PHILIPPINES After the fall of Marcos A NEW political situation has been opened up by the fall of Ferdinand Marcos. While a good many elements of the old regime still remain, the system of government established during the martial law period (1972-1981) has now been shattered.
A new configuration of forces is emerging. The respective place of the various sectors of the Philippine bourgeoisie and elite is changing profoundly, along with the mechanisms of government on the national level.
The anti-imperialist left in the country has to take this turn of events into consideration, all the more since for the moment at least it has lost the initiative.
The first beneficiaries of the overthrow of the Marcos regime are the political forces that most directly led Corazon (Cory) Aquino's campaign. That includes both reformists (although anticommunist) and conservatives, as well as those who jumped on the bandwagon at the last minute, such as the perpetual minister of defense Juan Ponce Enrile. PAUL PETITJEAN
The situation in the Philippines The new administration and the remains fluid. At least in the Metro- new government enjoy real mass Manila area, the population has had support. Corazon Aquino has won the experience of "people's power," everybody's respect, both by what of the might of a mass upsurge. she represents — as Ninoy's widow -Tomorrow, the revolutionary left and by the way she continued the may gather the fruits of this experi- fight after the February 7 elections. ence. The new government has acquired
The new regime has to assume a real legitimacy, forged in the democontrol of the provinces. It is divided cratic uprising and sanctified by the between a reformist pole attached Roman Catholic church. However, to the president's office and a conser- it remains a pro-imperialist bourvative one entrenched in the govern- geois government, as attested by the ment. It may be torn by conflicts composition of the government and of interests and personal ambitions. the support extended by Washington. Above all, it is going to have to con- The stakes in the period now front an economic and social crisis opening are very great. The success without parallel in the region - of a bourgeois transition to the postvital, urgent demands from the masses. Marcos era is far from assured. In
Likewise, relations with American fact, the orderly transition long hoped imperialism and negotiations on the for by the key sectors of US imperUS bases established in the archipelago ialism and of the Philippine ruling are going to put contradictory classes was scuttled by Marcos' intranpressures on the new regime. More sigence, the dynamic of the mass important still, because of the mobilization and the contradictions dynamic of the mass mobilization, a of Reagan's policy. new democratic opening has emerged Since the end of the 1970s, the in the country; the repressive vise Philippine bishops and elements in has been loosened. The mass move- the US administration have been ments can take advantage of this ringing the alarm bell. The incompeopening to advance their own poli- tence of the Marcos regime was tical and social demands. becoming obvious. In the economic sphere, the country was sinking h deeper into crisis. On the political front, the Marcos clan was driving growing sections of the elite into in opposition, and a Communist insurrection gained weight and subal stance with the growth of the New re
People's Army.
However, it was only after the st assassination of Benigno "Ninoy"
W
Aquino in August 1983 that Washing-
CE ton began to really get worried.
a
After a period of indecision, the th
United States opted for a policy of reform within the regime. Marcos fa was part of the problem; he was also fi to be part of the solution. He was
CC to open up the regime by dumping th
* the harder-nosed elements, including ril
General Fabian Ver, the chief of the
General Staff. This was to make it th possible to bring the oppositionist of
Philippine bourgeoisie back into the
Al government and reunify the Philippine ag elites.
lo
The ultimate objective was to th create the conditions for a more effective counterinsurgency campaign.
th
(1)
de
Here we can see a coherent imperiof alist project. It involved relying on a th reformed army to control a limited democratic opening, restoring legitiof macy to the neocolonial government, at least in the eyes of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes and acting to in concert with the Church hierarchy, in as the irreplaceable moral authority.
Nonetheless, this project failed, and the United States came to the gr brink of a real political disaster, a fo confrontation bloody military between Marcos' loyalists and the a forces that went over to Cory. This of failure had deepgoing causes.
ba
The first of these causes has to do with the nature of the regime that had been established with the direct and cl decisive help of the United States sil in the period of martial law. It was it:
not just a dictatorial government. It
TI was a clientelist and nepotistic one.
