### Revolution and an oppressed nationality : the Sandinistas learn from experience In Poland, the bureaucracy's official support for the Sandinista government in Nicaragua aroused suspicion and allergic reactions among the antibureaucratic fighters. The Polish oppositionists are particularly sensitive, because of their own experience and East European history in general, to charges of national oppression of minorities. The following article is being published in the 1985 summer issue of Inprekor, the Polish magazine of the Fourth International, to answer the questions about the Sandinista's attitude to the Indian question, which were fueled by the Western broadcasts. The material has been somewhat condensed for space reasons. All the quotes in it have been retranslated and the
At that time, the group decided to call itself "MISURASATA" (the Sandinista Alliance of Miskitos, Sumos, and Ramas), and it was to become the most influential organization in the region.
However, the population was in no way prepared for the drastic changes that followed the Sandinista victory in 1979. While under Somoza, the Miskitos saw very few Nicaraguans from the Pacific coast, they found cadres and technicians coming in in growing numbers as economic and social projects devised in Managua were put into operation. Then, as tensions increased on the frontier, there was a swelling inflow of military personnel. And the Miskitos had not been used to the sight of soldiers since the departure of the US troops in 1933. The Somozista repression had not been very visible, except in the mining area. So, the growing influx of armed Sandinistas seemed to them to be an invasion of their country. This was all the more so, because the "Spanish" were not familiar with culture and traditions of the Atlantie coast peoples. Between the tenden of a lot of insufficiently tra Sandinista activists to suspect that any who opposed them was a cou revolutionist and the tendency of the Atlantic coast people to see colonial in every step taken by the "Spanish the situation became explosive.
In their anxiety to unity the country around the revolutionary objectives put forward by the Front, the Sandinista leaders made a series errors, sometimes very grave ones,
25 they recognise today. To start with there were repeated declarations by the Front that "there is only one Nicaraguan nation," "the Atlantic coast Indians are Nicaraguans like the rest. or that one of MISURASTA's main objectives should be to "help forge a national consciousness, to promote patriotic feeling."
Posing the question in these terms meant not making a distinction between state and nation, it meant an impasse as regards the demands of the Miskitos and other minorities on the Atlantic coast for self-determination. It meant not seeing the importance of the stress the Miskitos put in their own documents on the need to take their own fate in their own hands, to recover their cultural identity, to be able to use their own language.
The FSLN's first documents accepted a series of these demands. But their practice unfortunately was something else again. At the start, for example, the literacy campaign, which was seen as an essential means of emancipating the Nicaraguan people, was projected only in Spanish. It required the insistence of MISURASATA to get this work done in the native languages. As for self-organization, despite the Front's assurances that what had to be done was to respect and "support the specific forms of organization of the various native communities," wits
23 wording may differ slightly from the Jacqueline ALLIO
Since the victory of the Sandinistas, the Western press and the "free radio" stations that broadcast to Eastern Europe have continually accused the FSLN of having become a new colonial power and of massacring the Atlantic Coast Indians, the Miskitos. To understand what is going on in this region, you have to realize that when Somoza fell, some 6,000 Somozista National Guards took refuge in Honduras in camps financed by the USA, where they enjoyed the connivance of the Honduran army. The US president, Ronald Reagan, has not concealed the fact that he envisages using the former Somoza troops to invade the Atlantic coast, in the context of a broad scheme for destabilizing the Sandinista revolution.
Since 1979, the Contra troops have kept up constant pressure on the northern part of the country, which is inhabited mainly by the Miskitos. The native populations have been the first victims of the armed clashes taking place along the Rio Coco, the river marking the frontier between Nicaragua and Honduras.
Why have the problems arising in this region become the Achilles heel of the Sandinista government? It has to be understood that the Atlantic coast was colonized by the English and was only ceded to Nicaragua in 1894, against the will of the population, which is largely made up of Indians (60,000 Miskitos, 10,000 Sumos, and 1,000 Ramas) and of Black Creoles, who are descendents of slaves imported from Jamaica. All of these groups have always looked with distrust or even hostility on the inhabitants of the Pacific coast, whom they call the "Spanish."
