The price of the government's referendum victory
BY SHAMEFUL manipulation and coercion of public opinion, the
Socialist government managed to break the anti-NATO majority that exists throughout the Spanish state. In this way, it won the March
12 referendum on NATO membership by 2 million votes.
Thus, it gained the backing of an electoral majority for the pro-
NATO policy that it has pursued since it came to power and dealt a severe blow to the peace movement, which has been the principal political movement, the major obstacle, standing in the way of the government's pursuit of its capitalist policy.
On the other hand, the government and the PSOE [the ruling
Socialist Party] itself suffered an important weakening of their social base. And, above all, they failed to defeat the peace movement politically. It came out of the referendum with the strength and the will to continue the fight, and capital intact. MIGUEL ROMERO
In a completely unequal contest with the entire state apparatus, seven million votes against NATO were not a victory. But, nonetheless, the great majority of these votes reflect a political position clearly to the left of the PSOE, which represents the highest level reached in this respect since the opening of the post-Franco period.
This reality soon gained the ascendancy over distress and disapwith all its moral and intellectual pointment, even on the evening of March 12, particularly in view of the clear majority against NATO won in Euzkadi [the Basque Country ], Catalunya [Catalonia] and the Canary Islands.
After a long period of doubt, the Socialist party finally called the referendum because it was forced to by the relationship of forces created by the peace movement. Failing to call it would have meant serious political trouble for the government.
It would have strengthened the peace movement, and the movement would have adopted more radical positions.
The only alternative remaining to the government in its attempt to take the country into NATO and thus defeat the peace movement was to call the referendum and try to win it. The risk that it would lose the referendum was very great. But the Socialist government had already shown its readiness to run any necessary risk to solve the central problems of the Spanish bourgeoisie.
To win the referendum, the government had to confront deep-seated popular feeling against NATO, which, in fact, was one of the fundamental factors in its victory in the October 1982 general elections (in which, it should be remembered, the PSOE [the Spanish SP] hinted with calculated ambiguity that it would take Spain out of NATO).
The question put to the vote was drawn up after a very long study, using sophisticated marketing tech-niques, in order to sow the greatest possible confusion in the electorate. For example, the word "NATO" did not appear (in fact for months it had been eliminated from official discourse), but was replaced by the term "Atlantic Alliance." And the most shameless Socialist leaders, one of whom was the premier himself, Felipe Gonzalez, strove to explain the subtle conceptual differences between the two terms.
Moreover, the question included three conditions that the government pledged to respect in this "Atlantic Alliance" - that it would keep Spain out of the military structure, not permit nuclear weapons in the country, and that it would reduce the number of American troops.
Finally, the government declared that a victory for the "no" vote would leave in effect all the bilateral treaties with the United States, and therefore confirm the status of the American military bases.
In the first phase of their electoral campaign, the Socialists' objective was to try to convince people about the supposed advantages of the Atlantic paradise. The crudity and demagogy used by the government ministers and the main leaders of the PSOE reached levels that would be hard to believe for anyone who had not lived through them.
One after the other, bogeymen were paraded - the threat of international isolation, a Western economic boycott, threats to democratic freedoms, increased unemployment. The government played the antiCommunist and patrioteering cards to the hilt (the PSOE's slogan was "For Spain, vote 'yes'.") Up until then, only the most reactionary 8
Spanish right had indulged in that sort of thing.
The banking industry was presured to put out a communique signed by the presidents of the country's, seven leading banks, calling for a "yes" vote and evoking economic disasters in the event of a victory of the "no" vote. Scare campaign
The demagogy had no limits. The minister of foreign affairs went so far as to claim that a victory for the "no" vote would lead to Spain's expulsion from the EEC. The minister of defence said that withdrawal from NATO would return Spain to the era of the "gasogeno," an apparatus that was used in cars in the 1940s because of the shortage of gasoline. (This term became a symbol of the backwardness and poverty that prevailed in that period.)
Despite all the means brought into play, this whole phase of the campaign was a complete failure. The results of all the polls in early March showed a majority against NATO, with a decided vote varying between 8 and 10 million persons.
The PSOE and the government then resorted to "Felipismo" [the bonapartist cult around the premier], the only political base they had left and also the only ideology that the party has today. In his speeches in the last days of the campaign, Felipe Gonzalez did not waste a lot of energy in repeating the themes of the "Atlantic unity" propaganda already spread by his subordinates. His role was not to convince people of the advantages of joining NATO but to get the largest possible number of people to vote against their convictions.
For this purpose, Gonzalez used the new notorious formula of "Who is going to implement the "no?" ["Quien va a gestionar el No?"]. The question implicitly involved the threat of his resigning if the referendum lost. He used the lack of a credible alternative on his left (remember that the parliamentary vote on NATO membership was 97% "yes" and 3% "no.")