A
The state was coalesced nationally under Marcos, but it became
•the ge instrument of a clan that enriched re itself and broadened its own patronage ar base through its control of the repressive forces, the public funds and government contracts. The state, as an
W instrument in the hands of a clan,
A became finally a key element in
01 consolidating a political dynasty, that th of the Marcos-Romualdez family and th of its intimates, military men such as ar
General Ver, or businessmen such as to
Eduardo Cojuangco.
The development of such a regime re
1.
See in particular Walden Bello,
"Les Etats-Unis et M. Marcos, ou comment
D s'en debarasser " 'Le Monde diplomatique'
1985;
and
Naya
February
Chanda, in
"Reagan's fence-sitters finally welcome m
Aquino," 'Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 6, 1986.
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986
has grave consequences from the standpoint of the long-term interests of imperialist domination, even if initially the Marcos state was able to carry out the infrastructural and social and economic reforms, as well as the repression that Washington wanted.
The army, the police and the state administration became identified with the presidency, which in turn came to be seen as the one big enemy, a unifying focus for mass struggles that were diverse and heterogeneous. The Marcos regime created conditions favorable for the formation, for the first time in the archipelago, of a coherent revolutionary movement on the national scale and a united guerrilla struggle.
As the private property of a clan, the state aroused the opposition of growing sections of the bourgeoisie. And, with the economic crisis aggravating the situation, it gradually lost all legitimacy in the eyes of the middle classes.
As a dynastic regime, it preempted the future. Even the prospects of the death of an ailing dictator in itself opened no reformist perspective for
Within the regime, the intimates of the president and his wife consolidated their power more and more, pushing out those who did not belong to this circle of cronies. A key figure in the regime such as Juan Ponce Enrile, known for his political cunning, his ruthlessness and his ambition, gradually lost control of the armed forces to General Ver, a former bodyguard of Marcos, a brute, but a friend of the family. After the end of the 1970s, the regime's social
Despite the American pressures, a regime such as that of the Marcos clan proved incapable of compromise, since self-reform was quite alien to its forms of internal functioning. Thus, the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983 was seen by the Church and the oppositionist bourgeoisie as a declaration of war from a regime that had shut the door to any significant liberalization, to any sharing of power.
The reinstatement of General Ver, who was accused of having engineered Aquino's murder, in his post as chief of the General Staff; and the fact that Marcos kept him, despite everything and everybody, as head of the armed forces, finally showed Washington that the dictator could not be a part of a solution to the crisis of the regime.
Thus, the pro-imperialist reform policy advanced by the US State Department ran up against Marcos' intransigence. But the American administration was itself divided. The Pentagon and above all Reagan personally wanted at all costs to avoid a break with Marcos. There was a long-standing friendship between. Reagan and the Marcos family. They had known each other for 20 years, and the Philippine president had helped, by financial contributions, to get his American friend, the former governor of California, elected president. But there was more to it than this.
The division in the American administration up to the eve of the denouement of the crisis shows that and on other occasions have not been definitively overcome. The dilemma is always the same: Should the United States hang onto an allied dictatorship that, although in crisis, is "reliable," or must it take the risk of ambitious reforms that could
In this case, the stakes were particularly high, given the presence of immense US military bases in the islands. Marcos was aware of the divisions administration and Reagan's positions, and he was able to play on them with considerable cunning. elect neck before the F A week refusing to face the facts and dump its Philippine protege. Republicans and Democrats in congress had to create a fait accompli by supporting the generals going over to Cory to get Reagan to yield. Even then he gave the ousted crooked dictator an almost triumphant reception in Hawaii.
Reagan is turning a grave personal setback, the failure of his policy in the Philippines, into a diplomatic success, refurbishing the United States' image as a democratic power. But the recent divisions can appear again tomorrow, since some US services are supporting the reformist project of Cory and the presidential lobby, while others are relying on the conservative elements in the government and the army. Cory's cards
Corazon Aquino is clearly not the naive and green little mother that she was believed to be. Since the end of 1985 and the start of the election campaign, she has demonstrated considerable political sense, a sense of how to maneuver and also how to make compromises. Her first moves as president show that she is definitely a factor in the new system of rule, and not just a symbolic moral figure.