On top of this, the Indian and Black population was entirely converted to the Protestant, Moravian church in the nineteenth century, while the rest of the Nicaraguan population are Catholics. Little by little, the Moravian pastors International Viewpoint 15 July 1985 original versions. became the real leaders of the Indian and Black communities, often supplanting the traditional hierarchies.
Moroever, at the end of the nineteenth century, the economy of the region came under the control of US- dominated multinationals, thereby acquiring features distinct from the rest of the Nicaraguan economy. In the twenty years during which US troops occupied the country -from 1912 to 1933 - the Americans did not hesitate to reinforce their economic and political domination of the region by playing on the divisions between the ethnic groups and promoting racial prejudice among the minorities.
However, at the same time, while they exploited the Indians savagely in the gold mines, it was the big US companies that developed what little social services existed in the region, and this enabled them without too much trouble to convince the local people of the superiority of US institutions over Nicaraguan ones. This task was made easier by the division between this region and the rest of the country, a division that was not only economic and cultural but geographic (there was no highway linking the Atlantic and Pacific coasts). The Miskitos and the revolution
All these factors explain why the people of the Atlantic coast did not take part in any of the political struggles that have convulsed the country over the past century. They played no role in the Sandinista struggle in the 1930s, nor in the long guerrilla struggle led by the FSLN, even if a section of them did decide to support the Front when Somoza was toppled. In 1973, Miskito intellectuals had founded an organization to defend the rights of the native people against the Somoza dietatorship, and in November 1979 they decided to support the revolution.
representatives often limited themselves in practice to setting up organs directly linked to the FSLN, such as the CDS, AMNLAE, etc. i The results were disastrous.
The economic and political difficulties the Front encountered in the country as a whole, obviously explain why it could not respond immediately to all the aspirations of the native people. But they by no means justify the paternalism that is to be found in many official statements stressing the "backwardness" of the Miskitos and their "very low level of consciousness." Thomas Borge, the minister of the interior, said, "we are decolonizing them." William Ramirez talked about "our Indians."
How could it be overlooked that the very fact that the native people referred to the Sandinistas as the "Spanish" - because that is how they always referred to the central government, whether it was Somocista or Sandinista - indicated an underlying problem? An indication that the FSLN was not collectively and fully convinced of the specific oppression of the native minorities is the way that some leaders approached the question of the native languages. The one responsible for the Atlantic coast, Luis Carrion, went so far as to doubt that Miskito "constitutes a real language." He stressed that a whole part of the Atlantic coast population was of mixed blood, and so the national question should not be exaggerated.
It is striking to see how often in their analyses the Front leaders stressed the racial divisions among the various ethnic minorities - which are a real problem -as if that justified a centralizing and normative approach to the problems arising. "They have a race consciousness, one such leader said. If that were true, did it not indicate that the revolution did not necessarily have the same significance for the native peoples as for the rest of the masses oppressed under Somoza? The Sandinistas seemed convinced that the material gains brought by the revolution would essentially solve these problems. They had to learn from experience that things were a little more complicated than that, that the customs, communal way of life, and system ot values of the Indians were decisive elements that they had completely underestimated. Conflicts begin
So, disagreements quickly arose between the FSLN, which sought to unite the entire Nicaraguan people, and the MISURASATA that considered itself the organization of the native peoples freely associated with the Nicaraguan revolution. And the reactionary forces at work in the country had already moved to penetrate the MISURASATA and manipulate some of its leaders, did not fail to take advantage of these differences to whip up feelings in the native communities by spreading horror 24 stories about the Sandinista leaders.
In the beginning, MISURASATA's demands did not seem to conflict with those of the Front. In a 1980 platform, the Indians said that recognition of the native language would make possible "real integration of the Indians, as opposed to a policy of assimilation. At the time it took up the land question in general terms, saying that "the agrarian reform should enable the Indians to become the legitimate owners of their lands." It demanded that the lands on which the Indian communities had always lived should henceforth be recognized as their legal property. It was only with the sharpening of local conflicts between natives and representatives of the Sandinista government, conflicts systematically whipped up by contra provocations, that the MISURASATA changed its positions and widened its demands.
In a plan drawn up in 1981, at the peak of the conflicts, MISURASATA invoked the ancestral right of the Indian communities to all the lands in the region, demanding their restoration and the right to run the entire Atlantic coast area on all levels. It specified that the riches of the area should be exploited for the sole benefit of the coast population and not of Nicaragua as a whole.
