The Anglo-lish deal who gains who loses?
THE PACT OFFICIALLY known as the "Anglo-Irish Agreement" was signed on November 15, 1985, by the British prime minister, Margaret
Thatcher, and the Irish taoiseach (premier), Garret FitzGerald. An elaborate ceremony was arranged for the signing, for the sake of a media circus, at Hillsborough Castle, County Down, a symbol of the
Protestant ascendancy in Ireland.
The ceremony followed months of secret negotiations and a series of deliberate leaks about the likely outcome. Both Thatcher and
FitzGerald proclaimed that the main aim of the "Hillsborough Deal"
was the defeat of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army. (1)
JOHN MEEHAN
Since the H-Block/Armagh hunger strikes of 1981, Sinn Fein, under the leadership of Gerry Adams, the abstentionist member of parliament for West Belfast, have successfully contested elections in the Britishruled six-county enclave, getting about 13% of the total vote (about 42% of the vote of the oppressed Catholic population). This compares with about 18 per cent for the bourgeois nationalist Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which is led by John Hume, member of parliament for Derry.
The SDLP, who were deeply involved in the confidential DublinLondon discussions leading up to the signing of the deal, now desperately need to see it bring some concessions for the Northern nationalist minority so that they can regain ground lost to Sinn Fein.
It is now clear that there will be no significant concessions. The Unionist majority have voiced their own opposition to the agreement in their traditional "no surrender" style. This has included a series of bellowing reactionary speeches, in particular from the rable-rousing preacher, Ian Paisley, who is the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and member of parliament for North Antrim; a frenzied mass rally in Belfast; and the resignation of all the 1. For an assessment of the November 1 - 2 1985, "Ard Fheis" (congress) of Sinn Fein, see "Sinn Fein Moving Leftward, the stakes for the national liberation movement," in "International Viewpoint" No 87, November 25, 1985.
Unionist MPs from the London parliament. Bye-elections for the 15 vacated seats will take place on January 23, 1986.
The Loyalist hysteria does have an intimidating effect on the nationalists. On the other hand, the traditional cries of the Protestant ascendancy on the defensive, "no surrender" and "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right" (2) reminds them of their downtrodden position in the Six Counties.
In this context, nationalists react not uncommonly by thinking, "If the Loyalists don't like it, maybe it has something to offer." This is a naive, knee-jerk response, which is entirely self-deceptive. But its effects can be seen particularly in the neocolonial south, where there is much less direct experience with British imperialism. There, opinion polls indicate that a large majority of the population look favourably on the pact. FitzGerald lays the constitution at Maggie's feet
This pressure is reflected by the sinuous course of the bourgeois party that has traditionally most exploited nationalist sentiment, Fianna Fail. At first, the party leader, Charles Haughey, raised the shout of "betrayal," accusing FitzGerald of selling out to Britain. The day after the deal was signed, Haughey declared that it was "an astronomical setback and a bad day for Irish nationalism."
A few days later, he told the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party in notably mellower tones that the party would not be "destructive of the agreement" if it would ameliorate the condition of the nationalist community." There was a clear connec tion between Fianna Fail's dithering and its score in the opinion polls. In one week its lead over the unpopular Fine Gael-Labour coalition government dropped from 11% to 6%.
There was no wavering by Sinn Fein. In a statement released immediately after the deal was signed, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams said that the Dublin government had formally recognised partition, thereby repudiating Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution.
FitzGerald had insulted the "long suffering nationalist people of the Six Counties," Adams said, by telling them in the Irish language that they could now raise their heads. "It is because we have raised our heads," Adams continued, "and have struggled and made sacrifices for our civil and national rights that the running sore of British involvement in Ireland has been addressed at all."
The agreement, Adams said, amounted to the "total abandonment of SDLP, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail assurances that they would not accept any internal Six County arrangement.
"Sinn Fein's position remains clear. We will continue to give principled leadership to the nationalist people." The Sinn Fein president said that the only way Unionists and nationalists could get together would be if the Unionist veto were withdrawn in a "Britishless" Ireland.
What is actually in the Hillsborough agreement, and what are its long and short-term prospects?
The very first article of the agreement says, "any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland." (3)
This provision is directly contrary to Article 2 of the Irish constitution, which does not recognise any such entity as "Northern Ireland." It says, "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and its territorial seas."