Just before the electoral slates were closed, she was able to make a compromise with Salvador Laurel whereby she agreed to run under the label of his party, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), while remaining the candidate for president.
She managed to thwart Marcos post-election maneuvering by declaring herself the winner on the basis of the first results. She was able to resist those who advocated compromise in the face of Marcos' intransigence.
Moreover, she was able to sidestep the sudden offer of patronage from Enrile when he "rebelled" and took refuge in Camp Crame and invited her to set up her government in General Fidel Ramos' police headquarters. At the same time, she agreed to take on board these dubious last-minute allies.
Above all, throughout the weeks of open crisis, she was able to keep in touch with the democratic mass upsurge and give it impetus. She is using the momentum of this movement today to force through some initial radical measures, such as the release of all the political prisoners.
Behind Cory, therefore, there is a project, if not a program, and a political milleu that constitutes a foundation stone of the new government. The history of the Philippines is different from that of the other countries in Southeast Asia, and the present situation is unprecedented.
A lot of unknowns remain, in particular the evolution of an army that never got a taste of power before the martial-law regime, as well as of the Church and certain sectors of the Catholic hierarchy.
Such sectors of the hierarchy, and then the bishops as a whole when the crisis became too serious, played a considerable role in Corazon Aquino's campaign. Already a moral and institutional power, the Roman Catholic Church has now gone into politics. It is a de facto participant in the new government.
In the new regime, thus, we find what were very traditional elements in Philippine political life before martial law, such as the big families and their regional power; more modern elements, such as the commercial bourgeoisie, as well as more unusual components - the army and the Church. This is in fact part of the legacy of Marcos. He made the army a central axis of the regime and forced the Church to intervene as an arbiter in order to respond to the major crisis that was opened up by the activity of the army itself.
The institutional Church has been the main formative influence on Cory. As the wife of a politician long imprisoned by Marcos, she was marked by the moderate wing of the defenders of human rights. A member of
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986*
The new government
THE NEW government's center of gravity is quite conservative, despite the inclusion of some reformer and liberal elements.
Salvador Laurel, vice president premier, minister of foreign affairs. He broke with Marcos only late in the game, taking the leadership of UNIDO, a coalition of "moderate" opposition groups often associated with the traditional landholding oligarchy.
- Juan Ponce Enrile. Minister of defense. He held this post under Marcos. Came over to the opposition at the last minute. He was the guiding spirit of the martial law policy initiated in 1972.
Was considered one of the most intelligent figures in the Marcos regime. His position weakened after the end of the 1970s because of the rise of the faction of General
Ver and Imelda Marcos.
- Jaime V Ongpin, minister of finance. Head of one of the coun try's main mining companies, the
Benguet Mining Corporation. Represents the big-business bourgeoisie identified with Makati, the "City"
or "Wall Street" of Manila.
- Jose Conception Jr., minister of commerce and industry. A businessman who was president of the Namfrel, the independent movement to monitor the elections which played such an active role in the exposure of the election frauds.
Aquilino Pimentel, minister of local administration. Mayor of
Capagyan de Oro in the northern part of the island of Mindanao.
President of the PDP-Laban, linked the country's social elite, she has never broken her class ties. Her political options are polarized on one side by the figure of Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila, the pivot in a conservative hierarchy but today resigned to reforms; and, on the other side, the currents linked to the "social democrats" and Catholic Action.
These currents have been around for a long time. Already at the beginning of the 1970s, they competed for influence in the student milieu with Marxist currents. But they were paralyzed to a considerable extent by the martial law regime. Only the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was then able to organize multiform resistance to the dictatorship.
It alone was able to build an underground apparatus rooted in sections of the masses, able to act on a national scale, to absorb the blows of the repression, to extend progressively an armed struggle movement, to combine legal and semilegal struggles with clandestine activity. 6 to the "Social Democratic" current. A reformer.