The Front responded immediately that such demands were unacceptable for several reasons. The MISURASATA claimed to speak for all the people of the coast, whereas the majority of the population were of mixed blood and did not share its views, any more than did the Black Creoles. Moreover, it was unfair to demand at the same time more aid in every sphere (the 1981 Sandinista plan called for investments of 250 million cordobas, while the region produced less than 100 million cordobas worth of goods ) and refuse to let the rest of the country get any profit from the wealth of the region.
However, to immediately accuse MISURASATA of separatist, or even racist designs, as several FSLN leaders did in the discussions around MISURASATA's 1981 plan, was certainly not the way to convince the native people that it was necessary to find a common economic and social framework in order to solve the problems of developing the Atlantic coast. A separatist current undoubtedly existed within the MISURASATA, but the FSLN's policy helped to provoke unanimous opposition to it rather than to persuade the coast minorities that forming a separate state was a utopian idea and would not make it possible to achieve their aspirations.
This is the context for understanding the evolution of a lot of Miskitos who supported the Sandinista policy at the beginning and have since turned up leading opposition groups. A notable example are the young people who conducted the literacy campaign on the Atlantic coast, and who at the start of 1981 staged demonstrations of force in some big nationalized agricultural enterprises in the area demanding that they pay a tax on their profits to the native communities. The Front decided at the time to arrest some of these people, and it arrested several MISURASATA leaders.
After two weeks of demonstrations by the Miskitos demanding the release of their people, the FSLN relented, and started looking for a political solution. In August 1981, the FSLN published its "Statement of Principles" on the Atlantic coast. On the one hand, it reaffirmed the principle of the unity of the nation and of Nicaraguan territory, as well as the ownership of the entire Nicaraguan people of all natural resources on the territory governed by the revolutionary state. Moreover, it stressed necessary connection between improving living standards and economic development. But on the other hand, it recognized the right of the native communities to maintain their languages, their culture, and their traditions; their right to community ownership of the lands on which they live; their right to get a share of the profits from the forest industry; and their right to selforganization and to participate in the administration of the coast and of Nicaragua as a whole. Mass emigration of the Miskitos
However, despite the FSLN's efforts to correct its previous errors, the adoption of the measures provided for in the Statement of Principles and the beginning of their application were not enough to reestablish confidence, and several thousand Miskitos decided to emigrate to Honduras over 1981. In November of the same year, parallel to the escalation of American threats, the Somocistas stepped up their incursions in order to create a climate of permanent insecurity in the border
Fearing that a military escalation might lead to a war with Honduras and be a pretext for an invasion of the. Atlantic coast, the Front decided to evacuate all the population from the border area in order to create a no man's land that the Somocistas would not be able to cross. That was the starting point for the whole anti-Sandinista campaign in the Western media accusing the Front of having perpetrated massacres against the Miskitos and the other minorities in the region.
One of the Miskito leaders living in exile, Staedman Fagoth, reported to the US Congress that thousands of Miskitos were i tortured, buried alive, and murdered. Is there any truth in this? In January 1982, ten thousand Miskitos were in fact taken on foot, in trucks, and in helicopters to a new economic development zone a hundred kilometers to the south. It is clear that for most of the population, this transfer represented a real trauma, despite the efforts that
International Viewpoint 15 July 1985
were made to make the trip easier.
"This precipitous transfer led to the burning of a lot of houses and the slaughter of livestock," the deputy of the Zelaya region on the Atlantic coast said. "There are reasons for this. This way, the counterrevolutionists established in Honduras, the National Guardsmen, could not use the houses or find food. That is understandable. But there was a psychological effect. The people saw several years of work reduced to ashes in a few minutes. They wondered if it wasn't possible to take the time to salvage the zine roofing sheets (because for them a zine roof represents a lot of effort)."
However, a creole priest interviewed specified: "I was in the region then. You had to choose between taking them away or letting them die there. At the time, the attacks were already quite heavy in those places, and the Miskito population was caught between the Nicaraguan armed forces and those of the Somocistas. I estimate, when you consider the character of the Miskitos, that it would have taken a year or two to convince them of the need for moving .. and there really was no time." (1)
As regards the rumors of massacre, it quickly turned out that they came mainly from the Mokoron camp in Honduras, Where the Miskitos who had lett Nicaragua in 1981 took retuge. When the Inter-American Human Rights Commission came to do an onthe-spot inquiry in May 1982, only two persons out of 300 questioned claimed to have witnessed a massacre.
