO), the pillars of the revolutionary state are being dismantled, and it is hard to see how this process will be reversed.
The disarmament of the civilian population undertaken by the Sandinista People's Army (EPS) has gone ahead; tens of thousands of arms have been recovered and General Humberto Ortega - who remains the head of the army - has stated: "national reconciliation is gradually being established, leaving the left and right extremes on the sidelines. Peace has been won and we are consolidating it through the total disarmament of the civilian population...; the reduction in size and the professionalization of the armed forces is clear, the National Assembly is functioning in a democratic manner, rilla struggle. Furthermore this army had successfully fought external aggression and internal counter-revolution. It was impossible simply to abolish the Sandinista army and replace it with Contras. This would have meant civil war, especially since UNO had promised the demobilization of the counter-revolution.
The bourgeoisie was aware that, even if it controlled the government, it did not have a firm grip on the state, which the remained foreign, powerful and hostile to it.
The UNO therefore decided to play for time, since it had no other choice. In exchange for a promise that the EPS and its command structure would be maintained - with Humberto Ortega at its head — the Sandinistas pledged not to use the army to regain lost ground.
Nonetheless, the FSLN made concessions: President Violetta Chamorro received the power to lead the army if she wished and remove Ortega; the EPS was drastically reduced in size, and the army cadres, starting with Ortega, had to give up their activities as FSLN militants. Finally, the government tested the reliability of the army by entrusting it with missions to maintain public order.
Concessions lead to debate inside Sandinistas
These concessions led to a debate inside the FSLN.
While nobody proposed that the EPS should be used for a short term taking of power, that wing of the Sandinistas that was most critical of H. Ortega's political line - that is militants coming from the former Prolonged People's War tendency, the GPP, who put out the bulletin Nicaragua Desde Adentro (see document below) — declared: "one cannot deny that the fact that the army chiefs and some of the troops belong to the Sandinistas is an advantage for the FLN - beyond the fact that formally soldiers cannot be militants of the Front, for in the last analysis this means that, if it comes to it, the FLN will have under its orders an organized military force that could support an eventual popular uprising against the government". This perspective was totally ruled out by Humberto Ortega and other Sandinista leaders.
Nicaragua Desde Adentro explained: "Nonetheless, it is equally clear that the subordination of the army to the executive power involves its implicit support to the hegemonic sector of the bourgeoisie [the Chamorro-Lacayo-Cesar wing], privileg1. See International Viewpoint, no. 184, May 7, 1990. 2. El Semanario, February 28, 1991. 3. Behind the scenes, Javier Pichardo was accused of having relations with the right and its joumal La Prensa; of wanting to make the airforce autonomous and of having wanted to repress the strikers in June. Officially he was accused of having a "particular conception" of the amy. 4. See /V, 187. 5. Nicaragua Desde Adentro, July 15, 1990.
isolating the extremists"? ARNOLD BERTHU T HE EPS has seen its forces drop from 90,000 in February 1990 to 28,000 by the end of that year. Some 5,000 officers have been sacked. At the same time some left wing elements have been sidelined - for example the eviction of Colonel Pichardo from the head of the airforce, and of other EPS cadres in August 1990, is a sign of the times.
The Sandinista police, renamed the National Police, is under the direct orders of the government which is increasingly using it against strikers; it has been subject to purges; the revolutionary morale of many of its officers has been extinguished. But this is not enough for the government which is forming new police forces, recruiting from former Contras. An "urban and rural guard" is being set up — its name reminiscent of the sinister Guardia of the former dictator Somoza.
The zone of people's property (APP, the nationalized sector) is being privatized, with the agreement of the Sandinistas, since the signing of the collaboration agreement of October 1990. Industrial and agricultural enterprises are being handed back to their former owners or sold. The banking system, which was taken over by the state in 1979, is also being partially privatized, in contradiction with the constitution, but with the agreement of some of the Sandinistas. Finally the monopoly of foreign trade is threatened.
The health, education and cultural ser12 vice systems are being run down. The Sandinista television network (STV) has International Viewpoint #205 • April 29, 1991 been dismantled; the Sandinistas now control only some private radio stations (one of which covers the whole country) and a short television programme -which the government feels able to suspend, as it did temporarily after the July 1990 strikes.