* * *
The government also includes a half dozen other ministers.
Around the government and the president's office are other figures known for their defense of human rights, as well as many personalities belonging to Church circles and the so-called social democratic current. They include the following:
- Jovito Salonga, chief of the president's Commission for Good Government. A former senator who lived long in exile in the United States, president of the Liberal Party (progressive wing).
Joker Arroyo, the president's executive secretary. A lawyer known for his defense of political prisoners.
- Rene Saguisag. Spokesperson of the president. Also a lawyer known for his defense of political prisoners.
***
In the institutions of the state, the key figures have been kept in place to assure continuity. They are the following:
— General Fidel V Ramos, chief of the General Staff. Former assistant chief of the General Staff, moderate adversary of General Ver. Came over to the opposition at the last minute. Very close to the Pentagon. Expert in "counterinsurgency."
- Jose B Fernandez, governor of the Central Bank. Veteran of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.
The martial-law regime did not leave much space for political "third forces," either of the right, the center or the left. The 1970s were a period of growing bipolarization. However, the government did leave certain semidemocratic openings that allowed various marginalized currents to survive.
The Church could not simply be brought to heel in a country where 85 per cent of the population is Catholic. An army-Church commission, in fact, was established to negotiate the fate of members of the religious orders threatened by the repression.
It was only at the end of the Marcos regime — when formally martial law had been lifted - that the "red" priests and nuns became the target for liquidations. Church social activity could not be eliminated by decree. It was the crucible for very extensive mass work.
The anti-Marcos lobbies established in the United States were powerful, and the regime had to respect a minimum of formal rules in order to forestall criticisms, especially in the universities. The local governments could not be made to march in step in a country that had never known a centralizing regime. Some provinces remained oppositional.
So, the "social democratic" current maintained itself, although marginally. But it diversified. Its traditional wing, unlike the Marxists, advocated nonviolence. This is true today of the Reverend Father Jose Blanco, a Jesuit priest (2), who was denounced as a "clerico-fascist" as late as September 1985 in a communique of the National Democratic Front (NDF), for his divisive activity within the opposition forces. (3)
Another Jesuit priest, the Reverend Father Intengan, founded the underground Social Democratic Front. But a left wing of this movement involved in mass work, opposed the anti-Communist orientation of the national leadership and often advocated the principle of an alliance with the CPP.
Members of the social democratic current were arrested for conducting armed actions and planting bombs in urban areas.
In the hierarchy, since the end of the 1970s, the bishop of Bukidnon, Monseignor Francisco Claver, gained a reputation for his defense of a "third way" between the dictatorship and the guerrillas. While recognizing the primary responsibility of the government, he denounced the army and the NPA as two twin forces of militarization. (4)
The social democrat positions corresponded to the concerns of many of the bishops, who were worried about the radicalization of the Church base and convinced that liberation theology was an instrument subversive penetration, manipulated by the Communists.
Socially, the Jesuits have had a considerable influence among members of the Philippine elite, in particular through their running of the Ateneo University. Now, the Jesuits and the "soc. dem." personalities have gained an important political weight. They influence a party such as the Philippine Democratic Party Combat (PDP-Laban) and Corazon's brother-in-law, "Butz" Aquino. They are well represented in the presidential lobby. They advocate reform to forestall revolution.
2. See Reverend Father Jose Blanco, *Non-violence actualite, ' March 1986. "Vers une revolution non-violente?"
3. 'Liberation' (organ of the No. tional Democratic Front [NDF], Special Issue No. 2, September 11, 1985, *In unity, our struggle will flourish; in division, unity, our strugle will nourish; in division, our struggle will perish,
Francisco Claver, "Philippines le termoignage de Mgr. des Junes nations, No. 257, Januar Claver, ," 'Croissanes 1984. International Viewpoint 24 March 1986
Despite the obvious reluctance of the military, the president obtained the release of all the known political prisoners, including Jose Maria Sison, a historic figure in the CPP; and Bernabe Buscayno, accused of being the legendary Commander Dante, who symbolized the link between the Huk guerrillas in the 1950s and the NPA, which was formed in 1969. (5)
The conflict between the "reformers" and the "conservatives" is developing today on other terrains, starting with the extent of special powers to be granted to the "revolutionary" presidency and the institutional reforms to be pushed through.
