The November stay-away and its lessons for the future The successful two-day stay-away of Black workers in the Transvaal on November 5-6 is not simply the emergence of past forms of opposition. It marks a new phase in the history of protest against apartheid; the beginnings of united action among organised labour, student and community groups - with the unions taking a leading role.
Below we reproduce an edited version of an article which appeared in and personnel that was to be a central feature of the recent unrest. A large number of councillors have now resigned, some in protest over the unviability of these institutions, and others because the state could not guarantee protection of life and property. As one councillor expressed it:
I am virtually in hibernation in the board offices since my home was burnt down. If I just resign I will have two enemies - the board on the one side and the people on the other. I am pleading that I be accepted back into the community. (4)
Many of the councils were rendered inoperative and it was to address this crisis of legitimacy that a special Cabinet sub-committee was established.
The financial and political crisis of the town councils helps explain the present wave of resistance. It has also given rise to new oppositional organisations -the civic associations - that constitute an alternative source of legitimacy to the discredited creations of state policy. It is significant that employers' organisations are calling on the state to negotiate with these bodies over the real problems in the townships - instead of simply detaining their leaders. However, given that all the main civic associations and community organisations in the Transvaal are affiliated to the UDF, no resolution of the township crisis is possible which does not address the fundamentals of the apartheid state. Nor has the extensive use of miltary force, which has only raised the level of violence, proved successful in undermining the resilience and new-found power of the civic organisations. It was this failure to negotiate, together with the limitations of state repression, that resulted in the stay-away which was in effect a bid decisively to alter the balance of forces in the townships. - Trade union organisation and worker militancy
Recent years have witnessed phenomenal increase in trade union membership amongst Black workers. (see Table 1). It was this growth in trade union organisation which made possible the successful November stay-away. What is particularly striking is the continuing growth since 1980, despite the fact of recession and heavy retrenchments. (5) 1. The conservative figure of 300,000 is obtained by multiplying the total number of Blacks employed in private industry in the PWV area (374,313) by 60% and then making allowance for retail and services. The figure of 800,000 is obtained by multiplying by 60% the total number of Blacks in paid employment in the PWV area (1.485, 000) minus the number of mineworkers (150,000).
A boycott of Simba Quix products (mainly chips and crisps) was organised by workers dismissed by the company. The protest in the Vaal township was against high rents and brought together trade unions and community organisations. The third stayaway took place over a month later in Kwa Thema springs and ended in a victory. 3. See South African Review' Vol II. Loser 21 /0r Buttini: 10.1 Ravan Press 1984. 4. South African 'Star' November 21, 1984. Labour Bulletin' 10.1 August-September 1984.
9 the May 1985 edition of the South review published in Johannesburg.
The article was produced through Group, set up specifically to r Publication was delayed pending the stay-away committee. DOCUMENT
In comparison with past stay-aways this one was the largest. Precise calculations are extremely difficult. Adopting the figure of an average 60% stay-away in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV) area (this being the consensus figure of employers and the media) then anything up to 800,000 and certainly not less than 300,000 participated. (1) The numbers involved are considerably more when one included the approximately 400,000 students who stayed away from school.
The significance of this stay-away in comparison with the student-led stayaways of 1976 was the active involvement and leading role of organised labour. Most unions over the last ten years have been preoccupied with building organisation on the shop floor and have eschewed overt involvement in issues beyond the factory. It is a measure of the extent of the crisis in the townships that these unions responded so rapidly to the student call for support.
Since September three localised stayaways had already taken place in Tembisa (the Simba Quix boycott); in the Vaal and in Kwa Thema Springs. (2) As a result of these actions the beginnings of a working relationship between community, student organisations and the trade unions was formed.
The November stay-away was also the culmination of three different but inextricably linked processes: in the townships, the factories, and the education system. - The crisis in township government
The present township crisis is caused by a popular reaction to the bankruptcy of the government's urban policy. After the November 1976 student-led township revolt that left the ineffectual Urban Bantu Councils in ruins, the state established the Community Councils with slightly wider decision-making powers. As part of its constitutional reform International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
African Labour Bulletin, a monthly the work of the Labour Monitoring aonitor the November stay-away. outcome of charges laid against the package the Botha government sought to give greater autonomy to Black local authorities as a prelude to drawing them into a new regionalised "multiracial" , second tier level of government. This was the aim of the Black Local Authorities Act (Act 102 of 1982) which came into operation in August 1983. The elections for the new town councils were held in November with only a 15-25% poll. (3) Less than a year later, they were to become the target of mass resistance that has reached levels unprecedented in South Africa's history.