Strikes, land occupations, barricades
All this is not going through unnoticed. The counter-revolutionary measures have had to confront several waves of land occupations and strikes leading to barricades.* Even if they are on the defensive, the popular organizations are capable of putting forward their demands in a way that is rare in Nicaraguan history. But, as could be foreseen during the general strike of July 1990, this social activity is not enough to provide the FSLN with a strategy in the current situation. Its errors of judgement on the state of play both inside and outside the country are a factor in its internal crisis.
After the election defeat, the question of the maintenance or not of the Sandinista army was posed. While the bourgeoisie was once more in control of the government, it did not have at its disposal an armed force capable of decisively crushing mass resistance. The abolition of the EPS was in the UNO election programme. But how to replace it?
The EPS was the product of an authentic revolution and its cadres from top to bottom came from the anti-Somoza gue-
ing thus its professional and constitutional character against its original Sandinista policy""
This text insisted on the fact that the EPS was going to be the object of a struggle between the bourgeois government and the FSLN, with the government attempting to "seduce" key army personnel.
This thinly veiled attack on H. Ortega's line was broadened by a very strong critique of EPS military and political strategy in the 1980s, and the economic line followed since 1988 on the initiative of the circle around the Ortega brothers. This attack, expressed by those close to Tomas Borge, certainly had something to do with the hard line taken by H. Ortega in his meeting with the interior minister.
But it is not so clear that this alternative to the economic and political choices of the 1980s was defended by Borge in a systematic fashion inside the national leadership of the FSLN
The fact that, on April 25, 1990, Humberto Ortega decided to stay at the head of the army, at the same time giving up his functions in the leadership of the Front, was criticized by the supporters of the former GPP tendency. According to them, Ortega should have been replaced as army chief by his deputy, comandante Cuadra. He was reproached for preferring his role as a statesman and military chief to that of a member of a collective leadership. Apart from this point of criticism, there is no evidence of the left wing putting forward any alternative line.
The EPS faced its most serious test during the July 1990 general strike, when hundreds of barricades were put up in Managua on the appeal of the National Workers Front (FNT), which brings together the Sandinista trade union organizations. The army daily cleared the main arteries of the capital with bulldozers, but did not clash with the workers, while the latter allowed the army to get on with the work as instructed by the government.
After the army finished the Sandinista militants rebuilt the barricades, sometimes with the help of soldiers in civilian dress. The government knew what was going on, but the mobilization was too powerful and the army too reluctant for UNO to try and order it to attack the strikers. The FSLN had to exert all its strength on the UNO government on the one side and the FNT on the other to get a (rickety) compromise which ended the strike.
### Disarmament of civilian population
When the agreements were signed, H. Ortega pledged to the government that the army would follow its orders and those of the president, that it would go ahead with the disarmament of the civilian population (the barricades were defended at night by people with arms, but he also made it clear that the EPS would not shoot down workers.
The disarmament of civilians has been going ahead, but it is by no means complete. Tens of thousands of weapons remain in the hands of the population, including in those of many Sandinista militants.
A few months later, the EPS had to confront a second challenge, this time coming from the right.
In November 1990, there was an uprising by local authorities in region V of the departments of Boaco and Chontales -in the centre of the country, a poor region of crop farming, and an old fief of the
Contras where the UNO won especially convincingly in 1990 — supported by armed former Contras.
The strategic route which links Managua and the Atlantic Coast, via the town of Rama, was cut and three hundred kilometers of road were blocked.
This action was orchestrated by the far right of UNO, led by the former vice- president of the republic, Virgilio Godoy.
The mayors demanded the removal of
Antonio Lacayo from his ministry —
Lacayo being Chamorro's eminence grise and a defender of compromise with the
Sandinistas; of the defence minster Carlos Hurtado and of General Humberto
Ortega; the departure of the police and the EPS from region V; the reduction of the defence budget; the formation of a rural police integrating former Contras;
the disarmament of civilians; the distribution of land to former Contras to the detriment of the APP and former EPS soldiers; the granting of real powers to
Virgilio Godoy, who, owing to his differences with the Chamorro-Lacayo-Cesar clan, has no specific tasks inside the executive.
