The role of the Church in the revolution THE CONFLICT between the revolutionary state in Nicaragua and the Catholic Church has been rising sharply in the last year.
The Church hierarchy uses the pulpit as a platform against the revolution and continually harasses those in the Church who support the revolution. Since he became a cardinal in May 1985, the archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo has been increasingly provocative towards the government. The Vatican itself has backed up this offensive.
The government has responded by seizing Iglesia, the publication of the archbishop's palace which had refused to conform to legal regulaions and by the closure of Radio Catolica because it did not broadcast President Daniel Ortega's new year message.
The Church has protested against what it calls persecution, but as Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge points out, if there is persecution in Nicaragua, "it is used by the Catholic herarchy against progres-
NICARAGUA committed to the liberation of man and of all mankind." (6)
The choice of favouring the pour was subsequently developed at the 1979 conference in Puebla, Mexico, which declared that it should be demonstrated through "a real solidarity with the poor (which) means making their problems ours and their struggles ours and learning how to speak for them." (7)
The Medillin conference can thus be considered as the birthplace of liberation theology. In terms of the organization of the Church, this change was to be transmuted into a flowering of eucharistic base communities (CEBs) and the advent of a system of "delegados de la Palabra" ("Representatives of the Word"). This preaching of the word by laypeople has explosive implications in a vertically structured Church and on the ideological level as well. The impact of the Medellin conference
At that time the Nicaraguan Church differed little, and if anything, was in a worse situation than in the rest of Latin America. There were few priests and most of these were foreign. The religious communities had turned inwards. The liturgy had not been renewed. The conservative Church hierarchy, allied to the government, did not seem to acknowledge the existence of a dictatorship until sections of the bourgeoisie went into opposition.
The peasant community experiment set up in 1965 by Father Ernesto Cardenal in Solentiname was the exception that proved the general rule. In general the Church was "asleep when Medellin came along". '. (8) Though. this conference did not have the same impact in Nicaragua as it did in Brazil, in Guatemala or in El Salvador, for example, nevertheless changes were in the wind, with the rise in struggles in the towns and countryside.
Between 1968 and 1970 CEBs began to develop in the poorest parishes, especially in Managua. This coincided with increasing agitation
1. • "Barricada", January 7, 1985.
2. The evangelical protestant churches, which represented about 3% of the population at the time of the revolution were also part of this process especially on the Atlantic coast with the Moravian church.
Gaspar Garcia Liviana, joined the Sandinista guerrillas as a priest and died at the front on December 11, 1978.
"¡ "Neuva Nicaragua" Giulio Girardi, 'Faith in the revolution, , 1983.
Gustavo Gutierrez 'Vatican Il and the Latin American Church', in "Diakona", No. 36, December, 1985. Along with Leonardo Boff. Gutierrez is one of the main theoreticians of liberation theology.
6. Medellin, "Juventud 15"
7. Medellin, , "Pobreza 13"
8. "Envio", December 1983.
15 sive priests, monks and nuns." (1) MARIA MERRI
An important aspect of the Nicaraguan revolution has, without doubt, been the massive presence of practising Christians, mainly Catholics, in the revolutionary process. (2) It is not just the role of individuals such as priests like Father Gaspar Garcia, who joined the FSLN and the guerrilla movement, that is worthy of note. (3) What is more remarkable is the. massive participation of active Christians whose commitment to the fight was not something apart from their faith and still less in conflict with it, but actually flowed from their evangelical thinking.
In an article by Giulio Girardi, which appeared in the review Nueva Nicaragua we read that "A church which is faithful to Christ can only be on the side of the poor ... This is not a matter of a purely ideological choice but of a real participation in this historic undertaking. For many Nicaraguans, to be a Christian is to have made a revolutionary choice; a choice to be with the poor in the sense of being on the side of social revolution. This is a way of living out faith and struggle for liberation as a single commitment." (4)
The expression of this was the participation of Christians, who had not given up their religious ideals,
International Viewpoint 21 April 1986 in the FSLN and, after the seizure of power, the presence of priests in the revolutionary government.
This conflict between two perspectives for the Church, which also constitute two different political perspectives, is the clearest expression of an internal crisis since the Second Vatican Council, which took place 20 years ago. Noting the gap between the Church and the wider society, the meeting decided to launch the Church "into" the real world. Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian theoretician of liberation theology, emphasizes this aspect: "In the case of Latin America this means we have to face up to the terrible poverty and oppression that the vast majority of the people in this region live under and be sensitive to their aspiration for liberation." (5) The Vatican II Council only barely touched on this option for the poor.
