International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Czechoslovakia and the Polish Example

· International Viewpoint No. 9, 21 June 1982 · pp 22-25 · 4,152 words

Eastern Europe Trade unions Latin America

In German: Das polnische Syndrom, 17. Mai 1982 (Inprekorr Nr. 8 (147), 16. September 1982)

Czechoslovak bureaucrats fear spread of the Polish example

Anna LIBERA

A little more than three years ago, the Czechoslovak authorities arrested fifteen members of the Committee to Defend the People Unjustly Persecuted (VONS). Six of these were sentenced to prison terms in October 1979. Vaclav Havel and Petr Uhl are still serving their sentences in extremely difficult conditions.

These arrests marked the beginning of a police offensive clearly designed to silence every expression of oppositionunderground publications, Charter 77 statements, or the activity of VONS.

This repression, which has not relaxed in three years, as well as the quickness that the Czechoslovak leaders have shown since the beginning to denounce what they call the "Polish counterrevolution," appear in a new light if they are looked at in connection with the worsening of the country's economic situation.

* * * With a zero growth rate, 1981 was the second worst year in the history of the Czechoslovak economy since the emergence of the People's Republic. It was exceeded only by 1968, during which an absolute decline in industrial production (-2.2% ) promoted the big debate on economic reform that was to pave the way for the Prague Spring. The parallel stops there, and this crisis is in no way comparable to the one in Poland or in Rumania. But the economic situation is serious enough to absorb the attention and the efforts of all the leading cricles in Prague.

### POLAND IS CLOSEBY

The reactions of the Czechoslovak leaders to the events in Poland have been swift and drastic. Already on September 4, 1980, the editors of the Czechoslovak CP organ Rude Pravo fulminated about imperialist plots and local reactionaries in the sister country across their northern border. On this occasion, they reminded their readers of the "Lessons of the Development of the Crisis in the Party and Society After the Thirteenth Congress of the Party in 1971," that is, the lessons drawn by the normalized Czechoslovak Communists.

The "Lessons" focused in particular on the forms under which the coun terrevolution concealed itself in social demagogy, imprudent demands, wildcat strikes, the fight for independent unions. The parallel with Poland was clear, and the editors concluded, moreover, that these lessons were not restricted to Czechoslovakia: "The international Communist and workers movement has added them to the reservoir of revolutionary experience (1)."

A few days later, Vasil Bilak, the ideologist of the Czechoslovak CP, noted, referring to Poland, the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" of the countries in the "Socialist Camp," (2), a doctrine which cost the Czechoslovak workers dear, but was the basis on which Bilak and his like were put in power.

TCHECOSLOVAQUIE

(DR)

In a speech to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP in October 1980, Bilak expounded this doctrine once again in detail. Basing himself on the criteria laid out in the "Lessons," he characterized the Baltic strikes as "counterrevolutionary." After expressing his hope that the Polish Communists would be capable of regaining their footing, he concluded: "We do not hide the fact that what is going on in Poland concerns us deeply-politically, ideologically, and economically.

"The Czechoslovak Communists and our people are for progress. The cause of socialism is dearer to them than anything else. This is particularly true when a socialist country is involved. Our Polish comrades can always count on the aid of our party and our people (3)."

The Czechoslovak CP leaders have never resorted to the prudent language that the Polish leaders have been forced to adopt. A few weeks before General Jaruzelski's crackdown, in a discussion over Radio Prague, a party ideologist denounced any perspective of "national unity" with Solidarnose, and put forward "his own" solution-a deepgoing purge of the Polish CP (which after that could really launch a process of normalization) and total confidence in the army, whose organ was one of the only remaining unbreached bastions of "Marxism-Leninism."

A CAMPAIGN WITH TWO TARGETS The Czechoslovak leaders obviously fear that an advance of the class struggles of the Polish working class would revive old demons in their own country. Even if for the time being, the strikes developing on the other side of the border did not touch off an open movement of sympathy among the Czechoslovak workers, the discontent aroused by the economic difficulties worried the Czechoslovak CP leaders, who were preparing to impose a rigorous austerity policy.

