IRAN The presidential elections: heaven not smiling on Islamic republic COMING THE day after the first devastating Iraqi bombing of Kharg Island, the hub of Iranian oil exports, the election of the president of the Islamic Republic takes on added importance as a test of the ability of the Khomeini regime to keep up the momentum of the war effort after suffering a grave economic and psychological blow. The following article indicates an accelerating erosion in the political base of the regime, along with growing divisions among the rulers. SABER NICKBEEN
On August 16, 1985, after many months of delays and postponements, Iranians were offered another chance to take part in what Khomeini has called "the freest kind of elections ever held anywhere." They were to choose a new president of the "Islamic Republic."
- Three choices were on offer: Khamenehi, who was the incumbent (the delays were precisely because it was not certain that Khomeini could accept him); Asgaroladi (the former minister of trade, a powerful figure in the Bazar); and Kashani (the son of the late Ayatollah Kashani, who helped the shah and the CIA carry out the 1953 coup d'etat that toppled Mossadegh). Up until recently, Kashani was the head of the Iranian delegation to the International Court at the Hague dealing with US complaints against Iran.
All three candidates were members of the Central Council of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), the only party represented in the parliament, the Majles.
Some 49 other prospective candidates were rejected as "unfit" by the Council of the Guardians, which supposedly serves as the watchdog of the "Islamic" constitution. Among them was the former premier, Mehdi Bazargan, who was told that he was not acceptable as a candidate because he did not bow to the Command of the Chief Mullah (Velayat-e-Faghih). The ex-head of government denied the charge.
Interestingly, the spokesperson of the Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Khazali, who made this charge, is a leading member of the Hojatieh faction, which fundamentally regards Khomeini as a heretic precisely because he supports the Velayat-eFaghih! (1)
Initially, there were a number of moves within the ruling clique in favor of allowing Bazargan to stand in order to encourage more participation and provide more of a facade of democracy. The former premier had demanded guarantees of a free election as a precondition for contesting. He was promised that the head. quarters of his Freedom Movement in Tehran, which were closed down before the last parliamentary elections would be reopened. Moreover, he was to be allowed to publish a new legal daily paper to replace Mizan, which was shut down in the aftermath of Bani Sadr's ouster during the summer of 1981.
The present premier, Mousavi, was even obliged to say that the government had "nothing against Mr. Bazargan taking part in the election."
1. The Hojatieh are social and economic conservatives linked to the Bazari merchants. Their religious ideology is that until the Hidden Imam appears, no reforms can be made. Therefore the so-called radical Islamics who identify with Khomeini, and Khomeini himself, are heretics because they suggest to the masses that they can give them blessings • that they could in fact only enjoy after the return of the Hidden these blessings is the theocratic Imam, the Shiite messiah. And one of these rule of the Velayat-e-Faghih.
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Later on, apparently, the rulers agreed amongst themselves that letting Bazargan stand involved more risks than advantages for the stability of the regime.
A campaign by Bazargan could easily have turned into a rallying point for the entire opposition to Khomeini's rule as Bani Sadr's election to the post of president in 1979 in fact did.
The one most immediately throatened was Khamenehi, and he was the first to move. He came out vehemently against letting Bazargan run, fearing that it would damage his own chances for reelection. His supporters spread the rumour that it was Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majles, who was behind all this.
The tale they spread went like this: "Rafsanjani failed to convince the Imam [Khomeini] to come out against the reelection of Khamenehi. [Remember, the latter's sister had just fled to Iraq!]. So, now he is trying to weaken Khamenehi's chances to get a respectable majority." (2)
In an interview, Khamenehi himself said: "I believe there is no need for us to put on a show of democracy and freedom. Because in our country, democracy is all too evident. The elections to the Majles last year were the freest sort of elections. We do not need [different] newspapers to show democracy." (Etela'at, July 25, 1985).