The Black Local Authorities Act was more the product of a constitutional conjuring act than of a real understanding of the material needs of the townships. Firstly, the town councils were given a limited autonomy but no viable fiscal base. The stated objective is that they should be self-financing and the government has drastically reduced its contributions to town council budgets. The townships, however, are little more than dormitory towns that have no taxable industrial enterprises. Furthermore, the predominantly working class residents, many of whom are unemployed, do not earn enough to provide a viable tax base. Consequently most of the councils are in debt. The Soweto Council, for example, is budgeting for a R30 million deficit in 1985, which it hopes to reduce by R10 million by increasing rents and service charges, in some cases by 100%. The proposed Vaal rent increases were in response to similar fiscal difficulties.
Secondly, whereas the state insisted that the town councils were adequate, democratically elected, representative structures, they were not linked up to central state representation, and hence were no substitute for full political rights. This lack of legitimacy was reflected in the low polls at the elections, the criticism of the system from councillors themselves, and eventually in the direct attacks on their property
Nor has recession and the threat of unemployment dampened the militancy of these newly-organised workers - as shown by the stay-away itself. If one looks purely at work-related stoppages, the number of strikes which took place in the first 10 months of 1984, is 14% higher than for the same period the previous year: 309 as compared with 270 strikes in 1983. (6) However the number of workers involved has doubled from 53,998 to 119,029. These global figures obviously mask important sectoral and regional variations and further research might indicate a shift towards more defensive actions. Even so the major employers' organisations have been alarmed by the rise in the strike rate. One personnel b manager, in a curiously. prophetic vein, stated in September: We will be lucky if by the end of the year we only have a labour relations problem. (7) This, together with the pressures of recession may explain the increasing use of mass dismissals during 1984 by employers in response to plant-based strikes. a But to reiterate, these tactics and the threat of dismissal have not prevented continued trade union militancy. Qualitative changes in the labour movement
There have been a number of qualitative changes within the South African labour movement in the recent past. At a "macro" level, the successful moves towards unity seem likely to result in the establishment of a new trade union federation in 1985. This federation will be the most representative working class body to have been formed in South Africa's history.
At shop floor level, the new unions are characterised by a high degree of worker control through mass participation, strict accountability, and the need for leaders to obtain mandates from rank and file members. These developments have been accompanied by the establishment of an effective shop steward system. So far these new unions have successfully resisted attempts to co-opt them through the industrial conciliation bureaucracy. Where unions have taken up places on industrial councils, it has been on the basis of continued worker control over representatives, and the freedom to pursue their interests at local level — as in the case of MAWU [Metal and Allied Workers of South Africa] at Highveld Steel. (8) Some unions, after considerable debate, have sought to turn certain aspects of the postWiehahn labour dispensation to their own advantage: registration, participation in industrial councils (9), recognition and stop orders, and the Industrial Court, which is empowered to rule on unfair labour practices. Of late the Industrial Court's rulings have been much less favourable to the unions, and there are signs that the honeymoon period is now over. 10
TABLE 1
TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 1969-83
Registered Unions
Unregistered
Unions
(African
African
Coloured/ White
Total
Grand mostly)
Asian
Total
1969
405
587
182
16
603
1980
57
304
447
808
166
975
272
330
1274
1546
1983
469
474
Source: SALDRU, Directory of South African Trade Unions
Beyond the basic struggle for recognition and decent wages, the emerging unions have challenged management on a number of issues: arbitrary dismissals, retrenchments, health and safety, and the very organisation and running of the production process. (10) In this way the frontiers of management control have been rolled back. There have been a number of responses to this. The state has sought to depoliticise at least one potential area of conflict — health and safety - through its Machinery and Occupational Safety Act. (11) Employers have sought to reassert areas of "management prerogative" as part of a continuing ideological battle to sell the free enterprise system to Black workers (12) and at a practical level, conduct of shop floor relations. (13)
With growing politicisation in the townships particularly since the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the National Forum Committee (NFC) in 1983 (14), unions have been under pressure to take up political positions. There have been a number of different responses: the development of political/community unionism, the growth of black consciousness unions, whilst CUSA (15) has dealt with the issue by affiliating to both UDF and NFC.
In the recent past trade unions have taken protest action, such as the halfhour strike involving 100,000 workers after the death of Neil Aggett in police detention in February 1982. Now, ironically, the very process of reform by the state has obliged unions to adopt a direct political stance. Thus FOSATU's active support for the boycott of the elections earlier this year was the result of pressure from its Indian and Coloured 6. See 'Star' November 6, 1984.
