Landmarks of a new situation A PAGE IN the political history of the Philippines is being turned over. In November 1986, a cabinet reshuffle was undertaken in dramatic circumstances. A 60-day ceasefire has been signed with the guerrillas and negotiations over essential questions have begun with the National Democratic Front (NDF). Preparations are underway for a constitutional referendum to be held in February.
The year 1986 opened with the "February Revolution," the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship and Corazon Aquino's accession to the presidency. It ended with the breakup of the first Aquino government. The situation remains very unstable. However, the main features of the country's new political geography stand out. PAUL PETITJEAN
PHILIPPINES American services. He does not face the same sort of hostility from the military and UNIDO as Pimentel. (2)
Most recently, at the beginning of January, Labor Minister Augusto "Bobbit" Sanchez was replaced by Franklin Drilon. Business circles, the US administration and the military had no love for Sanchez, a former human rights lawyer. Although he was politically on the center-left, he was considered too racivil, too nationalistic and too well disposed to the labor movement. Drilon, on the other hand, seems to offer the necessary guarantees of reliability. He is a lawyer also but employed by the multinationals and Philippine bosses.
The dismissal of Sanchez has removed from the government one of the main elements who stood apart from business circles and in opposition to military involvement in politics.
In November, Corazon Aquino found herself confronting a political crisis opened up by concerted action of the most reactionary sectors of her own government (represented by Enrile) and the Marcos "loyalists." Despite her populist watchword of "people's power," she did not turn to the mass organizations and the left to solve the crisis but rather toward the general stafi and the Americans.
Throughout the month of November, three chiefs of the US intelligence agencies stayed in the Philippines, including now retired General Singlaud, an expert in counter-insurgency warfare; and Ray Clive, former deputy director of the CIA.
As for the general staff, it made its demands known through the ten recommendations presented by General Ramos before coming out in support of the president and dropping the rightist wildmen of the RAM and Juan Ponce Enrile. (3) The latter's replacement as minister of defence, General Raphel Ileto, is a counterinsurgency expert who enjoys the confidence of the Americans.
In this latest political crisis, Washington and the Filipino armed forces clearly strengthened their hold on the country's governmental policy.
If the conflicts within the government came so sharply to a head, it was in particular because the negotiations undertaken with the National
1. coalition between Pimentel's Partido democratico ng Pilipinas and the Laban (Struggle) Party of Benigno Aquino, the murdered husband of the president. This coalition is headed by the president's brother, Jose "Peping" Cojuangco.
2. alliance of various rightwing political groups presented by Vice-President Salvador Laurel. The latter, having lined up with Enrile in the months preceding the November crisis, is for the moment being discreet. UNIDO and the PDP-Laban are the two main parties in the government coalition.
3. RAM, Reform the Armed Forces of the Philippiner Movement.
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On November 23, 1986, under the shadow of a major political crisis, Corazon Aquino demanded that all the members of her government submit their resignations. She reserved the right subsquently to accept certain ones and reject others.
The cabinet changes were only announced slowly, bit by bit. They are probably not yet ended. But those dismissals, transfers and appointments that have been made public confirm the events of November 1986. The presidency has struck out in two directions.
On the one hand, the administration broke with Enrile and the more provocative elements in the army. On the other, the November 23 presidential coup was also designed to set the stage for a major shift of the government to the right.
Juan Ponce Enrile, minister of defence in the first Aquino government, was one of the first to be dismissed. For months, this former impresario of the martial law regime had been attacking the president's policy. His cronies in the army were indulging in saber-rattling and staging more and more provocations. An attempt was underway to destabilize the government from the right. Enrile went too fast and too far. Threatened with being reduced to a figurehead, Corazon Aquino asserted her determination to take in hand a situation that had badly deteriorated.