The only qualification of this position in the constitution is in Article 3, which states that "pending reunification of the national territory," laws passed by the 26-County parliament (the Dail) shall cover the Souther state only. But this article also notes that this is "without prejudice" to the right "to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that [national] territory."
The Hillsborough agreement's claim that "there is no derogation of sovereignty by either government" is, therefore, absurd.
In its duplicity, the Dublin government risks leaving itself very exposed. Shortly after the deal was signed, Garret FitzGerald repeated a position that he has publicly held for several years: that Article 2 should be deleted from the 26-County constitution.
But he did not fail to add, with his characteristic cowardice, that he would not seek a referendum on the question. FitzGerald knows that his pro-Unionist view would be defeated.
Dependent on its more nationalistic base, Fianna Fail will not go along with any dropping of Articles 2 and
In promoting the Hillsborough deal, FitzGerald claims to be an "Irish nationalist" and represent "Irish nationalism." This, of course, enfuriates the Loyalists. But what do the British think about it?
The answer came in a December 3 speech by British "Northern Ireland" Secretary Tom King to a group of business people in Brussels:
"In Northern Ireland now we have signed an agreement in which the
Prime Minister of the Republic of Treland, notwithstanding the fact that he faces, or has to live with, a constitution that has aspirations about sovereignty over Northern Ireland, has, in fact, accepted that for all practical purposes and into perpetuity, there will never be a United Ireland." (Irish Press, December 4, 1985.)
Left holding the bag by this arrogant imperialist official, FitzGerald furiously demanded an apology to save at least some face. The insensitive King, who had the bad grace to speak plainly, duly obliged with a tangled statement at Westminster. He claimed that he had only been expressing a personal opinion:
"I recognize that the way I expressed this indicated that I considered this also to be the view of Dr. FitzGerald. I, of course, accept that this is not the case." (Irish Times, December 5, 1985.)
In a statement, People's Democracy, the Irish section of the Fourth International, commented: "Afterthe Forum Report, Margaret Thatcher said 'Out, Out, Out!' to a United Ireland. After the Anglo-Irish Deal British Direct Ruler Tom King says Garret FitzGerald agrees 'there will never be a United Ireland.'
"Garret, Maggie's Parrot, squirms, squeals and protests. It will do no good. He has chosen the humiliating and degrading path of putting forward 'views and proposals; quoting the agreement — to King, Thatcher, RUC supremo Jack Hermon and company in the Irish Conference!
"There is 'no derogation' of British sovereignty in this deal. Iron Britannia rules OK."
The southern state is up to its eyes in collaboration with British imperialism. It was founded in 1920 by a Westminster Act of Parliament, and consolidated its rule through a brutal civil war in 1922-23, involving the internment and summary execution of thousands of Republicans [militant nationalists].
Today, Portlaoise and Limerick jails are full of people who took Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution seriously. "Special" courts sit in Dublin without juries to try anti-imperialist activists. The police use brutal methods condemned by Amnesty International. (4)
Through Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, Sinn Fein is banned from 2. Unionists call the Six County state "Ulster. In fact, there are nine counties in the historic province of Ulster, only six of which were included in the Northern Ireland state when it was formed in 1920. 3. All quotations are taken directly from the full text of the deal. This can be found in the November 16, 1985, issues of the "Irish Press" and the "Irish Times" 4. For an example of a significant victory over the South state, see "The Release of Nicky Kelly" IV No 60, October 1, 1984. International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
national TV and radio. Such blanket censorship does not operate even in Britain or the Six Counties.
The Hillsborough deal offers plenty of scope for "improving" such collaboration. For example, Article 8 declares that the Anglo-Irish Conference [an all-Ireland consultative body set up by the agreement] "Shall consider whether there are areas of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might be harmonized."
Are the British government thinking of extending a "Section 31" to all of Ireland? The Hillsborough agreement opens the gate for that.
Another example of craven collaboration by Dublin is the extradition from the southern state to the Six Counties of people wanted there for political offenses.
Until recently, southern courts invoked the constitution and refused to extradite anyone to the Six Counties if they were wanted for offenses connected with the Republican struggle against the British authorities and the Loyalists. Extradition of republicans
In 1982, this policy was turned on its head by the ex-Fine Gael TD [teachta Dala, member of the Irish parliament] and Blueshirt (5) Chief Justice Tom O'Higgins. He declared that people up for extradition could only claim their offenses were political if they were "engaged in what reasonable, civilised people would regard as political activity."