The conflicts that continue to shake the new regime can offer the anti-imperialist left in the Philippines the opportunity to regain a field of independent mass action. The left's tactics
The entire left, even that part that backed Corazon's candidacy, has noted with concern the presence in the new government of a figure such as Enrile. Ed Garcia, representative of the Movement for National Sovereignty and 1 Democracy (KAAKBAY), which is led politically by Jose Diokno and also includes independent Marxists, argues that the "popular will" that brought Corazon Aquino to power has been deflected by the military.
But the entire left, including the part that advocated a boycott of the elections, recognises the popular character of Cory's victory.
In 1985, the Philippine left had begun to prepare its intervention in the 1986 regional and local elections. All the components of the left -including the CPP - were thinking of participating directly or indirectly in the electoral confrontation in a series of regions. But the announcement of the presidential elections confronted the anti-imperialist movement with a difficult tactical choice. Because it was divided it was difficult for the left to intervene rapidly enough to change the opposition candidates. The Aquino-Laurel ticket was bourgeois. But it raised great hopes among the people. The minority currents of the anti-imperialist left got involved in the election campaign. On the other hand the majority, represented by the CPP and the NDF, defended the principle of a boycott. (6)
Bayan, a mass coalition organization influenced by the NDF, theoretically justified the boycott by putting forward three non-negotiable preconditions for its participation in the elections: the resignation of Marcos (which was constitutionally necessary),
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986 the lifting of the decrees permitting arbitrary arrests and the release of political prisoners and the simultaneous organization of local elections. The CPP and the NDF generally denounced the February 7 elections as a farce without significance, if not thoroughly reactionary. In statement dated January 15 the CPP applauded Cory Aquino's courage. But it predicted that "the "snap presidential election' ... will be no different from the US-Marcos dictatorship's past bogus election ... But it has the making of being the biggest political swindle ever attempted by the US-Marcos clique upon our people." (7)
For the National Democratic Front also, these elections could only serve the interests of the regime. In a solemn appeal the NDF declared that: "The snap election is a farce that will only serve the interest of the Marcos regime and its US patron. This is the message that we impart in this manifesto." At the end of a lengthy analysis the NDF concluded that whatever the good will of Cory or of those who supported participation, "to participate in (this election), therefore, is tantamount to supporting the US-Marcos dictatorship and its bankrupt schemes. To participate in it is to give the ailing regime a new lease of life and further entrench tyranny. Far from securing the desired basic changes in the present system, participation in the snap election will only prolong the life of the entire oppressive ruling system and intensify the sufferings of the broad masses of our people." (8)
This boycott policy was applied only cautiously. The CPP did not try to oppose the course of the elections physically, and in several provinces movements that officially advocated a boycott helped the NAMFREL [National Citizens Movement for free Elections ] during the vote. Many members of Bayan, the radical coalition of mass organizations that advocated a boycott, joined in Cory's campaign.
It is likely that within the CPP divergent opinions have appeared. From his prison cell, Jose Maria Sison himself criticized both too hard a boycott policy and an uncritical policy of participation. He maintained that there could be cooperation between the supporters of a "minimum boycott," - that is, a position in principle, nothing more - and the supporters of "critical participation." (9)
However, it seems that in some groups of activists, which were divided about what attitude to take toward the elections, there were sharp polemics between left elements engaged in "critical participation"
and supporters of the boycott, who were convinced that the reelection of Marcos would be the signal for a new wave of radicalization among the masses who had seen their hopes dashed.