Two other members of the government, accused of glaring corruption, were quickly dropped. They were
Public Works and Highways Minister Rogaciano Mercado and Natural Resources Minister Ernesto Maceda. Nevertheless, the president took the trouble to send a personal letter to Maceda, a close associate of hers, assuring him of her esteem. Governmental changes
It is significant that these two "political" ministers were replaced by high-ranking "technocrats." Vicente Jayme was president of the Philippine National Bank and a former official of the World Bank, as well as head of at least 35 companies. Carlos Dominguez, agriculture and food deputy-minister in the first Aquino government, is also a former bank president. Both are Jesuit trained. Thus, in the new government the weight of "technocrats," linked both to business circles and imperialist financial institutions, has increased.
In early December, Aquilino "Nene" Pimentel lost his post as local government minister. A leader of the political party closest to the president, PDP-Laban, he retains ministerial rank as presidential adviser for national affairs. (1) But his previous portfolio was taken by Jaime Ferrer, who was a member of the Magsayay government in the 1950s. Although a leader of PDP-Laban, Ferrer is known for his rightist views and the excellent relations he has maintained with the
International Viewpoint 26 January 1987
BAGSAN AS
BATAS MILITAR
OGLABAN
EMOKRAS demonstrators. (4)
Four regional leaders of the NDF, including two ex-priests, led the march, which was one of the largest in the archipelago. It was greeted by Monsignor Fortich, chair of the National Commission to Oversee the Ceasefire. (5)
On December 11, in Samal, in Bataan province, not far from Manila, an NDF delegation consisting of Satur Ocampo, Tony Zumel and Carolina "Bobbie" Malay was greeted by two columns of guerrillas in arms. This was a response by the NDF, in the form of a challenge, to the war-like talk of generals Ramos and Ileto. The latter had been promising that regardless of the ceasefire they would disarm any NPA soldiers who came out of their mountain refuges.
The NDF opened an office in Manila and now has free access to the media. Since the members of the delegation are former journalists, they know how to use the means of communication. They have been occupying
Democratic Front had reached a turning point.
Since Corazon Aquino's accession to the presidency in February 1986, the theme of a return to peace, 17 years after the beginnings of the armed struggle, has become a central political question. Aquino moved immediately to try to occupy the ground, stealing a march on both the revolutionary forces and the military.
Naming two representatives empowered to negotiate a ceasefire - Satur Ocampo and Antonio Zumel and then developing concrete proposals - its initial proposals being maximalist - the NDF gradually regained the political initiative in the battle over peace. The government's credibility in this area, on the other hand, began to be undermined by the evident bad will of Defence Minister Enrile and the general staff of the armed forces.
On August 5, concrete negotiations for a ceasefire were begun. Six weeks later, agreement was in sight. Then, precisely on September 29, the communist leader Rodolfo Salas was arrested by the army in Manila. It was an obvious provocation. The NDF suspended talks. But instead of breaking off the negotiations, it made new proposals, which were more flexible than in the past.
The NDF proposed a 100-day ceasefire with no other conditions than those making it possible to open negotiations on the essential questions. In so doing, it very clearly put the government on the spot. If the ceasefire talks failed, the government would bear the responsibility for this in the eyes of public opinion.
It was in these conditions that the far right, covered by the military, 22 escalated its strategy of creating tensions. On November 13, trade-union leader Rolando Olalia was kidnapped, horribly tortured and murdered. But the scope of the demonstration at Rolando Olalia's burial - the crowd was estimated at 300,000 people - probably convinced the Americans and the military general staff that, for the time being, it was too dangerous to pursue this course.
The political crisis was defused on November 23 with the removal of Enrile from the government, and the way was opened up for the process of negotiations to go ahead. On November 25 agreement was reached in principle for a 60-day ceasefire. On November 27, the agreement was signed. It went into force on December 10. The battle of the ceasefire
Aquino could boast that the ultimatum that she threw down for the signing of a ceasefire had had an effect. The NDF accepted new concessions. But the agreement that was signed turned out to be very close to the proposals the insurgent leadership had made two months before.
In December, the revolutionary forces in fact managed to hold on to the political initiative. On the day the ceasefire began, mass demonstrations were held in various urban centers. On that occasion, hundreds of guerrillas came unarmed to participate in the celebrations. In Bacolod on the island of Negros perhaps a hundred NPA soldiers were among the 30,000 the TV screens and the front pages of the papers. Thus, they are emerging from the imposed shadows of clandestinity and making themselves known to millions of people. This is very important for a movement whose national leaders have often been unknown outside narrow circles.