Following this, Dominie MeGlinchey and Seamas Shannon became the first republican militants ever to be extradited to the north for political offenses. Other cases are pending.
The Hillsborough deal seeks to seal this treachery by allowing the South to sign the 1977 European Convention Against Terrorism." Up till now, the South has invoked the "political exception" and refused to sign this convention.
In the wake of Hillsborough, FitzGerald announced that the Dail would now comply with the British request.
Article 3 of the Hillsborough agreement associates the Dublin government with the British policy of devolving power "within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community."
This policy represents a substantial retreat from the 1972-74 policy of "power sharing," which explicitly allotted a place within any Six-County
International Viewpoint 13 January 1986 government to the SDLP. After only five months in office, the "powersharing" government was brought down in 1974 by a work-stoppage of Protestant workers organized by the reactionary Ulster Workers Council (UWC).
The Hillsborough agreement's reference to devolution arises afrom a British desire to end "Direct Rule," instituted in 1972 after the rise of the mass civil rights movement forced the London government to suspend the Unionist parliament at Stormont.
Under direct rule, a British cabinet minister has overall responsibility for the Six Counties. This colonial posting has been pithily described by a previous Tory occupant, James Price, as "the dustbin of British politics."
After the H-Block/Armagh campaign came to an end in 1981, Price himself dug into the garbage and retrieved Stormont, wrapped in a scheme called "Rolling Devolution."
The Loyalists, especially Paisley, co-operated with enthusiasm. But the SDLP was incapable of playing its designated collaborator role. Sinn Fein, reversing its previous no participation policy, contested the elections on a "boycott Stormont" platform. The SDLP was obliged to follow suit.
Sinn Fein won a respectable vote, and the new Assembly at Stormont was left as a rump full of bickering Loyalists.
Without the collaboration of the SDLP, the British were afraid to devolve any real powers on the Assembly, which was a purely Protestant ascendancy body. A rash move could have increased the electoral support for Sinn Fein, with incalculable potential spill-over in the South.
From the British government's standpoint, the Hillsborough deal is a manoeuvre to get around this roadblock. So far, it has produced results. FitzGerald and the SDLP have openly called for talks with the Loyalists.
Should the British decide now on a unilateral concession to the Loyalists on devolution, the Dublin government and the SDLP will be in serious trouble. The quisling nationalists cannot afford to pull out without conceding ground to the anti-imperialist resistance movement.
After this stunning catalogue of capitulations, one might wonder "Did they get no concessions in return?" The answer is no.
There has been some vague talk about resending the Flags and Emblems Act, which bans the flying of the Irish flag. It has also been suggested that it could be made legal to put street names in the Irish language. The fact is that the people in the nationalist neighborhoods have already taken these rights on their own.
Before the signing, some other carrots were dangled, such as a review of some judicial frame-ups of Irish people in Britain during the 1970s. Two notorious cases in this respect are the "Birmingham Six" and the Maguire family.
None of these people were at all connected with the republican move. ment. The Maguires were supporters in London of the British Tory Party! For this reason, some establishment figures, after innocent people have spent over ten years in jail under terrible conditions, consider that such "soft" convictions might be overturned. Similar frame-ups involving republican militants are ignored.
As yet, however, there has been no action on this front. It is quite possible that the paranoid Loyalist antagonism to the Hillsborough agreement and a real fear that calling into question any link in the chain of repression could open up a Pandora's box will stay any judicial review, even of the most obvious and counterproductive frame-ups.
It might seem strange at this point that the Loyalists have reacted with such outrage to a deal that offers them so much. That is, in fact, a useful question to consider.
First of all, let us look at the Loyalist backlash. On November 23, over a hundred thousand people [about one tenth of the total Protestant population of Northern Ireland] gathered in Belfast in front of a platform including 14 of the 15 Unionist MPs, all of whom have resigned to force a "referendum"' on the deal.
Ian Paisley has made statements that the role accorded to Dublin "in joint control of Ulster's affairs is tantamount to putting Adolf Hitler in the Israeli cabinet." (Irish Times, December 3, 1985.)
Loyalist elected representatives have physically attacked Tom King inside and outside Belfast City Hall. All Loyalist district councils are boycotting the British ministries.
Such a deep gulf has opened up between these Frankenstein's monsters and their creators that King's deputy, Nicholas Scott, has threatened to suspend the Stormont Assembly.
