THE document published below is taken from Nicaragua desde Adentro, a bulletin produced by militants of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) close to Tomas Borge, It puts forward the view that the fact that Contras had neither demobilized nor surrendered was one of the main reasons for the Sandinistas electoral defeat on February 25, 1990. It was first published in July an important role they were not efficient enough and did not get adequate training....
Contrary to the experience acquired during the long years of the guerilla struggle against Somoza's Guard, the EPS confronted the counter-revolution with regular methods of struggle. The Contras, who were at that time only at their beginnings, would have been more vulnerable to special units — all the counter-insurrectionary man-
1990.
DOCUMENT A FTER the revolutionary victory, an army was set up to protect our frontiers and defend national sovereignty and not — as in the past — for the purposes of internal repression. The army had a popular character — its cadres were formed in the guerilla struggle against the Somozist dictatorship and it thus had a clearly defined class character.
Knowing that the United States would not accept the existence of a popular revolution..the Sandinista People's Army (EPS) became a regular force to defend the country against foreign invasion. At the same time, Popular Militias were created: their main task was to confront the counter-revolution which was beginning to get organized in Honduras. The 14 main burden of the militias fell on the workers and students: while they played International Viewpoint #205 • April 29, 1991 uals recommend this. The EPS expanded to the point where it had too many tanks — in a nonoil producing country; it had a oil producing country. it had a sophisticated anti-aircraft system, designed to fight against modern aviation, but of no use at massive air bombardment, which, without doubt, would have destroyed the EPS' heavy arms. Only later would the US ground troops land.
Some say that, in such a situation, there should be a people in arms that could be led by the professionals of the EPS and which would inflict heavy losses on the invader. A man with a rifle, well dug in and preparing an ambush would be much more efficient in the long term than bulky and sophisticated technology which, in any case, would eat up enormous resources, es, be criticized internationally and become the central subject of negotiations. The doctrine of a war of the whole people was put on ice, awaiting the invasion, while the professional army was never able to totally fight the counterrevolution....
The Interior Ministry developed in another framework and ensured the immediate and direct confrontation with the
Contras. It set up the Pablo Ubeda special troops which, with those of the State
Security, dealt rapid and hard blows to the counter-revolution and infiltrated the ranks of the enemy rearguard. This irregular struggle achieved successes and led to the creation of the Battalions of Irregular Struggle (BLI), the Light Rangers (BLC) and finally the Small Units of Special Forces (PUFE).
The EPS has continued to make its main priority the defence of national sovereignty.... In order not to too much affect the sensitive structures of the army, it was sensitive structures of the army it necessary to have recourse to military service: thus an administrative solution was given to a strategic problem.
It is estimated that only 40% of the youth who went into the army, went willingly - the rest were compelled - and this had its effect on fighting efficiency...
Furthermore the demobilized youth — who identified much more with the revolution after their military service - ended up swelling the ranks of the unemployed; this meant a loss of potential cadres for the FSLN.
Seeking direct negotiations with the USA
In 1987 people began to talk about the strategic defeat of the Contras. This was true in the sense that the latter had no chance of taking power through arms; but the Contras remained one of the main forms of pressure financed by the TIS in forms of pressure financed by the US in its low intensity war and they already had an important social base in the country. The FSLN persisted in its desire to establish direct negotiations with the United States, and refused any dialogue with the Contras. But insofar as the Esquipulas peace process advanced, the possibility of negotiating with the US receded and pressure for bilateral negotiations with the Contras became stronger.
1988 saw an endless spiral of unilateral concessions by the Front, which ended up with openings to the right, on the backs of parts of the popular sectors; inflation reached 34,000%. The popular sectors were no longer active. They had become the objects of supra-structural political and economic decisions; the revolution began to weaken.
In 1988, after the Sapoa negotiations with the counter-revolutionary leaders, the EPS hit the Contras with operation Danto 88; this would have been hard to push back if the harassment had continall against Contra raids; it became an army of professional cadres, trained for the most part in conventional techniques.
Even if a danger of a confrontation with US forces existed, it would be illusory to believe that a Third World army, even if very well equipped, would be able to fight a successful conventional war. If there had been a war, there would have been