A certain number of foreigners (journalists, US congressmen, as well as the Social Democratic former president of Costa Rica, Jose Figures), as well as Moravian pastors, Catholic priests, and a Baptist minister were able to visit the new encampments in Nicaragua. They were able to discuss freely with the population and confirmed that no one complained of mistreatment during the transfer. An American section of the international Helsinki Watch group that had sent a delegation to Nicaragua reported that the government's explanation that the population had to be moved for security reasons was not unreasonable.
The International Indian Treaty Council, representing the American Indian movement, testified to a UN session in Geneva in 1982 that many Miskitos living along the border had asked to be moved in order to escape the forces operating from Honduran territory. Finally, a specialist on Indian minority problems in Latin America, Roxanna Dunbar Ortiz, a professor of international law, declared recently:
"I have never found anywhere the slightest evidence that the Sandinistas committed any massacres or any other crime .. It can never be pointed out too often how much Western public opinion has been the victim of a gigantic hoax. I have visited the prisons, and the noax. I nave visited the prisons, and unle International Viewpoint 15 July 1985 conditions under which the prisoners were arrested as well as those in which they are being held were perfectly legal and humane." (2)
The local creole priest previously cited added: "This is a historie problem a social,cultural, and economic problem. It is an ethnie problem. The counterrevolution made it a political and military one ... You have to realize that the Miskito people don't understand what the National Guard was, what Somocismo was, what the insurrection and revolution represent, anymore than they understand what the counterrevolution is. The Miskitos have never counted in Nicaraguan national life. They have lived for years and years the life of an isolated group, used by the English, used by the Americans, used by Somoza. The revolution has approached this group as if they were Nicaraguans, telling them: We are all alike and we are all going to participate in the movement. That is the nub of the problem."
However this person also said that he was convinced that the revolution had brought enormous gains for the Miskitos:
"The most important thing is to get where they feel like human beings. About ten thousand Miskitos were born with the revolution... That is, they were born to the word. They are starting speaking in their own language, when they were ashamed to before ... It was the revolution that opened up this breach, and the people poured through it. The first thing was the language, which meant dignity, organization was the second step. At this point, the counterrevolution came forward and occupied the political space that had been opened up by the revolution...
"A Lot of people learned to read, but we think that from the time of the literacy campaign the seeds of distrust of the revolution began to be sown among the Miskitos ... The great difficulties the revolution had in dealing correctly with these problems, some errors, and above all the manipulation of the situation by the US government, led to their sympathizing with the counterrevolution, and this became almost a matter of identity for the Miskito people." (3) Sandinistas rectify their policies
Since the time when this interview was done, a certain confidence has been reestablished between the Miskito community in Nicaragua and the FSLN. In particular, this is because the Sandinista leaders have acknowledged their errors: "We are paying for a lot of mistakes we made," Sergio Ramirez said in an interview in Le Monde in January 1984.
The FSLN government has taken concrete steps to respond to the aspirations of the native populations. The stationing of too many troops on the Atlantic. coast as has been publicly denounced, and more than forty soldiers and officers have been sentenced to prison terms for their racist attitude and their repressive behaviour toward the native populations.
An effort has been made to assure that the local security forces are made up mainly of people native to the region. This goal has been achieved. In 1984, local people made up 70%. Moreover, recruits coming from the Pacific coast are systematically briefed before being sent to the Atlantic coast. There is now a militia batallion made up entirely of Miskitos and English-speaking Blacks from the region.