This worry came to a head when the economic results for 1981 were announced. The growth rate was 0.2 percent, in contrast to the 2.7 percent projected by the annual plan. Industrial production grew by 2 percent relative to 1980, but this was 25 percent lower than the initial projections of the plan, and 15 percent lower than the revised projections made during the year.

In mining and construction, growth rates were negative-respectively -2.4 percent and -2 percent. The worst result was in agriculture (-3.4 percent relative to 1980, but relative to the targets set by the plan in 1981, the result was -230 percent).

The signs pointing to economic difficulties had been visible for several years but the Czechoslovak leaders proved unable to respond. At the start of 1980 already, they were obliged to admit that many of the projections in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1976-80) would not be achieved, in particular in the realm of energy and construction.

1. Rude Pravo, September 4, 1980. 2. Rude Pravo, September 13, 1980. 3. Rude Pravo. October 14, 1980. 23

At that time, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP, followed by the government, adopted a series of "new measures to improve economic management." These called for strengthening centralized planning, changing the attitudes of plant managers and workers, more autonomy for the enterprises in the framework laid down by the plan, and better utilization of resources (raw materials, energy, labor, and investment) (4).

These very timid steps remained in large part on paper, since the very word "reform" makes the present Czechoslovak leaders freeze in their tracks. But, most of all, these steps did not in any way get to the sources of the economic difficulties.

The root of the problem above all was the option made in 1970 for an investment policy stretched out over too long a period. Thus, enormous amounts of capital and resources were locked up in uncompleted projects. And the planners were unable to readjust their projections in time, when alarm signals began to appear and petroleum prices went up.

In a document on the economic situation published in March 1982, Charter 77 gave a series of significant examples, based on the official statistics given to the members of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak CP.

In western Slovakia, out of nine key projects scheduled for completion during the 1976-80 plan, only one was actually finished in 1980. In southern Bohemia, out of 140 building projects included in the plan, only 8 met their schedules. In 1980, there were no less than 119 projects on which no work had been done (5).

Therefore, for the entire post-1968 period, if you consider all sectors of the economy, the volume of capital locked up in unfinished projects exceeded the volume of additional national revenue created annually.

This situation has been further aggravated by a series of errors and wrong choices by the planners. Thus, they pushed the development of steel production at the very time when this industry was dropping steeply. On the other hand, the electronies industry was largely neglected. Here we see one of the effects of the choices imposed by the pressures of various factions of the bureaucracy.

Moreover, the waste of raw materials has weighed heavily on the economic results. Thus, for the period of the 197680 plan, waste of metals cost 10 billion crowns (about US dollars 900 million at the official exchange rate). With this amount 460,000 Skoda cars could have been produced, or 120,000 apartments built (this is still according to the figures reproduced in the Charter 77 document).

The nonfulfillment of the plan's targets in all sectors, in particular in the engineering industry, the main exporting sector (6) gave rise to a shortage of convertible currency that in turn made it more difficult to import the raw materials needed to complete the projects underway.

This problem is made worse by the fact that the Czechoslovak leaders are trying to avoid increasing their debts to Western banks (these remain at the relatively low figures of 3.8 billion dollars).

Within the framework of COMECON, import restrictions have been decided on. The same goes for imports from capitalist countries. These restrictions apply, for example, to petroleum and to livestock feeds, even if this endangers the growth of the herds.

In these conditions, the Czechoslovak CP leaders cannot try to stimulate one sector without automatically affecting investment in another. So, in an effort to moto senanmies they have adon- fort to make economies, they have adopted a recovery plan that amounts to a rigorous austerity program for the workers. It provides for severe cuts in investment in the social services, which are considered unprofitable.

In the health sector, investment has been reduced by 10%, and similar cuts have been made in education and culture. Savings are projected in the public transport sector. And apartment rents, as well as the cost of heating and electricity, are to be raised.

In October 1981, the price of gasoline, diesel fuel, and heating oil were also increased. In January 1982, there were increases in the price of meat, meat products, fowl, game, fish, rice, cigarettes, rice, alcohol, wine, and similar products.

Even though people continue to have more money than goods to spend it on, given the scarcity of goods, real wages have declined over the past two years and this is getting worse. For the first time since 1968-69, the regime can no longer guarantee rising living standards or even the maintenance of the existing one, although what it offered "in exchange" for the elimination of democratic rights and freedoms was material well being.