The NDF thus has an unprecedented opportunity to talk to the middle classes, which since 1983 have been playing an important role in the country's political evolution.
A good many officers, it seems, think that the ceasefire is too favorable to the left because it gives the insurgent movement de facto legitimacy. But General Ileto, the new minister of defence, has recognized that the army itself needed a respite. Faction-ridden, corrupt, isolated from the population, it has to be taken back in hand.
The officers have often set a bad example, lleto acknowledged in December. During the ceasefire, he said, "one important item is reindoctrination of the soldiers, their attitude toward service, their discipline, their cooperation with the people." (6)
For Corazon Aquino, the signing of a two-month ceasefire offered a good springboard for her campaign for the February 2 referendumplebiscite on the constitution. She is going to present herself as the apostle of peace. But she is also preparing for war. Everyone knows that the
NPA, New People's Army, guerrilla force led by the Communist Party of the Philippines.
See Philippe Pons' article in 'Le Monde' of December 12, 1986.
Interview published in the 'International Herald Tribune' of December 16, 1986.
International Viewpoint 26 January 1987
truce is fragile.
The prospects for peace remain
ARTICLES IN INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT dim. The journalist James Clad noted that Aquino "has few illusions about lasting prospects for peace. Her public pronouncements and privately voiced opinions suggest she wants first to establish the moral 'high ground' before committing the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) to renewed warfare." (7)
The NDF is well aware that the ceasefire is another way of continuing the fight. In the first inter. views he gave in September when he was beginning his job as a negotiator, Satur Ocampo already made his view on this clear. In an interview given to Alain Marc, he said:
"We are seeking a peaceful solution without thereby giving up our concepts of armed struggle. It would be very imprudent for us to lay down our arms now. I think that our strong point is precisely preserving our military capacity as well as our political authority in those regions that we control." (8)
Moreover, Satur pointed out for the Filipino press, "If the direction of the Aquino government's position in the negotiations is for us to surrender, then we don't think there is a
ON THE PHILIPPINES
Election will not solve crisis of dictatorship, by Paul
92
Petitjean
93
Marcos left isolated in the face of rising mass movement, by Paul Petitjean
94
In solidarity with the Filipino people
Statement of the IEC of the Fourth International
Filipinas fight multiform oppression, by Sonia Rupon
After the fall of Marcos, by Paul Petitjean
95
The decisive tests facing the Aquino government
97 by Paul Petitjean
98
Interview with a Filipino peasant leader
After the election: reassessment in the revolutionary
100 left, by Paul Petitjean
102
Communist Party makes a self-criticism, by Paul
Petitjean
103
The trajectory of the left forces that supported
Cory Aquino's campaign, by Paul Petitjean
104
Which way forward for the Philippine revolution?
by Sean Flynn
106
Bitter harvest for sugar workers of Negros by Peal going angry a fp with Bob Ortaliz
"People are going hungry".
109
Protests grow against murder of Rolando Olalia
USec statement
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The end of the first Aquino government by Paul Petitjean
Filipino leaders explain their perspectives
Who are the Volunteers for Popular Democracy?
Interview with Edicio de la Torre
Founding of the People's Party
Interview with Jose Maria Sison
Bisig: an openly socialist force, Interview with
Francisco Nemenzo and Randolfo David
10 Feb 86 24 Feb 86 10 Mar 86 24 Mar 86 21 Apr 86 5 May 86 2 June 86 30 June 86 14 July 86 15 Sept 86 13 Oct 86 24 Nov 86
8 Dec 86 basis for talks. We made it very clear form the rory start that in coming from the very start that, in coming to these negotiations, surrender is not on our agenda. There has to be a recognition that we are a political force with a considerable following in many areas of the country, that we have a program that has been to some degree implemented in some areas of the country and found to be beneficial to the people." (9)
The journalist Rodney Tasker wrote, "given the military's ultrasuspicious stance toward the feasibility of a ceasefire, and the left's refusal to lay down their arms, the prospects for a lasting end to the bloodshed are dim indeed. But in some ways, the fighting war on the ground has given way to a more serious political battle: a propaganda war. In this, the left has proved itself to be more adept and sophisticated than the government." (10)
The duration of the ceasefire will depend largely on the way the population, mass organizations and the various components of the Filipino left mobilize over this question. The longing for peace runs deep. It is what forced the army itself to accept the present accord.