The conference of Latin American bishops which was held in Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, marked a turning point for a Church which, having been for centuries the best ally of the colonial powers and subsequently of the national bourgeoisies, now wanted to be "authentically poor, missionary and paschal, free from association with any temporal power and wholly
amongst students at the Central American University (UCA), which was run by Jesuits.
It was significant that in October and November 1970 and again in 1971, when the UCA students, supported by about 20 priests, occupied Managua Cathedral to protest against arrest and torture, the archbishop's palace confirmed its solidarity, whilst deploring and condemning the action of the college heads.
At this time, the FSLN was beginning to make contact with priests, monks and nuns, Catholic youth and base communities. The Revolutionary Christian Movement, which was founded by Father Uriel Molina in 1971, was to train a large number of young people who either joined the armed struggle of the FSLN directly or else became couriers hiding arms and men. (9)
The Riguero community, in a poor district of Managua, founded by the UCA students and Father Molina was to serve both as a pool of activists and of cadres for the FSLN, such as Luis Carrion and Joaquim Cuadra. (10)
The 1972 earthquake accelerated the growth of the movement. The terrible situation of the people, the shameful robbery by Somoza who appropriated almost all the international aid - combined with an increase in repression, gave the armed struggle led by the FSLN more credibility as a way forward to bring down the dictatorship. Many young Christians joined the FSLN at this time as its activities became bolder.
Since 1971-72, the Church hierarchy had been taking its distance from Somoza. From then on it lined up with the positions of the bourgeois opposition organized in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) or in professional bodies such as the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), which wanted to negotiate a transition from the dictatorship.
Thus in January 1977, in yet another pastoral message, the Church rejected Somozaism and the FSLN, denouncing "these movements which proclaim themselves liberators but which promote an excess of passions". (11)
Right up until the last moment and the victory of the insurrection, the Catholic hierarchy, in league with the bourgeois opposition, was trying to negotiate in Caracas, Venezuela, for the broadening of the revolutionary government to include the National Guard etc.
In a statement issued on July 2, 1979, the Church hierarchy reluctantly accepted the insurrection declaring: "We all suffer from, and are affected by, the extremes represented by revolutionary insur16
Bendito el que viene en nombre del Senor
NICARAGUA UNIDA
EN SU FE TE PROCLAMA
CARDENAL DE LA PAZ
Cardinal-archbishop, Miguel Obando y Bravo. (DR)
rections, but we cannot deny their moral and legal legitimacy." (12)
The Church had no choice, but at the same time, the Catholic hierarchy was careful to warn against "any abuses of the revolutionary process," such as "threats against ownership and private property."
The triumph of the revolution on July 19 and the unchallenged place occupied by the FSLN as the only organization capable of carrying the struggle to a revolutionary victory, along with the support for Sandinismo from most religious believers, put the Church hierarchy in a difficult political position. To deny the legitimacy of the revolution and to oppose the FSLN would have meant cutting itself off from the mass of the population.
Also, the apparent anti-Somoza unity, which had prevailed in recent years, was merely covering up a sharp divide within the Church, which could only deepen to the detriment of the hierarchy, if the latter were to adopt a hostile policy. Also, in some ways the Church had drawn the lessons of the Cuban revolution. Because of its role in the counter-revolution, the Cuban Church had lost a lot of influence. Such dire consequences weighed heavily in the minds of the Nicaraguan bishops. Priests in the revolutionary government
The stance taken by the Sandinistas the day after the seizure of power left the bishops little room for manoeuvre. The Sandinistas' recognition of the role of religious believers in the revolution did not just amount to friendly declarations. The Government
Junta for National Reconstruction (JGRN) appointed four priests to ministerial posts: Miguel d' Escoto for foreign affairs, Ernesto Cardenal as minister of culture, Fernando Cardenal responsible for the literacy campaign and, a little later on, Edgar Parrales who was appointed under-secretary for the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security. (13) In all, about a dozen priests were given public responsibilities on different levels.