See 'Sunday Tribune', September 9, 1984. 8. See 'Work in Progress', No 34, 1984. 9. South African Labour Bulletin' 8.5, April 1983. Shantine annaus 10. See E. Webster, A new frontier of control? Changing forms of job protection in South African industrial relations Second Carnegie commission, paper no 3, Cape Town, 1984. 9.7 June 1984. 11. See 'South African Labour Bulletin' members. The point must also be emphasised that those trade unions which had followed a "survivalist" policy of concentrating on factory issues were under intense pressure to abandon this approach.
FOSATU's approach, spelt out by general secretary Joe Foster, was critical of non-worker controlled political action labelling it as "populist". (16) However, despite extensive discussions at leadership and shop steward level this highly significant attempt to define a distinet working class politics was not sufficiently followed through - creating a political vacuum. With growing polarisation in the townships, unions have been under pressure to give a political direction to their members. The split inside MAWU in mid-1984 brought these tensions to the fore, albeit in a confused way. (17) Unable to resist this pressure, intensified in the Transvaal with the entry of the Defence Force into the townships, these unions ov were catapulted into a central role in the stay-away. Thus when these trade unions were finally to move beyond the factory floor it was to be on terrain not fundamentally different from that criticised by Foster as non-worker controlled. However, the demand for action was seen to come from working class communities. Because these unions were now strongly established, they felt able to give support and direction to the action proposed. The question remains as to whether Foster's original criticisms of this kind of action have been answered. - COSAS and the crisis in education
The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) was established in 1979 to represent the interests of Black school students on a national basis. Its principal aims include alerting 12. See Paul Johnson in 'Financial Mail', November 23, 1984. 13. See 'South African Labour Bulletin, 10.2 October-November 1984 for an unsuccessful example of this at Simba Quix. 14. See International Viewpoint' No 77, June 3, 1985. 15. The Council of Unions in South Africa was formed in September 1980. For more information on this and FOSATU, see IV" No 8, 7 June 1982. 16. See 'South African Labour Bulletin 7.8 July 1982. 17. Ibid 10.1 August-September 1984.
International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
students and the wider community to the repressive nature of schooling in South Africa, and to participate in drawing up an educational charter for a future non-racial democratic education system. Although rooted in the educational sphere, COSAS views the struggle in the schools as part of a much larger struggle against oppression and exploitation, and is an active affiliate of the UDF. Furthermore, COSAS has promoted the establishment of youth organisations to serve the interests of young workers and unemployed.
Since the Soweto uprising of 1976, Black educational institutions have become sites of struggle as increasingly politicised students challenge the state's authority and contest discriminatory education. By October this year, some 200,000 students, primarily in the PWV region, were boycotting classes and many of them had been out for most of the year. That student struggle goes beyond the narrowly educational sphere was demonstrated again recently by student opposition to the Coloured and Indian elections, and by the role students have played in the turbulent protests which erupted in the Vaal:
Throughout the year, COSAS took the fight to theDepartment of Education and Training via a series of concrete demands which include the establishment of democratically elected SRCs [Student Representative Councils]; abolition of the age limit; (18) abolition of corporal punishment; and an end to sexual abuse of female students by male teachers. International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
The initiative towards what became the November stay-away came from the students. There was a slowing down in the momentum of student protest by the beginning of October due to three main reasons: first, the failure of the state to respond adequately to students' demands; second, students as a whole and particularly COSAS activists were subject to detention - 556 in all in 1984 - and in some cases have been killed (19) - leading to a weakening of organisation; thirdly, end of year examinations were approaching and school principals and particularly the town councillors were attempting to mount a campaign to entice students back to school. Large numbers of boycotting students would return to school unless the terrain of struggle could be shifted and the support of broader social forces enlisted.
Consequently, a call was made by the students for parent solidarity, and meetings were arranged in a number of townships with a view to establishing local parent-student committees. At the same time, an approach for assistance was made to other organisations within the UDF and a meeting was arranged for October 10. At this meeting it was argued that the student struggle would be advanced only if the trade union movement as a whole was willing to act in solidarity. Accordingly, COSAS at a later date invited the trade unions to join them and community organisations in the stay-away.
In the meantime a highly significant meeting attended by 4,000 people was bedsud:
lisda bIE boyst gur 192 Mu grittea 26W srit to 2205oua dO of gribrooos. •Isnoiger
Blacks demonstrating in Southern Africa (DR) taking place in Kwa Thema on October 14. This led to the establishment of a Kwa Thema parent-student committee consisting of ten students and ten parents. Many of the parents were active trade unionists and included MAWU and UMMAWSA shop stewards, as well as Chris Dlamini, president of FOSATU This committee was mandated to send telexes to the minister of Cooperation and Development and Education, Viljoen, as well as to the minister of law and order, LeGrange, listing the following student demands: scrapping of age limit regulations; election of democratic SRCs; withdrawal of white teachers (usually members of the Defence Force); removal of security forces from the townships; release of all detained students; the resignation of all community councillors; and calling on students to boycott school until an appropriate response was received from the department of education and training. If these demands were refused by the ministers concerned, then parents would take action in solidarity with students. (20)
No response was forthcoming and at a lengthy follow-up meeting the 18. This is a demand for an end to the upper age limits which exist at each level in the education system, often preventing students from resitting the year or grade. This system discriminates against Black students. branch 19. For example Benjamin Khumalo, Soweto secretary of cOSAs, see "SASPU Focus' 3.2 November 1984. All figures on deaths and detentions supplied by SAIRR [South African Institute of Race Relations). 20. "Sowetan' October 19, 1984.