With the opening at the begin. ning of January of the second phase of the negotiations, the NDF is going to try to give force to its conception of a just peace in the eyes of the population. It is now in fact that substantive negotiations are starting on
Bosses fight union growth
Interview with Crispin Beltran the conditions for a lasting peace. It is necessary to go to the roots of the civil war.
The NDF is going to make known the essential elements of its program with respect to national independence, popular democracy and social and economic justice. The government is demanding that the first discussions take up the questions of "food and freedom, jobs and justice." Aquino's economic program
The government is going to base itself on its legitimacy and the president's popularity. But in the propa. ganda battle that is shaping up, it risks having to pay a high price for its underlying immobility on social questions.
More generally, Aquino's economic program carefully leaves out any measure for radical social transformation. By comparison with the Marcos regime, it presents some innovations, introducing certain choices that are considered progressive.
These include dismantling the monopolies set up by the former dictator's cronies; giving priority in principle to agriculture, on which
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22 Dec 86
70% of the population depends, to small and medium-sized businesses that create jobs over the main urban centers (Manila!) and big (and costly) development projects; stress on the domestic market and not, as before, on exports; the appropriation of a 10, 000 million peso budget to create 3 million jobs, in particular by giving new impetus to public works (such as construction projects) and thereby reviving demand and the economy.
But the regime's daring stops at that point. Despite the superprofits made by foreign companies on such projects as the Bataan nuclear reactor - which amounted to a real scandal financially and in terms of safety - Aquino has decided not to repudiate any foreign debt incurred under the Marcos dicatorship. She is asking only for rescheduling of repayments. However, the service on this debt, which exceeds 26,000 million dollars, is a heavy burden on the country's resources.
James Clad, 'Far Eastern Economic Review,' December 11, 1986, P. 50.
8. Alain Marc, (published in Switzer. Interview with Satur Ocampo, 'Magazine, land), September 9, 1986, p. 29.
Cited by Benjamin Pimentel Jr. in 'National Midweek,' (Quezon City, December 17, 1986, p. 10.
10. Rodney Tasker, 'Far Eastern Economic Review, ' of December 18, 1986.
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International Viewpoint 26 January 1987
Better still for international capital, by dismantling the protective devices set up to safeguard the economic kingdoms of the Marcos family's cronies, Aquino is opening up the country to imperialist interests. The
IMF's demands regarding tariff barriers are to be respected. State enterprises can be bought out by foreign capital, which is also invited to invest more in agribusiness, the priority area of development for the national economy.
Finally, although agrarian reform is written into the draft constitution, no deepgoing social-reform measure has been put forward. Less state interference, the least possible state interference in economic life - that is the Reaganite credo of the powerful finance minister Jaime Ongpin. Aquino herself seems to have absolute faith in the dynamic laws of the capitalist economy, once a moral presidency assures the necessary climate of confidence in the country.
In October she told businessmen, "The government has completed the groundwork for an economic recovery and ... it is now up to the private sector to become more active." (11) James Clad has written, "Aquino's strategy is nothing more than letting internal distribution of goods and services work inside a freer economy." (12)
This economic philosophy is supposed to work when the world economic crisis is shrinking markets and increasing competition, including among dependent countries, and when the situation in the Philipppines itself is deplorable. Production has fallen 12% since 1984. Enteprises are operating on average at half capacity.
Without a transformation of social relations and a corresponding transformation of the state, the "natural" laws of the system will remain the same: The rich will make the gains. 24
### TEDIENDAY
NICARAGUA TOMORROW PHILiPPINES Investment will flow freely out of the country. Monies spent by the state will be diverted into patronage channels.