A "moderate" Unionist grouping, the Alliance Party, accuses the Loyalists of planning an Ian-Smith-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
Tom King's Brussels misstep -"No United Ireland in perpetuity" is one example of British efforts to calm the Loyalist monster. 5. The Blueshirts, imitators of Mussolini's Blackshirts and Hitler's Brownshirts, were a fascist organisation active in the 26 Counties during the 1930s. They are direct ancestors of today's Fine Gael, the most pro-imperialist of the big bourgeois parties.
7
NOT
Glasgow, Scotland. Paisley addresses an anti-Pope march (DR)
aUOM00
Another has been an internal memo in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) from the chief constable, Jack Hermon, which denied a claim by FitzGerald that in the future the police would accompany patrols by the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).
In some odd way, FitzGerald seems to think that RUC participation in these patrols would be a "reform." It is true that the UDR, a Loyalist-staffed British army regiment, has an atrocious record of attacks on Catholics.
But the RUC has plenty of skeletons in its cupboard too - for example, the shooting in cold blood of unarmed republicans Roddy Carroll and Seamus Grew in Armagh. (The officer responsible, Robinson, was later acquitted of murder by Judge Gibson, who praised his "marksmanship.")
The Hermon memo was produced at a DUP press conference on Deeember 4. With a mind-boggling disregard for reason and logic, the Paisleyites called Hermon a "collaborator" and a "paid lackey of the Dublin and London establishments." (Irish Times, December 4, 1985).
This incident, among other things, shows the futility of trying to conciliate Loyalist bigots. They are too rabid and bloodthirsty for that.
I referred before to the Loyalist strike that scuttled the last major British political initiative, "power sharing." All the Unionists united on the fundamental point of defending the Protestant caste privileges, defence of the Orange antiCatholic ascendancy.
High unemployment and social deprivation among Catholics convince 8 the Loyalist working class that "in the land of the blind, the oneeyed is king." This is similar to the attitude of the white workers to Blacks in South Africa, or that of Israeli workers and poor to Palestinians.
The Unionists see any Dublin involvement - or any SLP role -in the Northern state as a threat to the Protestant ascendancy. The Loyalists are furious for being excluded from the year-long Dublin-London secret talks. The coming electoral battles
They had seen Prior's Rolling Devolution as a quick way back to Stormont rule, and are incensed at extra delays and manoeuvres. Then there is the intolerable sight of 59 Sinn Fein members in district council chambers!
Tactical divisions in the Loyalist Bloc still play a role. Paisley stresses devolution. The Official Unionists, led by Molyneux, have in the recent past focused on "complete integration" into the United Kingdom.
These differences led to constant squabbling in the Assembly. But with the rise of a common enemy, Sinn Fein, such divisions receded into the background.
The Loyalists are clearly hoping to be able to repeat 1974. Whether or not they succeed in achieving that, there is no doubt that they have pushed the political pendulum to the right. In this situation, the anti-imperialist response to the Unionist bye-election campaign takes on a criticalimportance. The same is true of the problem of a long-term anti-imperialist strategy for the South of Ireland.
Four of the 15 constituencies in which bye-elections will be held have potential nationalist majorities. They are Mid-Ulster, Fermanagh/South Tyrone, Newry and Armagh, and South Down. Sinn Fein have declared that they will contest the bye-elections. and have offered a "nationalist pact" to the SDLP.
However, nationalist unity has been rejected in blunt terms by the SDLP. The party leader, John Hume, pointed out that while the SDLP supports the Hillsborough deal, Sinn Fein opposes it.
In itself, there is nothing wrong in proposing a "nationalist pact" to the SDLP. But it is important that this be done within a clear principled framework of mobilising the masses against the deal. That means collision with the SDLP leadership, which is committed to Hillsborough.
On the other hand, Sinn Fein could propose a united resistance in these elections - including with sections of the SDLP - by incorporating in proposals for a united platform issues of democratic rights and opposition to repression, such as the following: * Immediate British withdrawal * Disbanding the UDR and the RUC * Amnesty for political prisoners * An end to the Diplock Courts
[Special courts for trying political prisoners].
People's Democracy believes that such conditions must be placed on negotiations with the SDLP or any other nationalists. Moreover, PD is calling for structured discussions around a "Freedom Charter" for Irish Unity. The national liberation movement needs a whole new strategy to confront the new ruling class offensive, in particular in the South. L International Viewpoint 13 January 1986