11
next Saturday, which was punctuated by shouts of Azikwelwa (we shall not ride' - the traditional boycott slogan), it was decided to call a local stay-away for Monday, October 22, and if this failed to produce the necessary response, a further stay-away would occur on October 29.
The stay-away on October 22 was highly successful due to strong organisation and clear purpose. Press reports indicate that over 80% of workers stayed home. The stay-away involved violent clashes between youths, who set up barricades in the streets, and the police. The setting up of barricades, however, was a tactic that was not approved by the student-parent committee. It was the success of this stayaway which, according to Chris Dlamini, guaranteed support for the later call for a Transvaal regional stay-away in November.
The momentum built up in the Kwa Thema stay-away prepared the way for a larger regional action. On October 27, a broadly based and very important meeting took place in Johannesburg in response to the original COSAS appeal for worker support. The meeting was attended by 37 organisations, including representatives of FOSATU and CUSA (21) unions, together with other unions and representatives of youth congresses, community organisations, and the RMC. COSAS called on unions to show solidarity with the specific student demands articulated earlier.
All organisations came prepared to take concrete action. In the case of FOSATU representatives, the process by which they reached this decision is illuminating. As mentioned above FOSATU officials were already involved in the Kwa Thema campaign, and there is no question that there was a groundswell of shop floor support for the students' demands - due in part to student solidarity with unions during the Simba Quix boycott. FOSATU takes the initiative
In terms of its deliberations, the Central Committee of FOSATU met on 19-21 October. Following reports from Transvaal locals on the crisis in the townships, all Transvaal representatives the Committee, irrespective of political affiliation, felt some action was necessary. A sub-committee, made up of Transvaal members of the Central Committee, was established and given wide powers to both monitor the situation and to take appropriate action where necessary. Chris Dlamini was chair of the committee, and Bangi Solo [branch secretary of FOSATU-affiliated National Union of Textile Workers], the information officer. Both were detained after the stay-away. Meetings were held with students and student-parent committees. Thus FOSATU representatives arrived at the October 27 meeting with concrete 12
Chris Dlamini, president of FOSATU (DR) proposals and empowered to take action. As far as can be ascertained, a debate over the length of the stay-away resulted in a compromise on two days. It was also agreed that the stay-away be broadened to encompass the demands of trade unions and community organisations. The representatives of the 37 organisations present formed a general committee (the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee as it was to be dubbed by the press), and a four-member coordinating group was elected to handle practical preparations. This core coordinating committee consisted of Moses Mayekiso (of FOSATU and MAWU), Themba Nontlane (of MAGWUSA -Municipal and General Workers Union), Oupa Monareng (of SOYCO - Soweto Youth Council and RMC - Release Mandela Committee), and Thamic Mali (of RMC) — ie two union organisers, one unemployed worker from SOYCO and one ex-detainee out on bail. UDF was not formally represented because it did not initiate the stay-away itself, and since some organisations involved were not affiliates. Also since UDF affiliates were present there was no need for the UDF to be formally represented. It was also felt that it was not possible for the UDF to assume leadership because the struggle was seen as specific to the working class African townships of the Transvaal.
Two days after the meeting of October 27, FOSATU convened a meeting of all the Transvaal unions to coordinate action for the stay-away. This was followed by a series of meetings of unions, locals, and shop stewards to report back to members on the proposed demonstration. The decisions taken by the sub-committee were ratified by the full Central Committee when it met after the stay-away on November 10. (22)
The initial pamphlet calling for a stayaway for November 5 and 6 issued the following demands: democratically elected SRCs; the abolition of any age limit on secondary education; the abolition of corporal punishment; an end to sexual harassment in schools; the withdrawal of security forces from the townships; the release of all detainees; no increase in rents, bus fares or service charges. reinstatement of workers charges; reinstatement of workers dismissed by Simba Quix. The last demnd, a workplace demand, shows the continuity with previous campaigns. In the event, the Simba workers achieved their goal before the stay-away began.