### REPRESSION REMAINS

THE FAVORITE WEAPON Confronted with this economic balance sheet, the Czechoslovak CP leaders

4. Rude Pravo, March 14, 1980. See also Cahiers des pays de l'Est, Paris, May 1981.

5. Charter 77, "Informations et questions sur certains problemes economiques relatifs a l'augmentation des prix des produits alimentaires de base," March 1982, l'Alternative, Paris, May-August 1982.

6. In 1981, exports to the COMECON countries increased by 0.7% as against the 4.3% projected. Exports to other countries increased by 0.8% as against the 4.5% projected.

Paris demonstration in support of Czech political prisoners (DR)

24

are striving at all cost to prevent a political destabilization. They are acutely aware of the growing discontent of the population, which is especially critical of the pay-off artists and the various speculators who are profiting from the scarcities.

Between the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses of the Party, 47,515 letters and complaints about such abuses were made public (7). In the party itself and in the trade-union movement, more and more voices are being raised against the incompetence of the leaders (8).

Of course, the Czechoslovak CP leaders orchestrate their speeches about this in a demogogic way, talking about "improving the functioning of socialist democracy on all levels" and criticizing" those who abuse their positions to gain personal advantages." There has even been an article by Alois Indra saying that the Czechoslovak CP leadership "lost contact with the masses," and that the party itself was not in the best shape (9).

At a recent congress of the trade unions, the Czechoslovak CP leaders appealed to the leaders of the Revolutionary Trade Union movement to devote themselves more to defending the workers interests. In the light of the economic difficulties, it is easy to understand why such declarations are being made at a time when the leadership is appealing to the masses to make "greater efforts."

However, for safety's sake, the bureaucracy relies first and foremost on suppressing every voice of opposition that might strike a cord in the latent discontent that is appearing in various areas.

The eighteen months that have gone by since the Polish summer have been marked by an unbroken string of arrests, jailings, and daily threats and harressments against oppositionists. The authorities have been stepping up 48-hour detentions as well as trials.

On September 6, 1980, thirty signers of Charter 77 were arrested right after they had drawn up a message of solidarity with the Baltic strikers. They were released after the expiration of the legal limit of detention. But at the end of the month, twelve other persons were arrested when they were going to a meeting of the VONS. Since then the authorities have kept the Chartists under constant surveillance, increased the physical attacks on them by "unknown persons," and systematically applied harsh techniques in interrogating them.

The objective is twofold-to prevent any possibility for meetings and to break the resistance of the oppositionists one by one. The authorities also launched a full-scale offensive against the underground publishing carried out under the name of Petlice (Padloc Press). In February, they seized a lot of manuscripts in the home of the writer Lucwik Vaculik, one of the main movers in the underground publishing. They also staged raids against a number of the people who typed the manuscripts and seized many typewriters.

In May 1981, in connection with the arrest of two young French people who were transporting books to Czechoslovakia, the authorities arrested and charged sixteen Czechoslovaks with "ideological conspiracy." Ten were immediately jailed. Among those charged were some of those most prominent in the intellectual debates of the 1960s (10). These people are still awaiting trial. It keeps being postponed because of the lack of evidence against them.

Another significant event was the recent search of the home of Jaroslav Sabata. The authorities siezed only one thing-all the notes that he had been ac cumulating for a year to write a book on Poland.

There has also been a particular increase in repression against Catholics, to an extent not seen since the 1950s. This is certainly one of the effects of Poland. But it seems also that the Czechoslovak authorities are seriously worried by the growing influence of the church among the youth.

Karel Hruza, head of the government's Secretariat on Church Affairs did not conceal his concern in an interview with the New York Times at seeing the youth turn toward the church "in search of a new aim in life." But here the authorities' first reaction is to repress. On September 28, 1981, in Olomouc, six Catholics (two priests and four lay people) were sentenced to two years in prison for circulating such "subversive" religious publications as the Catechism and Pope John Paul II's latest encylical.

Facing this systematic persecution and growing difficulties in their daily lives, the oppositionists remain unyielding. The long document on the economic situation just published by Charter 77 shows how much they are trying to focus their attention on the problems of the workers. Previously, Charter 77 had centered its activity essentially on the defense of democratic rights.