Reportedly following the Imam's orders, Rafsanjani said a day later that it was possible that the Bazargan's appearance on TV or radio could lead to "a terrible crisis" whose consequences we might "not be able to bear." He raised the spectre of "counterrevolutionary plots," if Bazargan were able, for example, to hold an election rally in Tehran. Bazargan slapped down
So, the former premier was eliminated trom the race. On July 24, the council of Guardians told him: "Our nation has treated you with patience and politeness. But you should not persevere in your obstinacy, because we fear you may face an even darker future." His protests were not even mentioned in the press! And then he meekly shut up.
The contest, therefore, was between representatives of the three so-called wings of the IRP: the "proBazari [traditional merchant] wing, represented by the big merchant Asgaroladi; the "pro-Hezbolahi [Islamic "radical" ] "wing," represented by no less than the reactionary Ayatollah Kashani's son (which tells you a lot about the real nature of the Hezobalahis!); and the majority 20 ar ar pc sh of th M as W OI W A th Iranian women cast their vote. The Pasdaran watch on (DR) he
"Elteghatee" (eclectic) line, represented by Khamenehi himself ("the living martyr" (3).
The actual bosses of the IRP, who remain the real Bonapartes, despite a lot of the superficial theorizing (4), Khomeini and his "soldier," Rafsanjani, did not bother to put up any candidates directly representing them.
For his part, Rafsanjani declared that he could "work with all" the three factions. He knows that as long as the Imam lives and after his death, as long as Ayatollah Montezeri retains the throne, the function of the "legal" authority will remain in the Majles. The speaker's role, after all, is to put a legal stamp on the Imam's edicts and that gives him the dominant position in the government apparatus.
In the election campaign, which as usual was confined to two weeks, despite the Imam's warning about preserving unity, the three candidates all accused each other more or less directly of being in the pay of the Americans. Kashani raised the accusation against the government (that is against Khamenehi) that it had backed down to US imperialism in replacing him as head of the Iranian delegation to the Hague court. "The Americans demanded this!"
The premier responded to Kashani's charges by saying that it was the Imam himself who removed him." Mousavi's minister of labour, Sarhadizadeh, chose the anniversary of the 1953 coup to raise the question: "wouldn't it have been more proper for those who have selected the candidates for the presidency to have asked this man [Kashani] about his relations with Bahaie?" (the latter was a pro-American politician who helped the shah in the 1953 coup and supported Ayatollah Kashani).
The minister of labour compared Kashani to the "monafeghin" (hypo-
W crites," that is, false Muslims; this re term is usually applied to Muslim leftists such as the Mujehadeen) and G the "liberals," who, "like the USA be and Bakhtiar (the last permier appointed by the shah who now runs th a monarchist exile operation in Paris)
VC criticize the Islamic government."
Sarhadizadeh demanded that the Council of Guardians explain "how at it was that such a weak and incompeth tent person, who so damaged the of good name of the Iranian Islamic government [ie, in the Hague court KI case] and who was removed by the th Imam's order, could have been consiedered fit to stand as a candidate."
to
A Majles deputy and close ally of
Are Asgaroladi, Esrafilian, accused the 19 government of being both "weak in management" and "eclectic" in its of Islamic beliefs, even of "tending
WE toward socialism" in economic mat-
Men ters. The implication was that a de major injection of good old Bazari to know-how was what was needed to
Ppe solve the crisis in the country. (The
WE "religous" debate in the regime in all fact concerns whether the government should intervene more or less in the economy.)
The government counter-attacked by first saying that our most import-
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2. The reason for this conflict is that Khamenehi plays his own balancing game between the Bazaris and the Islamic "radicals" and does not directly represent Khomeini, as Rafsanjani does. In the last period Khamenehi has leaned more and more toward the Bazar and been seen by the clerics as apt to give too many concessions to the Bazaris, concessions that might undermine the political dominance of the clergy.
3. In Islam, "living martyr" is contradiction in terms, because the word is used essentially for Muslims who die fighting unbelievers. This title is applied sometimes to volunteers for the front to mean that they have already given up their lives.
That is, some people see Khamenehi as the Bonaparte in the situa tion, playing between the left represented by Khomeini and the right represented by the Hojatieh and the Bazaris. International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
ant problems are not economic but political" and if "these oppositionists shut up and do not join the chorus of the counter-revolutionaries, we can overcome the economic problems."