But there is desperate poverty, and it is all the more intolerable for being largely of recent vintage. According to Karina Constantino David, deputy minister for social affairs and welfare, "70% of the Philippine population lives below the threshold of poverty, that is, are able to satisfy less than 80% of their nutritional needs." (13) Over the past decade, the proportion of the population suffering from malnutrition has increased by 40%. Regime's opposition to social change
For the moment, the government is just saying "no" to the NDF's proposal: No to a radical agrarian reform, no to raising the question of the presence of US military bases on Philippine soil, no to selective repudiations of the debt, no to a real cleaning out of the state apparatus. The Aquino regime's opposition to change on social issues also reflects the constraints of dependence, in a situation of international economic crisis and extreme weakness of the progressive sectors within the local ruling classes. Quite symptomatically, the leadership of the RAM, which could pass for progressive when it was opposing Marcos in the army in the name of democracy, revealed itself, after the anti-dictatorial uprising of February 1986, to be radically reactionary.
This social rigidity worries even the Catholic hierarchy and the Jesuits, who are very influential in the corridors of power. John J. Carroll, a very anti-communist Jesuit father, director of the Institute on Church and Social Issues at Manila University's prestigious Ateneo, has expressed this concern in no uncertain terms in the international press.
"One anomaly of the post-Marcos era is that no crony of the former president has been imprisoned in the Philippines since the February revolution. The delay in locating and prosecuting those who had a part in the crimes of the Marcos regime goes back to the fact that the old political, military and judicial structures remain intact....
"History offers many examples of moderate reformers who failed because they remained too tied to the structures of the past; their successors usually have less concern for human rights and human values. Mrs. Aquino has not yet demonstrated a willingness to attack those structures, and even the new names suggested for her cabinet were middleof-the-road or right-of-center individuals. Until the government, the Church and the middle classes face up to this challenge, polarization and conflict will be endemic and Philippine democracy will remain a house built on and " (14
The purging of the far right and the center left of the Aquino government has not created a homogeneous body. It still includes the army and business people, the Church and rival political parties, technocrats and politicians.
11. Cited in the 'International Herald Tribune' of October 11-12, 1986.
12. •Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1986, p. 79.
13. Cited by Philippe Pons, 'Le Monde," January 8, 1987.
14. John . Carroll,, "More Targets for a Tough New Aquino," "The Los Angeles Times,' and the International Herald Tribune' of November 28, 1986.
International Viewpoint 26 January 1987
This government will probably come through its first political test of 1987 without any difficulty -that is, the vote on the draft constitution. But the next three that it will have to face could bring its internal contradictions to the surface again -the evolution of the negotiations with the NDF when the ceasefire period ends (shortly before the constitutional referendum); the need to respond to the opposition pole represented by Marcos' and Enrile's "loyalists," who are now free of any constraint of governmental responsibility; and the legislative elections next May.
There is not likely to be any simple "return to normal" in the short run, either to the norms of Marcos' personal dictatorship or to those of the two-party elitist game that existed before martial law. A lot of things have changed in these past 20 years.
Political forces are striving to create chaos and thereby set the stage for a new recourse to martial law. These are the so-called neofascist forces, whose role must not be ignored. They are still powerful and enjoy considerable support in the army and in the various regions. The pressure they bring to bear promotes the activity of those within the Aquino government who want to reduce the "democratic opening" won by the masses in February 1986. The fight for democratic freedoms remains a central task.
Nonetheless, a return to a coherent dictatorial regime similar to that of Marcos would run into major obstacles.
However, the mass movements today are far more powerful than in 1972. The Church is now directly involved in the political life of the country. The Americans have gone through the experience of the disastrous end of the Marcos regime. The Philippine bourgeoisie is on the alert. The army has acquired other means for exercising influence in the political game. The traditional regional pluralism of the islands is on the ascendancy again. The imposition of a new dictatorship would threaten to cost imperialism very dear, unless the situation changes profoundly.
In the present situation, there are elements of a "restoration" to the situation that existed before martial law: The politicians of the 1950s and 1960s are making their re-appearance. They are haunting the corridors of power. The new constitution restores a bicameral legislative, which favors the control of the parliamentary processes by elites. The regional big families have the upper hand.