This indicates that currents in the opposition are also drawing the lessons of Poland and are stressing the need to make a linkup with the concerns of the working class. Another indication of this was the announcement about a year ago of the formation of a Committee for Free Trade Unions.

In this difficult struggle, the Czechoslovak oppositionists need all our help. At a time when the Polish workers are defying the state of siege to reassert their rights, it is essential to include support for the Czechoslovak oppositions in all solidarity actions.

7. Courrier des pays de l'Est, Paris, May 1981, P. 41.

8. Charter 77, op. cit. 9. Alois Indra, Nove Slovo, March 11, 1982.

10. Eva Kanturkova, Jirina Siklova, Jan and Jiri Ruml, Jaromir Horec, Jiri Muller, Jan Mlynarik, Karel Kyncl, Miroslav Kusy, Milan Simecka, Jiri Hajel, Ivan Havel, Josef Jablonicky, Karel Holomek, Zdenek Jicinsky, and Mojmir Klansky.

Petr l

Petr Uhl has been in prison since his

He has been sentenced to five years under

JAl-polli arrest in May 1979.

the toughest regulatical prisoner two pounds of fruit or vegetables or vitamins. He can get all the soap he wants!

For eighteen months he was not allowed to receive anything. This was a punishment for having, as chief of his cell (an appointment by the authorities), allowed a fellow prisoner to lie down during the day, which is forbidden.

Money: He earns approximately 2000 crowns of which he can spend only seven per cent. This is spent on the newspaper "Rude Pravo" and on food in the canteen; the choice is very limited. He does a very unhealthy and totally uninteresting job.

Literature: He is allowed to read only books from the prison library. Other prisoners are usually allowed to study or read books in foreign languages. He was refused permission to do this and to keep up his French and German.

Isolation: He is totally cut off from his comrades who were sentenced in the same trial. He shares his cell with four to seven other prisoners. In the daily walk he is not allowed to make contact with other prisoners.

Other VONS prisoners are not quite so badly treated. They receive four visits per year, and can have a parcel at each visit. But, most importantly, they can see each other.

25 tions. This imprisonment follows an earlier imprisonment of four years from December 1969 to December 1973.

Peter Uhl is married to Anna Sabatova who herself was imprisoned for two years. She is now bringing up their two children alone; Sacha born in March 1977, and Pavel born in September 1975. Anna's father Jaroslav Sabata has served a sevenand-a-half year sentence.

The conditions of Petr Uhl's imprisonment are: Visits: He is allowed two hours per year, that is one hour every six months. During the visit two guards are present and take notes. At the last visit, in May 1982, his wife was told she was not allowed to kiss him.

Letters: He can send a four-page letter every fortnight. He can only receive mail from his wife or parents-in-law. (His parents are dead.)

Parcels: He can not have books. He is allowed only two photographs of his wife and children, which can be changed twice a year if the prison authorities permit.

Twice a year he can receive one four-pound parcel, plus

New success for PRT in Mexico

The election campaign of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT-Mexican section of the Fourth International) had new successes in April. During this stage of the campaign all the states on the Atlantic coast, from Tamulipas on the American border to Yucatan and Quintana Roo on the border with Belize and Guatemala, were visited.

This sixth phase of the electoral campaign took place in a region where the PRT's work has begun just recently. However, from the point of view of both the number of people attending the rallies, and those activists who have asked to join the PRT, the results were very pleasantly surprising.

Two rallies were organised in the state of Tamaulipas-in the border city of Matamoros and in Ciudad Victoria. Some 600 people attended the first, and around 500 the one in Cuidad Victoria, despite a torrential downpour. On the basis of the organising work for these rallies the PRT has developed important political work in the poor neighbourhoods, and in the state peasant organisations. In addition, a PRT regional committee was established in the state.

The campaign had its greatest success in Veracruz. Here rallies were organised in six different cities in a period of four days. In Jalapa some 500 companeros attended a rally, and fifteen activists, former members of the Communist Party, formed a sympathizers group. In the petroleum centre Poza Rica, a small town of 50,000 people, some 2,000 attended the campaign rally. Previously there was only one PRT comrade there, but after the rally 25 others, mainly oilrefinery workers, asked to join. One thousand people attended the rally in Orizaba, less than half the size of Jalapa. At this rally a Catholic priest from a working-class neighbourhood, who spoke in support of Rosario Ibarra de Piedra's candidacy, had to remove his cassock not to contravene the Mexican law which forbids priests to engage in partisan political activity.

