Tensions within the bureaucracy
Since February/March the underground writings circulating in Poland have been increasingly dedicated to analysing the political situation. The vast majority of them are unsigned, or signed pseudonyms. Some have been published in trade union bulletins. Others, like the we publish below, have been pubWe have chosen to publish this text simply be a facade, or a living organisation able to exercise power.
conflict between groups is equally concerned with the question of what repressive policies to
The Jaruzelski group believes that it is possible to have a Hungarian repression to start with to thoroughly society, followed
Thus this group wants to
But we must not forget that the struggle over succession to Brezhnev has now opened. It is a worrying thought that the positon of the Party apparatus here will be strengthened if that group takes power over there.
The other important factor in our internal situation is that although the Party apparatus cannot impose its own views it can block Jaruzelski's initiatives, and will not refrain from doing so.
us to understand the that the junta's attempts at 'normalisation' are running into.
The titles, footnotes, and trans- is proposed by the Party apparatus group. tion of the state of war it is possible to begin an analysis of the political situation which has been imposed on us. characterise it as an authoritarian bureaucratic system supported by the army. This is a well-known political system, particularly in Latin America. In that context it has been the object of many precise analyses. It is interesting to note the difference between the dynamic of such a system in the context of private property, and where, as is the case here, there is state ownership of the means of production.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
STATE AND THE PARTY APPARATUS The disintegration of the machinery of terror is visible to the naked eye. It appears in several ways. The coalition of forces which took the initiative to carry out the coup is in the process of disintegrating. The conflict between the group in the party apparatus and the group, headed by Jaruzelski is sharpening. (...) The primary difference between Jaruzelski and the party apparatus is on what role will be given to the party in the future political system. Within the Jaruzelski group we can see more and more clearly a tendency towards developing an authoritarian bureaucratic system within which the State, and not the Party, will be the decision-making centre. It will be a State based on the army. entail a severe limitation of the power of the party apparatus. This is already the case at the local and regional level, where the party committees are no longer the decision-making bodies.
This is less level where the two groups exist within the same structure. up the root of the conflict in stating that what is at stake is whether the party will institute overall repression, regardless of the victims, contrary to what The Jaruzelski variant entails widespread use of economic as well as political repression, as this is considered to be the most effective means of repressing the
This policy has been much criticised by the Party apparatus which has undertaken the publication supposedly clandestine journal, Workers
This journal presents itself as tradition of the Workers Opposition in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. It has made violent attacks on the Military Council for National Salvation (WRON) in its latest issues. Jaruzelski in particular has been heavily criticised for the whole of the last period. He is accused of reverting to the methods of Edward Gierek. That is, dividing the working class by creating different conditions for different professional sectors and allowing certain islands of tolerance. For example, permitting the publication of several books blocked by the censor. As further evidence they cite his contact with the Catholic Church.(...)
The party apparatus would like to see a trade union stripped of all contact with the opposition. They think it would be sufficient to separate the intelligentsia trom the workers, and then the apparatus of a party like the PUWP could step into the vacant spot. It is indicative that this party faction, which regards Kocioleck (1) as its leader is looking to ideological arguments. Its standpoint recalls the Stalinism of 1948-51: anti-bureaucratic rhetoric, putting the interests of the working class first, egalitarianism, anticlericalism, creating a new culture. use the same comparison, the Jaruzelski group could be compared to the second, bureaucratic, phase of Stalinism of 1951-
The unclarity in the present situation stems from the fact that we do not know which of these groups is dominant. Both have support from different power bases in the USSR. Jaruzelski seems to have more support, witness the welcome that Leonid Brezhnev gave him in Mos-
TENSIONS WITHIN THE REPRESSIVE
The second aspect of the fragmentation and disintegration of the machinery of repression is linked to the political role that the army plays, and the effect of that in its ranks. levels of the hierarchy. At the top the politicisation and factional differences are glaring. In the middle echelons where the military commissars are recruited, the entry of the army into the arena of power has had a strong impact. This recalls the situation of certain military regimes in Africa where the army has penetrated directly into the factories when the indig. enous bourgeoisie was too weak to stand
We can see that the officers have been thoroughly traumatised face to face with stark reality; the corruption of the administration, its incapacity, etc. Our career officers, cut off from real life for years, living in stable conditions in barracks, have received the same shock. Steeped in the soothing propaganda of the regime, they had no idea of the depth
We have the least information about the ordinary soldiers. But we can at least imagine that their morale is low, considering how quickly the discipline of the guards and patrols has broken down, with them looking for informal links with the population and expressing their psychological weariness with the role that has been forced upon them. All this is detrimental to the functioning of army, as a military force, and stimulating discussions within could lead the regime to shorten the of the state of war as far as possible, if only they can find another institutional solution capable of substituting for the present militarisation of the
Kociolek is the secretary of the PUWP in He was one of those directly responsible for the suppression of the Gdansk strikes in December 1970.