The object of the stay-away was to articulate student, worker, and civic grievances, and to put pressure on the state and to redress these. The entire community faced severe problems during the current recession. Also it was felt that the education issue could not be divorced from workers' problems - they could not be comfortable at work when their children were dying in the streets; and whilst jobless parents were unable to afford an education for their children. On the question of reaching non-unionised workers on the shop floor, each organisation was given specific tasks in this regard. In particular, hostel dwellers who in the past had been ignored, were a main target. In contrast to 1976 many hostel dwellers, particularly on the East Rand, were now unionised. In addition, 400,000 pamphlets were printed for distribution. However, there was little activity on the West Rand and in rural areas. Finally, COSAS specifically addressed its students constituency to ensure the stay-away in the schools whilst the unions undertook to ensure the stay-away from work. Monitoring the stay-away
In our attempts to monitor the stayaway we sought to investigate the relationship of trade union organisation to the size of the stay-away. Thus our sample of factories consisted exclusively establishments organised by trade unions. Using the SALDRU Directory of Trade Unions as our data base, we phoned every firm in the PWV area which had a recognition agreement with an independent union. We spoke to 71 of these, with only six refusing to talk to us. Our findings were: - Unionised factories gave overwhelming support to the stay-away. 70% of our sample had a stay-away rate of over 80%. - These unionised factories were concentrated on the East Rand and the Vaal -the areas where the stay-away rates (as also indicated by management bodies) were highest. - In Pretoria, commuters from neighbouring homelands tended to come into work and a similar thing happened in Brits with location dwellers supporting the stay-away • and commuters working normally. - There was no weakening of the stayaway on day two as had been anticipated by some observers: 56% of establishments maintained the same level of stay-away for two days, 20% weakened, and 24% actually intensified on day 21. See 'IV' No 8, June 7, 1982. 22. Details from official FOSATU press statements and statements from Alec Erwin, acting general secretary of FOSATU at the time.
International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
two. In the past extended stay-aways have failed, such as the call for a fiveday stay-away in November 1976 which simply petered out. - All sectors where unions were present were equally affected. Mining was an exception where lack of participation was probably due to their isolation from the townships and the aftermath of their own recent strike. (Table II) - There seems to have been no significant difference in the participation of migrants and township dwellers. In nine of the 71 establishments surveyed migrants were a significant proportion of the workforce. In five of these there was a 90% plus participation in the stayaway. Secondary evidence confirmed these findings. - None of the employers interviewed envisaged disciplinary action. The most common response was to deduct wages for the two days absence. Some employers treated it as paid leave; others, more sympathetic, accepted employees accounts of "intimidation" and paid wages in full. There is later evidence of dismissals in smaller and unorganised factories. - Many employers commented that Coloured and Asian staff worked normally.
According to press reports some 400,000 students observed the stayaway. In the Transvaal some 300 schools were completely closed. The Minister of Law and Order put the number of boycotting students at 396,000.
In terms of regions the overwhelming majority of schools in the Vaal Triangle, East Rand and Atteridgeville were deserted. The Department of Education and Training claimed that in Soweto attendance ranged from 30% to 90%. However, our investigaton indicates a much lower attendance level - although most matriculation students did write their exams on November 6 and 7.
In addition, students at the University of the North observed the boycott.
State response to the stay-away needs to be assessed from several perspectives. During the stay-away itself response was relatively restrained: no serious effort was made to actually force strikers back to work. It was only after the conclusion of the stay-away that the state moved sharply towards a counter-attack that began with the Sasol dismissals (23) and brought on a wave of detentions apparently linked to a conspiracy view of events. The state's delayed response makes sense when the broader context of the stay-away is considered.
Economic grievances and student unrest came together during the winter of 1984 in Transvaal and Orange Free State townships in a mounting wave of attacks on state authority and symbols of South African capitalism (for example, with the destruction of banks and building societies).