It seems that the hierarchy, having hesitated for several months, had finally decided to support the revolutionary process. The publication by the Nicaraguan episcopacy of the pastoral letter on November 17, 1979, greatly surprised those who had thought, and rightly, that the Catholic hierarchy was thoroughly reactionary, and greatly pleased all those practising Christians who now believed that the bishops had decided to join them in the revolutionary struggle.
Father Molina is one of the main organizers of the Antonio Valdivieso ecumenical centre which organizes Catholics and evangelical priests involved in the revolution. It is the 'bete noire' of the Catholic hierarchy, along with the Central American Historic Institute which publishes the review, "Envio."
10. The history of this experiment and of the one at Solentiname is contained in "Christianos en la revolucion", by Margaret Randall, Managua, 1983.
11. Statement by the episcopacy, in "The ideological struggle in the religious camp and its political significance", Second Nicaraguan Congress of Social Sciences, Managua, 1981.
12. Idem.
13. Ernesto Cardenal, a diocesan priest. Fernando Cardenal, priest and member of the Company of Jesus. Miguel d'Escoto, priest and member of the Maryknoll congregation. Edgar Parrales, diocesan priest. Father Parrales has been demanding from Rome his return to lay status since 1983. The Pope, whose policy is always to refuse those who make this request, preferred instead to suspend him in January 1985, "a divinis" along with the three others. International Viewpoint 21 April 1986
Both reactions are understandable when one reads the letter: "We are addressing ourselves to the Nicaraguan people of whom we are a part and who are searching for the road of truth and the realization of justice in the current revolutionary process that our country is undergoing and on which the eyes of the world are fixed. ... We do so as pastors of the Church, aware that many Christians have participated in the insurrection and are currently seeking to consolidate the victory. ... Sometimes you hear people say with trepidation that the process underway will lead towards socialism. We should look at this: ... if such socialism is one which the majority of Nicaraguans can benefit from, if all of us Nicaraguans can participate in a planned economy and if the wealth of the country is given over to the common good and if the differences between rich and poor, between town and country are reduced ... a socialism like this is a gain for our revolution." (14)
It is difficult to express the "divine surprise" which this letter represented to those who knew the more than moderate positions taken by the Church before the revolution and the road taken during the struggle. But, first it is important to make clear that the official Church never refers to this letter any more, treating it as the product of a rash moment when Marxists had penetrated its ranks.
Three factors played a role at the time. First, at that point in the revolutionary process, the Church hierarchy was divided as to what attitude to take, and it still is today. Second, many priests, religious functionaries and lay people were involved in the construction of the new Nicaragua and had not waited for orders from the bishops, which in itself tended to undermine the weight and authority of the latter. (15)
Thirdly, and this was without doubt the decisive factor, the bourgeoisie itself was also in suspense. Although it felt that it was not in political control, it still did not know what attitude to take to the FSLN.
At the beginning of May 1980, the bourgeois leaders, Violetta Chamorro and then Alfonso Robelo resigned from the Council of State hoping thereby to create a political crisis. A few days later on May 16, the bishops issued the following statement to the press: "In light of the exceptional events which have occurred today, lay people can just as effectively take on those political responsibilities formerly undertaken by certain priests." (16)
It is difficult to believe that it is just coincidence that less than a year after the victorv the conflict between after the victory the contlict between
International Viewpoint 21 April 1986 the Catholic hierarchy and the Sandinista government should open up at the same time as the first significant rupture between the FSLN and the bourgeois opposition.
If we look at the main stages of the crisis between the Church and the revolutionary state from 1980 to today, we see that they coincide exactly with other attacks against the revolution, and even take on an international dimension.
It would be a mistake to see only an internal conflict here, with the Nicaraguan Church hierarchy on one side and the FSLN and revolutionary Christians on the other.
As well as arming the contras, US imperialism has built up, in cooperation with the Vatican, an ideological campaign around the supposed persecution of the Church. From 1981 onwards, when Washington first began massive aid to the mercenaries, three important things occurred that illustrate the escalation undertaken by the Catholic hierarchy:
In June 1981, the bishops issued an ultimatum to those priests who were in the government, inviting them to choose between their religious duties and their public responsibilities.
In August 1983, the hierarchy opposed Patriotic Military Service (SMP) and denounced "armed violence" by the Sandinistas.
And finally in April 1984, in a pastoral letter published on the occasion of Holy Week, the archbishop's palace launched an appeal for "national reconciliation," that is for a dialogue with the armed counterrevolution.