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But the authorities do not really want to give up on this as the economic crisis is deepening and we can expect spontaneous explosions.
The third factor of disintegration lies in the tensions that exist between the army and the Ministry of the Interior. These were manifested in the first few weeks after the introduction of the state of war. For example, the publication of lists of internees containing the names of people who have long been abroad was an obvious attempt to make the military look ridiculous. The Ministry of the Interior could have corrected these lists, but did not do so. As we are now seeing increasing replacement of the army by ZOMO (2), which already comprises more than 80,000 men, such tensions could lessen.
THE ECONOMIC CHOICES OF JUNTA The search for a balance between the necessity of keeping the population beaten into submission, the rigours of martial law, the military commissars on the one hand; and on the other the search for rationalisation of the economy constitute another problem.(...)
The solution the authorities have chosen is a very bad one for Poland, and will make final resolution of the crisis much more difficult. But for them it seems to be the only possible one.
The economy has been divided into two sectors. The first is to work on the basis of raw materials provided by COMECON to restore production. This particularly applies to those enterprises and sectors where the production capacity is not fully utilised, but also to certain enterprises which previously produced for the needs of the country. This sector comprises almost 60 percent of light industry, 40 per cent of the chemical industry, naval construction, a part of the engineering and steel industries.
SOLIDARNOSC Z SOLIDARNOŚCIA
LUTY-MARZEC İNPREKOR nr.3 1982,
These enterprises are to use raw materials from the Soviet Union and export all their goods to the USSR. For our country, they will only produce inflation because the wages of the workers will be spent in the internal market. A substantial part of the transport service and energy production will be put to the service of this sector.(...)
The principal measures will be to create a growing dependence of the Polish economy on the Soviet Union. This sector will not simply export its goods there but will be increa ingly integrated into the Soviet system of planning, answerable to the central Soviet management, co-ordinated by Thus, one can talk of increasing assimilation of the Polish economy into the economic system of the USSR. This will also have disastrous consequences on the 'operation programmes'. (3) Not only has the USSR reduced its deliveries of raw materials by 20 per cent in relation to 1981, but it also reserves the right to decide on
This sector, integrated into Soviet management, will have priority for supplies, and the Polish authorities must content themselves with managing what
The second feature of the present economic policy is linked to the need to resolve the problem of Western credits. Western sanctions have removed any possibility of obtaining even limited credits. Given the dependence of the Polish economy on imports from capitalist countries (almost 60 percent of imports come from those countries; that much productive capacity is presently blocked), the only solution is to achieve a positive balance of trade. In that situation, banking practice would allow short-term credit, six weeks to two months. Since it is impossible in the existing conditions to increase exports, it has been decided once again to reduce imports by 30 per cent. That would allow the regime to obtain credit but would create an impossible situation; limiting exports would reduce the national revenue by
The differences show up in agricultural policy. The group puts forward the perspective of fixing import/export quotas and lectivising agriculture. group claims to stand for aid to individual peasants, although martial law has opened the door to the possibility of requisitions.
To satisfy the present needs of the country about 3.5 million tons of grain have been bought up to now. The official figures only cover the grain bought from individual peasants; we know nothing of the deliveries of the state and collectiv-
The possibilities of food supplies from the outside are limited. The introduction of administrative sanctions against the free sale of grain and halt to imports of cattlefood are forcing peasants to stockpile.
It is possible that the USA will lift its sanctions on deliveries of cattlefood to individual peasants. This would lessen the strain. But next year the situation will be as grave, if not worse, because the peasants will not be able to obtain goods for production and consumption. This would certainly force them not to sell their produce. That could lead to bread rationing and a more repressive policy towards the peasantry.(...) Warsaw, March 1982.
The ZOMO are motorised police reserves.
the Minister of the for production The multiplication of these priorities, sult of pressure on different sections of the bu- as a re has already led the government to institute kinds of 'super-priorities'.
Although it is a minority sector, the collectivised agriculture sector covers 20 per cent those in the individual sector, and grain producthe enterprises' use (in Third umerze:
issue of dokumeni: warunki porozumienia narodowego.
TRWA
SOLIDARNOŚĆ Z SOLIDARNOŚCIA
WALKA
Polish Inprekor strony l1 dokument :"sprawa wszystkich ludzi pracy"
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Problemy rewolucji antybiurokratycznej str. 37