On the social, economic, and political levels, the government has granted pensions to 5,000 former miners on the Atlantic coast who suffer from lung disease as a result of the exploitation they were subjected to under Somoza. The number of clinies has risen from 26 to 44. Some 480 new schools have been established, and industrial projects are underway to improve the economic situation of the region. Finally, the participation pr of the various minorities in the governmental bodies -regional as well as national - has greatly increased. In June 1984, for example, a Miskito woman was elected governor of the North Zelaya region. Autonomy for the Miskitos
But above all, the 1981 Statement of Principles has been made into a Bill of Rights for Ethnic Groups. It is sometimes called the Autonomy Statute for the Atlantic Coast. In this respect Luis Carrion said at the beginning of 1985; "All the steps accomplished show the recognition of the linguistic, cultural, and socio economic specificity of these groups. The autonomy bill is the culminating point of this entire process." (4)
For his part, William Ramirez said: "We have gone from total ignorance to a more or less serious knowledge of the Atlantic coast We think that we have matured a bit. Experience has led us to think, to take cognizance of the concrete reality, and to realize that before 1981 it was impossible to take up certain questions; they were a taboo for us. We were terrified of the idea of talking about autonomy, because we did not understand this problem." (5)
The FSLN's determination to take as liberal as possible an approach led concretely to the release in April 1985 of all the Miskito Indians still imprisoned, including those who worked in the contra groups supported by the US. This decision was in the context of 1. 'Envio', No 31, December 1983. 2. "Nicaragua aujourd 'hui", Nos 9-10. 3. Envio' No 31, December 1983. 4. 'Pensamiento Proprio', No 20, January 1985 Barricada, December 8, 1984.
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the negotiations begun between the Front and the representatives in exile of the Miskito armed opposition to the Sandinista government and of a nonaggression pact on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast that was recently signed.
Both sides are seeking an accord concerning the thousands of Miskitos who are still living in dreadful conditions in the Honduran refugee camp, cut off from their families and their homeland. Recognizing that there are serious dangers of an epidemic at the Mokoron camp, the Red Cross has tried to relocate the refugees in small villages where they could resume their traditional way of life. The population hesitated. Under the influence of some Miskito chiefs, it finally refused.
It is obvious that those who are warring against the Sandinista revolution with every possible weapon have an interest in keeping these people crowded together, in bad housing and hygienic conditions, prey to rumours of massacres. If the Miskito question remains a burning problem, it is because the heart of the region in which they live is a war zone. Over and above the negotiations underway, there can be no real solution to the difficulties on the Atlantic coast as long as the US supported contras continue their aggression against Nicaragua.
oughgoing solution, we are working together on this autonomy plan. And, based on a "popular consultation," we will formulate a provisional plan that the government is ready to accept. Our organization is also working for this and we believe that the support from the people will grow.
We think that in a year or two, all Miskitos will be organized, and that will help a great deal to concretize the autonomy plan.
Q. What is the position of MISATAN toward the Miskito organizations in Honduras and Costa Rica?
A. First it should be said that MISATAN is really trying to fight for the interests of all Miskitos, and by that I mean the interests also of the Miskitos in Honduras, Costa Rica, and the interior of Nicaragua. Naturally, there are also other organizations - MISURA and MISURASATA.
We support MISURASATA's dialogue with the government, because we think that the reuniting of our families is the most important thing, and that autonomy on their lands is the right of all Miskitos.
Q. But both these organizations remain in arms.
A. They have gotten these arms from the US government and with them they have in fact murdered their Miskito brothers and sisters in Nicaragua. It is not in our interests for our brothers and sisters to kill each other. Above all, we condemn the US government that has given arms to MISURA and MISURASATA, and we think that this has to be stopped. We are against the proposal for the US government to give money to carry on the war. We say strongly that that will lead to more bloodshed, more sorrow and tears for the people of Nicaragua and most of all for the Miskitos. We are against the behavior of the people who are following Reagan's policy.
Q. Before, you talked about the need for creating a climate of peace, and you also mentioned the amnesty that was declared by the government. What is the significance of this for the Miskitos?
A. We would have to see a climate of peace created for all Miskitos. In this respect, the amnesty decree meant that people who were outside the country fighting against the government got the possibility to return to Nicaragua, and we got the opportunity to work together with them to find a solution.
The national amnesty also gives us the possibility to concentrate, along with those returning, on solving the problem inside the country. War forced on us from outside means death for our brothers and sisters. Because of the amnesty, people who have a political position can return to the country and discuss with all the people of Nicaragua and the people of the Atlantic Coast how best to solve the problems of the country.
This is also a chance to bring all these people closer to the revolution.
International Viewpoint 15 July 1985