In these conditions, the vote on March 12 was not for or against NATO but over continuing the present political framework or facing a government crisis, with major effects on the system of government itself, a crisis of great scope and uncertain outcome. Gonzalez appealed for a vote of fear and got it in sufficient numbers to get a majority for the referendum. • It has to be recognized that this blackmail proved especially effective in the working class. The highest "Yes" vote came either in the politically most backward areas or in the majority of big working-class concentrations - from Getafe in Madrid to the poor neighborhoods in Andalucia and many towns in the industrial belt of Barcelona (Hospitalet, Badalona, Santa Coloma.) In other places such as Sabadell, the "no" won, thanks to the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois downtown vote, while a majority in the working-class suburbs voted "yes."
There were some isolated honorable exceptions - towns in the Asturian mining basin; Sagunto, which fought a long and heroic struggle against in dustrial reconversion between 1983 and 1984; some agricultural laborers' towns in Andalucia; some towns in the Valles in Catalunya. These exceptions are not sufficient to establish a pattern. They are explained by local characteristics of militancy and organization.
This working-class vote is particularly striking if you take into consideration the following facts: First of all, all the unions called for a "no" vote (including the Socialist union federation, the UGT, although in that case it was only a formal stand, without any active campaign). Second, for about two years, there has been considerable propaganda work and organization against NATO, which has been well directed and effective, aimed specifically at the workers. Thirdly, the workers have borne the brunt of the Socialist government's policies since 1982.
So, the extreme political ebb into which the Spanish working class has gone had a decisive weight in the results of the referendum. The positive effects that we expected as a result of the general strike last June 20 have not come to pass. The majority of the working class had a conservative reaction at a time when it was essential that it act in accordance with its most fundamental interests. This is the most negative fact in the results of the referendum.
It is interesting to make a rough estimation, without any pretentions to scientific accuracy, about the political makeup of the "yes" vote. My estimation is the following:
1982 PSOE voters - 7 million
Right-wing voters - 1 million
Bourgeois nationalist votes - 0.5 million
New voters - 0.5 million. (1)
Total - 9 million
This would mean that the PSOE kept about 70% of the votes it got in
1. The electoral register has increa by two million persons since 1982 estimated that the participation of new voters was very high, probabl than 80%.
International Viewpoint 7 April 1986
1982, although a part of these would have been shamefaced votes by people conscious that they were accepting blackmail. It is significant that on the night of March 12, the victors shut themselves up in the PSOE headquarters to hold their celebrations. In not a single town or city was there the slightest demonstration of joy in the streets by the supporters of a "yes" vote. To the contrary, the people in the streets were the unhappy but not demoralized supporters of a "no" vote.
The bourgeois political organizations, and above all the Alianza Popular, were the main losers in the referendum.
The Alianza Popular called for abstention, offering two reasons: First, it was opposed to holding the referendum. Second, it did not want to be bound in the future by the three conditions that were included in the question, which it considered meant a "shameful form of membership" in NATO.
It is estimated that out of the 5.5 million who voted for the AP in 1982, about 3 million abstained, Voted note a sit sumilied 1 million voted "yes," 1 million a "no" vote and at present backs the AP) and 0.5 million cast blank ballots, which was also accepted as an alternative by the rightist leaders. While this result is bad electorally, it is still worse for these rightists that abstention was rejected explicitly by the big bankers, the military hierarchy, and the major leaders of the imperialist world.
International Viewpoint 7 April 1986
Anti-NATO demonstration in Madrid, March 24, 1986 (DR)
The entire AP campaign gave the appearance of uncertaintly and incoherence, which is a new demonstration of the crisis of leadership of the Spanish right, which has a poor outlook for the next general elections.
Incoherence was still more notable in the parties of the "center," which have a considerable importance in Spain, because the only reasonable possibility for building a bourgeois electoral majority to oust the PSOE is the emergence of a strong "center" party able to ally itself with the AP and the bourgeois nationalist parties.
The main leaders of this "center" - the former premier Suarez and the bourgeois Catalan nationalist Miquel Roca - took an ambiguous stance. They voted "yes" individually but without daring to advocate this position publicly (to the point that Miquel Roca tried to vote in secret, hiding from the press and photographers).
The bourgeois nationalist parties probably suffered less loss of credibility. Both the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and the CiU [Catalan nationalists] are convinced friends of the Atlantic alliance. But they knew that the great majority of their base wanted to vote "no" in the referendum (more as a "punishment" of the PSOE than out of anti-NATO convictions). Moreover, they considered it positive for their interests that Catalunya and Euzkadi have a "no" majority.
In this second respect, these parties were probably mistaken. The victory of the "no" vote in Catalunya and, above all in Euzkadi, where it was overwhelming, (2) has seriously weakened the "legitimacy" of membership in NATO and is fueling a nationalist radicalization that the bourgeois nationalist parties will have a hard time controlling. In any case, the PNV and CiU leaderships voted "yes" without hiding it, and it is a reasonable estimate that those who voted for these parties in 1982 split 5050 between "yes" and "no."
In the referendum campaign, the peace movement reconsolidated its capacity to unite in political action millions of people belonging to the most diverse political currents, attracting the best, the most vital elements of the society, especially among the youth. The achievements of the radical left
The weight and political authority that the radical left has gained in the peace movement by its work since 1981 have been an essential factor in giving the movement the militant, active character and the profound antimilitarist and anti-imperialist content that distinguishes it for the most part.