The minister of labour accused Asgaroladi's faction of being in league with the "world powers" who want to "dominate our trading sector." He said that they themselves were "incompetent" and "we saw how they led their apparatus [ie, the Ministry of Trade] to bankruptcy, as well as themselves."
None of the leading ayatollahs who are opposed to Khomeini called on their flock to vote. The regime was so desperate for help in getting out the vote that they distributed Ayatollah Golpayagani's statement that he himself would vote but that he "hoped that the Islamic Republic would remain Islamic, and would respect the basic rules of Islam and not those rules which the slaves of God (5) themselves have imposed because of necessity."
Khomeini appealed once again to the nation to do its religious duty and vote. He even suggested that people could put in a "white vote" [that is, a blank ballot], but they should at least participate. Later on, when the rumour was spread that this idea of casting blank ballots was a scheme by Rafsanjani to weaken and embarass Khamenehi, the representative of the Council of Guardians, Imamie-Kashani, declared this proposal to be a plot of the "enemies of the revolution." (Radio IRI, 13 August 1985.)
The other more familiar methods of "encouraging" citizens to vote were also in evidence. Government employees, war refugees, and others dependent on the state were asked to vote with their ration cards. The peasants in the more remote villages were forcibly mobilized. And when all that failed, ballot boxes were stuffed.
Nonetheless, the results were not all that reassuring for the government. Two days after the elections, the State Ministry declared that 1.5 million people had voted in Tehran and the central province, and about 9 million in the rest of the country. The official results, issued the next day (August 19), however, put the total vote at around 14 million.
It was claimed that out of 14.2 million who cast ballots, over 12.2 million voted for Khamenehi, and 1.4 million for Kashani. Asgaroladi was accorded around 300,000 votes, and the "white vote" was put at 400,000.
Obviously, it was hardest to falsify the figures where there was a real race, as in Tehran, Esfahan, Shiraz,
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
Mashed, and Tabriz. The official total vote for the whole of Khorasan province for example, in which Mashed is located and which is the most populous province in the country, with about 9 million inhabitants, was only 1.4 million. In Mashed, Ayatollah Khoie, a very powerful local figure, has gone so far in opposing Khomeini that he is under virtual house arrest. He had asked his followers to boycott the vote.
In the entire province of Esfahan, with a total population of between 4 and 5 million, the recorded turnout was only about 900,000. What was brought no comfort for any of the factions, including the supremo of all the factions, Khomeini himself. The low turnout and the vicious charges traded back and forth between the candidates represented a defiance of his orders. This means that he is no longer able to unite the various cliques within the IRP.
Khamenehi's personal authority has been greatly weakened vis-a-vis the government, and hence his manoeuvring room is less. The differences between the two branches have been out in the open for the last six months. Because of this conflict, Mousavi has been unable to fill the important posts of minister of defense, minister of roads, and of the national plan and budget. Just before his election campaign, Khamenehi had accused the government of being leftist and "weak in the area of management." (Etela'at, July 23, 24, and 25.)
Despite the low votes they received, both of the "extreme" factions, the Hezbollahis and the Hojatieh are now in a better position to step up their pressure on the government. The Hojatieh can hardly be unaware of their unpopularity with the masses and therefore cannot have expected a big vote.
They used the election, however, to escalate criticism of the government. The basis of their power is economic, and it is growing. The decline in oil revenues, in fact, means a corresponding increase in the power of the Bazaris, who dominate the other sources of income in the society. The government more and more needs the help of the Bazaris to meet the rising costs of the war.
The budget for the Islamic year 1364 (1984-1985) is running a huge deficit and is being directly threatened bv a Bazari bovcott of produc- ened by a Bazari boycott of productive investment and their penchant for speculation and hoarding. It seems now that Khamenehi, despite the weakening in his personal authority, may very well win his point about the need for some fundamental changes in the cabinet. There are already widespread rumours that Mousavi is going to be replaced by Velayati, the present foreign minister. The later is associated with the proBazari wing.