But here again certain important elements in the relationship of forces have changed. The dominated classes cannot be excluded from the political game. Account has also to be taken of new actors on the stage who were not present as political forces before the martial law period -the Catholic hierarchy and the army - both of which do not (yet?) have their own parties.
Finally, the international context has definitely changed. The petrodollars have dried up. During her trip to the United States, Aquino got a lot of applause. But after long bargaining, she ended up getting only 200 million dollars in aid - a pittance. American manna is not forthcoming any more. That is going to make it much more difficult to find a compromise among the competing interests of the various pressure groups lined up behind the government. Constitutional referendum
The Philippines are still passing through a period of structural instability. The vote on the constitution on February 2 threatens to prove a •difficult juncture for the Philippine left. This is a real plebiscite offering Aquino an iron-clad hold on the presidency until 1992. In this election, she will be able to exploit her personal popularity to the fullest. The proposed constitution itself is a bourgeois and pro-imperiliast one that sanctions opening the country to foreign capital. It also includes a series of democratic clauses to liquidate the heritage of the Marcos period. The draft constitution has drawn sharp fire from the far right. Juan Ponce Enrile has taken the leadership of a crusade to get it rejected.
As the socialist organization Bisig sees it, the essential thing is not the constitution's pro-capitalist content but the battle taken up by the dictatorial forces (represented by Enrile) against the democratic gains of the "February Revolution." (15) In his report to the delegates of the organi. zation assembled to adopt a position on the referendum, Bisig's chair, Francisco Nemenzo, noted, "our decision should be based much more on the present political alignment of forces than on the content of the proposed constitution." (16)
In a statement, Bisig declared, "the discussion on the proposed Constitution cannot be separated from the issue of fascist revival." Rejection of the draft would "pave the way for a neo-fascist dictatorship." For this reason, Bisig "will vigorously campaign for the ratification of the proposed constitution while at the same time pointing out its inadequacies.
This critical endorsement of the constitution is part of the efforts to protect the political gains of February. At the same time, it is another opportunity to launch an education campaign to politicize the people so that they will not expect their liberation from a bourgeois state, no matter how democratic, and that they will not be misled into thinking that adopting this constitution marks the end of our struggle."
But, despite its anti-fascist character, the draft constitution is, to be sure, "essentially conservative, reflecting the sentiments and aspirations of the bourgeoisie." (17)
The National Democratic Front, according to Tony Zumel, has had a lively discussion on what position to take on the February 2 referendum. (18) The NDF was also preoccupied with tactical problems. Among them was a concern not to cut itself off again from important sections of the middle classes and the unorganized masses, as it did when it boycotted the presidential elections.
Some cadres of the NDF, for example on the island of Negros, seem to have announced that a vote for the constitution would be positive. On the national level finally a decision was taken to vote against it, even if on the day of the referendum this meant ending up on the same side as the extreme-right forces.
The pro-imperialist character of the draft constitution was a reason for this decision. But another, very probably, was a desire on the part of the NDF not to tie its hands during the peace negotiations by formally adopting a document that in many respects conflicts with its proposals.
If the constitutional referendum temporarily puts the left forces in a tricky position, the May 1987 parliamentary elections are going to be a wrenching trial for the government coalition. At that time, the specific interest of every faction making it up will take precedence over the policy of the presidency. But, over and above the constitutional referendum and the legislative elections, the essential thing in this first part of 1987 will probably be the struggles around the peace negotiations between the government and the NDF.
15. Bisig is the acronym of a Tagalog name meaning "Union for the Development of Socialist Theory and Practice."
16. 'Ang Sosyalista,' Vol. 1, No. of November 1986, 'Plebiscito at Panukulang Konstitusyon, Mapanuring Ratipiksayon, Pasya ng Bisig, " p. 5.
17. 'Bisig endorses constitution," 'Kasarinlan,' Vol. 2, No. 2, 4th Quarter 1986, p. 72.
18. "A fugitive afternoon with Tony Zumel," 'National Midweek' of November 26, 1986, p. 11.
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International Viewpoint 26 January 1987