That in fact was the prognosis on which the boycott call was based. Marcos could not lose control of the electoral operation; the United States would not drop its protege on that occasion. In these conditions, the opposition could only give the operation credibility. The CPP clearly had not gauged the democratic people's movement whose force turned the tables on Marcos. This error of perspective in fact extended even beyond February 7.
In an interview given on February 13, Antonio Zumel, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPP, and chair of the NDF, congratulated Corazon Aquino for the way in which she was continuing the struggle despite Marcos' electoral fraud.
While presenting a sober judgement on the forces of the revolutionary left in the country and discussing the conditions for a ceasefire in the event of an Aquino victory, Zumel announced that the political and social polarization of the country was going to accelerate still more.
The role of the moderate opposition was going to decline more and more: with "this revolutionary situation that we have ... it is logical that the moderate opposition will tend to contract as forces go to one side or the other." In fact, "today there is hardly any room for reforms." (10)
CP activists today admit that this error of judgement led them into a blind alley in these crucial weeks and that they now have to reevaluate their tactic. In early March, a debate was in progress in the CPP leadership over adopting a new tactical orientation, while Corazon Aquino was leading a rip-roaring ideological offensive, calling on the guerrillas to lay down their arms. At the same time,
In 1942, the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), which became pro-Moscow, and from which the founders of the present CPP broke in 1967, launched a guerrilla movement against the Japanese occupier, a movement known under the name of the Huks. See IV" No. 38, October 17, 1983.
6. See International Viewpoint,' No.
92, February 10, 1986
"Boycott the snap election, advance the revolution," *Ang Bayan'
(organ of the CPP), editorial statement, special release, January 15, 1986.
'Liberation, " Vol. 10, No. 1, Jantary
1986, "Our liberation lies in people's war; a call to boycott the snap elections, p. 4.
9. An interview given on December
26, 1985, extensive excerpts of which were reprinted in Intercontinental Press,'
Vol. 24, No. 5, March 10, 1986, p. 128.
10. Interview given to Guy Sacerdoti,
'Far Eastern Economic Review,' February 27, 1986.
PORTUGAL she offered the NPA a six-month truce to discuss the possible legalization of the CPP. (11)
For the time being, and in the absence of anything coming from the Philippines, the international office of the NDF, based in Europe, issued a statement on February 26, 1986, welcoming "a people's victory over the US-backed Marcos regime." It said, "In toppling the Marcos regime, the people have cracked the imperialist hold of the US over the Philippines" following a long and hard struggle. But there is a very great danger that the United States would seek to reestablish its control. "The NDF takes this occasion to congratulate Corazon Aquino for her role in the ouster of the US-backed Marcos regime. We are prepared to give our support to her positive efforts to fulfill such democratic demands as the release of political detainees and the restoration of press freedom." But the NDF notes that the struggle must be continued and it calls on the "Filipino people to defend their gains" and to "advance democratic and patriotic gains." It is simply a matter of taking the first steps to dismantle the apparatus of the former regime. (12)
The NPA claims to have 32,000 full-time or part-time fighters. The American intelligence services credit it with about 16,500 members. These figures are not contradictory, since the first includes part-time fighters. The NPA has acquired strong roots in many regions of the country. There seems to be no question of its laying down its arms. But it is possible that there will be a suspension of military operations to give the new government time to demonstrate to the masses what it is going to do and to give time to study Corazon Aquino's concrete proposals.
Today, the left forces, progressives and revolutionaries, have to operate in a new context. They have to reconstitute their unity in order to intervene in the coming months so as to take the initiative on the social and political fronts.
During this watershed period, it is very important to make sure that international solidarity does not flag. It is in fact very likely that the present situation is going to be seized on by anticommunist currents in international Church and social democratic circles in an attempt to isolate the Philippine anti-imperialist left.
Such attempts must be blocked. Today, as before, the independent people's movements need our help.
11. See in particular the article by Philippe Pons, 'Le Monde,' March 5, 1986, p. 6.
12. Declaration of the National Democratic Front published in "Liberation, Special Issue No. 2, February 26, 1986. 8 bc th