Bishop Vega went as far as to say that a "people who do not feel that their civil and social rights are guaranteed also have the right to seek aid wherever they can", a reference to US financing of the contras. (17)
One might add to this the battle against government policy in educa tion, the attempt to strip the 1984 presidential and legislative elections of legitimacy, combined with the increasingly virulent denunciation of priests and religious functionaries opposed to the hierarchy and the characterization of them as false prophets.
This is exactly the same line of march as that of the internal opposition - Coordinacion Democratica Nicaraguena (CDN — Democratic Nicaraguan Coordination), COSEP, la Prensa - and the contras grouped together in the Fuerza Democratico Nicaraguense (FDN - Democratic Nicaraguan Force).
Today there is no doubt that the Church is the trump card of the opposition to the revolution. The bourgeois parties are weak and scarcely credible. Their popular support is nonexistent and they are a prey to internal divisions. The November 1984 elections, for which they had clamoured with a great hue and cry, proved that they were incapable of fighting on their own against the Sandinistas. The Church alone is in a position to combat the FSLN ideologically and to dispute its legitimacy. Catholic hierarchy moves in
The Church wishes to channel, if not the discontent, then at least the weariness that may exist among some layers of the population because of the depth of the economic crisis, the real deterioration of living conditions and poverty. After the war of liberation with its cost in human life, the ravaging war of aggression with apparently no end in sight, preys on the minds of the least politicized sections of the population. The appeals to desert the SMP or to hold a dialogue with the contras, therefore strikes a chord amongst these layers.
The attacks on priests in the Sandinista government and, more generally, on all Christians engaged in the revolutionary process, have the same goal: to separate the Christians from the revolution by counterposing a "popular Church" understood as the church of government, to the only legitimate Church, that of Rome and the Catholic hierarchy, showing that Marxism and Christianity are incompatible.
Left to its own devices, the Nicaraguan Church would not be able to carry out this task. It is difficult to estimate exactly the number of priests in Nicaragua. They number perhaps 200 or 250, a majority of whom, about 60 per cent, are foreigners. (18) The diocesan and native clergy - the two tend to coincide -are generally more reactionary than the religious orders and foreign clergy. Traditionally, there have always been more foreign than Nicaraguan priests.
To draw a political profile of the clergy is still more difficult. With the
14. "Christian compromise for the new Nicaragua" November 17, 1979, Antonio Valdivieso centre, Managua, 1982.
15. Never mind the problem of protestant 'competition'. Between 1979 and 1984 the number of people adhering to the evangelical faiths went from 3% to 13%.
16. "The ideological struggle ..." Op. Cit.
17. "Amanecer", the review of the Valdivieso Centre, No. 38-39, December 1985.
18. Figures given in "Envio" No. 30, December, 1983, which relate only to priests since there are no figures for the gious orders, men and women, working in numerous members of the different relithe country.
17 LL
same reservations as to the accuracy of the statistics and figures given, it was estimated that in 1984 about 46 percent of the priests supported the revolutionary process in varying degrees, and that 54 percent more or less opposed it.
We must not forget that since that time the Church hierarchy has undertaken to send out of the country a good many of the most actively involved priests and to bring in others whose views are more in keeping with those of the hierarchy. Be that as it may, the forces of the Church are weak and the stakes are enormous: the Church's struggle, both external and internal, concerns not just Nicaragua, but all of Latin America. The White House and the Vatican, understand that very well. Reagan supports the Catholic hierarchy
As early as his first election Ronald Reagan's advisers were stressing the dangers that liberation theology represented for Us domination in the backyard of its empire. The Republican Party's Santa Fe document affirms: "The foreign policy of the United States must begin to confront and not just simply react a posteriori to) liberation theology as it is utilized in Latin America by the clergy [who support it] ... The role of the Church in Latin America is vital for the concept of political liberty. Lamentably, the Marxist-Leninist forces have used the Church as a political weapon against private property and the capitalist system of production, infiltrating the religious community with ideas more communistic than Christian." (19)
In order to intervene in this way, American imperialism is equipped with several institutions, the most powerful of which is the Institute of Religion and Democracy (IRD). This organization was founded in 1981 by a group of the American new right called the Coalition for a Demo cratic Majority (CDM), which includes in its membership none other than Jeane Kirkpatrick. The IRD is subsidized essentially by the Smith Richardson and Sarah Scaife foundations, which on numerous occasions have served as financial figureheads for the CIA.