The military officer responsible for this uprising was Aristides Sanchez, a CIA
NICARAGUA agent and former Contra adviser who was na for Contre adviser who was finally arrested and expelled to the US without trial.?
The aim of the action was to destabilize the Chamorro government and force it to crack down on the EPS, and the EPS was indeed compelled to accept a bigger cut in its budget than previously envisaged.®
"The mayor's rebellion" had an impact on the debates and votes in the National Assembly. At first only the 33 Sandinista deputies voted for the defence budget presented by the president; all the UNO deputies voted against. Chamorro then had to use her right of veto to get round this vote. This gave her time to negotiate a deal with the leaders of the UNO parlia mentary group involving an additional reduction of 8.5 cordobas-oros in the military budget. This was thus the price for getting the budget passed.
Chamorro also told the UNO leaders that "the removal of General Ortega is among my objectives, but it is not possible to set a date"?
After these discussions with the president, one of the leaders of the UNO right wing, A. Ubilla, explained to La Prensa (January 7, 1991), "We must be aware that the advantages today enjoyed by the Sandinistas are not solely due to Doña Violeta Chamorro. Her government came into being without arms, police or money, confronting a party that has everything that it lacked. Guiding the interests of the nation requires a lot of subtlety and patience"..
All the evidence suggests that this leader had put his finger on the situation. He understood that the revolutionary state has not yet been completely dismantled and that this will need time; but he clearly also believes that the dismantling is well underway and that the Chamorro-Lacayo clan is not doing badly in this respect.
Missiles supplied to Salvadoran rebels
In December 1990, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Bush administration was able to prove that SAM 7 and
SAM 14 missiles supplied to the EPS by
6. According to Humberto Ortega: "the FSLN was divided into three tendencies, and the differences were more than tactical. There were strategic differences with the thesis of the Prolonged People's War tendency led by Tomas Borge and the Proletarian tendency
[led by, among others, Jaime Wheelock and Luis Carron]. If one of these two tendencies had won the debate, we would never have taken power in Nicaragua. It was the "third way", "insurrectionary" tendency led by us which predominated. The same patter is present now." From an interview in Brecha, Uruguay,
August 17, 1990, quoted by La Prensa on September
12, 1990
7. See NDA, December 30, 1990.
8. At first, the EPS asked for a budget of 131 million cordobas-oros, The Chamorro-EPS discussions produced a figure of 78.6 millions. After the new reduction the budget is 78.1 million. This is a cut of 56% in the EPS budget between 1990 and 1991. See Envio,
Managua, February 1991. 13
9. Envio, February 1991.
10. See /V 203. April 29, 1991 • #205 International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA the Soviet Union in 1986 had been used by the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) in November 1990 to combat helicopters supplied to the Salvadoran army by the United States. 1° The Soviet foreign ministry publicly declared that it expected the Nicaraguan authorities to put a stop to such acts.
To get out of this impasse, the EPS leadership imprisoned four Sandinista officers who had given arms (without any material gain to themselves) and 11 Salvadorans. Furthermore, in a communiqué on January 1, 1991, the EPS accused Joaquín Villalobos, the FMLN leader, of having organized the transfer of the misSiles. On January 4, 1991, a declaration added: "this small group of officers, blinded by their political passion and guided by Strategic d extremist arguments, have injured military honour and infringed the loyalty of the institution and its commander, which is equivalent to an injury to the sacred, patriotic and revolutionary interests of Nicaragua".
The missiles crisis came as a big shock and disgusted many Sandinista militants who put their duty of international solidarity at the top of their scale of values. The Sandinista youth and the FNT have denounced the EPS stance and that of the FSLN leadership who supported it. The decision of the EPS to condemn internationalist servicemen has deepened the crisis in that institution's ranks which started in August 1990 when Colonel Pichardo, head of the airforce, and also held responsible for giving over-zealous help to the FMLN, was dismissed.* efeat and tactical victory