The stay-away was marked by township revolts in which at least 23 died, (24) with Tembisa being the most International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
TABLE II
STAY-AWAY PARTICIPATION RATES BY SECTOR
% Partici- Metal pation pation
90-100 50% 67% 70%
(12) (8) (14)
80-89 4% 17%
(1) (2)
70-79 4% 8%
(1) (1)
60-69 4% 8% 5%
(1) (1) (1)
50-59 8%
(2)
less than
50 26% 25%
(7) (5)
Total no 34% 17% 28% establi- (24) (12) (20)
shments seriously affected community. The South African Defence Force was put at its disposal. Already by October, The Minister of Law and Order, LeGrange, was justifying the use of the army in this way in a speech to the Transvaal Annual Conference of the National Party at Alberton. The state is clearly anxious about the possibility that township youths may try to develop no-go areas where police and army can appear only in force. Thus however menacing the withdrawal of labour may have seemed at the time to officials, the security forces were too thinly spread to make possible a physical suppression of the stay-away. Direct interference was largely limited to pamphlets mainly aimed at Soweto which called upon workers to unite against the strike. No sign was found of an effective attempt, on the lines of 1976, to create an anti-strike force among migrant workers. The employers' reactions
The first sign of a counter-blow by the state came in the form of mass dismissals of some 5-6,000 production workers at the Sasol two and three plants in Secunda, virtually the entire African workforce. Although management insisted that it took this action as a private sector employer, Sasol is a parastatal of great strategic significance and, one might speculate, requiring state consultation and assistance to bridge over the dismissal of such a huge labour force. The contrast to the 'no work no pay' stance of most large private sector employers was very marked. Police with dogs and hippos were quick to move
Auto,
Retail
Build. &
Build, &
Transport
43%
63%
(3)
(5)
29%
37%
(3)
(2)
14%
(1)
14%
(1)
10%
11%
(7)
(8)
All
Sectors
Sectors
59%
(42)
11%
(8)
3%
(2)
6%
(4)
4%
(3)
17%
(12)
100%
(71)
in and patrol the streets of the Secunda township, eMbalenhle, to assure the compliant removal of workers from hostels to the various bantustans. This was followed by a series of arrests and detentions, some thirty, in connection with the stay-away, including trade unionists and student leaders.
One can only speculate as to the purpose of the detentions. For the minister of Manpower, Pietie du Plessis, the stay-away can apparently be explained only in terms of sinister intimidatory forces using this lowest, most undemocrtatic and unchristian tactic' While business feared that the state was putting the post-Wiehahn labour dispensation at risk by its high-handed actions and conspiracy theory, the government apparently was more concerned about the near disintegration of its political reform strategies. The Black local government structures for many parts of the Rand are in ruins, under threat, or entirely discredited; no alternative to force, as witness the massive house to house raids in Sebokeng and Tembisa, appears to exist for regaining control of the townships. The state's immediate response was to wave the big stick for display, partly to warn unions and partly to reassure a white electorate which is feeling the pinch of recession, inclined to blame concessions to the Blacks as the cause of their problems, and tempted increasingly, especially in less affluent Rand constituencies, to opt for the anti-reform Conservative Party. Van Zyl Slabbert of the PFP certainly saw the detentions as 23. A majority of the Sasol workers were subsequently reinstated. See IV" No. 76, May 20, 1985. 24. Figures supplied by SAIRR
13
Chemical Food
an attempt to win support in the Primrose by-election. (25) However, press reports indicate certain reservations over this hardline policy on the part of senior government officials and some cabinet ministers. (26)
The first response of employer organisations was to play down the stay-away and so diffuse its effects:
*Not to over-react, not to vent a white back-lash which in turn causes a Black backlash and so fuels an ever-increasing cycle of action and reaction, must be the watchword'. (27)
Most employers were taken by surprise by the extent of the stay-away, and were unsympathetic to what they saw as a political strike unrelated to the workplace. As Leon Bartel, President of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, expressed it:
"The responsible employer should seek to divorce politics from labour relations. The stay-away is clearly a political matter and the employers should make it clear that political demonstrations will not be countenanced.' (28) The government's reaction
Any future stay-aways are likely to be met by a harsher management response. Already some employers are calling for a trimming down of the workforce, and could well use stay-aways as a pretext for retrenchments. "Enlightened' employers, however, would baulk at any direct attack on trade unions, and are keen to maintain the fragile relations established with unions in the postWiehahn period.
This was clearly demonstrated when the three major employer associations, ASSOCOM, AHI, and the FCI sent a joint telex to the minister of Law and Order after the detention of CUSA leader, Piroshaw Camay, warning that the wave of detentions were exacerbating a very delicate labour situation. LeGrange responded aggressively, questioning their support among employers.