This institute, which, with remarkable subtlety, considers that liberation theology is part of Soviet strategy on a worldwide scale, has concentrated all its efforts on Nicaragua in the last few years. Its material support is divided - oh so ecumenically. On the one hand it gives aid to certain members of the National Council 18 of Evangelical Churches of Nicaragua (CPEN) to help them in their fight against the Aid for Development Committee (CEPAD), which contains the majority of evangelical (Protestant) churches and is considered to be "Marxist-Leninist". . On the other hand, aid is supplied to the Catholic hierarchy by way of the Commission for Social Improvement of the Archbishopric of Managua (COPROSA).
Monseignor Obando was personally decorated by the IRD in 1982. COPROSA, which edited Iglesia, the revue seized last October by State Security, is in charge of developing community projects and the training of seminarists. It must be in quite good financial condition since it also receives funds from Aid for International Development (AID), which is linked to the American State Department. The sums poured into it by AID had reached the figure of 593,000 US dollars by October 1985. And that is not all. A private company, the WR Grace Corporation - whose director, John Peter Grace, is the founder-president of the American Institute for Free labor Development (AIFLD) - notoriously linked to the CIA - donated its mite to the good cardinal's works. In May 1984 one of the directors of the firm, John Meeham, drew up a report to the directors in which he rendered an account of his discussions with Obando and concluded: "The archbishop has set up a development plan to obstruct the Marxist-Leninist schemes of the Sandinistas ... He needs help, and if you think that he is correct, we should help him materially since he seems capable of managing his opposition well. Except for the Church there is no solid opposition that can claim to have so much local support". . [Retranslated from the French] (20) The argument must have struck home since turned must have struck home since shortly thereafter this organization over more than 30,000 US dollars to COPROSA.
But material aid, necessary though it is, is not enough. The ecclesiastical hierarchy prides itself today on being the only legitimate Church and is supported in that by the Vatican. The campaign waged by John Paul Il against anything that challenges Church tradition, whether on the theological plane or in regard to the functioning of the institution, leads the Vatican to develop a policy that converges objectively with that of the US administration in regard to Nicaragua. Rome has thrown its entire authority in the balance on the side of the hierarchy against the Christian activists engaged in the revolution. The issue of the presence of priests in the Sandinista government is the best illustration.
Nitrate shame ports for It is extremely important for enjoy an immense popularity among the people, remain in the government. And it is just as important for imperialism and the opposition that they leave it or that they cease to be priests. Now, they have all refused this alternative made in the form of an ultimatum. Resting on the November 1983 revision of canon law that prohibits priests and other religious personnel from occupying public office, the Vatican settled the juridical-clerical tangle created by , the different statuses of the four priests, by suspending them a divinis from their duties in January 1985, thus bypassing the regular proceedings of the Church.
The Pope, who scarcely relished his stormy encounter with the multitudes of the faithful on his visit to Nicaragua in March 1983, wanted to issue a warning to all those who claim to follow liberation theology. The chasm inside the Church
What is happening in Nicaragua has repercussions throughout the Church and has caused everyone to "chose their camp" ' The Pope has chosen his by promoting the archbishop of Managua, Obando, to the rank of cardinal, knowing full well that he was thus endorsing, legitimizing and enhancing the importance of the person who the contras call "our cardinal of peace" . Obando has returned the favour, since it was in Miami, in the presence of all the "elite" of the contras - Robelo, Eden Pastora, Arturo Cruz, etc. -that he donned the cardinal's crimson for the first time last June.
Those who fight inside the Church against this ideological and organizational striving for "a restoration identical to that of Metternich" (21) have also had to choose their camp. At the time of the exclusion of Father Fernando Cardenal from the Jesuit order, those in charge in Central America of that religious order replied by assuring him of their solidarity. The head of the Franciscans raised a protest against Obando's accusations in Rome against those who refuse to obey the hierarchy.
And this same Obando, who claimed to see one more step toward totalitarianism in the government's
19. Santa Fe document, third proposal, May 1980.
20. "Amanecer", July-August 1984. cultural supplement to "El Nuevo Diario", 21. Hans Kung, "El Nuevo Amanece»" December 7. 1985 December 7, 1985. International Viewpoint 21 April 1986
emergency measures of October 15, 1985, was answered by a hundred or so priests and religious personnel who accused the hierarchy of being largely responsible for that situation. The rift that existed in the Church at the time of the revolution has now become a chasm which, from now on, will be difficult to bridge.