Palamarillo is a small peasant community with a long tradition of struggle, where the PRT plays a leading role. During the rally here over 25 agrarian communities and more than 10 trade unions formed the Worker-Peasant Alliance of Veracruz. This is an important step forward in the process of centralizing the movement and is just one example of how the PRT is carrying out its commitment to build the mass movement through its election campaign. 26

The PRT made further growth in Minatitlan and in Coatzoacolas, where some fifty and thirty companeros respectively asked to join.

In the state of Tabasco, where previously there was not a single PRT member, 600 people attended the-meeting. A Tabasco regional committee of the PRT has been formed with some 25 activists.

This leg of the campaign was ended with a rally of 400 in Yucatan, and finally a rally of 100 fishermen was held in Isla Mujeres Quintana Roo. Here Rosario was received by the companeros in their boats.

To close this phase of the campaign the PRT, together with Naucopac, an organisation of the poor neighbourhood residents of Naucalpan, decided to participate in the official trade-union demonstration for May 1. This participation challenged one aspect of the character of the demonstration-support for President Lopez Portillo, and the PRI government.

During the demonstration more and more trade unions showed their discontent with the government and the PRI. The metro workers from Mexico City opened the way, allowing the PRTNaucopac contingent into the March, shouting slogans of workers unity. As a result, the PRT-Naucopac contingent of over 3,000 spent almost five minutes under the Presidential balcony shouting anti-government, pro-worker slogans. The PRT was the only left organisation in the demonstration, in which the bulk of the working class took part.

This is the way in which our campaign is advancing and the process of party-building going forward. Special mention should be made of the comrades who organise the rallies and undertake the agitational activity of the campaign. This mobile brigade of twenty full-time comrades who travel the length and breadth of the country both preparing the rallies and consolidating the PRT's new contacts has done an excellent job whose effects will be long-lasting. Belgian Trotskyists congress

The Ligue Revolutionnaire des Travailleurs/Revolutionaire Arbeiders Liga (LRT/RAL, Belgian section of the Fourth International) held its sixth congress, since its foundation in 1971, at the end of May.

The conference came at the end of the most important strike wave since the general strike of the winter 1960-61, which shook the bourgeois government of Winfried Martens throughout the months of January, February, and March. Thus the conference came at the appropriate time to draw the lessons of this movement and equip the organisation with a coherent political line.

The congress discussed a central political resolution which endeavoured to define the changes taking place within the mass workers movement, social-democratic and Christian, at the trade-union and political level. The discussion mainly concentrated on the political intervention in the period which has just opened. A wide majority emerged in favour of an orientation which placed at the centre of its strategy the fight for a common front of the social-democratic and Christian trade-union federations, the FTB and CSC, on the basis of anticapitalist demands. This was placed in the perspective of a general strike and its prospect: a workers government based on the mobilisation of the 2.5 million worker members of the FGTB and CSC.

There were two very small minority currents which put forward the embryos of alternatives. One advocated a priority orientation towards the SP-PS, the other a more propagandist position, giving much greater weight to criticism of the reformist leaderships.

The majority of the delegates placed themselves within the framework of the report presented by the outgoing leadership and made a certain number of corrections and improvements to this.

Another resolution, complementing the central political resolution, drew a balance sheet of the trade union work of the LRT/RAL over the last two years, and made an important correction on this point. The premise was that there is a trade-union left in Belgium, composed of thousands of workplace delegates, who struggle independently from the trade-union apparatuses, and for whom it is necessary to immediately mark out perspectives for struggle and centralisation. This led the LRT/RAL to prematurely favour inter-trade union and crosssectoral regroupments, on very advanced platforms, but in fact outside the trade union structures. This led to an underestimation of the united front, immediate demands, and the struggle to consolidate trade-union oppositions within the trade union structures.

← 'You have an historic chance....' — Document · Building World Party of Socialists →

Something wrong on this page?