These different responses to the stayaway reflect different experiences and pressures. Employers readily saw in the stay-away a threat to industrial relations in the workplace, and quickly commenced talks with FOSATU and CUSA. In particular, employers were worried about the effects of further stay-aways. What seems to have triggered the joint statement to the minister was the detention of Camay. This was confirmed by Dr Johan van Zyl of the FCI, and Tony Bloom of the Premier Group, who in separate interviews in the Sunday Express stated that they thought they were making 'good progress' in their negotiations with Camay when he was suddenly detained. (29) A further pressure on employers was the need to reconfirm their credibility with FOSATU and CUSA by publicly declaring their opposition to the detentions. (30) The general crisis is 14
Black trade-unionists in conference (DR) forcing employers, like labour to adopt a higher political profile. As Ackerman of Pick and Pay - arguing for greater political involvement by employers -expressed it: "The South African businessman (sic) has a crucial role to play in influencing internal change' (31)
The state, on the other hand, saw the stay-away as the work of a small group of agitators bent on using the trade unions for political ends. A number of reporters were subpoenaed as part of an investigation by the state for a possible offence under the Internal Security Act on the part of the stay-away organisers. Following massive international condemnation, those detained in connection with the stay-away were released. (32)
Employers feared that the state's initial reaction would curtail even the current limited reform programme -and the working relationship established with the state since 1979 to implement the reforms. Beyond this, capital's response to the stay-away and the general crisis includes a call for further and accelerated structural reform particularly over influx control - in order to head off any challenge to the social system itself. The subsequent conference convened by the United States/South Africa Leadership Exchange Programme, which brought together representatives of capital and potentially sympathetie Black leaders, called for: co-operative schemes in the workplace;
consultation and community involvement; recognition from government of socially responsible investment as tax deductible; a programme of job creation and the development of skills; investment of pension funds in Black urban areas; improved communication between the races. (33)
Beyond immediate reforms the two key financial journals responded to the stay-away by suggesting a dialogue with the ANC. Both drew on Tony Bloom's timely speech to the Wits Business School:
It is difficult to establish just how great the support for the ANC is among Blacks in South Africa, but I venture to suggest that it is very substantial. There is an inherent inevitability about talking to the ANC. It is not a question of if, but rather when?' (34)
Capital's reform proposals still stop short of one-person-one-vote - as Ackerman made clear. (35) However in the long-term, sections of capital may even be pushed to contemplate non-racial democracy, if the free enterprise system itself is threatened by the continuing crisis.
To conclude, therefore: - The stayaways crystallised the central contradiction of state policy — the 'liberalisation' of the industrial relations system without meaningful political and social change. Hitherto the major trade unions have focussed on factory floor issues avoiding involvement in more overtly political issues. The state's failure to adequately respond to the educational demands of the students and the growing crisis in the townships have propelled the trade unions beyond the factory floor.
In spite of recession workers were willing to risk their jobs by taking part in the stay-away - even when faced by management threats, as at Sasol. The state's response - the detentions and the sackings at Sasol - forced the trade unions to take further action, such as the call for a Black Christmas" [a boycott of Christmas products] -leading to a further politicisation. According to a recent FOSATU statement: 'the long-term implications of the stay-away could include more involvement of unions in political affairs.' 25. See 'Rand Daily Mail' November 17, 1984. 26. See Sunday Express, November 18, 1984. 27. See Finance Week' 15-21 November 1984. 28. Ibid. 29 See 'Sunday Express' November 18, 1984 30. See 'Rand Daily Mail' 17 November 1984. 31. See 'Rand Daily Mail' 23 November, 1984. 32. The four members of the co-ordinating committee were allowed out on bail pending charges under the Internal Security Act; three went into hiding and charges were finally dropped against the remaining member, Moses Mayekiso, in April 1985. 33. See 'Star' November 21, 1984. 34. See 'Finance Week' 15-21 November, 1984 and 'Financial Mail' 15-19 November 1984. 35. See Rand Daily Mail November 23, 1984.
International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
- The stay-away brought together the major opposition forces to apartheid in the Transvaal; groups which had not previously worked together. They share certain distinctive features: they are mass based organisations drawing predominantly from the working class: unions, student organisations - overwhelmingly from the children of workers, and youth organisations representing young workers and unemployed. In the end the stay-away was successful because it rested upon democratic grassroots support and organisation. It was because of the trade unions' deep roots in working class communities that they responded so rapidly to the requests of the students, and it was their highly organised and democratic structures which made it possible to mobilise at such short-notice for the stay-away. One important implication of these new forms of trade union organisation is that any policy of repression, of attempting to behead" these organisations by detaining leaders, is much lesslikely to be successful. A new and stronger opposition
This new alignment has involved a further polarisation of extra-parliamentary oppositional polities. Buthelezi's [leader of Kwazulu and Inkatha party] vocal opposition to the stay-away call distances him even further from the mainstream of opposition in South Africa. His interference in the Sasol dispute and his advice to workers to go back on management's terms will not endear him to the trade unions. (36) The high level of involvement of contract workers in the stay-away suggests a critical weakening of Inkatha influence amongst organised workers on the Rand. Forced to choose between loyalty to Inkatha and to their unions many supported the stay-away. Indeed it appears that migrants were systematically mobilised in support of the stay-away by student and community organisations and the trade unions. The hostel dwellers were to play no small part in advocating the stay-away. Nevertheless Inkatha's conservative influence remains strong particularly in Natal - which underlines the regionally specific nature of the stay-away. This also has important implications for those unions attempting to build up nation-wide organisation. There is already evidence of an attempt on the part of Buthelezi to reestablish his presence on the Reef in alliance with other conservative township groups -such as the Sofasonke Party. (37) - Where strong trade union organisation and community student organisation coincided the stay-away was most successful. It may be that the relatively weaker response in Soweto reflects the fact that there is less correspondence between working class and community organisation and the class profile of the area is more varied. Similarly the non-participation International Viewpoint 15 July 1985 of commuters in Brits and Pretoria indicates the absence of community organisation amongst commuters. Bearing in mind current decentralisation strategies this indicates a critical area for organisation in the future.