Today, the Nicaraguan revolution is defying liberation theology itself, for "until now this theology had worked out in relation to a possible, or even an imaginary, ir olution". (22) Today it is no lorer simply a question of defending ne right to fight against exploitatic or against repression, that is against the established order, but of giving substance to something new. The revolution has put its finger on the contradiction that is inherent in this theology, which does not lie in the contradiction between Christianity and Marxism but in the conflict between consistent loyalty to the poor and loyalty to the Church as an institution. Condemned to silence for a year by the Vatican, Leonardo Boff, one of the "fathers" of this theology, accepted the sanction, declaring: "I prefer to remain in the Church rather than to walk alone with my theology" (23) The brothers Cardenal and Miguel d' Escoto, subject to a harsher sanction, made the opposite choice, deciding not to walk alone, but to march with their people in the revolution rather than with a church that repudiated them.
What is the relationship of forces today between the Catholic hierarchy and the revolutionary state? Has the Church achieved its end, at least in part? Has it shaken the faith of the masses in the Sandinista Front? That does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, in the last few months, the FSLN has scored some points at the expense of the Church hierarchy. It has been divided: the tactic of the Archbishop of Managua is not visibly shared by all of the hierarchy since it is the hierarchy that is held accountable when it goes too far in anti-government provocation, and the effect produced is the opposite of that anticipated. This helps the FSLN and impairs the credibility of the episcopacy. The refusal to condemn the extortions of the contras; the complacency in regard to the use of mercenaries, whose activities are justified in the name of the cardinal and whom he has never denounced; such blatant acts as the mass in Miami - all these tend to "defrock" the Catholic hierarchy in the eyes of the masses. They show the hierarchy in its true colours as a partisan, counter-revolutionary force rather than as the picture of neutrality it would like to project. Who is winning the ideological battle?
However, both the official, and the 'popular' Church are now facing another problem; that of the decline of religious beliefs amongst young people, especially in the urban areas. Is it possible to speak here and now of an ongoing process of de-Christianization? It is undoubtedly too early to tell, but one thing is certain: before the revolution, religion and the Church filled a spiritual and material void. Today, the national liberation struggle and the FLN occupy ideologically all or part of that place for the immense majority of young people. As for social services in education and health which the Church provided in Somoza's time, because of the deficiencies of a state which was reduced simply to "bodies of armed men" , these services are today assumed on the public level by the revolutionary state.
No one can say how long Nicaragua will remain "a Catholic country". The Church of the poor is at the heart of this problem, since, siding with the revolution, it is in a sense the more under threat, while the official Church, harking back to tradition, can retain because of political positions, the support of the petty bourgeois layers. The hierarchy is aware of the stakes. It is not for nothing that it is concentrating its efforts where the revolution has had little effect, in the countryside or among those who have eluded the FSLN such as those in the informal economic sector in Managua. The revolutionary leadership knows that the best way to pull the rug out from under the feet of the clerical counter-revolution is, on the one hand, to win over more profoundly the rural sections, to the revolution, and on the other hand, to try to reduce, or at least neutralize the marginalized urban layers. The modification of the agrarian reform law of January 11, 1986, which in the last few months has legalized massive redistribution of land and permits the extension of it, gives to broad sectors of the poor peasantry a tangible expression of the revolution. The combination of coercive measures against the black market and the extension of popular control over distribution and prices is intended to thwart the speculation and inflation of which the workers are the first victims. The military successes won against the contras combined with a policy of amnesty for deserters from the SMP as well as the adoption of a statute of autonomy for the Atlantic Coast defusing the touchy question of the Miskitos, are all points marked up for the revolution.
But we must not be under any illusions: the loss of the mercenaries' military credibility does not mean that imperialism is going to lie down to negotiate and accept defeat. On the contrary, if this situation is confirmed in the coming months the danger of direct North American intervention will certainly increase, since, now more than ever, imperialism has no intention of letting a socialist revolution become consolidated in Central America.
22. Guilio Girardi, Op. Cit.
23. "International Herald Tribune", March 21, 1985.
19
Building a popular recreation centre in Managua (DR)
International Viewpoint 21 April 1986