5. The expression reflects the Hojatieh's idea that none of the basic laws of Islam can be changed, even interpreted to comply with practical needs, or "necessity." What this means concretely is that an Islamic government may not in any way limit the prerogatives of private property. The term "slaves of God" is a way of ridiculing the pretentions of mere mortals who presume to alter the "laws of God." By using this statement in an attempt to get out the vote, the regime in fact disseminated an attack on its own policies and basic political stance.
21 very noticeable one of the ma centers, was a by the worker pasdaran were that potential away.
In Tehran i was very mark only a few w had claimed million people of support for [Qods] Day), to give a figu votes for all Tehran is the factions have tional strength.
These low 1 by exaggeratin areas where t contest, such a Kurdish areas, was probably theless, in the million people voted in these population of Similar clearly e made for the southeastern a in the city of Esfahan, in provincial industrial nearly total boycott s. In Shiraz, so many at the polling stations voters were frightened tself, the low turnout ed. The regime, which eeks before the vote that it mobilized 5 in a demonstration the war (On Jerusalem did not even venture re of over a million hree candidates. And city where all of the their main organiza. figures were bolstered 3 the totals for other here was less of a s the Azerbaijani and where the turnout less than 5%. None• official figures, 1.6 are supposed to have areas which have a
8 to 9 million). xaggerated claims were vote in the war-hit reas, where the warhappy Khamenehi was supposed to have gotten a particularly big vote.
In any case, the main leaders of the regime had asked for, and predicted, a very high turnout -one "at least greater than before," that is, the 16.5 million votes claimed for Khamenehi in the last presidential election. That is what Khamenehi himself said, who needed a higher vote to strengthen his hand in the cabinet against Mousavi and in the Majles against Rafsanjani, who are less accomodating than he toward the Bazaris. For example, Khamenehi opposed Mousavi's removal of Asgaroladi as minister of trade.
On election day in Tehran, many people deliberately stayed indoors. In the working class suburbs of Karaj, a large number of people could be seen picknicking, but the polling stations were empty.
It was obvious that the elections
The Council of Guardians has, already reinterpreted the constitution to mean that the "new" president must present a "new" cabinet to the Majles.
The Hezbollahis, who have supported the Eclectics against the Bazar, have been further weakened by their low poll. But nevertheless, the economic crisis and the increasing discontent of the masses are pushing them into sharper conflict with the regime, which can be expected to react by continuing the purges in the Pasdaran Army (Sepah-yePasdaran) and further bureaucratizing the Islamic instruments for the control of the masses (for example, the Islamic societies and shoras) and in general bringing them under a tighter reign.
On the other hand, the Eclecties are going to continue to need the support of the Hezbollahis in order to balance off the Bazaris and maintain the clerical hold on political power. That means that it will be difficult for the government to abandon its pro-war policy. The fighting has assured a huge flow of money to the institutions of the Hezbollahis, and they have come to depend on it.
Thus, in sum the elections show that the regime is sinking deeper in its impasse, and that the consensus it achieved in the last Majes elections (6) is already coming apart, as its political base is shrinking steadily and rather rapidly. The regime's fundamental contradiction is that it seeks to maintain the hold of the clergy on political power and at the same time normalize economic relations, that is, restabilize capitalism. But these two aims are at root incompatible. The clergy cannot run a capitalist economy and society effectively, and ultimately the holders of the economic power will be satisfied with nothing less than hitching the state directly to their interests.
The maneuvers by Khomeini and Rafsanjani in these elections show the continuing determination of the rulers to maintain clerical power. But at the same time, the economic power and the audacity of the money bags are steadily growing and can less and less be held in check. This is shown in particular by the record of this Majles, in which Khomeini had succeeded in marginalizing both the Hezbollahis and the Hojatieh. It is worth looking at this record in a separate article in the next issue of IV.
For an analysis of the Majles elections and the makeup of the parliament elected, see my article *What the elections for the Islamic Parliament showed, International Viewpoint, No 56, 2 July 1984. 22