2. In the three provinces included under the autonomous Basque government, 65.16% of voters voted "no." In the Basque province of Navarra, not included in the autonomous area, the "no" vote was 52.70%. In Catalonia, it was 50.64%. In the Canaries, it was 49,69%, as against 44.25% "yes"
On March 12, the peace movement won a moral victory in the full sense of the word. It demonstrated to the society, the immorality of those who won at the ballot box, which has helped to undermine the legitimacy that the PSOE wants to give the "yes" majority.
The peace movement has also exposed bourgeois democracy in a practical way, which is more useful than a ton of propaganda. A position supported by only 3% in parliament got 40% in a referendum, in which only the government's capacity for coercion kept it from getting what it really represents in the society, a majority.
In the Canary Islands, Catalunya and Euskadi, the victory of the "no" vote was not only political but complete. In the Canaries, the main reasons for this victory lie in the anti-militarist consciousness built up in the people of the islands by the outrages of the troops of the Legion [an elite military force] based there and the threats that the archipelago could be turned into a NATO aircraft carrier in the Atlantic.
In Catalunya and Eukadi, the press is trying to explain the vote as a result of the PNV and the CiU's tolerance of a "no" vote. Victory for the oppressed nations
It is true that Pujol [CU] and Arzellus [PNV] avoided confronting the majority opinion of their respective electoral bases in favor of voting "no." But what really explains the results of the referendum in these two nations is precisely the existence within them of a deep-rooted national consciousness that gives the society a political cohesion, a capacity to resist the intimidations of central government.
Moreover, in Euzkadi, together with the extensive work of the anti-NATO coalitions, it is necessary to point up the role played by Herri Batasuna, an activist political force with mass influence. Having thrown itself into the struggle for a "no" vote, it was able to work for this in a consistent way, town to town, house to house.
These results in Catalunya and Euzkadi will reinforce the fight for national sovereignty, and that is cause for joy. At the same time, they have created new ties of sympathy and mutual respect between the "champions" of the "no" vote and the other peoples of the Spanish state. This is a valuable legacy of March 12 for the future struggles.
Finally, a rough estimate of the political makeup of the "no" vote 10 offers interesting and hopeful indications for the future. Some 3 million votes can be estimated to have come from people who voted for the PSOE in 1982; 1 million from the right; 0.5 million from the bourgeois nationalist parties; 1 million from the PCE [Communist Party of Spain] and the vote of the other far left parties in 1982; 0.5 million from revolutionary nationalist organizations and 1 million from young new voters.
The importance of the youth vote was confirmed in a particularly clear way where the "no" vote was in the majority. It can be said, therefore, that at least 3 million votes represented not just left opposition to the PSOE but a general political break from it. It can not be predicted today what will happen in this sector in the future, and still less what sort of electoral expression this may take. But when you remember the situation of prostration and marginalization in which the extreme left found itself after 1980, it can be said that a real recomposition has been set in motion, which is the most important contribution the anti-NATO movement has made to Spanish politics.
The deeper effects of the referendum, positive or negative, will only become clear in the medium term. This is not a good time to speculate about the future, especially when we are entering into a quite confused pre-electoral situation (general elections should take place next October).
The government is going to try to use the results of the referendum cautiously to gain time to recover from the loss of credibility it and the PSOE have suffered. It should not be expected, in any case, to be passive.
INO/
It will seek by every means to concentrate general attention, and especially that of the peace movement, on the buildup to the elections, which is the area where it is the strongest and the militant left weakest. It will probably also react in a tough way against a resurgence of the peace movement in the streets, which would give living proof of the limits of its victory. What next?
In the peace movement, there is massive sentiment for continuing the fight in accordance with the new conditions. A new campaign has already been decided on: "Bases out in the Spring!" ["En Primavera, Bases Fuera."] It will include the Sixth March to Torrejon, the site of the main US military base and of the birth of the anti-NATO movement in 1982.
The great challenge we face is to maintain the peace movement as a united mass movement, militant and organized at the grass-roots level, when there is no central objective and means of getting Spain out of NATO, that is, without the referendum.
Moreover, the government's electoral victory in the referendum involves a change in the general situation that affects all of the tasks of revolutionists. It is obviously easier to respond to the immediate tasks involved in continuing the anti-NATO fight, advancing the aspects of opposition to militarism, solidarity, anti-imperialism and so on than it is to reach conclusions on this general level. That is a theme for another article, later, after there is time for reflection.
But one thing is already clear. There were some who thought that the referendum was the "last battle of the transition" [from Francoism to bourgeois democracy], and that if it was lost there would be a massive demoralization that would take us back to the worst times of 1980-81. But this is by no means the sort of mood that is in the air today in Spain.
In the hundreds of post mortum meetings held by the peace collectives, there has been, to the contrary, a lot of spirit and determination to continue the fight. The same fighting spirit obviously also exists in the Liga Communista Revolucionaria, the Spanish section of the Fourth International. We summed up our attitude and that of the most militant section of the anti-NATO movement on the front page of our newspaper, Combate, in a phrase addressed to the electoral victors of March 12: "We wi again."
International Vionnint 7 A-aT T0nE