Where the stay-away was most intense - the Vaal, East Rand and Atteridgeville — school attendance was also negligible and student organisation was strong. As Dlamini put it, workers readily identified the demands of the students for democratic SRCs with their own struggles for independent The stay-away still an effective weapon representation in the factories. - In previous stay-aways a central tactic of the authorities has been to try and undermine the action by forcing workers out of their homes and back to work. That this did not happen on this occasion probably reflects two important developments: the scale and geographical spread of the action and the heightened forms of physical resistance adopted in the townships -barricades, attacks on state institutions, attacks on councillors and others who are viewed as collaborators. The security forces were thus thinly spread and had to concentrate their resources on sealing off the most affected areas in order to contain the situation. - Sasol's hardline approach revealed the vulnerability of workers to reprisals after a stay-away. Even so, organised workers were in many cases able to secure undertakings in advance from employers that there would be no dismissals. It is perhaps necessary to stress the limitations of stay-aways; workers do not have the large resources to sustain a long general strike. Moreover an action which is township-based can be easily sealed off by the security forces. By staying at home the workers surrender the initiative and are cut off from fellow workers in other townships. - One feature of the stay-away was the absence from the scene of the Black consciousness organisations. Whilst they did not oppose the stay-away, they offered no organisational support. A spokesperson from Azapo criticised aspects of the stay-away: Its lack of political content — it was ridiculous for students to approach workers; it would be more correct the other way around. Its positive aspect was to force the unions into political activity? It was also felt by Azapo that little consideration was given to the possibility of reprisals by the state. Also of concern to this critic was what appeared to be an "Africanisation" of the protest. While this may be one view, in fact this point implicitly underlines the working class nature of the stay-away - since the composition of the working class in the Transvaal is overwhelmingly African. This was also reflected in the dominance of the African affiliates of the UDF during the stay-away. - The decision to resort to stay-aways reflects the absence of political rights for Blacks - the vote, freedom of speech and association. So long as Blacks are refused access to political power, the stay-away will re-emerge as a weapon. However given the recession, the degree of organisation and the limitations of the tactic, the major unions have stated clearly that there will be no more stayaways in the immediate future.
Stay-aways remain essentially nonviolent demonstrations of power - and not an organised challenge to the state. (The large number of deaths during the stay-away - 23 in all — were not the result of the tactic itself, but were part of the ongoing township unrest which has claimed 161 lives since January and resulted in over 1,000 detentions). (38) In the past the state has responded to such demonstrations of power in a repressive manner with the result that legitimate protest has been forced underground or into exile. A similar response in the present situation would further deepen the internal crisis - and has already led to international condemnation. The demonstrations outside the South African Embassy and Consulates in the USA have achieved considerable publicity. More important was the response of the international trade union movement and particularly the International Metal Workers Federation -which earlier in 1984 pledged support to the struggle of Black workers for trade union and political rights. (39)
A number of specific questions are raised by this particular stay-away. Did the speed with which the decision was taken curtail normal democratic procedures? Perhaps this is inevitable in a crisis situation - and the success of the stay-away may actually be a measure of the harmony and common purpose of union leadership and rank-and-file. Were unions drawn into an essentially "populist" protest that was not of their making and not in their interest? Did they have a choice - given the pressures from the community? Was the state's response underestimated - and will it have its intended effect of again confining the unions to the factory floor? How successful can co-optive strategies be, and how significant is the difference in response between capital and the state? Can capital persuade the state to take more meaningful risks to bring about reform - or are government options constrained by the need to maintain wider political support amongst whites? The stay-away represents a new alignment of forces against apartheid. The question is, if it endures, what form will it take: a return to the tactics of the 1950s or the extension of working-class politics? • 36. 'Rand Daily Mail' November 27, 1984. 37. 'Rand Daily Mail November 26, 1984. 38. Figures supplied by SAIRR 39. See 'South African Labour Bulletin' 9.6, May 1984.
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IRELAND IDCI AND